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Abstract 
CARL SCHMITT AND POLITICAL CATHOLICISM: FRIEND OR FOE? 
by 
BRIAN J. FOX 
 
Adviser: Professor Richard Wolin 
The scholarship on controversial German constitutional lawyer and political theorist Carl 
Schmitt (1888-1985) has long accepted what can be called a “standard narrative” as regards his 
intellectual development.  This narrative treats Schmitt as, on the whole, a “Catholic” intellectual 
and “political theologian” until the mid-1920s when he turns decidedly towards a secular 
decisionism.  Commentators frequently point to Schmitt’s non-canonical second marriage in 1926 
as the biographically salient factor in dating a turn from an early association with political 
Catholicism to his later nationalist authoritarianism.  This later approach to politics led Schmitt to 
promote plebiscitary dictatorship in the last years of the Weimar Republic and to then readily 
accept the National Socialist regime once it came to power.   
This dissertation attempts to completely revise the standard narrative, which has functioned 
as a procrustean force within Schmitt scholarship.  Indeed, the assumption of the jurist’s 
Catholicity prior to becoming alienated from the Church amounts to a red herring, in large 
measure existing due to the efforts expended in shaping Schmitt’s image after the Second World 
War both by the long-lived jurist himself as well as on his behalf by his students and friends.  By 
reading Schmitt’s texts within the context of his diaries and letters (most only recently made 
available) on the one side, and of the general trends in German political Catholicism and 
intellectual life on the other, a better grounded intellectual biography of Schmitt should emerge. 
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PREFACE 
Carl Schmitt and the Nazi Reich, 1933-36. 
After the German parliamentary elections in November of 1932, forming a stable coalition 
government involving the National Socialist German Workers Party (Nationalsozialistische 
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP or Nazis for short) proved beyond the capacity of Chancellor 
Franz von Papen (1879-1969).  His December successor, General Kurt von Schleicher (1882-
1934), proved equally incapable.  During the week of January 22nd, 1933 Schleicher attempted to 
persuade President Paul von Hindenburg (1847-1934) to declare a public state of emergency and, 
yet again, disband the Reichstag and stall future elections.  He hoped to avoid a vote of no 
confidence likely to occur when parliament reconvened on the 31st.  News of Schleicher’s request 
leaked and on January 26 Ludwig Kaas (1881-1952) wrote a letter of protest to Hindenburg and 
Schleicher.  Kaas was a Catholic priest, canon lawyer, and Chairman of the politically Catholic and 
moderate German Center Party (Deutsche Zentrumspartei, or Center for short).  In his letter Kaas 
emphatically writes: 
Just as I already strongly expressed myself against the entire relativizing tendencies of Karl Schmitt [sic] and 
his henchmen towards national law, so I can in this case only give the most forceful warning against resorting 
to a path whose justification is legally impossible.  The suspension of the election date would be an 
undeniable violation of the constitution . . .
1
 
 
The prelate refers here by name to a professor of constitutional law then at the University of 
Berlin, Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), who had recently risen to prominence as an advisor to Papen 
and Schleicher.
2
  He is also the subject of this study. 
Schmitt had been skeptical of the Republic’s long-term chances for survival from its 
inauspicious beginning in 1918 on the post-First World War ruins of the Wilhelmine Empire and 
                                                 
1
 As quoted in: Karl-Egon Lönne, “Carl Schmitt und der Katholizismus der Weimarer Republik,” in Die eigentlich 
katholische Verschärfung: Konfession, Theologie und Politik im Werk Carl Schmitts, ed. Bernd Wacker (München: 
Fink, 1994), 27. 
2
 Papen was Chancellor from June 1 to November 17, 1932 and Schleicher from December 3, 1932 to January 28, 
1933. 
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concomitant disintegration of German monarchy.  A defeated nation, Germany struggled under 
the punitive burdens placed on it by the Versailles Treaty as well as interventions from the Allied 
Powers and dictates emanating from the League of Nations in Geneva; all of which impaired the 
Republic’s sovereign independence.  Schmitt’s skepticism was further fed by the continuous threats 
of social unrest provoked by violent paramilitary factions on both the ideological left and right.  
Therefore, he long argued that the Weimar Constitution’s Article 48 should be understood as not 
delimiting the scope by which the President could suspend constitutional guarantees in a time of 
crisis to restore order.
3
  Schmitt advocated plebiscitary presidential rule modelled on what he 
labelled “commissarial” dictatorship.  Such a form of rule was essentially counter-revolutionary, or 
a conservative (albeit authoritarian) measure through which the President would act beyond the 
Constitution in response to specific internal and external crises only to restore the preexisting 
social and political order.  Schmitt contrasted commissarial to “sovereign” dictatorship in which the 
dictator is himself a revolutionary force wholly disconnected from the political and constitutional 
form of the State as it had existed prior to the crisis.  The sovereign dictator, therefore, is radically 
free to refashion and reconstitute the political order as he sees fit. 
Schmitt had been asked as early as 1930 to submit a legal consulting report on presidential 
rule by emergency decree to then Chancellor Heinrich Brüning (1885-1970) of the Center Party
4—
who happened to lead Weimar’s longest running Cabinet from March 30, 1930 to May 30, 1932.  
                                                 
3
 Schmitt worked out his theory of presidential dictatorship as a possible means of sustaining the Weimar Republic in a 
multitude of works, such as: (as Schmitt-Dorotić), Die Diktatur: Von den Anfängen des modernen 
Souveränitätsgedankens bis zum proletarischen Klassenkampf (München/Lepizig: Duncker & Humblot, 1921); 
“Reichspräsident und Weimarer Verfassung,” Kölnische Volkszeitung, March 15, 1925; “Das Ausführungsgesetz zu 
Art. 48 (sog. Diktaturgesetz),”Kölnische Volkszeitung, October 30, 1926; “Die Diktatur des Reichspräsidenten nach 
Art. 48 der Reichsverfassung,” in Der deutsche Föderalismus: Die Diktatur des Reichspräsidenten, Gerhard Anschütz, 
et al. (Berlin/Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter, 1924), 63-104, originally this was a lecture given at the meeting of the 
Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer zu Jena on April 14-15, 1924 and Schmitt included it in the second edition of Die 
Diktatur (München/Lepizig: Duncker & Humblot, 1928), 212-59; Verfassungslehre (München/Leipzig: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1928); and Der Hüter der Verfassung (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr-Paul Siebeck, 1931). 
4
 Carl Schmitt, Verfassungsrechtliches Gutachten über die Frage, ob der Reichspräsident befugt ist, auf Grund des Art. 
48 Abs. 2 RV. Finanzgesetzvertretende Verordnungen zu erlassen (Berlin: typescript of a report from July 28, 1930). 
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However, the jurist found Brüning’s party independent successors, Papen and Schleicher 
(particularly the latter), to be more receptive to his views on sustaining the Republic by 
authoritarian means.
5
  Admittedly, Schmitt was most concerned with the threat of revolutionary 
Communism during Weimar, and frequently expressed admiration for Italian Fascism or for the 
nationalisme intégral (integral nationalism) of French polemicist Charles Maurras (1868-1952).  
However, he never evidenced a similar admiration in the homegrown National Socialists
6
 prior to 
their takeover.  Schmitt even sought to strengthen the Weimar State by ready participation in 
Papen’s anti-federalist Preußenschlag (Prussian Coup) of 19327 before advising Schleicher, who 
was quite interested to frustrate or control the Nazis rather than give them power.  However, 
Hindenburg refused to disband the government and so Schleicher resigned the Chancellorship on 
January 28, 1933.  Schmitt knew of the resignation the day before as his diary records the 
complaint: “The Hindenburg myth is over.  Beastly state.  Schleicher resigned, Papen or perhaps 
[Adolf] Hitler [1889-1945] comes.  The old man has gone mad.”8  Schmitt’s conservative and 
authoritarian instincts led him to a deep preference for social and political orderliness and security.  
                                                 
5
 Brüning and Schleicher: “found they shared a similar distaste for ineffectual parliamentary politics and a desire to see 
the monarchy restored, but Brüning expressed scruples about the use of authoritarian methods.  He was ‘astonished’ 
when Schleicher pointed out that Article 48 of the constitution provided a legal means of carrying out needed change 
through a presidential dictatorship.”  Quoted from: Helen Lovell Evans, The German Center Party 1870-1933: A 
Study in Political Catholicism (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Press, 1981), 357. 
6
 See: Joseph W. Bendersky, “Carl Schmitt and the Weimar Right,” in The German Right in the Weimar Republic: 
Studies in the History of German Conservatism, Nationalism, and Antisemitism, ed. Larry Eugene Jones (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2014), 268-90. 
7
 See: Reinhard Mehring, “Die ‘Ehre Preußens’ in der ‘legalen Revolution’: Carl Schmitt im Frühjahr 1933,” in Der 
Tag von Potsdam: Der 21. März 1933 und die Errichtung der nationalsozialistischen Diktatur, ed. Christoph Kopke et 
al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), 113-33; Ellen Kennedy, Constitutional failure: Carl Schmitt in Weimar (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2004), 159-69; and Jeffrey Seitzer and Christopher Thornhill, “An Introduction to Carl 
Schmitt’s Constitutional Theory: Issues and Context,” in Constitutional Theory by Carl Schmitt, trans. and ed. Jeffrey 
Seitzer (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 21-6. 
8
 Entry of January 27, 1933 in: Carl Schmitt, Tagebücher 1930 bis 1934, ed. Wolfgang Schuller and Gerd Giesler 
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag Berlin, 2010), 256. 
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So the rise to power of Hitler, the Nazi Party leader, in the first month of 1933 was initially met 
with trepidation and concern on Schmitt’s part.9 
Kaas’ letter of protest first appeared in print on the front page of Berlin’s leading Center 
Party newspaper, Germania, on Sunday January 29, 1933; three days after he wrote it and the day 
after Schleicher resigned.
10
  Schmitt spent the day in a state of agitation after reading the prelate’s 
criticism.  Twice that day he telephoned his friend, Prussian Finance Minister Johannes Popitz 
(1884-1945), who encouraged him to pen a response.
11
  The next morning Schmitt dictated a reply 
to Kaas (also addressed to others, including Hitler
12
) in which he asserted that he “does not relative 
State law, but fights against abuse destructive of the State and Constitution.”13  Leaving home with 
the letter and stopping in at the Café Kutschera, Schmitt learned that “Hitler had already become 
Reichs Chancellor and Papen Vice-Chancellor.  Excited, pleased, happy.  I sent my letter off to 
Kaas.”14  This first recorded reaction by Schmitt to the fateful political event of January 30, 1933 is 
ambiguous, since it is not entirely clear whether “excited, pleased, happy” is meant to characterize 
Schmitt’s reaction to Hitler’s appointment or the mood of the people in the café and streets.15  Be 
                                                 
9
 Schmitt biographer Christian Linder characterizes Schmitt as “deeply depressed” and dismayed that the Prussian 
takeover and maneuvers of Schleicher and President Hindenburg in his “senility” were going to fail and result in 
Hitler’s takeover of power.  See: Christian Linder, Der Bahnhof von Finnentrop: Eine Reise ins Carl Schmitt Land 
(Berlin: Matthes and Seitz, 2008), 304-6.  See also: Gary Ulmen, “Just wars or Just Enemies?” in Telos, 109 (Fall 
1996), 99-112.  Ulmen claims that “Schmitt criticized Hitler at the beginning of the Nazi regime, as reported by one of 
Schmitt’s Jewish students, who was in Schmitt’s seminar when Hitler took power in January 1933.  In private 
conversations, Ludwig Lachmann has stated that Schmitt expressed his distress at the Nazi victory in his seminar in no 
uncertain term, which was consistent with Schmitt’s warnings in 1932 against allowing any party unfriendly to the 
constitution the ‘equal chance’ to compete for political power” (ibid., 104n17). 
10
 Ludwig Kaas, “Offener Brief an dem Herrn Reichskanzler vom 26. January 1933,” in Germania, January 29, 1933.  
Kaas’s letter also appeared in other Center affiliated papers throughout Germany. 
11
 Entry of January 29, 1933 in: Schmitt, Tagebücher 1930 bis 1934, 257. 
12
 Paul Noack, Carl Schmitt: Eine Biographie (Berlin: Verlag Ullstein GmbH, 1993), 160. 
13
 Reinhard Mehring, Carl Schmitt: Aufsteig und Fall, eine Biographie (München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2009), 304. 
14
 Entry of January 30, 1933 in: Schmitt, Tagebücher 1930 bis 1934, 257. 
15
 The least reliable biography of Schmitt is Noack’s.  Noack claims that Schmitt lamented in his diary entry of January 
29, 1933: “So the old man [Hindenburg] is forced to appoint Hitler” (Noack, Carl Schmitt, 160).  Then his version of 
the entry for January 30
th
 quotes Schmitt as having written: “everything was already excited because of Hitler's 
appointment as chancellor.  I sent my letter to Kaas off with a certain satisfaction” (ibid.).  Schmitt’s diary entries for 
these critical events are now available in Schmitt, Tagebücher 1930 bis 1934.  The editors specifically criticize Noack’s 
rendition for having inserted “numerous formulations (conjectures) which are not included in the original” (Wolfgang 
Schuller and Gerd Giesler, “Editor’s Foreword,” in Schmitt, Tagebücher 1930 bis 1934, VIIn2).  Their edition 
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that as it may, Schmitt quickly adapted to the changed state of affairs when it became apparent two 
months later that Hitler would be the Republic’s last Chancellor. 
In the wake of the Reichstag Fire of February 27 and the electoral win of the Nazi Party-led 
coalition on March 5, complete control of the German State was effectively turned over to Hitler 
on March 23, 1933 with passage of the Enabling Act.  On April 1, Schmitt called this act “a turning 
point of constitutional significance,”16 and two weeks later editorialized that it amounted to national 
revolution.
17
  Schmitt’s depiction indicates he understood the Nazi takeover as an instantiation of 
sovereign dictatorship as opposed to the less radical commissarial form he had long favored for the 
resolution of Weimar’s social and political crises.  However, he had now changed his tune; the 
editorial was penned for a National Socialist publication, and in addition to acknowledging the 
Enabling Act as revolutionary, Schmitt also “praises the Nazis for freeing Germany from the 
clientelistic and parasitic ‘heterogeneous power clumps’ basic to the pluralist party state.”18  His 
impatience with what he believed were contradictions implicit to Weimar’s Constitution as well as 
a belief that social pluralism and liberal parliamentarism had undermined the unitary and 
sovereign German State eased his rapid transition to support of the new regime.  Once the Nazi 
                                                                                                                                                             
transcribes Schmitt’s entries for late January 1933 quite differently than Noack as evidenced in these two quotes.  First, 
Schmitt does not reference Hindenburg being forced to appoint Hitler in his entry for the 29th.  Secondly, Noack 
seems to absorb that crucial sentence fragment “Excited, pleased, happy” into Schmitt’s next statement that he mailed 
his letter to Kaas.  Shuller and Giesler present them as fully separate sentences, not necessarily meant to be read in 
conjunction.  It is possible that Noack added into his rendition of Schmitt’s diary entries some aspects of a later 
undated document also in the jurists’ archives reprinted as: “Remembering the 30th January, 1933” in Schmitt, 
Tagebücher 1930 bis 1934, 482. 
16
 Quoted in: Peter Caldwell, “National Socialism and Constitutional Law: Carl Schmitt, Otto Koellreutter, and the 
Debate over the Nature of the Nazi State, 1933-1937,” Cardozo Law Review, 16.2 (December, 1994), 407.  The 
original source is: Carl Schmitt, “Das Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich vom 24. März 1933,” 
Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, 38.7 (April 1, 1933), 455-8.  
17
 Carl Schmitt, “Das gute Recht der deutschen Revolution,” Westdeutscher Beobachter, 46.166 (April 14, 1933).  
Also published in Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, 151 (June 3, 1933). 
18
 William E. Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End of Law (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), 
105.  For an additional example to those already mentioned, in mid-1934 Schmitt acknowledged that Hitler’s actions 
“led beyond the Weimar Constitution,” as quoted in: Caldwell “National Socialism and Constitutional Law,” 399.  
The original source is: Carl Schmitt, “Ein Jahr nationalsozialistischer Verfassungsstaat,” Deutsches Recht, 4.2 (January 
25, 1934), 27-30.  This short essay was also reprinted by a student of Schmitt’s in: Ernst Forsthoff, ed., Deutsche 
Geschichte seit 1918 in Dokumenten (Leipzig: Alfred Kröner, 1935), 248. 
xi 
 
takeover was a fait accompli, to his lasting infamy, Schmitt joined the National Socialist Party in 
May 1933 and actively supported it until his expulsion—very much against his will—in December 
1936. 
When Schmitt decided to join the Nazi Party, he did so with enthusiasm
19
 and quickly 
advanced under the patronage of the second most powerful man within the Party, Hermann 
Göring (1893-1946), as well as from its leading jurist, Hans Frank (1900-46).  Both Göring and 
Frank had admired Schmitt’s work on presidential dictatorship in the last years of Weimar.  
Through his capacity as head of the National Socialist Jurists’ Association and as President of the 
Academy of German Law, Frank named Schmitt editor of the leading Nazi law journal, the 
Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung (German Jurists’ Journal) on June 1, 1934.  Then, in July, Göring 
appointed Schmitt the State Counselor for Prussia.  Schmitt wasted no time in using his influence 
and pen in an effort to legally establish and stabilize the new regime by writing a defense of the 
legality of the Röhm Putsch immediately upon becoming editor of the Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung.  
More commonly known as the “Night of the Long Knives,” the putsch was a series of political 
assassinations of those people Hitler considered a threat to his consolidation of power, and was 
carried out from June 30 to July 2, 1934.  The murdered included Ernst Röhm (1887-1934) and 
other leaders of the Sturmabteilung (Storm Division, “brownshirts,” or SA), the paramilitary arm 
of the original Nazi movement, which Hitler presently feared as too independent and a threat to 
the official German military now at his disposal.  He also had many conservative and nationalist 
political opponents murdered, including Schmitt’s friend, the former Chancellor Schleicher. 
                                                 
19
 While Schmitt did record his concerns over the Nazi takeover in diary entries such as for April 2, 1933, he also 
recorded excitement at the chance to attend a consultation meeting and press event for Hitler with his friend Johannes 
Popitz (1884-1945)—who was soon to be appointed the Prussian State and Finance Minister—in entries for April 4th 
and 6th, 1933.  See: Schmitt, Tagebücher 1930 bis 1934, 277-9.  A doctoral student and then assistant of Schmitt’s at 
the University of Berlin, Günther Krauss (dates unavailable), claims that in the spring of 1933 his mentor 
recommended that he join the Nazi Party “so strongly that it was meant as a command” (Günther Krauss, 
“Erinnerungen an Carl Schmitt – Teil 3: 1933,” in Schmittiana I, ed. by Piet Tommissen [Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 
1988], 59). 
xii 
 
Schmitt’s academic writings of this period, and that of many of his students, engaged in 
debate with rival jurists over the correct way to speak of the legal functioning of the Nazi State, as 
well as formalize and solidify the regime.
20
  He reflected on the new political form of the German 
State emerging after the Enabling Act as a “total state” set to replace the outmoded relic of the 
nineteenth century, the liberal Rechtstaat (Constitutional State).
21
  Schmitt also approved of the new 
State’s guiding principles of “leadership” (Führerprinzip) and a racial form of nationalism to 
provide social homogeneity and an identity or unity between the people (Volk) and the State.
22
 
Schmitt’s effort on behalf of the Nazi consolidation of power went beyond scholarly 
debates, and was foreshadowed in a letter he received from philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-
                                                 
20
 For further discussion see especially: Jerry Z. Muller, The Other God That Failed: Hans Freyer and the 
Deradicalization of German Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 208-12; Richard Wolin, 
“Carl Schmitt, Political existentialism, and the Total State,” Theory and Society, 19.4 (August 1990), 389-416; 
Scheuerman, The End of Law, 85-112; and Caldwell, “National Socialism and Constitutional Law,” 399-427. 
21
 Schmitt began to develop his understanding of the total state in the chapter titled “Die Wendung zum totalen Staat,” 
in Der Hüter der Verfassung (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr-Paul Siebeck, 1931).  This chapter was also published as a 
separate essay under the same title in Europäische Revue, 7.4 (April 1931), 241-50, and again in: Carl Schmitt, 
Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar – Genf – Versailles 1923 – 1939 (Hamburg: Hanseatische 
Verlagsanstalt, 1940), 146-57.  Schmitt’s next treatment of the concept is found in a lecture delivered several times in 
the fall and winter of 1932-3 and published as “Weiterentwicklung des totalen Staats in Deutschland,” Europäische 
Revue, 9.2 (February 1933), 65-70.  This was also reprinted in Positionen und Begriffe, 185-9, as well as in: Carl 
Schmitt, Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924 – 1954: Materialen zu einer Verfassungslehre (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1958), 359-66.  The final work on the total state by Schmitt was a lecture given on February 5, 
1937 and published as: “Totaler Feind, totaler Krieg, totaler Staat” Völkerbund und Völkerrecht, 4 (1937), 139-45.  It 
was reprinted in Positionen und Begriffe, 235-9, as well as: Carl Schmitt, Frieden oder Pazifismus?: Arbeiten zum 
Völkerrecht und zur internationalen Politik 1924-1978, ed. by Günter Maschke (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005), 
481-507.  All three of these essays can be found in English in: Carl Schmitt, Four Articles: 1931-1938, ed. and trans. 
Simona Draghici (Corvallis, OR: Plutarch Press, 1999).  An excellent summation of Schmitt’s views on the 
development of the pejorative “quantitative” to a “qualitative” total state, which he favors, is found in: Muller, Other 
God That Failed, 210-11. 
22
 See especially: Carl Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk: Die Dreigliederung der politischen Einheit (Hamburg: 
Hanseatische Verlangsanstalt, 1933).  This text also appeared in part under the title “Führertum als Grundbegriff des 
nationalsozialistischen Rechts,” Europäische Revue, 9.11 (November 1933), 676-9, and is available in English as State, 
Movement, People: The Triadic Structure of the Political Unity, ed. and trans. Simona Draghici (Corvallis, OR: 
Plutarch Press, 2001).  See also his: “Reich—Staat—Bund,” lecture given on June 20, 1933 at the University of Köln, 
available in Positionen und Begriffe, 190-8; an editorial “Das gute Recht der deutschen Revolution,” Westdeutscher 
Beobachter, 46.166 (April 14, 1933), also in Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, 151 (June 3, 1933); and Fünf Leitsätze 
für die Rechtspraxis (Berlin: Deutsche Rechts und Wirtschafts-Wissenschaft Verlags-Gesellschaft m. b. H., 1933), 
which was reprinted in Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses vom 14, Juli 1933, mit Auszug aus dem 
Gesetz gegen gefährliche Gewohnheitsverbrecher und über Maßregeln der Sicherung und Besserung vom 24. 
November 1933, ed. by Arthur Gütt et al. (München: J. F. Lehmanns, 1934), 201-2, as well as published as “Neue 
Leitsätze für die Rechtspraxis,” Juristische Wochenschrift, 42.50 (December 16, 1933), 2793-4, and Deutsches Recht, 
3 (1933), 201-2, and finally as “Das Jahr des Rechts” Sonntag-Morgen (January 7, 1934), 3. 
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1976) in August 1933.  Schmitt had sent Heidegger a copy of the second edition of his book, The 
Concept of the Political,
23
 and the philosopher’s thank you note expresses the hope the jurist will 
lend him his: “decisive cooperation when it comes to reconstituting the Law Faculty [of the 
University of Freiburg] as a whole from within in accordance with its scientific and educational 
program.”24  Schmitt did indeed engage in practical efforts at normalizing the Nazi regime such as 
Heidegger mentions.  For, in 1935 Schmitt lectured and published in defense of the Nuremberg 
Laws on racially classifying Jews and denying German citizenship to all non-“Aryans.”25  Then, in 
October 1936, the jurist organized a conference for the National Socialist Lawyers’ Association in 
which the participants discussed eradication of the “Jewish Spirit” from German jurisprudence.26 
Despite these efforts in support of the regime Schmitt was ultimately looked on with 
suspicion by the methodically paranoid elements tasked with the internal security of the Nazi Party 
and Germany’s developing Führerstaat, namely, the Shutzstaffel (Protection Squad, or SS).  Under 
the direction of Heinrich Himmler (1900-45) the SS had grown from a small paramilitary unit for 
the security of Hitler to control, by 1936, the entirety of Nazi Germany’s police forces and security 
services, both internal and State.  Schmitt’s pre-1933 associations (including friendships with Jews), 
his lack of any expressed National Socialist ideological sympathies or efforts on behalf of the Nazi 
Party before joining them, as well as having been widely considered a supporter of “political 
Catholicism” and the Center Party, opened him up to the machinations of competitors seeking 
                                                 
23
 Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1933). 
24
 Martin Heidegger, “Heidegger and Schmitt: the Bottom Line,” Letter of August 22, 1933, translator uncredited, 
Telos, 72 (Summer 1987), 132.  Heidegger had just been named the university’s Rector. 
25
 See: Carl Schmitt, “Die nationalsozialistische Gesetzgebung und der Vorbehalt des ‘ordre public’ im Internationalen 
Privatrecht,” Zeitschrift der Akademie für Deutsches Recht, 3.4 (1936), 204-11; and “Die Verfassung der Freiheit,” 
Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, 40.19 (October 1, 1935), 1133-5, available in English as “The Constitution of Freedom,” in 
Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis, eds. Arthur J. Jacobson and Bernhard Schlink, trans. Belinda Cooper (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001), 323-5. 
26
 For further detail, see: Raphael Gross, Carl Schmitt and the Jews: The “Jewish Question,” the Holocaust, and 
German Legal Theory, trans. Joel Golb (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), 68-76; Bernd 
Rüthers, Carl Schmitt im Dritten Reich: Wissenschaft als Zeitgeist-Verstärkung? (München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1990); 
and William Scheuerman, “Legal Indeterminacy and the Origins of Nazi Legal Thought: The Case of Carl Schmitt,” 
History of Political Thought, 17.4 (1996), 571-90. 
xiv 
 
advancement within the Nazi legal profession.  Such competitors included Reinhard Höhn (1904-
2000) and Otto Koellreutter (1883-1972) and they successfully fed the SS’s paranoid suspicions.27  
As a result, in December of 1936 Schmitt was denounced as an “opportunist Catholic rooted in a 
Hegelian concept of the state” in a leading SS publication and quickly driven from the Party and 
his post as editor of Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung; although he retained his professorship and (largely) 
symbolic role as a Prussian councilor.
28
 
 
Impact of Schmitt’s Nazism on Scholarly Exegesis. 
Schmitt’s period of Nazi involvement gives rise to a number of possible methodological 
pitfalls when analyzing his early works, the primary one of which is an a priori reductivism to one 
or the other of apologetics or prosecution.  Closely associated with such polemics is the temptation 
to a synchronic or artificially teleological approach to the interpretation of Schmitt’s life and 
thought.  If one seeks a possibly more familiar point of comparison, the situation for Schmitt 
scholarship is much the same as that on Heidegger.
29
  Like with Heidegger, the constrictive dangers 
                                                 
27
 Otto Koellreutter attacked Schmitt and his students in: Volk und Staat in der Weltanschauung des 
Nationalsozialismus (Berlin: Pan Verlagsgesellschaft, 1935), 6-11; and “Letter to the Editor” Junge Front (February 5, 
1934).  For more on the polemical battles between rival schools of Nazi jurisprudence see: Caldwell, “National 
Socialism and Constitutional Law,” 399-427.  Joseph Bendersky stresses the attacks on Schmitt that his former student 
Waldemar Gurian published in his anti-Nazi journal published as an émigré out of Switzerland, in Carl Schmitt: 
Theorist for the Reich (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 229.  Gurian’s journal was titled Deutsche Briefe, 
and his anti-Schmitt articles include: “Carl Schmitt schafft den Menschen ab” (December 13, 1935); “Ein 
Bolschewistenfreund als Nationalsozialistischer Kronjurist” (March 13, 1936); “Der NS Kronjurist Carl Schmitt über 
das Plebiszit” (April 3, 1936); “Carl Schmitt gegen Carl Schmitt” (May 22, 1936); “Der Fall Eschweiler, Das Opfer 
Carl Schmitts” (June 19, 1936); and “Staatsrat Carl Schmitt” (October 9, 1936).  They have been collected in: 
Waldemar Gurian, Deutsche Briefe 1934-1938: ein Blatt der katholischen Emigration, ed. Heinz Hürten (Mainz: 
Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1969). 
28
 William Hooker, Carl Schmitt’s International Thought: Order and Orientation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 37n10.  The anonymous articles denouncing him were: “Eine peinliche Ehrenrettung,” Das Schwarze 
Korps, (December 3, 1936), 14; and “Es wird noch immer peinlicher,” Das Schwarze Korps (December 10, 1936), 2.  
The chief ideologist of the Nazi Party, Alfred Rosenberg (1893-1946) also joined in the denunciation of Schmitt with: 
“Totaler Staat,” Völkischer Beobachter (January 9, 1934) and a January 8, 1937 report Amt Rosenberg placed in 
Schmitt’s police dossier which has been published by Günter Maschke as “Das ‘Amt Rosenberg’ gegen Carl Schmitt: 
Ein Dokument aus dem Jahr 1937,” Zweite Etappe (October 1988), 96-111. 
29
 Although Heidegger student Karl Löwith (1897-1973) may deserve the credit for first addressing the relationship 
between Heidegger’s thought and Nazism in his book Heidegger: Denker in dürftiger Zeit (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 1960), the cottage industry that has arisen in the last few decades was primarily spurred on by the 
xv 
 
of apology or polemic can be encountered within the three most common explanations for 
Schmitt’s support of Nazism: as “opportunism”; “an episodic aberration”; or “a logical culmination 
of a pre-Fascist trajectory.”30 
Scholars more inclined to defend or apologize for Schmitt’s Nazi collaboration gravitate 
towards the first two explanations above.  They are greatly aided by the fact that the jurist’s most 
productive intellectual period pre-dates 1933 and largely coincides with the Weimar Era.  Schmitt 
was forty-four years old at the time he joined the Nazi Party, a time when Hitler’s seizure of the 
German State had already occurred.  The large influx of new applicants accepted into the Nazi 
Party in May of 1933 were “strewn no palm leaves,” and Hitler “once spoke of ‘the not particularly 
respected vintage 1933 in the movement’” to indicate the suspected opportunism of such Johnny-
come-latelies.
31
  However, a point, which has come to be overwhelmingly accepted—and lends 
credence to the third explanation for his Nazism—is that Schmitt held strongly anti-Semitic views 
his entire life.
32
  The evidence of his racism has been the biggest factor in reducing the appearance 
of strong apologias on Schmitt’s behalf in recent years since it clearly makes the Nazi ideology 
seem less innately repugnant to scholarly perception of the jurist’s character and beliefs.  The 
explanations of “opportunism,” or “aberration,” are now more typically accepted by those not 
                                                                                                                                                             
publication in France of Victor Farias’s Heidegger et le nazisme, trans. Myriam Benarroch and Jean-Baptiste Grasset 
(Paris: Verdier, 1987).  Other major titles in this discussion include: Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being: The 
Political Thought of Martin Heidegger (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Richard Wolin, ed., The 
Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990); and Emmanuel Faye, Heidegger, 
l’Introduction du Nazisme dans la Philosophie: Autor des Séminaires inédits de 1933-1935 (Paris: Albin Michel, 
2005).  With the first volumes of Heidegger’s “Black Notebooks” recently being published it seems that l’affaire 
Heidegger will not run its course for some time yet to come.  Yet, it is noteworthy that the active public service in 
support of the Nazi regime lasted for roughly a third of the length of time in the case of Heidegger as it did for 
Schmitt.  
30
 Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy: an Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt (London: Verso, 2000), 7. 
31
 Krauss, “Erinnerungen an Carl Schmitt,” 59.  Schmitt’s membership in the party is dated as May 1, which matches 
that of three of his friends employed as professors at Braunsberg’s State Academy.  These colleagues include the 
“brown-priests” Hans Barion (1899-1973) and Karl Eschweiler (1886-1936) as well as Church historian Joseph Lortz 
(1887-1975).  Although it is possible that they all entered the Nazi Party on that exact date as a form of protest against 
the Communists, Krauss indicates that due to the high volume of new applications in the month all membership cards 
issued were by default dated to the 1
st
.   
32
 His anti-Semitism has been quite decisively catalogued in Gross, Carl Schmitt and the Jews, 68-76. 
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looking to apologize for or defend Schmitt as much as seeking to bracket off his Nazi collaboration 
in their interest in reviewing, debating, or even appropriating specific ideas or texts.  This is most 
frequently the case for academics interested in critically discussing political liberalism, whether 
from a perspective of the right or left.
33
 
The third option appeals to the harshest critics of Schmitt who are inclined to see any 
utilization of his thought as the adoption of “fruit of a poisoned tree.”34  However, it is easy to see 
the philosophical danger of an artificial teleology if one takes too doctrinaire a judgmental 
approach to Schmitt.  Biography might seem to be destiny from the a posteriori perspective of 
historical hindsight; but if one holds to some version of philosophical anthropology that accepts the 
freedom of human will and judgment (whether of a compatibilist or libertarian sort) history 
becomes more open.  The human person as historical agent is site of the interplay and confluence 
from one direction of contingency and deliberate choice; while from the other direction arrives 
necessity and constraint both internal (habitual) and external to the agent. 
For the purposes of this study I wish to be understood as attempting to split the difference.  
Like his critics, I favor the view that Schmitt’s Nazi involvement was a “logical” outcome of the 
manner in which his thought and personality developed through the Wilhelmine and Weimar 
eras.  However, I by no means believe that the outcome was “necessary” given my subscription to a 
compatibilist philosophical anthropology.  Therefore, I am not persuaded by the harshest critics of 
                                                 
33
 For example, see: George Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl 
Schmitt between 1921 and 1936 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989); Paul Edward Gottfried, Carl Schmitt: Politics 
and Theory (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990); Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (New York: Verso, 
1998); and Kam Shapiro, Carl Schmitt and the Intensification of Politics (New York: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2008). 
34
 Understandably, certain scholars who seek to defend political liberalism are most likely to take this dim view of 
Schmitt.  Examples of works taking this approach include: Jürgen Fijalkowski, Die Wendung zum Führerstaat: 
Ideologische Komponenten in der politischen Philosophie Carl Schmitts (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1958; 
Christian Graf von Krockow, Die Entscheidung: Eine Untersuchung über Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt und Martin 
Heidegger (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1958); Stephen Holmes, Anatomy of Antiliberalism (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1993); Wolin, “Schmitt, Political existentialism, and the Total State”; and Mark Lilla, The 
Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics (New York: The New York Review of Books, 2001). 
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Schmitt that one cannot, if so inclined, engage in a decontextualized analysis, or even an 
appropriation, of the jurist’s views.  In a letter of 1930, Schmitt’s friend, the conservative nationalist 
novelist Ernst Jünger (1895-1998) described Schmitt’s thought—specifically in The Concept of the 
Political—as a “mine that explodes silently.”35  This is an apt description and one that I believe can 
be applied to his works more generally.  Despite its applicability, however, it does not follow that to 
enter the “minefield” of Schmitt’s thought and life is to necessarily invite the same warning Dante 
found inscribed over the gates of Hell. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 See the letter of Ernst Jünger to Carl Schmitt of October 14, 1930 in: Horst Mühleisen, “Die Beziehungen zwischen 
Carl Schmitt und Ernst Jünger (zugleich em Dokument ihrer Freundschaft) - Ein Versuch,” in Schmittiana I, ed. Piet 
Tommissen (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1988), 110. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
The Standard Narrative in Schmitt Scholarship 
“If I had not known that [Carl Schmitt] was Catholic, he would have probably not seemed 
to be such to me.”36—Armin Mohler. 
 
German legal and political theorist Carl Schmitt’s (1888-1985) thought holds a great deal of 
interest to scholars in multiple academic disciplines, both in itself and in context, as his career 
spanned the most tumultuous decades of German history.  The ill-repute Schmitt garnered by his 
collaboration with the Third Reich from 1933-36 has, however, necessarily cast a long shadow 
backwards and forwards over the entirety of his life and work.  Scholars in all disciplines are forced 
to tackle the origins of his thought and personal background to an extent usually typical only for 
intellectual historians.  Unfortunately, there long existed a negligible amount of contemporaneous 
primary source material beyond Schmitt’s published writings from which scholars could shape an 
understanding of his intellectual formation pre-1933.  The first three substantial Schmitt 
biographies all reflect this dearth.
37
  While Aristotle may not have been entirely correct that nature 
abhors a void, historical scholarship typically does.  It was thus unsurprising for scholars to 
combine claims from Schmitt’s postwar autobiographical recollections with an extrapolation from 
the larger social, regional, and confessional milieu from which he emerged into what I call the 
“standard narrative.”  This narrative fills in the vacuum of Schmitt’s early years and intellectual 
development with a presumption of his Catholicity.  It presents Schmitt as a “Catholic intellectual,” 
even a proponent of “political Catholicism”38 until the later Weimar years.   
                                                 
36
 Armin Mohler, “Carl Schmitt und die ‘Konservative Revolution,’” in Complexio Oppositorum: Über Carl Schmitt, 
ed. Helmut Quaritsch (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1988), 144. 
37
 Bendersky, Theorist for the Reich; Noack, Carl Schmitt; and Andreas Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt: sein Aufsteig 
zum “Kronjuristen des Dritten Reiches” (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995). 
38
 For example, political scientist Ellen Kennedy holds to the standard narrative when she claims: “In the first years of 
the Weimar Republic Carl Schmitt was closely identified with political Catholicism” (Ellen Kennedy, “Introduction: 
Carl Schmitt’s Parlamentarismus in Its Historical Context,” to The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, by Carl 
2 
 
The standard narrative runs through the greater portion of secondary scholarship on 
Schmitt as there is broad agreement—despite numerous individual variations—that confessional and 
theological considerations are decisive for coming to terms with, at least, Schmitt’s first several 
decades of intellectual development and work, if not his entire oeuvre.  The primary objective of 
my study is to undermine this narrative by constructing what I believe to be a more accurate, and 
hopefully illuminating, intellectual and historical counter-portrait of Schmitt as a secular-minded 
and decidedly modern political theorist.  I contend that Schmitt in the Wilhelmine and Weimar 
eras was motivated neither by personally held Catholic beliefs, nor even particularly concerned 
with appearing to be a Catholic intellectual.  Therefore, a quick review is in order of the manner in 
which the standard narrative features in the first Schmitt intellectual biography—and for twenty-six 
years the best—political scientist Joseph Bendersky’s Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich.  
 
Theorist for the Reich and the Standard Narrative 
Theorist for the Reich was published in 1983—two years before the controversial jurist’s 
death
39
, and has aged remarkably well.  Even today it is likely the biographical source most 
frequently cited in English language Schmitt scholarship.  Since it was only arguably overtaken for 
pride of place amongst Schmitt biographies in 2009 when Reinhard Mehring’s Carl Schmitt: 
Aufstieg und Fall
40
first appeared, Theorist for the Reich is likely the most influential single source 
for promulgating the standard narrative.  Bendersky structured Theorist for the Reich around the 
historically contextual placement of Schmitt’s political and legal thought and quite properly 
                                                                                                                                                             
Schmitt, trans. by Ellen Kennedy [Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985], xiv).  The basis for her claim is Schmitt’s 
Roman Catholicism and Political Form, and his “close contact with Catholic political and intellectual circles [that] had 
made him by 1926 the leading exponent of the Catholic view among German jurists” (ibid).  Yet, she fails to explain 
what the “Catholic view” consisted in. 
39
 It surely was a most daunting task to write an objective and rigorous biography of a subject who was yet alive, 
especially one as problematic as Schmitt, and Bendersky deserves great credit for his scholarly achievement. 
40
 Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall. 
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emphasizes his subject as first and foremost a German academic jurist.  He depicts Schmitt as a 
significant and presumptively sincere Catholic intellectual through the early years of the Weimar 
Republic based on evidences culled from three basic directions: Schmitt’s personal background as 
a Catholic Rhinelander; his Weimar connections to Catholic intellectuals, publishers, academics, 
and Center Party politicians or activists; and the presence in his early writings of some concepts 
and terms borrowed from theology as well as direct references to Catholic thinkers.  
On his family background Bendersky stretches into a reasonable presumption of Schmitt’s 
Catholicity a number of raw facts known to scholars at the time.  These facts include: Schmitt’s 
father was a lifelong supporter of the Center Party; the jurist had three great uncle priests who lived 
through Bismarck’s Kulturkampf; his mother desired her eldest son become a priest; he always 
identified himself with his Rhenish and more specifically Franco-German heritage from the 
Moselle region.
41
  Bendersky also accepted Schmitt’s postwar recollection that he had navigated the 
secularizing influences of early twentieth century German education “with his faith undaunted and 
he never lost his deeply rooted aversion to materialistic philosophies.”42  Counter-evidence to 
Schmitt’s presumptive Catholicity during these years is primarily understood, by Bendersky, as 
tactful accommodation to Wilhelmine Prussia’s Protestant-dominated political and academic 
realities.  In Chapter Two of this study it will be argued that problems exist for all of the above 
assumptions.   
                                                 
41
 Bendersky, Theorist for the Reich, 4-6. 
42
 Ibid., 7.  This view is echoed by Koenen who treats Schmitt as having moved from out of the “Catholic diaspora” 
into the exposure of “liberal-Protestant Prussian dominated institution[s]” (Der Fall Carl Schmitt, 31) with faith intact.  
After Theorist for the Reich, Koenen’s Der Fall Carl Schmitt was the next most influential work of Schmitt scholarship 
in giving subsequent commentators the impression that Schmitt fit smoothly both by effort and belief in his 
contemporary Catholic intellectual milieu.  Noack’s biography is the least influential of the three earliest biographies of 
Schmitt but he likewise claims that Schmitt’s “life remained conspicuous in its Catholicity” (Carl Schmitt, 16).  Perhaps 
Noack’s most influential view in this regard is that he recognizes Schmitt’s “admiration for [the Church’s] political 
sophistication and institutional dignity” and that the jurist “transferred this admiration to other institutions” (Carl 
Schmitt, 16-17).  Kam Shapiro follows Noack on misinterpreting Schmitt’s interest in institutionalism as a product of 
his Catholicism rather than as derivative of his secular and modern concerns in Intensification of Politics. 
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Bendersky expertly sets the stage for Schmitt’s Weimar-era thought by contextualizing it 
within the jurist’s first-hand experience of the social and political turmoil involved from the outset 
of the fledgling Republic.  The impact on Germany of its military defeat, the subsequent burdens 
of the Versailles Treaty, and its shaky transition from imperial monarchy to republic, made 
Schmitt skeptical and deeply concerned for Weimar’s political prospects.  However, Bendersky 
concludes that Schmitt accepted the Weimar Republic largely because of the involvement in its 
creation and governance by a Catholic political party, the Center: 
When the Weimar constitution went into effect on August 11, 1919, Schmitt was faced with the crucial 
decision of accepting the republic or remaining in opposition.  Unlike the rootless political romantics, 
however, Schmitt had a guide in the Catholic Church-the embodiment of tradition and enduring values-which 
historically had served as a haven in the midst of chaos and change.  The Catholic Center Party, which had 
been an active participant in the formation of the republic, supported the new constitution.  And Schmitt 
found the Catholic involvement in the development of the new order encouraging.  The Center Party might 
serve as a bulwark against more radical trends, particularly those associated with Bolshevism, which could 
lead into unknown spheres of political experimentation.  While not dispelling Schmitt's fears about 
Germany's political future, Catholic participation did help to make the republic more palatable to him.
43
 
 
Bendersky does not cite a source for the above claim but identifies Schmitt with German political 
Catholicism of the Twenties based primarily on the jurist’s connections within the milieu.44  He 
also makes use of Schmitt’s postwar autobiographical claims made in interviews, especially a radio 
interview from the early Seventies.
45
  This interview leads Bendersky to claim that while a professor 
at the University of Bonn (1922-26), “if [Schmitt] displayed any political partisanship at this stage in 
                                                 
43
 Bendersky, Theorist for the Reich, 27. 
44
 Kennedy makes use of Bendersky’s depiction of Schmitt as frequent contributor to Weimar Catholic publications in 
“Introduction” to Crisis, by Schmitt, xiv and xliin4.  Kennedy’s later work Constitutional Failure, puts to one side 
considerations of Schmitt’s “Catholic” or theological thought to focus on his specific temporal political and legal 
concerns since he was primarily a jurist.  This is a common, and valid, approach for a political theorist, however, by 
trying to tie together the entire scope of Schmitt’s political thought by jumping from one text to another (often written 
decades apart) and thus generally decontextualizing his works she does little to reform the flawed standard narrative.  
In fact, she says Schmitt “could accurately be described as a latter-day counterrevolutionary who wished that Rome and 
its church could return a world based on the values of European Christendom” (Ibid., 176); or again: “That Schmitt 
remained a devout believer throughout his life is indisputable; so too are the many explicit (and hidden) Catholic and 
Christian references in his work.  His interest in, and commitment to, Roman Catholicism is obvious in many of his 
early works” which she then lists as Theodor Däublers Nordlicht (1916); “Die Sichtbarkeit der Kirche” (1917); and 
Römischer Katholizismus und Politische Form (1923) (Ibid., 182 and 235n113). 
45
 Dieter Groh and Klaus Figge, “Interview mit Carl Schmitt für die Sendung Zeitgenossen des Südwestfunks (1 
February 1972),” in Over en in zake Carl Schmitt, ed. Piet Tommissen (Brussels: Economische Hogeschool Sint 
Aloysius, 1975), 89-109. 
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his life it was for the Catholic cause.”46  Over the course of the greater bulk of this study I will argue 
against the identification of Schmitt with political Catholicism or the general Catholic intellectual 
milieu of Weimar.   
Bendersky also believed that Catholicism had a deep influence on Schmitt’s political and 
legal thought.  First, Schmitt’s “tendency to view politics in terms of friend and enemy was no 
doubt greatly influenced by his youthful identity as part of a minority caught in a confessional 
struggle.”47  Here, the biographer assumes the experience of having been a Catholic in Protestant 
Prussia in the decades just after the Kulturkampf indelibly shaped the jurist’s thought.  Secondly, 
the standard narrative is made plausible by its apparent fit with a number of Schmitt’s Wilhelmine 
and Weimar books.  Schmitt published three books on legal theory before the First World War 
which are commonly read as reflecting a youthful neo-Kantianism and anti-positivism, or at least a 
generally “normative” approach to the law compatible with an ethically and intellectually rigorous 
Catholic worldview.  Bendersky postulates: 
Neo-Kantianism offered Schmitt a means of synthesizing the dichotomous sympathies he felt as a German 
nationalist and as a Catholic. The dictates of universal moral principles could be reconciled with the authority 
of the state; morality and power, religious conviction and nationalism, could be harmoniously integrated. It is 
not surprising therefore that neo-Kantian thought pervaded his early works.
48
 
 
Furthermore, Bendersky suspected that Schmitt’s lifelong dedication to hierarchical authority and 
anti-individualism, which is already present in these early works, is Catholic in inspiration.
49
  Such 
views were commonly accepted amongst both Catholic and non-Catholic German conservatives—
particularly of the mandarin class Schmitt sought to join—so it is not illogical for Bendersky to 
identify the source as Catholic rather than secular-conservative, although I will make the case in 
Chapter Two that the latter source fits the evidence better. 
                                                 
46
 Bendersky, Theorist for the Reich, 48.  Historian Paul Edward Gottfried relies on Theorist for the Reich to an 
extent for biographical details on Schmitt, however, he correctly suspected that Bendersky stresses too much the extent 
to which Schmitt was a Catholic intellectual or a supporter of Center politics in Politics and Theory. 
47
 Ibid., 6. 
48
 Ibid., 10. 
49
 Ibid., 12-13. 
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Schmitt wrote eight major books in the Weimar era and it is certainly the case that several 
of them can fit a constrained—I will ultimately argue superficial—narrative of Catholicity, including: 
1919’s Political Romanticism with its defense of Catholicism as “classical” against the charge of 
being “romantic”; 1922’s Political Theology and its defense and appropriation of nineteenth 
century Catholic counter-revolutionary thought; and, especially, 1923’s Roman Catholicism and 
Political Form,
50
 which treats in passing the Church as representing and safeguarding European 
civilization as a bulwark against communist Russia.  Political Form truly was the “single work [from 
which] Schmitt had acquired a reputation as a Catholic publicist”51 both then, and since.  For 
Bendersky, it is also the primary evidence of his claim that Schmitt “would defend the Catholic 
cause into the mid-1920’s”52 since he reads it as, “nothing less than a reaffirmation of [Schmitt’s] 
allegiance to the Church.”53  Thus, when Schmitt makes a reference to Catholicism or theology in 
his early works, commentators frequently believe it to spring from a confessional allegiance and 
Catholic roots.
54
  In the case of the afore-mentioned texts I will argue for their fundamental 
secularity and distinct lack of Catholicity in Chapters Four through Six.   
Although Theorist for the Reich is an important source of the standard narrative, it also has 
had a positive influence on scholarly recognition of the temporal specificity of treating Schmitt as 
some form of “Catholic” intellectual.  Bendersky, and the bulk of commentators after him, 
recognize a definite shift, or even break, away from Catholicism within the jurist’s works towards 
decisionism, nationalism, and authoritarianism in his later Weimar writings.  Bendersky believes 
                                                 
50
 Hereafter referred to as simply Political Form in order to emphasize its true subject matter. 
51
 Bendersky, Theorist for the Reich, 50. 
52
 Ibid., 5. 
53
 Ibid., 48. 
54
 For example, when Klaus Kröger reflects upon Political Form in 1988 he naturally found it “notable that Schmitt 
himself came from a German Catholicism in which he of course knew the great social encyclicals of Leo XIII, a 
German Catholicism which had won the Kulturkampf not only in the form of the Center Party but as a significant 
influence.”  See: Klaus Kröger, “Bemerkungen zu Carl Schmitts ‘Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form,” in 
Complexio Oppositorum: Über Carl Schmitt, ed. Helmut Quaritsch (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1988), 171.  Kam 
Shapiro believes the bare fact of references made to “metaphysics” in Schmitt’s Weimar works is enough to 
characterize them as from a “Catholic period” in Intensification of Politics, 21. 
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he can exactly date the change in Schmitt’s thought to the Winter Semester of 1925-26 at the 
University of Bonn.  It was then that Schmitt held a seminar on “Political Philosophy” in which he 
first developed the friend-enemy thesis expounded in The Concept of the Political.
55
  Overall, the 
consensus view on the contextual dating of Schmitt’s alienation from Catholicism differs only 
slightly from Bendersky’s.  Scholars most typically point to the jurist’s civil marriage to Dušanka 
Todorović (1903-50) on May 5, 1926, given Schmitt incurred latae sententia excommunication56 
from the Church by failure to first have his earlier sacramental marriage to Pauline “Cari” Dorotić 
(1883-1968) declared canonically null.
57
  There is, however, general agreement with political 
theorist and intellectual historian Paul Gottfried’s assessment that, “[b]y the mid-twenties . . . 
                                                 
55
 Bendersky, Theorist for the Reich, 88.  The Concept of the Political was originally a lecture given on May 10, 1927 
at the Deutschen Hochschule für Politik in Berlin.  It was first published as an essay in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft 
und Sozialpolitik, 58.1 (September 1927), 1-33; that venerable journal in which Weber’s classic The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism appeared in two parts over 1904-5.  This first version of The Concept of the Political was 
reprinted with essays from Hermann Heller, Max Hildebert Boehm, Ernst Michel and Fritz Berber in Probleme der 
Demokratie for the series “Politische Wissenschaft—Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik und des 
Instituts für Auswärtige Politik in Hamburg,” 5 (Berlin-Grunewald: Walther Rothschild, 1928), 1-34.  Additionally, the 
fifth part was published as a separate article in Germania, 186 (April 21, 1928).  It was finally published in book form 
as Der Begriff des Politischen.  Mit einer Rede über das Zeitalter der Neutralisierungen und Entpolitisierungen, 
(München/Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1932 [given as publication year despite actually appearing in November 
1931]).  This revised presentation included an afterword from October 1931 as well as the essay “Das Zeitalter der 
Neutralisierungen und Entpolitisierungen” (66-81).  This essay was originally a lecture under the title “Die europäische 
Kultur im Zwischenstadium der Neutralisierung” given on October 12, 1929 at a meeting of the Association for 
Cultural Cooperation held in Barcelona and published as an article in Europäische Revue, 5.8 (November 1929), 517-
30.  The second revised edition of the book did not include the conference text and so was simply titled Der Begriff 
des Politischen, (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1933).  All editions since the fifth follow the 1932 edition in 
order to exorcise those elements inserted in the 1933 edition which were most amenable to Nazism.  Additionally 
these later editions cobble together selections from several other Schmitt writings as corollaries.  The details are as 
follows: fifth edition titled Der Begriff des Politischen.  Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien, 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963), foreword from March 1963.  The three corollaries are: “Übersicht über die 
verschiedenen Bedeutungen und Funktionen des Begriffes der innerpolitischen Neutralität des Staates,” 97-101, an 
excerpt from Der Hüter der Verfassung (1931); “Über das Verhältnis der Begriffe Krieg und Feind,” 102-11, a revised 
and expanded version of his essay “Inter pacem et bellum nihil medium,” from Zeitschrift der Akademie für 
Deutsches Recht, 6.18 (October 1, 1939), 594-5; and “Übersicht über nicht staatsbezogene Möglichkeiten und 
Elemente des Völkerrechts,” 112-15,  excerpted from pages 183-5 of Schmitt’s Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht 
des Jus Publicum Europaeum (Köln: Greven, 1950).  Finally, a fragmentary note on Hobbes from Schmitt’s 
participation in a 1960 Ebracher Seminar is appended in these later editions. 
56
 This form of excommunication is one in which the penalty is inherent in and occurs directly from the act itself. 
57
 The Schmitt-friendly participants of the twenty-eighth Special Seminar of the Hochschule für 
Verwaltungswissenschaften Speyer from 1986 also agree that Schmitt’s alienation from Catholicism occurred in late 
Weimar and was of a “personal” nature, an oblique reference to his excommunication.  The lectures and discussions 
from this seminar are available as Complexio Oppositorum: Über Carl Schmitt, ed. Helmut Quaritsch (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1988), here at 171.  To list but a few more examples of the many who agree, see:  Balakrishnan, 
Enemy, 62-3; Jan-Werner Müller, A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 19; Shapiro, Intensification of Politics, 40.   
8 
 
Schmitt no longer concerned himself with the question of Catholic orthodoxy.”58  As another 
prominent Schmitt scholar, political scientist John P. McCormick, put it: “The moral authority of 
Roman Catholicism disappears altogether; indeed, Schmitt formulates a definition of politics 
explicitly and radically divorced from both morality and theology.”59  Over the course of this study 
I will present the case that while Schmitt did indeed drop most of the “Catholic” or theological 
language of his early works from his later Weimar ones this does not actually mark a distinct shift 
as regards the most basic premises of his political thought.  Rather, my contention is the “Catholic” 
references and language of his early works are of superficial interest, and act as a red herring, 
which has long hindered scholarly treatments of Schmitt’s intellectual development and views.  
The jurist was far more a wolf in sheep’s clothing amongst Weimar’s Catholic intellectual milieu.     
The above critical summary notwithstanding, I have great respect for the scholarly integrity 
and uniform excellence of Bendersky’s body of work on Schmitt.  In fact, he deserves particular 
praise on at least two points especially relevant for this study.  First, since I am engaged in a work 
of intellectual history and proceed diachronically, I share his concern for adequate and accurate 
periodization of Schmitt’s thought and actions.  Secondly, he is a strong critic of a major change of 
direction in Schmitt scholarship which I consider to be an updated, yet inferior, offshoot of the 
older standard narrative focused on in this study.  The change of emphasis is referred to as the 
“theological twist” in Schmitt scholarship, as it deals with Schmitt’s religiosity, and will be discussed 
in more detail below.  By utilizing Theorist for the Reich to introduce the narrative I seek to upend 
I do not thereby intend to reject Bendersky’s excellent study as a whole, or cast aspersions its way.  
Indeed, the creation of a Straw Man argument is a very real and present danger for my thesis that a 
flawed “standard narrative” has too much influence over Schmitt scholarship.  It therefore 
                                                 
58
 Gottfried, Politics and Theory, 25. 
59
 John P. McCormick, “From Roman Catholicism to Mechanized Oppression: On Political-Theological Disjunctures 
in Schmitt’s Weimar Thought,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 13.2-3 (June-
September 2010), 396. 
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behooves me to lay stress upon how eminently reasonable the growth of this narrative was in the 
postwar era. 
 
Postwar Origins of the Standard Narrative 
As mentioned above, the most decisive force in shaping the standard narrative was the lack 
of primary resources.  The dearth of source material on Schmitt’s early life long existed for two 
reasons.  First, Schmitt’s unpublished material, his Nachlass, has been effaced of a good bit of 
material dealing with his Nazi years (1933-36) and related to his first marriage (1915-22).
60
  
Relatedly, as Bendersky noted, Schmitt was simply reticent about a good deal of his past.
61
  
Secondly, and more consequently, Schmitt wrote his Nachlass in a unique style of shorthand.  
Johann Schmitt (1853-1945) taught a form known as “Gabelsberger” to his son, but it was already 
old-fashioned when he had learned it in the mid-nineteenth century.  According to one editor of 
his diaries, Schmitt further personalized this shorthand to such an extent, there is, effectively, only 
a single person in Germany with the requisite knowledge to transcribe them.
62
  Thus, study in 
Schmitt’s archives has been extremely difficult for scholars and the publication of his Nachlass is a 
slow and tedious process that has only begun since 2000 to generate volumes from his early years.   
Schmitt was extremely long-lived, dying three months shy of his ninety-seventh birthday on 
April 7, 1985.  After being banned from teaching, as part of the de-Nazification process at the 
conclusion of the Second World War, he returned to his hometown of Plettenberg in exile.  The 
jurist had significant financial concerns after the war since he was not able to secure a pension 
                                                 
60
 Mehring, Aufsteig und Fall, 16. 
61
 Bendersky, Theorist for the Reich, 44.  This was especially true as regarded his first marriage since he made an effort 
to erase any reference to Pauline “Cari” Dorotić (1883-1968) from his archives—not even a single photograph of her 
exists—and in later life would refer to her simply as “the Woman.”  See: Mehring, Aufsteig und Fall, 16. 
62
 Ernst Hüsmert, “Preface,” to Carl Schmitt, Tagebücher: Oktober 1912 bis Februar 1915, ed. Ernst Hüsmert (Berlin: 
Akademie, 2003), x.  Hüsmert names Hans Gebhardt of Eckersdorf (dates unavailable) as the sole qualified translator 
of Schmitt’s shorthand. 
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based on his professorial career until 1952
63
 and his chances to publish were also greatly reduced.  
Schmitt even seriously considered emigration to Argentina to join a close friend, William Gueydan 
“de” Roussel (1908-unavailable) who had fled there to avoid imprisonment for his part in the Nazi 
collaborationist Vichy regime of France.
64
  During these lean years Schmitt was sustained primarily 
by the Academia Moralis, an organization formed by friends, which operated in secret as a private 
charity for his benefit.
65
  In such an inauspicious personal context it is not too surprising that, as 
historian Jerry Z. Muller noticed:  
In the four decades after the fall of the Third Reich, [Schmitt] devoted a good deal of his time and energy to 
rewriting his past, as he tried to convince first Allied investigators and then journalists and historians that he 
had been intellectually and politically distant from National Socialism before and after 1933.
66
 
 
His infamy and ban from teaching exacerbated the mundane problem Aristotle warns us to 
remember, “every one, almost, is the worst judge in his own causes.”67  Therefore, after the lack of 
primary sources, the next most significant cause of the formation of the standard narrative was the 
concerted effort by Schmitt and his protégés to control his image and reshape his past after the 
Second World War.     
                                                 
63
 See: Linder, Der Bahnhof von Finnentrop, 254-8. 
64
 Mehring, Aufsteig und Fall, 488.  Gueydan “de” [he added this article to fake noble lineage] Roussel studied in 
Berlin in the middle 1930’s and published a French translation of Schmitt’s Legality and Legitimacy in 1936, of The 
Concept of the Political in 1942, along with other essays.  He was friends with Schmitt since 1933 and wrote a 
dissertation, that reflects the jurists’ influence, on the development of a strong presidency in Germany from 1918-33.  
During the war Gueydan was the secretary (and possibly the lover) of Bernard Faÿ (1893-1978); the French historian 
tasked with collating and investigating the names of French Freemasons in an effort to single them out as the primary 
internal enemy by the Vichy government of Marshall Philippe Pétain (1856-1951).  See: Barbara Will, Unlikely 
Collaboration: Gertrude Stein, Bernard Faÿ, and the Vichy Dilemma (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 
250n101.  Gueydan also did his part in trying to support the standard narrative of Schmitt as a Catholic by declaring 
him “the greatest Catholic philosopher of the twentieth century” (William Gueydan de Roussel, “Carl Schmitt, 
philosophe catholique et confesseur,” in Schmittiana III, ed. Piet Tommissen [Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1991], 57).  
His reminiscences on his friend were originally published in Spanish as “Carl Schmitt: Filosofo católico y confesor” 
Gladius, 5.15 (August 15, 1989), 167-72. 
65
 Mehring, Aufsteig und Fall, 497. 
66
 Jerry Z. Muller, “The Radical Conservative Critique of Liberal Democracy in Weimar Germany: Hans Freyer and 
Carl Schmitt,” in The Intellectual Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, 1870-1945: International Conference in 
Memory of Jacob L. Talmon, ed. Zeev Sternhell (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1996), 193.  
Schmitt’s efforts at rehabilitation have less to do with the “dynamics of disillusionment” that Muller finds in the writings 
of Schmitt’s friend Hans Freyer (1887-1969) once the latter came to believe the Nazi Reich was failing to live up to his 
expectations in the mid-1930s.  See: Muller, Other God That Failed.  Schmitt did retain his friendship with Freyer and 
even wrote an article to honor the sociologist-philosopher on his seventieth birthday: Carl Schmitt, “Die andere Hegel-
Linie.  Hans Freyer zum 70. Geburtstag,” Christ und Welt, 10.30 (July 25, 1957), 2. 
67
 Aristotle, Politics, Book III, Chapter IX. 
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On his own behalf Schmitt entertained and cultivated protégés who would visit him in 
Plettenberg.  He also participated in his former student Ernst Forsthoff’s (1902-74) “informal 
seminars held over several decades in Ebrach” as well as similar ones in Münster.68  Additionally, 
he stressed his Catholic heritage in an apologia he published, as well as in a number of interviews, 
and an autobiographical vignette left for his bibliographer.
69
  Finally, he attempted to connect with 
numerous intellectuals who had come through the Third Reich untainted, in the hopes they could 
assist in the rehabilitation of his public persona as well as help him find outlets for publishing 
translations of his books.  He had limited success in this last attempt, being primarily rebuffed by 
                                                 
68
 Matthew G. Specter, Habermas: An Intellectual Biography (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 48.  
Forsthoff was a doctoral student in law under Schmitt at the University of Bonn in the early 1920’s and was habilitated 
at the University of Freiburg in 1933.  He was a “member of the Deutschnationale Jugendbund during the 1920s” 
(Muller, Other God that Failed, 211) and at the end of Weimar was deeply involved with purveyors of extreme 
German nationalism such as the journal Der Ring, which was deeply influenced by the political views of historian 
Arthur Möller van den Bruck (1876-1925), and then the Deutsches Volkstum of the Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt.  In 
1933 Forsthoff defended the concept of the Führerprinzip as well as Schmitt’s views for legally establishing the Third 
Reich as a “total state” in an infamous work of that same name.  After the war Forsthoff was allowed to return to 
teaching public law at the University of Heidelberg in 1951 after earlier being forced out of political administration by 
the occupying Americans.  For more detail, see: Muller, Other God that Failed, 211-12; as well as, Stefan Breuer, Carl 
Schmitt im Kontext: Intellekteullenpolitik in der Weimarer Republik (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012), especially 
chapters VII and VII, 173-232. 
69
 Schmitt’s apologia was generated during his postwar captivity at the hand of the Allies, Ex Captivitate Salus: 
Erfahrungen der Zeit 1945/47 (Köln: Greven, 1950).  His postwar diary also dates from this time but was only 
published after his death as Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947-1951, ed. Eberhard Freiherr von Medem 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991).  The primary radio interview extant is: Groh and Figge, “Interview mit Carl 
Schmitt.”  However, Schmitt did a more substantial autobiographical interview in December 1971 as part of an oral 
history project on his hometown of Plettenberg.  Some of the material from the interview was adapted for a book 
project covering Plettenberg’s most famous son: Ingeborg Villinger, ed., Verortung des Politischen: Carl Schmitt in 
Plettenberg (Hagen: v. d. Linnepe, 1990).  It was also known and utilized by Dirk van Laak in Gespräche in der 
Sicherheit des Schweigens: Carl Schmitt in der politischen Geistesgeschichte der frühen Bundesrepublik (Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag GmbH, 1993).  The entire uncut interview transcribed from the original radio recording was 
recently annotated and edited by Frank Hertweck & Dimitrios Kisoudis, “Solange das Imperium da ist” Carl Schmitt 
Im Gespräch 1971 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010).  A few autobiographical details were also made available in 
the interviews of Schmitt by Maoist Joachim Schickel.  The first interview was from April 25, 1969 and broadcast on 
the Norddeutschen Radio in Hamburg on May 22, 1969.  It was published as “Gespräch über den Partisanen—Carl 
Schmitt und Joachim Schickel” in Guerrilleros, Partisanen: Theorie und Praxis, ed. Joachim Schickel (München: Carl 
Hanser, 1970), 9-29; and later made available in: Carl Schmitt, Staat, Grossraum, Nomos: Arbeiten aus den Jahren 
1916-1969, ed. Günter Maschke (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1995), 619-42.  Schickel interviewed Schmitt twice 
more and published all three together as Gespräche mit Carl Schmitt (Berlin: Merve, 1993).  A final interview in which 
Schmitt asserts his Catholicity is: Fulco Lanchester, “Un giurista davanti a se stesso. Intervista a Carl Schmitt,” 
Quaderni Constituzionali, 3.1 (1983), 5-34.  Finally, “1907 Berlin” was an autobiographical essay written in the winter 
of 1946-7 that Schmitt entrusted to his protégé and bibliographer Piet Tommissen on April 12, 1965.  It was finally 
published in: Piet Tommissen, ed., Schmittiana I (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1988), 11-21. 
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the likes of neo-Thomist Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain (1882-1973)
70
 and Christian 
political philosopher Eric Voegelin (1901-85).
71
  His greatest success was with the Jesuit theologian 
Erich Przywara (1889-1972).   
Przywara established himself as one of the greatest Catholic minds in philosophy and 
theology during the Weimar era.  Famed Protestant theologian Karl Barth (1886-1968) believed 
                                                 
70
 In the 1920’s Schmitt had “close contact” with Maritain (Mehring, Aufsteig und Fall, 144); although the contact was 
primarily due to a mutual friend, Pierre Linn (dates unavailable), the translator of Schmitt’s Political Romanticism into 
a French edition of 1928.  After the Second World War Schmitt found that neither Linn nor Maritain would 
reestablish contact with him and his reaction exhibits some of the darkest but enduring aspects of his character, such 
as: anti-Semitism; deep and grudging bitterness; and a lack of remorse.  All are on display in Schmitt’s letters to his 
friend Gueydan “de” Roussel in which he blames without any evidence the “Jewish” Raissa Maritain (1883-1960), wife 
of Jacques, for the fact that neither the philosopher—who he now characterizes as a “wicked and noxious man”—nor 
Pierre Linn will renew contact and correspondence with him (ibid., 56-7).  In one letter blaming Raissa Schmitt even 
characterizes her as exploiting the French Catholic novelist Léon Bloy (1846-1917) for propagandistic purposes (ibid.).  
Tommissen points out that Schmitt had apparently read the first volume of Raissa’s autobiographical chronicles of the 
early twentieth century French Catholic revival, Les Grandes Amitiés (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1941), which goes 
into detail on Jacques and her friendship with Bloy and ends with the novelist’s death.  Bloy had authored a book, Le 
Salut par les Juifs (Salvation through the Jews) which was pivotal in the conversion of Raissa from atheism.  It is quite 
possible that Raissa’s personal story of conversion which strongly identified with the Jewish Christ was anathema to 
Schmitt’s Gnostic anti-Jewish interpretation of Christianity, which shall be discussed in Chapter Two.  Despite 
Schmitt’s bitterness towards them, the Maritain’s case for beatification as paradigm of a holy marriage is currently 
under consideration by the Church. 
71
 Voegelin’s two letters to Schmitt definitely suggest the jurist sought assistance in getting his writings published in 
English.  They are found in: Eric Voegelin, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, Volume 30: Selected 
Correspondence 1950-1984, ed. Thomas A. Hollweck, trans. Sandy Adler, et al. (Columbia, MO: University of 
Missouri Press, 2007), 88-90, 249-50.  Voegelin was clearly uninterested in helping Schmitt or developing a close 
association as he waited months before responding to either of the jurist’s letters and depicts himself as extremely busy 
in both.  He also avoids making too many statements, let alone questions, that would elicit further correspondence.  In 
fact, Voegelin’s first reply of May 8, 1951, is a full year after receipt of Schmitt’s initial letter to him.  This letter 
provides an indication of the extent to which Schmitt was still interested after the war in the impact of Judaism on 
political and legal thought given that Voegelin discusses his views on Jean Bodin (1530-1596) in great detail.  Schmitt 
had apparently been trying to ferret out what in Bodin suggests “Judaization” from having possibly had a Jewish 
mother.  Voegelin’s response is to suggest there is too little evidence as regards Bodin’s mother, her ethnicity or 
religion and influence, and so this question should just be left as speculative; but that a far surer influence upon Bodin 
lies in Dionysian mysticism or even Arab thought (ibid., 88-9).  Although Mehring points out that Voegelin agreed with 
Schmitt’s claim that political views relate to fundamental metaphysical or theological views on divinity, even for atheists 
(Mehring, Aufsteig und Fall, 128) he was far more an astute and stringent critic of Schmitt.    Voegelin even recognized 
the necessity of grappling with Schmitt’s constitutional theory given that after the war the jurist: “in spite of his Nazi 
leanings, [was] still the great authority in the matter of constitutional theory in Germany” (Letter to Erskine McKinley 
of January 20, 1959 in: Voegelin, Selected Correspondence 1950-1984, 376-9).  Powerful criticisms of Schmitt can be 
found in a number of Voegelin’s extant letters, such as: May 20, 1950 to Alfred Schütz (ibid. 55-6); November 18, 
1953 to Theo F. Morse (ibid., 183-4); and August 20, 1959 to Robert Heilman (ibid., 392-6).  On Voegelin and 
Schmitt, see also: Sandro Chignola, “The Experience of Limitation: Political Form and Science of Law in the Early 
Writings of Eric Voegelin,” trans. Francesca Murphy, in Politics, Order, and History: Essays on the Work of Eric 
Voegelin, ed. Glenn Hughes, et al. (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001), 75-9. 
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“Przywara was the Catholic thinker par excellence”72 after they engaged in a series of debates from 
1927-29.  The Jesuit was also an early admirer of Schmitt’s work; he wrote a complimentary review 
of the second edition of Schmitt’s Political Romanticism73 and discussed the jurist’s thought in a 
couple of later Weimar articles.
74
  After the war, Przywara praised Schmitt in 1953 as a great 
constitutional lawyer and sociologist “who had to endure anti-Nazi persecution due to his 
independent genius.”75  He viewed Schmitt’s “independent genius” as in having been an “anti-
Berliner Rheinlander, but ‘Prussian after the Spirit.’  In an ‘almost suicidal self-overcoming of his 
Rhenish heritage,’ he had realized in his political philosophy the mind of Spain ([Juan] Donoso 
Cortés [1809-53]) and Prussia.”76  For his part Schmitt wrote a “draft report on Przywara”77 
eventually made public by Schmitt’s secretary Piet Tommissen as well as contributed an article to a 
1959 festschrift
78
 for the theologian.  
Given Schmitt’s pecuniary retirement in a state of public disgrace it stands to reason that he 
and his friends might stress a narrative of his Catholicity; the presumption of Schmitt as a 
fundamentally Catholic thinker is extremely useful when defending the jurist against being 
identified primarily with Nazism.  Efforts to rehabilitate his image in the direction of being a 
                                                 
72
 Francis Slade, “Catholicism as a Paradigm of the Political?” Telos, 109 (Fall 1996), 115n8.  Catholic philosopher 
Josef Pieper (1904-97) was a student and friend of Przywara (as well as critic of Schmitt).  He claims that the public 
series of debates between Pryzwara and Barth was the first significant impetus for fruitful ecumenical dialogue between 
Catholics and Protestants in modern Germany, see: Josef Pieper, No One Could Have Known, An Autobiography: 
The Early Years 1904-1945, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), 67. 
73
 Erich Przywara, S. J., “Review of Political Catholicism,” Stimmen der Zeit: Monatsschrift für das Geistesleben der 
Gegenwart, 55.12 (September 1925), 471-2. 
74
 Erich Przywara, S. J., Ringen der Gegenwart: Gesammelte Aufsätze 1922-1927, 2 volumes (Augsburg: Dr. Benno 
Filser, 1929), 218-20 in volume 1; and “Deutsche Front,” Stimmen der Zeit, 124. 3 (December 1932 or 33), 153-67. 
75
 Manfred Dahlheimer, Carl Schmitt und der deutsche Katholizismus, 1888-1936 (Paderborn: Ferndinand Schöningh, 
1998), 562. 
76
 Dahlheimer, Schmitt und der deutsche Katholizismus, 453. 
77
 Carl Schmitt, “Entwurf eines ‘Berichtes’ an P. Erich Przywara,” in Schmittiana: Volume VII, ed. Piet Tommissen 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 212-18. 
78
 Slade does well to point out the festchrift contribution as well as look for possible influences from the theologian on 
Schmitt’s work in:  Slade “Catholicism as a Paradigm,” 115-16.  The festschrift article is: Carl Schmitt, “Nomos—
Nahme—Name” in Der beständige Aufbruch. Festschrift für Erich Przywara, ed. Siegfried Behn (Nürnberg: Glock & 
Lutz, 1959), 92-105.  It was further reprinted in: Schmitt, Staat, Grossraum, Nomos, 573-91.  Then it was added as a 
corollary into an English translation of Schmitt’s Der Nomos der Erde, see: Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in 
the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, trans. Gary L. Ulmen (New York: Telos Press, 2003), 336-50. 
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“Catholic intellectual” began with his pre-war students; a number of whom maintained their 
academic, legal, or political careers by virtue of having avoided being purged in the postwar process 
of de-Nazification.
79
  From there, the apologetic efforts radiate out from Schmitt’s “regular partners 
in conversation” during his “Plettenberg ‘exile’” who claimed to notice his “personal rootedness in 
the faith and piety of his childhood.”80  Two postwar protégés of the jurist worth singling out for 
their pronounced influence in establishing the standard narrative are Armin Mohler (1920-2003), 
and Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde (born 1930).
81
 
Swiss-born Mohler was a communist in college who then sided with the Nazis once they 
invaded the USSR; he even defected from the Swiss army, moved to Germany and offered his 
support.  Typical for the Nazis, they distrusted Mohler and did not let him join.  After the war, he 
studied philosophy in Basel under Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) and his dissertation achieved fame 
when published as The Conservative Revolution in Germany, 1918-1932 (Stuttgart: Friedrich 
Vorwerk Verlag, 1950).  In the book he treated Schmitt, Ernst Jünger, Oswald Spengler (1880-
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 The afore-mentioned Günther Krauss, for example, claimed that Schmitt was in his final estimation: “Catholic, and 
instantly recognizable as such” (Krauss, “Erinnerungen an Carl Schmitt,” 62.  Krauss wrote a dissertation on the 
Protestant ecclesiastical lawyer Rudolph Sohm (1841-1917) in 1932-33, and then was an assistant to Schmitt at the 
University of Berlin.  He was also a devoted anti-Semite and one of the foremost legal theorist defenders of the Third 
Reich.  Richard Faber utilizes quotes from Krauss as well as the National Bolshevist Ernst Niekisch (1889-1967) to the 
same purpose of suggesting that Schmitt was not a true Nazi due to his Catholic foundation.  See: Richard Faber, “Carl 
Schmitt, der Römer,” in Die eigentlich katholische Verschärfung, 257-278.  Joining Krauss and Ernst Forsthoff in 
joining the Nazi Party were other Schmitt students such as Werner Weber (1904-76), and the constitutional law 
historian Ernst Rudolf Huber (1903-90).  Weber received his doctorate in law under Schmitt’s direction in 1930.  
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and he also became a prominent constitutional lawyer in the Federal Republic.  Huber completed a doctorate under 
Schmitt at Bonn in 1926 and later worked under his professor as a legal counsel to the late Weimar cabinets of both 
Chancellor Papen and von Schleicher.  He frequently published articles reflecting Schmitt’s influence in right-wing 
nationalist journals and after the Nazi takeover joined Schmitt in aggressively trying to rid German legal theory of 
“Jewish” influences.  For an in depth overview see: Breuer, Carl Schmitt im Kontext, especially chapters VII and VIII, 
173-232; also, Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt, 104-5.  After the war Huber served as an assistant to Schmitt for a time 
and had to wait until 1952 before he was allowed to resume an academic life at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau.  
On Weber and Forsthoff, see especially: Müller, A Dangerous Mind, 70-81.  For Huber see the works of Ewald 
Grothe, including: “Eine ‘lautlose’ Angelegenheit? Die Rückkehr des Verfassungshistorikers Ernst Rudolf Huber in 
die universitäre Wissenschaft nach 1945,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 47 (1999), 980–1001; and “Über den 
Umgang mit Zeitenwenden: Der Verfassungshistoriker Ernst Rudolf Huber und seine Auseinandersetzung mit 
Geschichte und Gegenwart 1933 und 1945,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 53 (2005), 216–35. 
80
 Bernd Wacker, “Foreword,” in Die eigentlich katholische Verschärfung, 7. 
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 For an overview of Schmitt’s postwar interactions with a younger generation of intellectuals see: Mehring, Aufsteig 
und Fall, 510-16. 
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1936), Ernst Niekisch (1889-1967), Hans Blüher (1888-1955), and Thomas Mann (1875-1955) as 
various types of “conservative revolutionaries,” but all as occupying a place on the ideological 
spectrum distinct from Nazism.
82
  As for Schmitt, Mohler believed the academic jurist did not 
really fit in with other conservative revolutionaries; rather, his political thought happened to be 
simply influential amongst a variety of right-wing intellectuals.  The Conservative Revolution in 
Germany helped instigate a long-running debate in the literature on Schmitt between those who 
judge him an irrational and völkisch proto-Nazi or fascist “conservative revolutionary” in Weimar 
and those who actually use Mohler’s ambivalent argument as an apologetic springboard.  The 
prosecutorial scholars generally ignored Schmitt’s supposed roots as a Catholic intellectual but his 
defenders (sometimes even apologists) often note that Schmitt’s Catholicism makes him a poor fit 
as a conservative revolutionary.
83
  Instead, he should be understood as a more typical and 
mainstream Weimar Catholic conservative and pragmatic political realist. 
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 Mohler served as Jünger’s secretary from 1949-53 and then ran the Carl-Friedrich-von-Siemens-Stiftung from 1964-
85.  Mohler became a prominent figure of the postwar “New Right” (Nouvelle Droite) begun by another postwar 
student, admirer, and even bibliographer of Schmitt, the French philosopher Alain de Benoist (born 1943).  Mohler’s 
correspondence with Schmitt is available in: Armin Mohler and Carl Schmitt, Carl Schmitt—Briefwechsel mit einem 
seiner Schuler, ed. Armin Mohler, et. al. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995).  For more on Mohler and Schmitt see: 
Michael E. Sallinger, Wege und Zweige: Betrachtungen zu Ernst Jünger, Friedrich Georg Jünger, Martin Heidegger, 
Gottfried Benn, Carl Schmitt, Erhart Kästner und Armin Mohler (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2002). 
83
 Some of the representative works that treated Schmitt as a conservative revolutionary include: Graf von Krockow, 
Entscheidung; Fijalkowski, Wendung zum Führerstaat; George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual 
Origins of the Third Reich (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964); and Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: 
Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).  
Joseph Bendersky provides an excellent review and convincing criticisms of the thesis of Schmitt as conservative 
revolutionary in: “Carl Schmitt and the Conservative Revolution,” Telos, “Special Issue on Carl Schmitt,” 20.72 
(Summer 1987), 27-42.  Bendersky correctly emphasizes Schmitt as a latter-day Hobbesian “realist.”  One interpreter 
who aligns Schmitt with the conservative revolutionaries but avoids most of the criticisms that Bendersky lodges against 
earlier heavy-handed caricatures of Schmitt is Jürgen Manemann in Carl Schmitt und die Politische Theologie: 
Politischer Anti-Monotheismus (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2002).  Manemann smartly places Schmitt in the 
context of conservative revolution specifically despite or against the fact that he is “often seen in the secondary 
literature as a prominent representative of Catholicism in the 20’s” (ibid., 88).  Mohler later revisited the debate to 
make it much clearer that he did not think Schmitt was a conservative revolutionary exactly because of his Catholicism 
as well as his “anti-Nietzschean” views.  See: Armin Mohler, “Carl Schmitt und die ‘Konservative Revolution,’” in 
Complexio Oppositorum: Über Carl Schmitt: Vorträge und Diskussionsbeiträge des 28. Sonderseminars 1986 der 
Hochschule für Verwaltungswissenschaften Speyer, ed. Helmut Quaritsch (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1988), 129-
52.  For a discussion of the apologist implication of Mohler’s thesis see: Manemann, Carl Schmitt und die Politische 
Theologie 90-3.  Purveyors of the standard narrative are too numerous to simply list but they (by my definition) take 
the latter approach of stressing Schmitt’s Catholicity. 
16 
 
Böckenförde is one such apologist for Schmitt in the postwar era who was also, informally, 
his student.  Like Schmitt, Böckenförde was a constitutional lawyer and academic professor; he 
then served as a judge on Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court from 1982-96.  He reflected 
Schmitt’s influence in a large number of his views, particularly in criticisms of liberal political 
theory, and, most famously, on secularization as undermining the homogeneous and law-abiding 
ethical character of citizens.
84
  Germane to this study, Böckenförde was the first in Germany to 
garner widespread attention by criticizing the postwar consensus view that the Catholic Church had 
been one of the best forces of resistance against the Nazi regime.  In a 1961 article in Germany’s 
leading journal for Catholic culture, Hochland, Böckenförde argued that the Catholic Church and 
Catholic thought shared numerous affinities with Nazism; especially a shared authoritarianism 
which explained the ready acquiescence to and even collaboration with the Nazi regime of many 
Catholics.
85
  Böckenförde’s article treats both the Center Party and Germany’s Catholic bishops as 
deeply implicated in the rise to power of the Nazis.  This essay is arguably the first volley fired in 
an ongoing postwar German Kulturkampf over the role of Christianity in abetting or even 
informing Nazism.
86
  A leading Schmitt scholar, John P. McCormick, recognizes this cultural 
struggle as frequently informing prosecutorial interpretations of Schmitt’s Nazi collaboration: 
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 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, “Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisation,” in Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde, Recht, Staat, Freiheit: Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie, Staatstheorie und Verfassungsgeschichte 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 92-114. 
85
 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, “Der deutsche Katholizismus im Jahre 1933: Eine kritische Betrachtung,” Hochland, 
53 (1961), 215–39.  Böckenförde reprinted the essay in Der deutsche Katholizismus im Jahre 1933: Stellungnahme zu 
einer Diskussion (Freiburg: Herder, 1988).  This volume includes his reply to a contemporaneous critical respondent: 
Hans Buchheim, “Der deutsche Katholizismus im Jahr 1933: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde,” Hochland, 53 (1961), 497-515.  The article was also quickly translated into English in Cross Currents, 
11 (1961), 283-304. 
86
 This Kulturkampf is one aspect of the general postwar German process of coming to terms with the Nazi era 
(Vergangenheitsbewältigung).  Böckenförde’s article predated Rolf Hochhuth’s 1963 play, The Deputy: A Christian 
Tragedy, which is typically credited for igniting the “Pius War” debate over the action or inaction during the Holocaust 
of Pope Pius XII (r. 1939-58).  These Pius Wars continue on as the best known and most popular aspect of the 
deeper German historical and cultural debate in large measure begun by Schmitt’s protégé.  The “Pius Wars” are also 
the form in which this postwar Kulturkampf most strikingly crossed the Atlantic.  Representative English language titles 
include, on the side of Pius XII’s detractors: John Cornwell, Hitler’s Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII, (New 
York: Viking, 1999); Michael Phayer, The Catholic Church and the Holocaust, 1930-1965, (Bloomington: Indiana 
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In the intense but often unspoken Kulturkampf in contemporary Germany between those who would blame, 
alternatively, authoritarian Prussian Lutheranism or fanatical Central European Catholicism for the rise of the 
Third Reich, Schmitt is consistently positioned as an example of the latter: a ‘typical’ Catholic totalitarian.87 
 
These camps “reduce fascism to an extreme expression of pathological religiosity.”88  Fascinatingly, 
this cultural struggle also contributes to a defense of Schmitt in Böckenförde’s hands. 
Böckenförde made immediate use of his criticism of German Catholicism in 1933 for the 
purpose of clever Schmitt apologetics.  He included a long footnote
89
 in his Hochland piece to 
differentiate Schmitt from the naïve course pursued by Franz von Papen to place Hitler in power 
while believing he could be controlled, as well as from the Center Party that had helped pass the 
Enabling Act.  Rather, Schmitt had smartly attempted to preserve the Republic by means of 
presidential dictatorship.  Böckenförde also separates Schmitt from trends in Catholic thought 
such as natural law theory, as well as from “Reichstheologie” (imperial theology) and its basis in an 
“organic theory of the state”; both of which he believes contributed to Catholic support for the 
Nazis.
90
  Thus, while Böckenförde chastises Catholicism generally—and political Catholicism in 
                                                                                                                                                             
University Press, 2000); David Kertzer, The Popes against the Jews: The Vatican’s Role in the Rise of Modern Anti-
semitism, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001); Susan Zuccotti, Under His Very Windows: The Vatican and the 
Holocaust in Italy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Daniel J. Goldhagen, A Moral Reckoning: The Role of 
the Catholic Church in the Holocaust and Its Unfulfilled Duty to Repair, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002); and 
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 John P. McCormick, “Political Theory and Political Theology: The second Wave of Carl Schmitt in English,” 
Political Theory, 26.6 (December 1998), 843.  McCormick is specifically lodging this criticism against an updated 
version of what I call the “standard narrative” which I will address below.  This rendition treats Schmitt not so much as 
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 McCormick, “Political Theory and Political Theology,” 843. 
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 Böckenförde, deutsche Katholizismus im Jahre 1933, 56n45. 
90
 The claim that Reichstheologie influenced Catholic support of the Third Reich is plausible, and will be discussed in 
Chapter Nine of this study; but such an argument is inexplicable and counter-intuitive with regards to Catholic natural 
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particular—as contributing to support for the Nazi regime, he is also distinguishing Schmitt from 
both, and hence from Nazism.   
It is noteworthy that this characterization of Schmitt as deeply independent from both 
Catholicism and German political Catholicism fits with the critique of the standard narrative I 
argue for in this study.  Schmitt’s independence of mind certainly finds support in the fact that he 
never joined the Center Party, and, his influence on Weimar politics was most facilitated by the 
last two chancellors, Papen and Schleicher; both of whom were un-affiliated with any political 
party.  Indeed, Schmitt was quite dismissive of the Center’s Heinrich Brüning, Weimar’s longest 
serving Chancellor, despite Brüning’s willingness to utilize presidential decrees to govern.  Schmitt 
remarked in his journal in July of 1931 that Brüning was, “not the last word of German 
Catholicism.”91  However, the apologetic purpose to which Böckenförde puts his depiction of 
Schmitt is problematic.  This apologia depends on Böckenförde’s Kulturkampf accusation against 
Catholicism for indubitably fomenting and leading Germans to Nazi support, a contention that is 
certainly debatable.  It could just as well be the case that the opposite polemical stance could be 
argued for in the case of Schmitt; namely, that his lack of Catholic belief and disinterest in political 
Catholicism made him far more likely to end up supporting the Third Reich.  Indeed, returning to 
Schmitt’s journals we find his statement five months after Hindenburg won reelection as the 
German President over Hitler, that he would rather see the Nazi leader President before Brüning.
92
   
Böckenförde later changed course to align himself more with the standard narrative 
approach to defending Schmitt.  He has insisted that in order to understand Schmitt one must 
recognize that a “central drive” of the jurist’s thought comes from having been a part of the 
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 See the entry for July 24, 1931 in: Schmitt, Tagebücher 1930 bis 1934, 126.   
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 See the entry for September 6, 1932 in: ibid., 214. 
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population for whom the Catholic Kulturkampf was a pivotal influence and “spiritual heritage.”93  If 
that is the case, then the most logical apologetic tactic is to depict Schmitt as a mainstream Catholic 
conservative whose collaboration was unexceptional amongst such persons; it was simply 
something conservative German Catholics did in 1933.
94
  Furthermore, by virtue of his purported 
Catholicism, Schmitt could be defended against the charge of having been a “genuine” Nazi.  
Böckenförde makes the attempt by claiming to “seriously” convert to Nazism one “had to 
renounce Catholicism” and “[t]hat cannot be said of Schmitt, even during the 1933-36 period.”95  
Finally, and further proving his eventual changes of opinion (or mental elasticity), Böckenförde 
stated his agreement with the newest offshoot of both the standard and Kulturkampf narratives 
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“political Catholicism” after the war.  In fact, several years before his Kulturkampf essay he had already published a 
deeply Schmittian article in the same leading Catholic journal demanding that the Catholic Church completely abstain 
from any involvement in partisan politics.  See: Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, “Das Ethos der modernen Demokratie 
und die Kirche,” Hochland, 50 (1957-8), 4-19.  Instead of joining the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich 
Demokratische Union or CDU) Böckenförde has always been a member of the leftist Social Democratic Party 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands or SPD).  Schmitt likewise treated postwar Germany under Konrad 
Adenauer (1876-1967) and the Christian Democrats with total disdain.  He wrote to William Gueydan “de” Roussel, 
in September 1960: “I have read many times your article on ‘Leviathan and Man’ and I . . . still wonder if it is 
unfortunate or rather lovely that it is not possible to publish it in the Germany of the Christian Democrats” (Gueydan, 
“Carl Schmitt,” 57).  Without irony, Schmitt ends his complaint on a note of extreme pathos: “. . . I tell you: 
‘Tenebrae factae sunt dum crucifixissent Jesum Judaei’” (ibid.).  Schmitt’s Latin phrase is a quote from the Catholic 
Good Friday liturgy—“Shadows covered the earth when the Jews crucified Jesus”—here put to the blasphemous use of 
identifying himself as an innocent Christ-like sufferer of persecution. 
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which can also be utilized for Schmitt apologetics.
96
  This newer treatment casts the jurist as more 
generically “religious” than specifically Catholic, and as essentially a “political theologian.”97 
 
The “Theological Twist” within the Standard Narrative 
Schmitt’s Catholicism, and its importance for his thought, was a generally accepted 
assumption in part due to the propaganda efforts of his students and friends noted above, but also 
due to a general lack of interest in actually investigating the theme until after his death in 1985.
98
  
This lack is despite the fact that the last book Schmitt published, Political Theology II, revisited 
one of the jurist’s favorite themes99; a theme in which he is reasonably credited for inspiring broad 
interest among many post-Second World War thinkers.  One such intellectual was Jacob Taubes 
(1923-87), a widely influential professor of Jewish Studies.  Taubes approached Schmitt from “a 
left-wing Jewish viewpoint” but depicted him, in a 1987 book, not as “the Hobbesian decisionist 
the world knew”—and that I believe him to primarily be—but, “really as ‘an apocalypticist of the 
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Counter-Revolution.’”100  Then in 1988 the erstwhile philosopher Heinrich Meier published a 
book describing what he took to be a “hidden dialogue” between his muse, political theorist Leo 
Strauss (1899-1973), and Schmitt over the necessity of an absolute decision a thinker must make 
between faith and reason in order to become either a “political philosopher” or a “political 
theologian.”101  Italian philosopher and politician, Michele Nicoletti, who penned a grand study of 
Schmitt’s political theology and claimed it accords with a Catholic philosophy of State102 joined 
Taubes and Meier in 1990. 
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Such highly speculative readings of Schmitt were bolstered by the publication in 1991 of 
the jurist’s journals, and assorted primary materials, written soon after his post-Second World War 
internment.
103
  Professor of theology Michael Hollerich is far from alone when he claims Schmitt’s 
Glossarium, “contained abundant evidence that he thought of himself explicitly as a Catholic.”104  
The three most commonly quoted passages for the purpose of demonstrating Schmitt’s Catholic 
bona fides are the following; listed in rising order of popularity: 
I believe in the katechon [Pauline term for the “restrainer” (τὸ κατέχων) of the Apocalypse (or eschaton)]: it 
is for me the only possible way to understand Christian history and to find it meaningful.
105
  
 
This is the secret keyword to my entire mental and authorial life: the struggle for an authentically Catholic 
intensification.
106
   
 
For me the Catholic faith is the religion of my fathers.  I am a Catholic not only by confession but also 
historical origin, if I may say so, by race.
107
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All three of these postwar reflections have contributed to the perpetuation of both branches of the 
standard narrative in the secondary literature on Schmitt.  However, the jurist’s first biographer is 
rightly skeptical of purveyors of this: 
. . . most recent trend in Schmitt historiography: the ‘theological twist.’  They argue that Schmitt’s deep 
Catholic faith in revelation and Christian eschatological history are the keys to his thinking and political 
engagements. In the struggle between good and evil, he supposedly felt compelled to strengthen the Katechon 
against the various historical forms assumed by the Antichrist—modernism, Bolshevism, liberalism, pacifism, 
and so on.
108
  
 
For the present purpose of introduction I will only point out that the most significant problem with 
recent approaches in the vein of the “theological twist” is their necessary over-reliance on Schmitt’s 
postwar writings and reflections to read back and impose a narrative of religiosity on the totality of 
his works and thought.
109
  I will make a sole exception for the second quote about Schmitt’s 
“struggle for an authentically Catholic intensification.”110  When understood in a certain manner 
this postwar remark can be used as a description of a good deal of Schmitt’s behavior and writings 
in the later Weimar years, as will be discussed below in Chapter Six.  All things considered, 
however, the problem of overreliance on Schmitt’s postwar reflections returns us once again to the 
void that existed in primary materials; a void that only began to slowly be remedied from 2000.   
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Schmitt’s Nachlass Diaries and their Impact on Standard Narrative 
 
The first volume of material previously unavailable to researchers on Schmitt is a collection 
of the letters Schmitt wrote to his younger sister Auguste from 1905-13; which appeared in 2000.
111
  
These letters were followed by Schmitt’s diaries and other contemporary material covering the 
years 1912-15 and 1915-19 in 2003, and 2005, respectively.
112
  The two most recent German 
language biographies of the jurist are the first to take this recently available material into account.  
They are Christian Linder’s Der Bahnhof von Finnentrop: Eine Reise ins Carl Schmitt Land 
(2008) and Mehring’s afore-mentioned Aufstieg und Fall (2009).113  
As a journalist and travel author Linder’s more literary, even lyrical, approach to 
biographical story-telling—which includes imaginary conversations with the deceased Schmitt—
leaves his work far less influential than the systematic and sober approach taken by Mehring, the 
academic political scientist.  Mehring also had the advantage of having already authored several 
well-respected books
114
 and numerous articles on Schmitt before his magnum opus.  Therefore, it 
is quite just to claim that Aufstieg und Fall—with its deep commitment to archival research—is the 
closest to a definitive biography of Schmitt yet written, or likely to be published for some time to 
come.  Mehring’s great biographical achievement is far more likely than Linder’s to influence 
subsequent Schmitt scholarship, and deservedly so.  However, Linder’s biography does have one 
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feature I consider to be in its favor.  While impressionistically pursuing insight into the 
controversial jurist’s psychological and spiritual motivations, Linder proves far more willing than 
Mehring to break from the standard narrative.  To take here but one example, Mehring provides a 
perfectly correct description of the recently published letters from Schmitt to his sister as 
illustrating “the brother as mentor,” and accurately draws upon their express content.115  Yet, 
Mehring fails to notice the most striking feature of these letters is actually one missing from them; a 
feature that anyone long familiar with the standard narrative presentation of Schmitt would be 
conditioned to expect.  It is left to Linder to point out that when reading: 
. . . the letters of the youthful Schmitt to his sister Augusta, we find no evidence of the often held view that 
Schmitt’s intellectual positions were explainable in overheated Catholic terms obtained during growth in the 
Plettenberger Diaspora.  One detects nothing of a Catholic militancy.
116
 
 
In fact, there is no indication that the author of these letters is specifically Catholic at all beyond a 
reference to the German-Catholic tradition of celebrating one’s “name day.”117 
Mehring had already signaled an acceptance of the standard narrative and its later off-shoot 
which stresses Schmitt’s general religiosity in his earlier work before the archival material became 
more available.
118
  Aufstieg und Fall continues the standard narrative in a more watered down form 
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by characterizing Schmitt as primarily a religious thinker and a lifelong Catholic.  However, 
“religious” is now meant in diffuse, vague, and very personal terms, and “Catholic” lacks all 
specificity as regards actual practice or belief.  For example, Mehring characterizes Schmitt from 
roughly the end of the First World War until the mid-Twenties as seeking to overcome his own 
romantic tendencies as well as his early brooding negativity by means of a “Christian creed that 
negates metaphysical pessimism and Gnosticism”119, yet; this “creed” remains undefined.  Mehring 
believes Schmitt experiences an early Weimar period of renewed religiosity inspired primarily by 
Protestant existentialist philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813-55) and Spanish Catholic counter-
revolutionary Juan Donoso Cortés—the latter of which Schmitt largely builds his political-
theological project upon.
120
  In Chapters Two and Four I contend that Schmitt’s interest in 
Kierkegaard and Donoso does not prove a Catholic, Christian, or simply “religious” revival and I 
will often point to Mehring’s own research as evidence.  Mehring also believes—in further 
agreement with the standard narrative—that a secular-mindset only establishes intellectual priority 
for Schmitt after his remarriage and excommunication from the Church caused him to undergo a 
“change of mood” and a “change of direction.”121  This last thesis of the standard narrative I will 
attack over the course of this study.   
In a private communication, Mehring rightly cautions against drawing strong conclusions 
about Schmitt’s motivations in these early years given the still existing lacunae in primary material 
evidence.  In addition to an honorable motive of scholarly circumspection I believe that Mehring 
also feels a sense of compunction about daring to tread into the inner life of a person’s religious 
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faith.  He would likely agree with Karl-Egon Lönne’s emphatic claim that since Schmitt clearly 
thought of himself as a Catholic “no one has the right to say otherwise.”122  Considered as a matter 
of ecclesiastic law this is certainly correct but also quite an unremarkable truism.  Schmitt was 
always a Catholic, not because of assertions on the part of himself or his commentators, but, 
rather, due to his baptism and the basic principle of semel baptizatus, semper baptizatus (once 
baptized, always baptized).
123
  Simple assertions that Schmitt was Catholic either dodge or simply 
miss the interesting fact that each and every Catholic can still fail to be in full communion with the 
Church, both at specific points of time in their lives or over an extended period.  Nominal or 
merely “cultural” Catholics—as Schmitt most assuredly was—can be more accurately described 
under a number of refining rubrics based on their discernible beliefs and practices, such as: 
“lapsed”; “non-practicing”; “dissenting”; “heretical”; “apostate”; and even “excommunicated.” 
Many recent Schmitt commentators actually recognize the difficulty in characterizing 
Schmitt’s Catholicism.  For example, Gopal Balakrishnan presumes the truth of Schmitt’s having 
“an attitude, more difficult to specify, stemming from a Catholic, petty-bourgeois and provincial 
background,” while still astutely acknowledging that Schmitt remained “a man without 
conventional allegiances or sentimentalities.”124  Even Lönne, who defies anyone to deny that 
Schmitt is a Catholic, admits the jurist is: “Catholic in a very special and perishable, seductive 
manner.”125  Therefore, the standard narrative has perdured in part due to the reluctance of 
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Schmitt scholars to engage in sticky evaluations of the jurist’s heterodoxy and heteropraxy; an 
evaluation most would be ill-prepared to conduct even if they deemed it a necessary or decorous 
task.  Luckily, one does not need to be an inquisitor in the mold of a Tomás de Torquemada 
(1420-98)—the bane of Spanish Marranos—in dealing with Schmitt.  The basic takeaway from 
studying his behavior and words without a presumption of his Catholicity is that Schmitt is simply 
not a Catholic thinker. 
Indeed, I am agnostic as to whether Schmitt personally held to any Catholic or Christian 
beliefs.  He neither considers himself beholden to the intellectual life of the Church nor openly 
presents himself as such.  His interest in certain superficially Catholic or theological themes and 
ideas results neither from a Catholic frame of mind nor even a fundamentally religious impulse, 
rather, from secular motives, be they juridical, sociological, or political.  Schmitt’s apparent 
rejection of metaphysical materialism is as little evidence of his religious bona fides as it is for 
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900).   
With some thinkers, the historian can use social factors to assume their beliefs.  This 
approach really does not work with Schmitt.  As a result, Catholicism inadvertently acts as a red 
herring within Schmitt’s writings and has endured as a stumbling block in the secondary literature 
on him.  Balakrishnan suggests “world wars and revolutions are often solvents of these inherited 
identities, erasing, scrambling and recombining the relevant details from the past.”126  Indeed, the 
fall of an imperial constitutional monarchy, post-First World War revolutionary agitation of the left 
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and right, occupation and oversight by foreign powers under the Versailles Treaty, and the arrival 
of a constitutional parliamentary republic are of paramount importance in analyzing Schmitt’s 
mature thought.  Catholicism definitively, and theology to a large extent, should be allowed to fade 
towards insignificance, but Schmitt scholarship has yet to fully accept this state of affairs.  The 
recently published primary materials have revealed far more about Schmitt’s intellectual 
commitments and influences from the ages of seventeen to thirty-one than previously available.  
Therefore, the veil of obscurity shrouding the jurist’s life and intellectual development through the 
Wilhelmine and Weimar eras has slowly begun to lift.  However, neither recent biography nor the 
Nachlass publications have truly been absorbed by the great bulk of Schmitt scholarship that 
continues to be rapidly published, especially in the English language.  I believe that a complete 
reevaluation of the standard narrative is now an imperative task; especially pressing given 
Mehring’s unprecedented archival research127 combined with his reluctance to break decisively with 
this outdated narrative. 
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Chapter 1. 
Political Catholicism 
“[I asked]why, in his book on ‘the concept of the political’ he had not written a 
syllable about the bonum commune, since the whole meaning of politics surely lay 
in the realization of the common good.  He retorted sharply: ‘Anyone who speaks 
of the bonum commune is intent on deception.’”128 
—Josef Pieper. 
 
The Definition 
To establish Schmitt’s relationship to political Catholicism it is first necessary to define the 
phrase and establish the context.  Historian Martin Conway uses the expression to “describe 
political movements . . . which claimed a significant, though not necessarily exclusively, Catholic 
inspiration for their actions. . . .  Political Catholicism does not mean Catholics who were active in 
politics but political action which was Catholic in inspiration.”129  Given its focus on organized 
parties or groups, Conway’s definition requires a slight modification to suit my purpose, to wit, it 
must include intellectual-theoretical activity.  Thus, political Catholicism is a proper term of 
designation for the organized political activities of a movement or party as well as for the writings of 
theorists, either individually or grouped, for whom Catholic doctrine and theology are a significant 
and self-conscious source of inspiration for their intellectual and/or practical efforts.  To be a 
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proponent of political Catholicism it is insufficient to be only nominally or culturally Catholic; the 
faith must be normative.  Both the local material and legal interests of Catholicism considered 
ecclesiastically, as well as the Church as authoritative teacher (magisterium) of the individual or 
group by means of its body of doctrine, tradition, canons, and institutions must be recognized by 
the movement or theorist in order for them to be designated an example of “political Catholicism.”  
Anything less would make the ascription of the term “Catholic” too misleading given another 
system of thought (“liberalism” or “conservatism” most commonly at present) would be actually 
determinative.
130
  Let us now solidify the concept of political Catholicism by examining its 
intellectual origins and development within the modern era as a response and alternative tradition 
to political modernity. 
 
Part One.  Survey of Catholic Political Theory from the Middle Ages to Modernity 
Pre-Modern Catholic Political Thought 
Scholastic thought maintained continuity with ancient philosophy and both can therefore 
be treated under the single term “pre-modern.”131  Two specific points of agreement are of vital 
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importance: the metaphysical concept of telein (ends) in nature ordered to the ultimate telos (end) 
of the Good, and the virtue of phronēsis (prudence or practical intellect) as determinative of 
proper ethical and political action.  The first concept suggests the erotic nature of the soul, of its 
natural desire for the Good and for the achievement of the human end; the enduring state of 
completeness called eudaimonia (happiness) in Aristotle or beatitudo (beatitude) in the 
churchmen.  The second principle entails the practical intellect applying the first principles of 
ethics and human nature—derived from natural law, metaphysics and theology—to the specific and 
particular context within which statesmen are tasked with acting for the common good materially 
considered.  Both of these guiding principles or concepts will be seen wending their way through 
the development of scholastic and then modern Catholic political thought.   
Scholastic political thought from at least as early as Saint Augustine’s (354-430) City of God 
described a division of Authority (auctoritas) and Power (potestas) between two separate orders, 
the spiritual and temporal.  The spiritual order is embodied in the Catholic Church and functions 
as the Authority upon natural law and the first principles of ethical life.  The temporal order is the 
political community, or specifically its governing part, tasked to exercise Power in directing the 
community towards the common good materially considered.
132
  Of the two orders, the spiritual 
(the social or pre-political order) is viewed as both temporally prior and ontologically superior to 
                                                                                                                                                             
been practiced.  . . .  Philosophy as ‘ancient’ and as ‘medieval’ is the creation of ‘modern’ philosophy.  The new 
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thought and the nature of reality and being. 
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the political.  This priority and superiority does not entail subjecting the temporal to theocratic 
rule, rather, it serves as a check on tyranny as well as revolution.  The former is avoided by moral 
critique and check on government injustice and the latter by legitimating political authority as 
perfective of human nature—assisting in the achievement of man’s telos—and ordered to God’s just 
dominion. 
Additionally, the pre-modern consensus amongst Catholic thinkers held that the 
establishment of political community entails both “designation” of a ruler and “transmission” of 
power, yet misapprehending either aspect can cause errors.  On the side of transmission, 
“traditional views concerning the consent of the governed”133 form the basis of the transfer of power 
from the people as a whole to the designated government.  
Civil authority resides primarily in the civil community, not in any distinct person.  . . . The controversial 
issue is whether the God-given power to claim obedience for the sake of the civil common good resides 
primarily in the civil community as a whole.  [Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), Thomas Cajetan (1469-1534), 
Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621), and Francisco Suárez (1548-1617)] hold that it does.  They hold, 
accordingly, that the designation of rulers—whenever there is need for a distinct governing personnel—is 
accompanied by a transmission of power.
134
   
 
Practically speaking the designated Power in medieval Europe meant the monarch, although, 
following Aristotle, Aquinas had recognized that there were several legitimate forms that political 
rule could take given that all government was ordered to the same end.  The legitimacy of regimes 
other than monarchy was most forcefully revived for theoretical discussion in the Baroque era 
Thomists, particularly the Spanish scholastic renaissance known as the “School of Salamanca.”   
These Jesuits (such as Suárez and Luis de Molina [1535-1600]) “often ran afoul of Catholic 
sovereigns by speculating that political authority is vested inchoately in the body politic, that the 
original form of government was by nature democratic, that there are, in principle, plural forms of 
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legitimate government.”135  Indeed, given that the traditional Catholic understanding of politics 
opposed the free and universal exercise of royal power, conflict was inevitable.
136
  Yet, 
Christendom, a generally unified civilization,
137
 largely held until the early modern monarchs began 
to actively foment nationalism through centralization as well as exploit the emerging social 
revolution of Protestant sectarianism. 
 
Political Modernity: Protestantism, Gallicanism, and Absolute Sovereignty 
Political Modernity is deeply tied to the rise of Protestant Christianity; in many ways it 
serves as modernity’s version of “political theology.”  Protestantism, similar to the earlier 
developing Islam, lacks a robust ecclesiology.  Consequently, the Protestant mind was more 
amenable to political mythology and nationalism.  The demand for state control of religion, ever 
striven for by princes and kings, was naturally attractive to Protestants trying to establish toleration 
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for their sects and protection of their interests.  Contrariwise, Catholicism inculcated a larger 
degree of internationalism by giving believers a sense of belonging to a Europe-wide (if not 
worldwide) Christendom.  Augustine praised the diversity of the Church and its irreducibility to 
culture a millennium before Martin Luther (1483-1546) penned his revolutionary theses: 
This heavenly city, while it sojourns on earth, calls citizens out of all nations, and gathers together a society of 
pilgrims of all languages . . . It . . . is so far from rescinding and abolishing these diversities, that it even 
preserves and adopts them, so long only as no hindrance to the worship of the one supreme and true God is 
thus introduced.
138
 
 
However, Catholic monarchs were not less likely than their Protestant counterparts to desire 
control over the Catholic Church within their territories.  Indeed such struggles and machinations 
can be traced throughout medieval history as a fight between “state supremacy” (later called 
Josephism or Gallicanism) and “ultramontanism.” 
From the Latin for “beyond the mountains” (ultra montes) the term signifies a hard identity 
Catholicism which upholds the pope’s spiritual and ecclesial authority as the leader of the Church, 
therefore, it is traditional and orthodox.  The word originally came into being as a pejorative for 
use by supporters of political nationalism or state supremacy.  Its earliest known usage dates to the 
German Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV (r. 1070-1105) who upbraided his political opponents as 
Ultramontanes in their support of Pope Saint Gregory VII (r. 1073-1085) and his attempts to 
reform the clergy by attacking European monarchs simoniacal (selling clerical office) influence on 
the priesthood.
139
  Ultramontanism thus serves as a term of contrast within Catholic political 
thought to Gallicanism; the latter being the heterodox statism or nationalism that truly metastasized 
within religious thought from out of the Protestant Reformation and early modern political 
thought.  As the word itself indicates, Gallicanism can exist within Catholic nations just as much as 
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Protestant if the pope, and even the Magisterium, is seen as a threat to the purported autonomy of 
the lay believer, local church and national bishops, or, simply, if the principle of state supremacy is 
accepted.  Indeed, the Catholic monarchy of the French and Spanish Bourbons achieved the 
dubious honor of being paradigmatic of modern absolute kingship. 
With the onset of religious strife the pre-modern understanding of politics, which had 
resulted in a limited form of monarchy, came under rigorous intellectual attack.  Modern science 
dismissed ends from nature, including human nature, completely altering the manner in which 
political regimes were differentiated and evaluated.  To pre-modern philosophy a political regime 
has the human attributes of the ruling element or part and is evaluated in terms of the capacity of 
that part to instantiate the common good.  Beginning with Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527), 
modern political philosophy conceptualizes rule as without human attributes; the ruler exhibits 
divine qualities, such as, unity (singularity), omnipotence, and infallibility.  The result is that the 
Sovereign can never be judged as potency; rule becomes an end in itself—autonomous—not to be 
evaluated in ethical terms.  Philosopher Francis Slade explains: 
The actuality of the [modern] sovereign, unlike that of the [pre-modern] king, is complete as soon as it exists.  
Whereas a king is measured and limited by the form he aspires to embody in his kingdom, realizing that 
form in varying degrees, there being good, bad, and mediocre kings and kingdoms, the sovereign is never less 
than a sovereign.
140
   
 
As Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) put it: “the name of Tyranny, signifieth nothing more, nor lesse, 
than the name of Sovereignty, be it in one, or many men.”141  And Machiavelli uses the single term 
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principality, to cover both pre-modern concepts of tyranny and kingship.  These two philosophers 
are joined by Jean Bodin (1530-1596), who is best credited for developing fully the modern 
concept of unitary and absolute sovereignty.  Bodin also assisted Hobbes in providing Gallicanism 
the guiding principle of Cujus regio, ejus religio (whose rule, his religion).  These three early 
modern philosophers of the State stand as a Great Triumvirate for whom Schmitt evidenced the 
deepest attachment and admiration.   
The philosophical revolution begun with Machiavelli included the rejection of the pre-
modern understanding of statecraft as mastered by the virtue of prudence.  Instead, modern 
political philosophy replaced phronēsis with the Florentine’s definition of virtú as facility in 
achieving one’s purposes or designs without regard to their intrinsic ethical merit, given the lack of 
natural ends.  This line of thought was expanded, by Hobbes, as characteristic of the practical 
intellect of the Sovereign; namely, prudence is reduced to mere efficacy in achieving the aims or 
purposes (self-defined) of the sovereign power in the State.  The substitution of efficacy for 
prudence marked the modern transition to a non-normative understanding of politics.
142
  Norms do 
return in the modern liberal tradition, either as self-generated out of reason—Kritik, as in 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)—or, as contractually agreed upon, as in Hobbes or John Locke (1632-
                                                                                                                                                             
Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, ed. and trans. Victor Gourevitch [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997], 52). 
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 This non-normativism was ironically enshrined in modern ethical philosophy by a decidedly “normativist” 
philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who wrote: “Now skill in the choice of means to one’s own greatest well-
being can be called prudence.  . . . The word ‘prudence’ is used in a double sense: firstly, it can mean worldly wisdom, 
and secondly, private wisdom.  The former is the skill of someone in influencing others so as to use them for his own 
purposes.  The latter is the sagacity to combine all these purposes for his own lasting advantage” (Immanuel Kant, 
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington, [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co, 1991, 3rd 
ed.], 26 and 26n4).  Unlike Hobbes or Machiavelli, Kant rejects both definitions because he does not believe in private 
wisdom.  That is, he accepts the degraded concept of prudence but only in order to reject it and bring moral principle 
back into politics by tying it to the conscience of the Good Will which can determine what is to the lasting advantage of 
the Kingdom of Ends.  Kant holds that nature (as understood by modern science) compels us to seek “happiness” and 
prudence is simply the means to that aim.  However, happiness is solely a private and non-moral endeavor consisting 
of obtaining our “own purposes.”  And with that classical phronēsis is degraded into, at best, private sagacity in 
achieving one’s own advantage; it is simply one kind of morally irrelevant “hypothetical imperative” which must be 
rejected in favor of the categorical. 
38 
 
1704), but not as given by nature (ends).  For Schmitt we will find that norms return simply as the 
prerogative of Sovereign declaration.   
Early modern Catholic monarchs recognized that their own long-standing desire to assert 
their power over the Church in their realms could be achieved by means of exploiting the social 
revolution sweeping Europe.  By taking up the mantle of “Defender of the Faith” (Fidei defensor), 
as Pope Leo X (r. 1513-21) dubbed England’s King Henry VIII (r. 1509-47), these kings leveraged 
their defense of Church interests and the fight against Protestant heresy into concessions and 
prerogatives for the State vis-à-vis the Church within their territory.
143
  Thus, pre-modern limited 
monarchy began to be replaced by the modern unitary sovereign State, first exemplified in 
Bourbon absolutism and later by modern republicanism. 
Bourbon absolute monarchy as it coalesced under Louis XIV (r. 1643-1715) was most ably 
defended by Bishop Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (1627-1704), who drew upon Bodin’s work on 
absolute sovereignty to promote a theory of “divine right” rule based on an error in interpretation, 
or simply an abuse, of the scholastic concept of “designation” and “transmission” previously 
discussed.  Bossuet held that God, not the civil community, designated the monarch directly 
through heredity from Adam.  Such a claim bypasses the need for a “transmission” in order to 
grant power to a ruler and ground a duty of obedience on the part of the ruled.  Bossuet’s theory 
of “divine right” thus gave kings a firm standing to combine in themselves, as divinely 
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commissioned, both power and authority against the claims of the pope.
144
  As Bossuet and 
Bourbon absolutism demonstrates, the establishment of modern absolute monarchy and national 
churches was as much a matter of course in Catholic kingdoms as Protestant, up until the period of 
revolutionary fervor that began with the French Revolution. 
 
Restoration Period: Legitimism and Ultramontanism 
The Restoration period of early nineteenth-century Europe after the final defeat of 
Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) and the peace established by the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) 
saw the balance of power in Europe tilt in a decidedly Protestant direction.  After all, Napoleon 
had largely destroyed the Catholic powers while ultimately being defeated by the efforts of a 
coalition consisting of England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, with only the latter being a Catholic 
State.  Additionally, Poland was absorbed, Holland dominated Belgium, and the Rhenish “prince-
bishops” were eliminated.  The eminent historian of modern Christianity, Owen Chadwick, 
pointedly remarked that “[t]he word Restoration bore only a very partial truth in the Roman 
Catholic Church.”145  Monarchies may have been restored but once again in the modern absolutist 
form to the further expense of the Catholic Church, both considered internationally in the person 
of the Pope and his territorial rule, as well as locally, in her particular interests within the various 
European states.  The Church sought to establish concordats in order to try and maintain local 
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independence but rarely succeeded; those actually agreed to “marked a general increase in state 
control.”146  Reluctantly, but in the main, the Church accepted the absolute sovereigns, which ruled 
modern Europe, as the most prudent approach in the revolutionary decades of the first half of the 
nineteenth century.  This policy of “legitimism” or “regalism” prioritized political obedience above 
ecclesial interests.
147
  However, the pre-modern intellectual foundation for Catholic political 
thought remained intact in the modern era and soon began to experience a renaissance. 
In the nineteenth century, particularly under the influence of the principle of democratic 
popular sovereignty, the modern State began to shift from Gallicanism to secularism, denoting 
religion “private” while making the self-worship of the people, nationalism, the “public” religion.148  
It is easy to forget that as the ancien regime of absolute monarchs began to fall in historically 
Catholic nations and democratic republics arose, a separation of Church and State did not 
accompany the change.  Rather, the prerogatives over the Church within a nation’s borders, which 
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had been claimed by the Catholic monarchs, were transferred (or attempted to be) to the 
republican State.  Even more encroachments were made into Church affairs, as well as property 
confiscated. 
Such vast, sweeping changes of political modernity by its agent the State ultimately 
demanded an intellectual retrenching on the part of Catholic intellectuals both inside and outside 
the hierarchy.  Philosopher and historian Russell Hittinger informs us that: 
. . . [T]he post-1789 church-state crisis is what gave the Church real incentive to develop a body of social 
doctrine.  On this score it is important to understand that the social doctrine did not begin with the industrial 
revolution and the problems of benighted and dislocated workers.  It began with the need to defend the 
institutions of the Church.  Catholic social doctrine, accordingly, emerged in defense of two propositions: 
first, that the state does not enjoy a monopoly over group-personhood; second, that societies other than the 
state not only possess real dignity as rights-and-duties bearing unities, but that they also enjoy modes of 
authority proper to their own society.
149
 
 
These two propositions originate in pre-modern and ultramontane thought.  The ultramontane 
stance is, therefore, foundational to modern “political Catholicism” simpliciter; it unified Catholic 
conservatives and liberals alike, such as: Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821)
150
; Louis de Bonald (1754-
1840); Juan Donoso Cortés (1809-53); Hugues-Felicité de Lamennais (1782-1854); Charles-
Forbes-René, Comte de Montalembert (1810-70); and Jean-Baptiste Lacordaire (1802-61).
151
  The 
renaissance of ultramontanism also occurred on the popular and incipiently democratic level in the 
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nineteenth century in response to Gallicanism and creeping nationalist centralization; both looked 
upon the Church as an alien element in the social body and the pope as simply a foreign power.   
 
The Late-Modern Leonine Elucidation of Catholic Political and Social Principles 
In a related manner, the papacy rose in significance, ecclesiastically and popularly, while 
other bishops of large dioceses in Europe (e.g., Mainz, Cologne, Trier, and Salzburg) were 
diminished by Gallicanism: “The French bishops were stipendiaries of the State; the Spanish 
bishops were troubled by division and civil war; the Archbishop of Vienna lived under a Josephist 
government.”152  In seeking reprieve from the State Catholics naturally looked to the pope and thus 
became “ultramontane.”  The papacy in the nineteenth century “was elevated, not in political 
power, for there he lost rights steadily; but in the feeling of ordinary faithful worshippers.”153  The 
centralization and strengthening of the Vatican as voice of the Church was, paradoxically, the only 
successful means for Catholics in the several nations of Europe to maintain their religious liberty 
against the ever increasing encroachments of the State.   
The first resounding attempt by the Vatican to fight back the tide was Pope Pius IX’s (r. 
1846-78) promulgation of the encyclical Quanta Cura (Condemning Current Errors) on December 
8, 1864 accompanied by the Syllabus Errorum (Syllabus of Errors).  Within the Syllabus only 
seven of its eighty propositions do not deal directly with the relation between Church and State:  
In proposition after proposition, Pius IX flatly denies the rights once exercised by Catholic sovereigns, and 
now by nation-states.  He declares, in effect, the independence of the Church not only in matters of ordinary 
governance (sacraments and the episcopacy), but also with regard to schools, religious orders, marriage and 
families, and sodalities.
154
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In effect, Pius “inaugurate[d] what came to be known as Catholic social doctrine.”155   
The Syllabus and Vatican I laid out the predicates of ecclesiastical order unfettered by civil control.  They 
killed Gallicanism—no more national churches, no Catholicism controlled by local ecclesiastical and lay 
elites.
156
 
 
Even an observant contemporary like John Henry Cardinal Newman (1801-90), critical of the 
timing of defining papal infallibility and universal jurisdiction, praised its overall result: “there will 
be no more of those misunderstandings out of which Jansenism and Gallicanism have arisen, and 
which in these latter days have begotten here in England the so-called Branch Theory.”157  In this 
mid-nineteenth century context began well over a century of the papacy, in which, half of all 
encyclicals would deal with “problems relating to the nature, the ideologies, and the policies of the 
state.”158   
In these encyclicals the modern era popes consistently endorsed the pre-modern thought 
of Aquinas as lodestone for Catholic social and political thought; thus, making Thomism 
normative for Catholic intellectuals from the decades immediately before Schmitt’s birth through 
more than half of his productive life.
159
  In fact, a German Jesuit, Josef Wilhelm Karl Kleutgen 
(1811-83), wrote Pope Leo XIII’s (r. 1878-1903) initial draft of Aeterni Patris; the 1879 encyclical 
which reestablished Thomistic scholasticism as the foundation for the present and future of 
Catholic philosophy and theology.  These social encyclicals also “share a common stock of 
principles on such things as the human person, the different forms of solidarity, subsidiarity, and 
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the common good.”160  All four principles are fundamental to political Catholicism.  No pope was 
more important intellectually in this period than Leo XIII, and no encyclical better illustrates the 
four core principles of Catholic social thought than his Rerum Novarum dealing with the conflict 
between capital and labor and promulgated in 1891. 
 
Rerum Novarum 
On the first principle of the dignity of the human person, Leo delivers a strong critique of 
socialism
161
 combined with a defense of the natural right to property:  
[A] man's labor necessarily bears two notes or characters.  First of all, it is personal, inasmuch as the force 
which acts is bound up with the personality and is the exclusive property of him who acts, and, further, was 
given to him for his advantage.  Secondly, man's labor is necessary; for without the result of labor a man 
cannot live, and self-preservation is a law of nature, which it is wrong to disobey.
162
 
 
Additionally, he recognizes the natural right to association most immediately in the family as the 
fundamental social unit.  Human sociability leads to the creation of other corporate or mediating 
societies, including labor associations, but premier among them is the Church and its charitable 
organizations.
163
   
The natural impulse towards social life leads to the second principle of solidarity: 
The consciousness of his own weakness urges man to call in aid from without.  . . . It is this natural impulse 
which binds men together in civil society; and it is likewise this which leads them to join together in 
associations which are, it is true, lesser and not independent societies, but, nevertheless, real societies.
164
 
 
It follows that there is no necessity of conflict between social or economic classes.  To illustrate the 
point Leo utilizes an organic analogy: 
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Just as the symmetry of the human frame is the result of the suitable arrangement of the different parts of the 
body, so in a State is it ordained by nature that these two classes [labor and capital] should dwell in harmony 
and agreement, so as to maintain the balance of the body politic.
165
   
 
Leo’s purpose in the analogy is to stress solidarity, that both “need the other: capital cannot do 
without labor, nor labor without capital.”166  He soon utilizes the metaphor again: 
The members of the working classes are citizens by nature and by the same right as the rich; they are real 
parts, living the life which makes up, through the family, the body of the commonwealth; It would be 
irrational to neglect one portion of the citizens and favor another, and therefore the public administration 
must duly and solicitously provide for the welfare and the comfort of the working classes; otherwise, that law 
of justice will be violated which ordains that each man shall have his due.
167
 
 
The pontiff’s use of an organic analogy has been a cause of confusion amongst many interpreters 
of the encyclical, who understand it as promoting a romantic social organicism.
168
  However, such a 
reading makes a fundamental category error as regards “parts” and “wholes” alien to Catholicism’s 
Thomistic philosophical tradition, which forms the basis of Leo’s thought.  Specifically, the 
“whole” which is a political society, is not the same as the “whole” which is an organism, a natural 
body, because the parts within a society are themselves also  “wholes” in their own right (as 
persons, families, corporate entities) with their own parts/whole relationship as well as specific 
human dignity.  Contrariwise, the parts of a natural organism are simply material parts (such as 
hands and feet) and do not have the same dignity in relation to the whole of which they partake as 
do the “parts” of social wholes.  
 Therefore, the key phrase in the passage of Rerum Novarum just quoted is “through the 
family,” as the family is itself a “whole” consisting of individual human “parts” which are likewise 
treated as “real.”  That is, the “parts” of the family—persons—are substantial and not merely 
                                                 
165
 Ibid., §19. 
166
 Ibid. 
167
 Ibid., §33, emphasis added. 
168
 For example, see: Martin Conway, Catholic Politics in Europe, 1918-1945 (New York: Routledge, 1997), 23; and 
Evans, German Center Party, 184-5.  Conway thinks Rerum Novarum “could be used to justify a nostalgic anti-
modernism” and Evans thinks it expresses a view of society common to romantic anti-modern conservative sentiment 
such as found in the Austrian economist Othmar Spann (1878-1950); who later became influential amongst a faction 
of Catholic extremists that joined the Nazis.  However, Spann was far more influenced by German Idealism and 
Romanticism than either Leo or Thomas. 
46 
 
constitutive.  Persons, for Leo, subsist both as a part to a larger whole and as a whole in their own 
right.  The political ramification of Leo’s orthodox understanding of the relationship between 
social parts to the whole is a strict denial of both anarchism (and classical liberalism) as well as 
statist totalitarianism whether in Socialism or (later) Fascism.  The former ideologies succumb to 
individualism, which denies that families and social groups actually do materially constitute a real 
whole, a society.  The latter destroys the integrity of the parts by subsuming them completely to the 
social whole; thus denying their dignity as substantial wholes in addition to being constitutive parts 
in favor of a romantic social organicism.
169
 
The discussion of the relationship of parts to wholes leads to the crucial principle of 
subsidiarity as it relates to the proper relationship between the State and the intermediary, and 
subsisting, forms of social association, again beginning with the family.  Leo acknowledges that 
“lesser” societies do lack full autonomy (indeed, no societies are autonomous as all must conform 
to natural law), and are subject to the consideration of the political common good which it is the 
duty of the State to seek and defend.  However, the State must recognize its limits and act in justice 
towards the smaller but wholly “real” corporate entities.  For example, the State may only intrude 
in the family in rare circumstances, either to provide “public aid” in times of “extreme necessity,” 
or if in the home, “there occur grave disturbance of mutual rights.”170  Additionally, Leo argues that 
given property is a natural right the State can only interfere with it in authentic cases of conflict with 
the justly construed interests of the common good.
171
  That the State has absolute limitations, and in 
fact, a positive duty to protect subsisting corporate and social entities is illustrated most essentially 
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in the case of “the confraternities, societies, and religious orders which have arisen by the Church's 
authority and the piety of Christian men.”172  Leo claims that reason dictates, according to natural 
law, that these societies are “perfectly blameless” and fully sanctioned, but further: 
In their religious aspect they claim rightly to be responsible to the Church alone.  The rulers of the State 
accordingly have no rights over them, nor can they claim any share in their control; on the contrary, it is the 
duty of the State to respect and cherish them, and, if need be, to defend them from attack.
173
 
 
Leo then sadly notes, in modern times, such religious societies have in fact been suppressed, 
despoiled, and continually “hampered in every way,”174 grossly violating the principle of 
subsidiarity.
175
   
The principle of subsidiarity does acknowledge the duty of the State to pursue and defend 
the common good, however, the State must resist the desire to intervene unjustly and thus degrade 
the autonomy of corporate societies.  Leo illustrates:  
Whenever the general interest or any particular class suffers, or is threatened with harm, which can in no 
other way be met or prevented, the public authority must step in to deal with it.  . . .  The limits must be 
determined by the nature of the occasion which calls for the law's interference - the principle being that the 
law must not undertake more, nor proceed further, than is required for the remedy of the evil or the removal 
of the mischief.
176
 
 
He adds, “The State must not absorb the individual or the family.”177  The restraint of the State is 
based on recognition that mediating societies are themselves “unities of order.”178  They have their 
own internal order (of parts and wholes) and an integrity which involves seeking their own 
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particular “common good.”  Hence, these lesser “common goods” need to be respected by the 
“greater” political society: “The State should watch over these societies of citizens banded together 
in accordance with their rights, but it should not thrust itself into their peculiar concerns and their 
organization, for things move and live by the spirit inspiring them, and may be killed by the rough 
grasp of a hand from without.”179 
Finally, on the principle of the common good as the proper object of the political 
community, regardless of the specific form in which the State exists, Leo writes:  
By the State we here understand . . . the State as rightly apprehended; that is to say, any government 
conformable in its institutions to right reason and natural law . . .  The foremost duty, therefore, of the rulers 
of the State should be to make sure that the laws and institutions, the general character and administration 
of the commonwealth, shall be such as of themselves to realize public well-being and private prosperity.  This 
is the proper scope of wise statesmanship and is the work of the rulers.  . . .  [I]t is the province of the 
commonwealth to serve the common good.
180
 
 
Leo adds in a number of examples of what the common good consists in: “moral rule, well-
regulated family life, respect for religion and justice, the moderation and fair imposing of public 
                                                 
179
 Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, §55.  See for a further illustration the last line from §50 quoted above, “lesser and not 
independent societies, but, nevertheless, real societies.”  Additional elaboration follows in §51: “These lesser societies 
and the larger society differ in many respects, because their immediate purpose and aim are different.  Civil society 
exists for the common good, and hence is concerned with the interests of all in general, albeit with individual interests 
also in their due place and degree.  It is therefore called a public society, because by its agency, as St. Thomas of 
Aquinas says, ‘Men establish relations in common with one another in the setting up of a commonwealth.’  But 
societies which are formed in the bosom of the commonwealth are styled private, and rightly so, since their immediate 
purpose is the private advantage of the associates.  ‘Now, a private society,’ says St. Thomas again, ‘is one which is 
formed for the purpose of carrying out private objects; as when two or three enter into partnership with the view of 
trading in common.’  Private societies, then, although they exist within the body politic, and are severally part of the 
commonwealth, cannot nevertheless be absolutely, and as such, prohibited by public authority.  For, to enter into a 
‘society’ of this kind is the natural right of man; and the State has for its office to protect natural rights, not to destroy 
them; and, if it forbid its citizens to form associations, it contradicts the very principle of its own existence, for both 
they and it exist in virtue of the like principle, namely, the natural tendency of man to dwell in society.”  The principle 
of subsidiarity thus derives from the Catholic understanding of human dignity and freedom and can be found 
developed in Aquinas at ST I, Q. 65, Art. 2.  In short, given the ontological priority of the familial and social to the 
political community as well as human freedom and choice, then nothing which can be done at a local and 
decentralized level should be done by a more complex and distant bureaucratic or centralized body.  Leo XIII is 
generally viewed as the first pontiff to fully begin developing this principle at the level of Church doctrine.  The term 
itself dates to the works of Italian Jesuit Luigi Taparelli (1793-1862).  Hittinger helpfully summarizes the concept: “For 
Taparelli and the tradition of Catholic social doctrine, subsidiarity is not a freestanding concept.  As a principle 
regulating and coordinating a plurality of group-persons, subsidiarity presupposes a plurality of such persons, each 
having distinct common ends, kinds of united action, and modes of authority” (Russell Hittinger, “Society, 
Subsidiarity, and Authority in Catholic Social Thought,” in Civilizing Authority: Society, State, and Church, ed. Patrick 
Brennan [Lexington Books, 2007], 135). 
180
 Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, §32. 
49 
 
taxes, the progress of the arts and of trade, the abundant yield of the land . . . everything . . . which 
makes the citizens better and happier,” especially promoting “to the utmost the interests of the 
poor.”181  A related traditional principle of Catholic political thought present in Rerum Novarum is 
worth mentioning in conclusion.  Namely, that the source of political rule, of sovereignty or power, 
is God
182
 and therefore, must be exercised on the model of divine rule and solicitude necessarily 
restrained by the good, as reason recognizes it in the natural law.  Tyranny then, just as it had been 
for classical political thought, is governance to “the advantage of the ruler,” while good governance 
is for “the benefit of those over whom [the State] is placed.”183  On all of these basic principles of 
Catholic social and political teaching, Schmitt is in dissent or dismissive, as will be pointed out 
where appropriate going forward.  Now let us shift focus from the general and theoretical 
foundations of Catholic social and political thought to the specific manner in which political 
Catholicism developed in Germany. 
 
Part Two.  Political Catholicism in Germany. 
Modern German Political Catholicism to the Kulturkampf (1815-70) 
For the Germanic lands “the secularization of 1803 [The Final Recess] was never 
undone,”184 so that the territorial remnants of the Holy Roman Empire were absorbed into larger 
states, such as France, Austria and Prussia.  Prussia had begun the conquest of Catholic territories 
in the 1700’s by the addition of Silesia and in partitions of Poland, including the Bishopric of 
Ermland, West, South, and New East Prussia. By the first two decades of the 1800s, there were no 
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more privileged “prince-bishops,”185 the right of sanctuary was ended, and Church property was no 
longer sacrosanct as evidenced by the suppression of many monasteries and abbeys.
186
  Further, 
after the Vienna settlement of 1815, Baden, Württemberg, and Hesse-Darmstadt became the 
Protestant states with the most Catholics in them and all three “issued official edicts establishing the 
principle of state supremacy over the churches” in 1821.187  Even in Bavaria, ruled by the Catholic 
Wittelsbach dynasty, King Ludwig I’s (r. 1825-48) “personal piety, respect for the papacy, and 
encouragement of Catholic scholarship were at all times balanced by his firm belief in a Josephine 
state supremacy, which decisively prevailed in 1847-48.”188  In short, “[t]he first decades after 1815 
saw not the reversal of the State controls sought by the eighteenth century but their expansion.”189  
Thus, the approximate beginning of modern German political Catholicism dates to the “Pre-
March” (Vormärz) period of Restoration stretching from the final defeat of Napoleon in 1815 to 
the German Revolution which began in March of 1848 (the Märzrevolution).
190
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In these early decades of the nineteenth century a consensus slowly developed amongst 
German Catholics (most pronounced in Prussia) to politically resist state domination of the 
Church.
191
  Mind, it was a consensus and not unanimity.  Historian Christoph Weber noticed two 
main camps—broadly construed—within German Catholicism in the nineteenth century.  On the 
one hand were the “traditionalists,” orthodox and ultramontane defenders of popular piety who 
attacked the Protestants and state bureaucracy which interfered in the autonomy of the Church.  
The other camp consisted in “enlightened” liberal Catholic clergy, nationalists (conservative or 
liberal) and bourgeois who supported the Protestant bureaucracy and wanted a state church 
(Staatskirchentum).
192
  Only the former camp engaged in a “political Catholicism” as the latter 
camp found its political motivation and principles not in their Catholic faith, regardless of its bona 
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fides, but in secular political ideologies.
193
  Since the proponents of German political Catholicism 
maintained an attachment to pre-modern philosophical principles, their story is primarily one of 
ultramontanism. 
The most significant early show of Catholic resistance to the Prussian State occurred in the 
events of the 1830s known as the “Cologne troubles” (Kölner Wirren).  In 1826 the Prussian 
bureaucracy had succeeded in make overnight religious pilgrimages illegal, motivated by their 
rationalist desire to combat “superstition.”194  The State had even been assisted by the subservient 
Archbishop of Cologne, Count Ferdinand August von Spiegel (1764-1835), who was similarly lax 
on enforcement of Church law regarding priestly assistance at mixed marriages.  Canon law 
required a priest to be assured by the couple that they agreed to raise their children as Catholics, 
but recent Prussian law decreed that “sons be brought up in the father’s faith and daughters in the 
mother’s.”195  In 1837 von Spiegel was replaced as archbishop by Clemens August von Droste-
Vischering (1773-1845) who “began his term of office by purging the theological seminary in Bonn 
of professors who taught the principle of state supremacy over the churches and he defied the state 
regulations on mixed marriages.”196  Additionally, he refused to enforce the prohibition on 
pilgrimages.  For his defiance of the state, Droste-Vischering was imprisoned until April of 1839.  
Archbishop Martin von Dunin (1774-1842) of Posen-Gnessen in East Prussia was similarly 
arrested for defiance of the laws regarding mixed marriages and imprisoned for ten months.   
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The ensuing furor over imprisoning geriatric bishops brought to prominence the Catholic 
journalist, Joseph von Görres (1776-1848), who in 1837, in a “widely circulated pamphlet, 
Athanasius, . . . protested the imprisonment of Droste-Vischering and demanded freedom of 
action for the [C]hurch and parity for Catholics in the civil service and universities.”197  Görres then 
started the Historische-politische Blätter für das katholische Deutschland, the journal which 
inaugurated political Catholicism as an ultramontane, intellectual, and organized political 
phenomenon in Germany.
198
  To resolve the troubles, the government decided to quietly stop 
enforcing the pilgrimage prohibitions and released the archbishops.   
It is reasonable to see the Cologne Troubles as foreshadowing later conflicts, as Evans 
suggests:  
The tendency of the Prussian state to regard the Catholic clergy as a potentially subversive element, the 
immediate willingness to use force against it, and, most significant, the passive acceptance of this by the non-
Catholic population are all suggestive for later civil rights issues not only in the Kulturkampf but also in 
actions against other ‘subversive elements’ such as Socialists, Poles, Alsatians, and Jews.199 
 
                                                 
197
 Evans, German Center Party, 6.  The subject of the Cologne Troubles allows me to comment upon the fact that 
while Evans and Sperber both lack a constraining political ideology that would make them excessively antagonistic to 
their subject matter, such antagonism is evident in other prominent works on German political Catholicism.  For 
example, in Beleaguered Tower: Dilemma of Political Catholicism in Wilhelmine Germany (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1976) Ronald J. Ross pursues the Sonderweg approach by wondering why modern 
Germany did not develop into a stable liberal democracy.  He sees the Center primarily as a backwards and retrograde 
party which “collaborated with antidemocratic forces, [and] inhibited political and social reform” (ibid., xv).  Ross 
believes that the stalemate situation between Protestantism and Catholicism which resulted from the Reformation’s 
failure to fully revolutionize Germany was “cause of the aberrations of German evolution” (ibid., 3).  He frequently 
uses loaded language to cast a negative light on German Catholics defending their interests and often assumes the 
correctness of judgments he makes without sharing an argument.  For example, he claims that during the Cologne 
Troubles the Prussian government was upholding “equality” in forcing the Church to marry couples against their 
canonical requirements.  He then describes Bishop Droste-Vischering as “stubborn” and “obstreperous,” causing the 
government to “lose patience” and dismisses Gorres’s Athanasius, calling it a “curious piece of work” which “ignored 
contradictions of the archbishop’s position,” without sharing his warrant for these claims (ibid., 13-15). 
198
 Evans, German Center Party, 6.  Given the definition of political Catholicism spelled out above I agree with Evans.  
However, Sperber treats political Catholicism as much more strictly an issue of the existence of a political party which 
holds to a confessional platform.  Therefore, he dates German political Catholicism only as far back as the 1861 
electoral win of the Progressives since it was only in the period of 1850-66 that a number of social and economic issues 
coalesced into a unifying force for Catholics such as that they could establish a viable political party.  The key issues 
included: defense of usury laws; the protection of guilds; the fight against both laissez faire and state control; and 
opposition to Bismarck’s maneuvers against Austria for dominance of Central Europe.  See: Sperber, Popular 
Catholicism, 98, 153-5. 
199
 Evans, German Center Party, 5.  Two of the minorities she mentions, the Poles and Alsatians, largely overlap with 
Catholics. 
54 
 
Any setback to the government was temporary, however.  The Prussian state never ceased to apply 
pressure, such as encouraging “enlightened” priests to secularize Catholic religious associations and 
clubs, or at least push them towards expressed support for the expansionist Prussian state, and the 
bishops continued to have all communication with the Holy See reviewed by the government.
200
  
Yet, a significant change had occurred within German Catholicism in response to the Cologne 
troubles; both the lay and priests began to stir in hostility to state interference and became more 
unified in recognition of their confessional interests.  The ongoing issue of German national 
unification intensified this developing political Catholicism. 
The Catholic population of Germany was concentrated in regions most likely to resist the 
manner in which German unification progressed in the nineteenth century, on ethnic grounds in 
Alsace-Lorraine or German-Polish areas, such as Posen and Silesia, as well as in hotbeds of 
separatism such as Bavaria, the Rhineland and West Prussia.  Unification was envisioned in the 
1840s to 60s either as kleindeutsch (lesser Germany) excluding Austria or grossdeutsch (greater 
Germany) including it.  The two visions also differed greatly in terms of the importance of 
federalism, as the lesser Germany might be smaller in extent, but would be far more centralized.  
Thus, the kleindeutsch program found political support from organized liberalism, progressivism, 
and Protestant anti-Catholicism in addition to Prussian conservatives and nationalists.
201
  Southern 
Germans and Catholics were staunchly defensive of federalism and the autonomy of the states, so 
overwhelmingly favored continuance of the German Federation, which already included Austria.
202
  
Thus, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, engineered by Prussian Prime Minister and Foreign 
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Minister, Otto von Bismarck (1815-98), was opposed mainly by Catholics and progressives; the 
latter of whom viewed the war as reactionary and an attack on fellow Germans. 
During the run-up to war with Austria, the Prussian press fanned the flames of Anti-
Catholic prejudice.  The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung called the Habsburgs, “the mortal 
enemy of the Evangelical Church” and the conservative Kreuzzeitung prophesied that, “a religious 
war is brewing, perhaps as bloody as the Thirty Years’ War 200 years before.”203  The Catholics 
identified with their co-religionists and were vociferously pro-Austrian.  Mutinies and 
demonstrations were frequent occurrences and “Nowhere was the opposition to the war more 
open and vehement than in the Rhineland and Westphalia”—the land of Schmitt’s ancestors and 
youth.
204
  When the war came, any opposition was considered unpatriotic; hence Catholics were 
politically isolated and silenced given their general immunity to nationalism.  The resulting 
Prussian victory in 1866, reduced Catholics “to approximately one-third of the population . . . 
[and] also branded [them]. . . as somehow less than true Germans, [as] potential subversives in the 
new state . . .”.205  The views of the victorious typically become settled popular history; the suspicion 
of Catholics as subversive “particularists” due to their local and regional allegiances against 
Prussian led kleindeutsch nationalism became a widely adopted political assertion of even the 
Progressives, who had themselves opposed the wars.
206
  In 1867, the Reichstag of the North 
German Confederation only had two Catholic delegates when one of them, Hermann von 
Mallinckrodt (1821-74) made a speech alluding “to Prussia’s aggressive role in German history.”  
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Bismarck rejoined by “pointedly blam[ing] Germany’s division upon the thirteenth century 
‘Guelphs and ultramontanes.’”207  Just as in the prewar propaganda, the defeat of Austria “was 
widely hailed in Germany as a victory for Protestantism over Catholicism, a true completion of the 
Reformation.  Catholics did not have to be paranoid to feel that they were about to be 
Protestantized as well as Prussianized.”208 
Following quickly on the heels of victory over Austria was victory over Napoleon III’s 
Second French Empire in 1870-71.  As with the earlier war, German Catholics were opposed to 
Prussian militarism albeit they naturally did not favor France.  An unintended consequence of the 
Franco-Prussian War was the removal of French protection from the Papal States.  Italy’s King 
Victor Emmanuel II (r. 1861-78) did not miss the opportunity to put a final end to the Pope’s 
secular territorial rule.  Although the Papal States had been an albatross around the Pope’s neck 
for centuries, their loss did leave the papacy in a vulnerable position that persisted as an issue—
called the “Roman Question”—until the Lateran Treaty of 1929 created the Vatican City-State.209  
“The defeat of Austria, followed by the defeat of France and of the papacy in 1870, seemed to 
symbolize the downfall of international Catholicism and placed German Catholics, however they 
felt as individuals, collectively on the defensive.”210  Catholic defensiveness quickly produced 
political unity and the development of the German Center Party.   
Germany’s liberal and progressive parties were dogmatically “anticlerical, secularist, and 
freethinking, while the conservative parties were closely identified with the established Protestant 
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state churches.”211  This had been true for over two decades, but the new national configuration of 
1870 drove home Catholic political isolation and necessitated creation of a confessional party to 
defend their interests.  The resulting Center Party adopted as its platform the Soest Program which 
included the following nine points: independence and rights of the Church; political equality 
among religions; protest of any secularizing of marriage; support for denominational schools; 
maintain federalism; decentralization of the federal administration; limited taxation and spending; 
support for the middle class of farmers and small business owners to balance capital, landed 
property and labor; and freedom for efforts to resolve the social problem without threatening 
workers with moral or physical ruin.
212
  From this platform, it is easy to recognize the status of 
political Catholicism as a highly developed attempt to formulate a “third way” between the modern 
political and economic left and right.  German Catholics were socially diverse but when unified by 
their religious interests and principles the result was:  
. . . a section of the population whose leadership was traditionally conservative and even allied with reaction 
developed a political party allied, for many purposes, with the Left . . . with an ideological base flexible 
enough to encompass a strong civil rights platform, a relatively high concern for social welfare, an opposition 
to militarism, and even, by the opening of the twentieth century, a tentative embrace of democracy.
213
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Center leadership was less socially diverse as it mainly consisted in conservative aristocrats.  Yet, 
due to their politically Catholic platform—which continued with little change to be the unifying 
agenda for the party until its demise—and resistance to Bismarck’s centralizing, militarist, and 
authoritarian government, the Center leaders were routinely called “rebels,” and “linked with 
radicals, Socialists, and other ‘enemies of the state.’”214  This line of attack was a consistent refrain 
from Bismarck and the National Liberals as they combined forces to attempt the destruction of 
political Catholicism during the Kulturkampf (cultural struggle) of 1871-83. 
 
Kulturkampf (1871-83) 
 Although the Kulturkampf is most closely identified with Prussia and Bismarck, it actually 
began in a number of majority Catholic southern German states, and continued for various lengths 
of time and degrees of intensity before being nationalized by Bismarck.  Austrian liberals believed 
that Catholics were supporters of Slavism and federalism against German-Magyar dualist rule and 
so controlled suffrage laws in a manner that kept a Catholic political party from even developing 
prior to the Christian Social Party of the late 1880s.  Bavaria had similarly constructed suffrage laws 
to discourage organized political Catholicism, and passed a “pulpit paragraph” (Kanzelparagraph) 
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prohibiting “abuse of the pulpit” by speaking against the state or its laws.215  In the state of Baden 
the Liberal government reacted to the publication of the Syllabus of Errors in 1864, by beginning 
an assault on confessional education.  Led by the liberal government minister, Julius Jolly (1823-
91), Baden pushed for the combination of Protestant and Catholic schools (Simultanschulen) 
under lay supervision, only allowing classes in religious instruction to be separate.  In 1867, Jolly 
and the liberals enacted a law requiring clergy to pass a state exam on their educational 
qualifications.  Then in 1869, civil marriage became compulsory and all schools were declared 
secular and under the control of the state.  Additionally in 1870, Baden made it illegal to publish 
the dogma of papal infallibility.
216
   
 Prussia began an anti-Catholic legislative campaign later than other German states due to its 
fear (especially promoted by Queen Augusta [r. 1861-88; Empress from 1871])
217
 that the southern 
states might withdraw in protest from the Prussian dominated German Confederation.  As soon as 
Bismarck became confident in German national unity in 1871, he quickly made up for lost time, 
concerned as he was by the success of the new Center Party in its first election cycle the same 
year.
218
  Bismarck prepared the political landscape by publishing calumny in “letters to two 
newspapers linking the Center with the Progressive radicals because of its civil rights stand, and 
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conjuring up a ‘Red-Black alliance.’”219  He further attempted to undermine the nascent Center and 
political Catholicism by associating it with non-German ethnicities, for example, in 1871, he: 
. . . advised that there had been ‘too much forbearance against ultramontane, anti-Prussian efforts in West 
Prussia, Posen, and Upper Silesia.  There is a Slavic ultramontane and reactionary propaganda from the 
Russian border to the Adriatic Sea, and it is necessary to defend our national interest and our language against 
such hostile efforts.’220 
 
A month later he asserted: “[t]he influence of local clergy hinders the use of the German language, 
because Slavs and Romans in alliance with ultramontanism seek to uphold barbarism and 
ignorance and fight everywhere in Europe against Germanism, which seeks to spread 
enlightenment.”221  In 1872, Bismarck made his famed speech against the Center, accusing it of 
“mobilization against the state” and he “denounced the idea of a confessional party as dangerous 
and divisive.”222 
 Bismarck’s Kulturkampf really took off once he replaced the moderate Prussian Minister 
of Culture, Heinrich von Mühler (1813-74), in 1872, with Adalbert Falk (1827-1900), a protégé of 
Julius Jolly.  Bismarck and the National Liberals preferred open warfare with Catholicism while 
Mühler had refused to take that step.  Falk had no such reservations in carrying out the 
Chancellor’s directive “to restore the rights of the state in relation to the church, and naturally with 
as little fuss as possible.”223  In practice the latter clause was of far less importance than the former.  
Bismarck looked for any chance to alienate the Church from involvement in society, such as: 
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cutting off financial support to a bishop for not clearing an excommunication of a heretical teacher 
with the state; ending the post of Catholic military chaplain; and intentionally nominating a 
heretical Cardinal as ambassador to the Holy See in order to provoke his rejection and then 
eliminate the diplomatic post in response.  The primary work of the struggle was carried on in laws 
which Falk had passed over the course of several years, the most stringent of which are known as 
“May Laws,” for having been passed in spring Reichstag sessions.  These laws increased in severity 
and reach from year to year.  Some of the laws included: a pulpit law banning sermons which 
spoke critically of the State or its policies; legal limitation of the use of clerical punishment; 
oversight of clerical matters by a royal court; the exile of the Jesuits
224
; requiring religious instruction 
be given in the German language; removal of Catholic school inspectors and then of priests from 
teaching in state schools; civil marriage; priestly training and appointment as the prerogative of the 
State; the freedom of individuals to separate from churches by declaration; the right to expatriate 
any priest at will; confiscation of Church property; forcibly disbanding religious orders and 
communities; suspension of state income to the Church, or even taking over its financial 
administration. 
 The promulgation of these laws served to unite and intensify Catholic support for the 
Center which expanded its electoral success throughout the Kulturkampf, especially with significant 
victories in the Prussian Landstag in 1873 and the Reichstag in 1874.  The laws led to both 
widespread local defiance as well as uneven application in the states where the government 
bureaucrats had the difficult task of trying to apply them.  The government thus resorted to 
escalation by widespread arrests and imprisonments, of even very public personages, such as the 
Archbishop Miecislas Halka Ledochowski (1822-1902) of Gnesen-Posen for encouraging religious 
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instruction in Polish, and Fr. Paul Majunke (1842-1899), the editor of the Center’s Berlin 
newspaper Germania.  Majunke’s arrest is a good example of the disregard for the rule of law 
common to the Kulturkampf, given that he was by right, immune from political arrest as member 
of the Reichstag.
225
  The year 1875 was the high point of government force and terror with every 
Prussian bishop exiled or imprisoned by its end.  The Frankfurter Zeitung put together a list 
tabulating:  
. . . [T]he arrests of 241 priests, 136 editors, 210 Center party members (in addition to those included in the 
first two categories) and 55 other persons; 20 confiscations of newspapers; 74 house searches; 103 expulsions 
and internments; and 55 dissolutions of meetings and organizations.
226
 
 
The May Laws specific to the year, known as the Orders and Breadbasket Laws:  
. . . involved 296 different branches [of Catholic religious orders] and several thousand men and women.  
Their property was taken by the state.  Their disbanding by the police was the occasion of much public 
protest, and caused [Emperor] William I and [Empress] Augusta more distress than any other aspect of the 
struggle.
227
 
 
The height of Bismarck’s arrogance was reached in November of 1877 when he asked the cultural 
ministry: 
. . . whether the pope himself might properly be considered subject to the May laws as the ‘highest Catholic 
church employee . . . naturally only within the territory of the Prussian state.’  The ministerial councillor who 
responded to this suggestion felt that the law in question ‘had not really been intended for foreigners’ and 
would not be possible to apply in practice to the pope!
228
 
 
The intent and scope of laws do, indeed, become more difficult to grasp when a ruler gives free 
reign to the exercise of their political will.  
 The lawlessness of Bismarck’s government incited general disrespect for its laws, with at 
least eleven protest gatherings ending in violence from 1872 to 1877.
229
  Pius IX issued a striking 
encyclical on February 5, 1875, which directly counselled German Catholics to engage in passive 
resistance to the state by recognizing the nullity of the May Laws.  Pius encourages Catholics to 
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“rightfully fulfill both duties” by giving “tribute and homage to Caesar in those matters which are 
subject to civil authority and power” but to “refuse to give to Caesar what belongs to God.”230  
However, Catholics did not always maintain the high road, and at times degraded into displays of 
prejudicial retaliation.  For example, instead of celebrating on September 2 the newly instituted 
national holiday memorializing victory over France, Sedan Day, Catholics celebrated instead the 
elevation anniversary of Pius IX, June 16, each year during the Kulturkampf.  A sad practical effect 
of this manner of protest was that in Catholic areas, the majority would carry on business as usual 
on September 2, thus the “beflagged and illuminated houses of the bureaucrats, Protestants, Jews, 
and National Liberals stood out, an easy target for stone-throwing.”231   
The Kulturkampf also created ample opportunity for political parties most likely to defend 
civil and minority rights to compromise their stated principles.  When the law to exile the Jesuits 
was passed by the Reichstag in 1872 only one National Liberal member voted against it, one third 
of the Progressives, and the sole socialist.  Yet, “the civil rights issue was very clear-cut: without due 
process of law or any stated cause other than their membership in the society these men were 
deprived of their rights of residence in Germany.”232  In similar fashion, the May 1874 vote on the 
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Expatriation Act found hardly any liberals opposed, despite the fact that it “clearly violated the civil 
rights of German clergy,” allowing the government to summarily exile any priest.233  To the extent 
that voices were raised out of concern for the disregard of the rule of law, Bismarck simply had the 
pesky constitutional articles deleted.  Indeed, the Chancellor’s consistent message that: “We are 
acting in self-defense and cannot restrain ourselves with liberal phrases about citizen’s rights”234 was 
more than sufficient justification given the popularity of the Kulturkampf.
235
  What the cultural 
struggle was not, however, was successful.
236
 
Implementation at the level of the states had always been highly uneven and the local 
liberal parties and bureaucrats tasked with living with large or even majority Catholic populations 
naturally compromised.
237
  The most important and visible failure of the Kulturkampf, though, was 
the continued steady success of the Center Party, which had given Catholics the means to be a 
permanent adversarial force in kleindeutsch German politics.  With the election results of 1877 
confirming the Center’s staying power, Bismarck began to think that he may be able to undermine 
                                                                                                                                                             
Germany despite Article 2; the real threat they faced was police harassment and surveillance as well as being harassed 
when teaching and actually being proscribed from teaching religion.  Yet, to barely repeal this moot article took such 
incredible political maneuvering and horse trading as well as caused such a demonstrative public backlash by 
Evangelicals that the Center was forcefully reminded of its precarious place in German society (ibid, 137-9).  The full 
ban on the Jesuits would not be lifted until 1917 at a time when the Imperial government was collapsing and could 
finally recognize the Church as an intrinsically socially conservative force for public order. 
233
 Evans, German Center Party, 69. 
234
 Ibid., 61.  A delegate of the Freikonservative Partei (Free Conservatives or FKP) provided another quote 
representative of Bismarck’s attitude: “a political party in this house which has its center of gravity outside Germany 
has no right to be judged by the same standards with which the other parties are judged” (ibid.,  66).  Such views on 
Bismarck’s rule and the propriety of the Kulturkampf fit nicely with Schmitt’s views on “commissarial” dictatorship as 
will be discussed below in Chapter Four. 
235
 Ross, Beleaguered Tower, 13. 
236
 Evans summarizes the results as giving final victory to the Church “although its position was never again so favorable 
as in Prussia in the years before 1870.  State supervision of the public schools, civil marriage, and easy withdrawal from 
church membership were permanent realities, not even challenged in the Weimar period” (Evans, German Center 
Party, 92). It is worth noting that the Apostolic See made specific allowance to the Center to use their judgment when 
negotiating reforms to civil law in the early 1900s that included provisions respecting civil marriage and divorce. 
237
 See Blackbourn, Marpingen, 226-35; also Ronald J. Ross, “Enforcing the Kulturkampf in the Bismarckian State and 
the Limits of Coercion in Imperial Germany,” The Journal of Modern History, 56.3 (September 1984), 456-82.  Ross 
argues that the Bismarckian state never had the institutions and reach needed to carry out such a coercive project 
against a third of the population; it was never able to live up to its authoritarian pretensions.  He later builds upon this 
essay in: The Failure of Bismarck’s Kulturkampf: Catholicism and State Power in Imperial Germany, 1871-1887 
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1998). 
65 
 
political Catholicism by a reverse approach of ending the clash and making peace with the Church.  
Even if the Center survived a loss of what might be its raison d’etre, his hope was that it could be 
turned into a party supportive of the government.
238
  After Pius IX died and Leo XIII was elevated 
to the papacy in February 1878, Bismarck cleverly decided to open up negotiations for an end to 
the struggle directly with the Apostolic See.  He hoped to marginalize the Center by circumventing 
it and, incidentally, reinforced the notion that Catholics are a foreign-led element in the body 
politic.  The Center treated the Kulturkampf as involving vital constitutional principles and the rule 
of law, whereas, the Apostolic See treated the affair as they would any other foreign and diplomatic 
negotiations for the defense of Church interests.  Therefore, while the Holy See initially sought a 
restitution of the legal status of Catholics prior to 1870, as the Center wanted, they eventually 
accepted Bismarck’s promise to simply stop enforcement of anti-Catholic laws.  Such an approach 
left the hated laws on the books and implied state supremacy at all times as well as the potential to 
renew the conflict, quite an unsatisfactory resolution to the Center.   
Negotiations between Bismarck and the Holy See took place over the course of eight years, 
with an official end to the Kulturkampf finally coming by passage of “Peace Laws,” in the springs of 
1886-7, which greatly revised the original May Laws.  The process was punctuated by several 
opportunities for the Center Party to assert, or showcase, its independence from the Church 
hierarchy.  The Center first disappointed the wishes of the Holy See by voting against the Anti-
Socialist Laws which passed the Reichstag in 1878, and then repeating the performance each time 
the laws came up for extension (1880/84/86/88/90).  In a letter of 1880 Bismarck vented his 
frustration:  
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Of what use to us is the theoretical position of the Roman See against the Socialists, when the Catholic 
fraction in the state, while loudly avowing its devotion to the will of the pope, gives public assistance in all its 
votes to the Socialists, as [it does] to every other subversive tendency?
239
 
 
The Center shared in the orthodox Catholic rejection of socialism, but constitutional principles 
determined their vote as a matter of political prudence.  Party leader Ludwig Windthorst (1812-
1891) had explained their stand for civil rights and the rule of law in the Reichstag a few years 
earlier, during the height of the Kulturkampf: “On the question of absolute state supremacy . . . the 
Prussian state might not always be controlled by authoritarian conservatives and that a Social 
Democratic state might make use of the principle of absolute supremacy in very different ways.”240  
Restrained constitutional government was too important to undermine by destruction of the civil 
rights of even a minority group like the Socialists, whom the Center did consider dangerous. 
The next significant disagreement between the Center and the Holy See again related to 
the issue of “absolute state supremacy,” as it involved the price the Church had to pay in the 
negotiated peace with Bismarck.  Leo XIII recognized that Bismarck cared most about 
reinstituting the placet (Anzeigepflicht), that is, the allowance of royal approval for all ecclesiastical 
appointments in German territory.  The placet had been restricted in the 1840s, during the reign 
of Frederick William IV, by the monarch’s promise to “appoint as bishops only those men in 
whom the pope expressed confidence.”241  For Bismarck, the placet was now the concession he 
needed most “in order to avoid the accusation that the Prussian government had arrived at 
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Canossa.”242  Leo thus initially conceded indeterminate allowance of the placet for minor Church 
positions and promised expansion of this prerogative according to the extent to which Bismarck 
reciprocated.  In the end, Leo conceded to Bismarck the full placet to insure the “Peace Laws” 
presentation in the Reichstag.  The leadership of the Center believed that such a concession went 
too far and were able to have it removed from the bill, as otherwise they would not have allowed it 
to pass the lower house.   
Soon after the “Peace Laws” were passed, Bismarck’s military funding bill came before the 
Reichstag, and Windthorst provocatively amended it to only be good for three years instead of its 
traditional seven (hence known as the “Septennat” law).  The move so infuriated Bismarck, who 
had received an assurance of help to pass the bill from the Holy See, that he “denounced what he 
called a ‘Polish majority’ and precipitously dissolved the Reichstag on 14 January 1887.”243  During 
the politicking that went on after the dissolution, the Center was attacked “on the old grounds of 
being pro-Alsatian, pro-Polish, collaborator with Social Democrats, and in general, a danger to the 
fatherland.”244  Leo’s Secretary of State sent a note to the Center indicating that the Pope wished it 
would pass the bill without amendment.  A party leader replied with the Center’s reason for the 
action it had taken as well as saying that if the Pope wished the Party to dissolve itself it would do 
so, but that if “a party was to exist, it must make its own political decisions.”  A second letter came 
back in response in which the Apostolic See assured “the Center of its continuing importance and 
of its freedom to act independently as a political party,” although they again asked them to support 
the Septennat.
245
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The second letter was soon leaked, which led “[b]oth the liberal and the conservative press 
[to criticize] the ‘disloyalty’ of Catholic politicians to their religious leader, and Windthorst was 
dubbed the ‘Guelph antipope’ by one liberal paper, the Kölnische Zeitung.”246  The furor over the 
Center’s supposed disloyalty to the pope became the occasion for Windthorst to deliver his 
“greatest”247 speech in which he addressed the consistent misapprehension of the Party’s enemies 
with regard to actual Catholic teaching about the political and social spheres.  He explained the 
Pope, of course, did not really care about a bill funding the German military.  Rather, the Center 
and the pope disagreed only on the nature of the most prudent political course to take to achieve 
shared aims.  Yet, in that disagreement, the Pope readily acknowledged the Center’s proper 
independence to make such determinations.
248
  The episode allowed the Center to both assert and 
explain its independence from the Holy See while yet remaining proponents of politically Catholic 
opposition to the government.
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Fin de siècle through the First World War (1900-18) 
 One of the more important results of the Kulturkampf, as an outgrowth of the unity and 
development of the Center, was the increased social organization of Catholics.  Some of the 
significant organizations created to promote Catholic political activism included: the Görres Society 
of Catholic lawyers and scientists, founded in 1876 to promote the development of the sciences 
amongst Catholics; the Windthorst League, a Catholic youth club to groom future Center delegates 
begun in 1895; and the Catholic Women’s League, founded in 1903, to promote political 
participation of Catholic women.  Especially noteworthy was the Volksverein für das katholische 
Deutschland (The People’s Association for Catholic Germany) established in 1890, by lawyer and 
Center Reichstag member Adolf Gröber (1854-1919).
250
  The Volksverein was created in response 
to the political agitation of the Evangelical League formed by Prussian Protestants in 1886.  The 
League acted “for the defense of German Protestant interests’ against ‘false parity and tolerance 
concepts’ to bring ‘more light into the Roman darkness which still lies over fully a third of our 
people.’”251  For its part, the Volksverein: “stated its object to be ‘the opposition of heresy and 
revolutionary tendencies in the social-economic world as well as the defense of the Christian order 
in society.’”252  Windthorst hoped that the Volksverein would serve as “not only a defensive 
                                                                                                                                                             
monarchy, and republic) the discussion of which form is the best can be put aside as an abstraction.  Rather, he 
reminds the French that all of these forms of government “may be affirmed . . . good, provided it lead straight to its 
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Center Party: 1890-1906, 24-5.  Such a disagreement further demonstrates the rule of prudence within Catholic 
political thought.   
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propaganda organization but as a much broader social and educational agency.”253  The 
Volksverein’s heyday was prior to the First World War, when Evans describes it as the Center’s 
idealistic “conscience.”254 
 The Volksverein is evidence for the “deep and lasting impression” which the Kulturkampf 
left on the Center Party and German Catholics in general, both because of the government’s 
actions as well as the “obvious enthusiasm for anti-Catholic measures shown by the Protestant 
population of Germany.”255  The struggle reinforced Catholic distaste for the Kleindeutsch form of 
German national unity, and as a body, Catholics were never truly reconciled to it; partly evidenced 
by the principled commitment to federalism and decentralization throughout the life of the Center 
Party.
256
  More generally, it had a lasting negative legacy in its “injurious effect upon the 
development of responsible parliamentary government in Germany,” by making any future 
cooperation between the Liberals and the Center—the main parties of the political middle—
incredibly difficult and fraught with mutual distrust.
257
  However, the Center and Catholics, in 
general were not naturally disposed to anti-authoritarian, let alone revolutionary, sentiments.  
During the earlier years of revolutionary fervor in 1848-49, Catholics had even committed to a 
makeshift alliance with the Prussian state.
258
  Such an alliance did occur again during the years of 
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1901-06 when the Center Party became the dominant legislative party.
259
  This interlude as a 
government party did not end well when the Center’s indifference to militarism and colonialism 
finally became too much for the Imperial government to tolerate.  From 1906 to the First World 
War, the Center once again found itself a solidly opposition party.  More important than 
opposition to the government in this period were the fault lines within political Catholicism that 
came to the fore, most decisively in the Gewerkschaftsstreit (“Union Controversy”) and the 
Zentrumstreit (“Center Dispute”). 
 Well before the First World War, the Center had a well-established reputation for trying to 
pass legislation to assist struggling laboring groups and defuse social conflict.  They particularly 
focused on the Mittelstand of peasants, craftsmen and shop keepers but also gave keen attention to 
urban workers that they wanted to keep from gravitating to Socialism.
260
  In 1877, the Center 
proposed social legislation, which was mocked by liberals and Social Democrats as “medieval” 
because it called for Sunday rest and wanted to protect corporative organizations (not unlike what 
Leo would call for fourteen years later in Rerum Novarum), which they thought sounded like the 
recently destroyed guilds.  Possibly more notable is that the attempted legislation provoked (or 
embarrassed) the liberals and Socialists into proposing their own legislative schemes for labor 
reform.
261
  Rather than simply seeking a return to pre-modern guilds, “Catholic social policy since 
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the beginning of modern machine industry in Germany had . . . [sought the] . . . repudiation of 
capitalism and Manchester School liberalism”262 as well as Socialism.   
In Germany, the Catholic unions found native sources for political inspiration in the views 
of the early nineteenth century economist, and Catholic convert, Adam Müller (1779-1829) as well 
as the romantic and heterodox philosopher Franz von Baader (1765-1841).  Müller was a sharp 
critic of Adam Smith’s liberalism, particularly its individualism.  He critiqued it from a religious 
and ethical standpoint which stressed the responsibilities of the state for the common good, 
focused attention on corporate bodies within society, and anticipated Leo XIII’s concept of 
solidarity.  Baader’s economic views were similar to Müller’s, but additionally argued for political 
participation by the working class.  If the medieval guilds could not be revived (hence his romantic 
streak) then Baader wanted industrial organizations which could limit both competition and free 
trade.
263
  Catholic workers began to aggressively organize into labor unions during the 1890s 
drawing upon these native sources as well as finding particular encouragement with the 
promulgation of Rerum Novarum in 1891.  The intellectuals behind Catholic unions generally 
sought to “avoid the evils of both socialism and capitalism,” by seeking that “third way” of 
mediating groups commonly designated corporatism.
264
 
                                                                                                                                                             
division between clerical and anticlericals effectively prevented the development of parliamentary government in 
Prussia, a consequence of the conflict which was surely not overlooked by Bismarck” (ibid, 65). 
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The initial development of Catholic labor unions was largely devoid of controversy, and the 
national organization of the Congress of Christian Unions was led, from 1903 to 1928, by the 
steady hand of “a young cabinetmaker from Bavaria,” Adam Stegerwald (1874-1945) as well as 
under the guidance of the Volksverein.
265
  But, as the unions began to gain more representatives in 
the Reichstag and slowly gained in influence and numbers, their very legitimacy came to be 
questioned and the Gewerkschaftsstreit ensued.  From 1900, the German bishops, as a group, had 
expressed their concern in a pastoral letter that Catholic trade unionism was developing in a 
direction that would lead it to join with the Socialist unions; they also were concerned about the 
inclusion of Protestants and acceptance of striking.  Although the Center responded by declaring 
its support of the unions, the controversy would become intertwined with the other conflict within 
political Catholicism prior to the First World War, the Zentrumstreit, and gain in ferocity from 
1907 until the war.   
The opposition to the increasingly inter-denominational Christian Unions came from a 
faction within Center politics designated as “integralists,” which had largely sprung into being from 
a misunderstanding of Pope St. Pius X’s (r. 1903-14) fight against theological modernism.  Pius’s 
encyclical of 1907, Pascendi dominici gregis (On the Doctrines of the Modernists), primarily had 
France in mind when he encouraged the rooting out of modernist heresies from faculties and 
seminaries as well as renewed vigilance as regards Catholic publications.  Theological modernism 
had never been a strong trend in German Catholic theology, yet the fear of modernist influences 
provoked a debate within the Center Party over “integralism,” that is, “a wholehearted Catholic 
consciousness in all aspects of intellectual endeavor and, presumably, of life in general.”266  The 
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proponents of integralism rejected anything they thought could make the Center a less confessional 
party and invite outside influences, such as from Protestants sympathetic to Party concerns.  
Alliance with Protestants had occurred most within the labor unions, for Stegerwald had been 
particularly successful in developing inter-denominational Christian trade-unionism.
267
  It is the 
debate over integralism versus inter-denominationalism within the Center that was at the heart of 
the Zentrumstreit. 
 The Center had always maintained theoretical inter-denominationalism, even, if in practical 
terms, they existed as a confessional Catholic party.  Likewise, the Catholic unions pragmatically 
recognized the need to expand their membership in order to effectively offer an alternative to the 
Socialist and liberal unions.  The leader of the alternative to the Christian unions was Franz von 
Savigny (dates unknown) who promoted strictly Catholic workers’ associations.  Savigny’s chief 
ecclesiastical ally was the Prince-Bishop of Breslau, Cardinal Georg von Kopp (1837-1914), who 
“sought repeatedly to elicit official preference for the associations from the Vatican.”268  Pius X 
finally decided to intervene in the controversy in the encyclical Singulari Quadam (On Labor 
Organizations) of September 24, 1912.   In the encyclical Pius essentially refers the German 
combatants to recall and follow the advice and directives of Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum.  He thus 
summarizes and expresses a consistent and traditional view, that the best forms of association will 
accept Catholic principles and normally be exclusively Catholic, however, the need to combat 
socialism makes a number of forms of labor organization, including interdenominational ones, 
theoretically possible and licit as they are all context dependent.  Further, all unions or associations 
need to accept the oversight and guidance of the local bishop.
269
  Unfortunately the encyclical did 
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not settle these controversies within German political Catholicism; it took the deaths of Cardinal 
Kopp and then Pius X in 1914, the outbreak of war, and finally a papal encyclical from Benedict 
XV (r. 1914-22) of November 1, 1914, which called—in the context of the eruption of a World 
War—for Catholic unity and the suppression of divisive sects within the faith.270 
Beyond the internal struggles the Center faced, problems within German political 
Catholicism were also evidenced by the great difficulty that Catholics faced in achieving social or 
political advancement.  “Windthorst once remarked that the meeting room of the Reichstag 
fraction should have a sign above the door reading ‘abandon hope, all ye who enter here,’ because 
Centrist affiliation was such a barrier to government appointment.”271  The universities were also 
bastions of Protestantism and Prussian nationalism.  The major case study revealing the extent to 
which anti-Catholic prejudice ruled the universities is the furor that erupted over the 1901 
appointment to the University of Straßburg of the twenty-six year old Catholic, Martin Spahn 
(1875-1945), the son of Peter Spahn (1846-1925), a judge and Reichstag member for the Center.  
His appointment as a professor of history was due to pressure from the government, and 
eventually, a direct intervention by King William II, as part of a plan to bring the teaching of 
Catholic theologians under state control by establishing a Catholic faculty of theology at the 
university and thus removing it from the local Catholic seminary.  The government was in 
negotiations with the Apostolic See to establish the faculty and believed it needed to give 
professorships to other Catholic candidates to achieve their aim.   
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The appointment caused a storm of controversy in the press, partly due to his age and as 
being perceived as an act of political patronage, but more out of the bigotry of liberal Protestants in 
and out of academia.  The famous historian Theodor Mommsen (1817-1903) penned a series of 
articles protesting the appointment by implying “that a Catholic world-outlook disqualified a man 
for a university history position.”272  Friedrich Meinecke (1862-1954) was even more direct: 
“Catholic history professors are and remain a monstrosity.”273  Simultaneously, nationalist-Völkisch 
students fought “to exclude the rapidly growing Catholic student corporations from recognition by 
the universities.”274  The furor becomes even more fascinating when one considers that Spahn was, 
at the time, a quite secularized, nominal Catholic interested in pushing the Center towards a 
nationalist politics allied to Protestant conservatism. 
The Center was likewise largely unable to improve parity for Catholics in bureaucratic and 
governmental office.
275
  The situation for Catholics would only become noticeably better in the later 
years of the First World War:  
In the year 1917 there was a decided change of heart, and a number of Catholic appointments to high office 
were made, including Center party members.  With the deteriorating war situation and threat of social 
revolution, the Center suddenly appeared far less subversive to the regime than it had before.
276
 
 
Although the Republic would not be unanimously or continuously popular amongst Catholics, 
they shed few tears for the Wilhelmine Reich.  It is into this changing environment that Schmitt 
began his professional academic career—he was no victim of anti-Catholic discrimination.  
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Chapter 2.  Biographical & Textual Placement of Schmitt 1888-1915 
“First is the command, the people come later.”277 
—Theodor Däubler 
 
Family Background 
Schmitt was born on July 11, 1888, in the small (around 5000 residents in 1900) Rhenish 
town of Plettenberg-Eiringhausen in Westphalia of the Sauerland, about thirty miles northeast of 
Cologne.  The Rhineland had been under Prussian rule since 1815, and although the region was 
65% Catholic, Plettenberg was majority Protestant.  Schmitt’s father, Johann, was the oldest of nine 
children to farmer and innkeeper, Nikolaus Schmitt (1826-81) and Catherine Anna Franzen (dates 
unavailable), in the Eifel village of Bausendorf close to the Moselle River.  Johann spent two years 
in the postal service in Mosel before he took a job with the railroad which relocated him to 
Plettenberg in October of 1878.  Given his skill-set, having studied both stenography and 
accounting, he soon found a better position as a bookkeeper and clerk in the sales office of 
Graewe & Kaiser, a metal fasteners fabricating firm, and would remain there until a late retirement 
at the age of seventy-five, in 1928.  Although he was well-liked and given real accounting 
responsibilities within the firm he had no chance of rising to an executive level given one of the 
partners, William Graewe, was an active freemason.
278
  Johann was a popular man in Plettenberg, 
active in the Gabelsberger stenography club as well as the parish church, where he was an 
alderman and used his accounting skills to handle parish finances and tax collection.  He was also a 
member of the Center Party until its demise in 1933.  In 1879, Johann married a Protestant named 
Maria Carola Helene Rehse (1850-82).  They had one son, Ernst (1880-1919), and a daughter 
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Marie who died in infancy (1881), with Maria following in 1882.  Four years later the widower met 
Carl’s mother, Louise Steinlein (1863-1943), and they were married in September 1887. 
Louise also hailed from the Eifel.  She was born illegitimate to Augusta Louise Bell (dates 
unavailable) in 1863.  Augusta then married Franz Josef Anton Steinlein (1833-1911), a Trier 
customs official, in 1865.  The standard commentary often points out that Schmitt was the nephew 
of three great uncle priests who survived the Kulturkampf; all three were older brothers of Franz 
Steinlein: Nicholas (1821-1894), Andreas (1823-1897), and Peter (1825-1892).  However, the real 
story is not one of unalloyed Catholic heroism.  From Koenen, we learn that the youngest of the 
three priests, Peter, actually spent time in prison as a “victim of Bismarck,” but Andreas was a 
“black sheep” who supported the May Laws.  Nicholas split the difference by surviving the cultural 
struggle in a merely decent fashion, neither a legendary fighter nor collaborator.  However, recent 
biographical research indicates that Nicholas was the biological father of Louise.
279
  Her family 
frequently lived with Father Nicholas Steinlein in the Eifel and he made holiday visits to the 
Schmitt household until his death, when Carl was six.  Nicholas’ natural paternity to the family, 
while remaining a priest, complicates the image of Schmitt as having simply come from a strong 
family system of “Catholic support,” like Koenen suggests.280   
Louise spent several years of girlhood in Paris and received a strict Catholic education in 
the French department of Meuse, by the Sisters of Saint Charles Borromeo.  As a typical Catholic 
mother, she hoped her first-born son would discern a vocation for the priesthood, and more 
generally, she was the primary impetus for advancing her childrens’ education; although Johann 
persuaded the local pastor, Fr. Fischer (dates and full name unavailable), to train Carl—an altar 
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server in his youth—in Latin beyond just liturgical usage.281  The Schmitts had four children in total.  
The first-born, Carl, was followed by: a daughter, Auguste (1891-1992), called “Ussi” (anglicized as 
“Uzzi”); Joseph (1893-1970), known as Jup; and a second daughter, Anna Margarethe (1902-54). 
As a result of Louise’s upbringing, French was a second language for her, and Carl became fluent 
under her tutelage at a young age as well as from spending holidays with French speaking relatives 
living in the Mosel and Lorraine regions.  Schmitt always took great pride in these French-German 
Mosel roots, and especially celebrated its wine; he “would speak of the Moselle valley as though he 
had been reared in that setting.”282  Schmitt depicted his family as having been part of a Catholic 
migration—a diaspora283—from the southwest of the Mosel Valley in search of better prospects in 
the more industrialized areas of the Rhineland.  Much of Johann’s side of the family did indeed 
relocate to Plettenberg, including three siblings and his son, Ernst, Carl’s half-brother.  In an 
interview from 1971 Schmitt described his hometown as a “little nest” where his “very modest” 
family lived as a “religious minority in an intensely evangelical, partly sectarian Protestant 
environment.”284  However, area studies caution us to not take Schmitt’s characterization at face 
value. 
Jonathan Sperber’s research on popular piety in the Rhineland found that by the 1880’s 
Rhenish Catholics (65% of the population) were, in the main, “firmly united under ultramontanist 
auspices” due to having come through a “period of intense state persecution,” and that the Church 
“enjoyed an unprecedented degree of popular support.”285  However, exceptions to this general 
rule existed, particularly amongst the bourgeoisie, who were not models of piety.  The Rhineland 
                                                 
281
 Education was clearly a priority for her as Carl’s sister Auguste was sent to study to become a teacher and then his 
brother Joseph became a physician. 
282
 Bendersky, Theorist for the Reich, 5.  Schmitt poetically describes his personality by likening it to the slow and silent 
Mosel river in his postwar apologia Ex Captivitate Salus, 10, as Noack points out in Carl Schmitt (Berlin: Verlag 
Ullstein GmbH, 1993), 16. 
283
 Schmitt, Carl Schmitt Im Gespräch, 31. 
284
 The original source is the Groh/Figge interview, here quoted from: Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt, 31. 
285
 Sperber, Popular Catholicism, 8. 
80 
 
was an economically cutting edge region of a majority Protestant—and Protestant-ruled—Prussia, 
which made a deep imprint on the Catholic bourgeoisie.  Instead, they evidenced the general 
secularizing trends from out of the French Revolution and freemasonry, as well as the social 
pressure of an overwhelmingly Protestant upper class.
286
  In fact, southwest Germany was the most 
clearly liberal area of the time, and the Catholics there were likewise the most secular and liberal of 
all German Catholics.  Unsurprisingly, it is also the region in which the schismatic-liberal “Old 
Catholic” movement287 had made its presence most felt after the First Vatican Council.288 Thus, 
Schmitt came from the exact German Catholic social and regional milieu most likely to have 
bucked the general ultramontanist trend, and see its faith recede in the face of secularist and 
Protestant social pressure.
289
  It will soon become evident that Schmitt did indeed follow this quite 
common modern path of secularization. 
 
Schmitt’s education (1894-1910) 
Schmitt began Catholic primary school in 1894, first in the Plettenberg city center, and then 
nearer home in the Eisringhausen District, in 1897.  Fr. Fischer recommended that Carl be sent 
fifteen kilometers away to the neighboring city’s state grammar school, Attendorn, as there was no 
local boys’ school.  Attendorn was chosen because the populace was majority Catholic, and Carl 
would be able to board in a nearby seminary, the Collegium Bernadinum.  So, at eleven years old, 
Schmitt was enrolled at a Prussian humanistic Gymnasium, which, despite being in a Catholic 
majority town, was a progressive-national liberal, and even, secularist school. 
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Attendorn only allowed for two hours of religious instruction, which was very light for the 
time, even for a state school.  The curriculum was heavy on language study at which Schmitt 
excelled.  He was required to learn Latin, Greek, French, and then chose English over Hebrew.  
The choice to study English was a strong indication that Schmitt had already rejected any form of 
priestly training given that Hebrew was a requisite of theological study.
290
  He recalled having first 
broken the news that he did not want to pursue the priesthood to his father, towards the end of 
high school: 
I remember a short Conversation with my father, in 1904/05 . . .  .  He was then 51/52 years old, I was 16/17 
. . .  .  I told him that I did not want to study theology.  He said, ‘have you spoken with your mother?’  And 
then added, ‘In any case, we want to leave the Church in the village.’291 
 
There is actually no indication that Schmitt ever wanted to be a priest; it likely was never anything 
more than a dream of his mother’s, whom Schmitt always held in lower esteem than his father.  
He recalled Johann with great fondness and sympathy as “industrious”292 and “a very devout 
Catholic . . . who had a lot of bad luck in his life.”293  Yet, the placid response of his father to 
Schmitt’s declaration that he did not want to study for the priesthood, as well as the fact that he had 
first married an Evangelical woman at a time when German Catholics were enduring the 
Kulturkampf, suggests a certain liberality or at least an aloofness from strong religious identification 
and sentiment.  Rather, indications are that Louise was the more strictly devout Catholic parent.   
When recalling his studies in Attendorn from 1900-07, Schmitt mentions the presence in 
the faculty of the “worst kind” of “free-thinking” teachers.  Included was a Darwinist natural 
science teacher that he describes as a “drunkard bachelor.”294  He mentions two more teachers by 
name, Ernst Sommer, who wrote books such as Gymnastik des Willens (Gymnastics of the Will), 
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and Körperkultur (Body Culture), and a “typical elementary school teacher,” named Joseph Wüst, 
who was social democratic and anti-clerical.  Yet, Schmitt admits, much later on, he had come to 
recognize how deeply those secularist teachers had influenced him.
295
  Schmitt never seemed to 
accept evolutionary theory in detail, but he credits the Darwinist with helping to awaken within him 
a scientific curiosity.  He recalls with admiration that Sommer taught him about “Bushido”—the 
Japanese term for “way of the warrior,” indicating the samurai life.296  And Wüst taught Schmitt that 
theologians do not study pedagogy, but instead simply unleash themselves on schoolchildren in 
order to control them, a view echoed in Schmitt’s description of life boarding in the seminary.   
Schmitt claimed the Collegium Bernadinum was very old-fashioned and characterized by a 
defensive close-minded approach given “so-called subjectivism” was expelled “from all sides,” with 
the result that such a “strict Catholic religious education . . . could be impressed upon by 
nothing.”297  The use of the sarcastic diminutive “so–called” to describe those views the seminary 
rejected, fits the demeanor on Schmitt’s part of what would have been considered in contemporary 
parlance “modernist,” and would now likely be considered “liberal” Catholicism.  Such an 
impression of dissent is bolstered by Schmitt’s amusing, but bitter, contention that his experience 
in the seminary prepared him for certain periods of his adult life, specifically time spent in a 
military barracks, and then, in an American prisoner of war camp.
298
   
Although Schmitt could not recollect exactly which Attendorn teacher was responsible, one 
of them gave him a copy of David Friedrich Strauss’ Life of Jesus, an infamous book to the 
orthodox due, in part, to its denial of the historicity of the Gospel accounts of Christ.  Schmitt 
mentions only the presence of Strauss’ Indexed book being discovered amongst his belongings as 
grounds for his expulsion as a boarder at the seminary in September 1906, the beginning of his last 
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year in high school.  However, Mehring has discovered, a month earlier (August 3
rd
 1906), Schmitt 
was caught and punished with detention along with twelve classmates for an “illicit tavern visit.”299  
He believes that incident more likely to have resulted in Schmitt’s expulsion given that the 
seminary president informed his parents that his “behavior does not correspond to his 
knowledge.”300  Schmitt was left having to commute by train for the final months of his Gymnasium 
studies and his letters of the time to Auguste reveal no record of recriminations from his parents.  
They do, however, show that he enjoyed the long commute and looked upon his expulsion as a 
mark of pride; even signing himself ironically as “the beast man of Plettenberg” (der beese Mann 
aus Plettenberg).
301
   
While Schmitt’s postwar recollection leaves open the question of whether or not he had 
found Strauss’ Life of Jesus persuasive, we now know, from a letter of October 1906, he was 
certainly interested enough to expand his reading of the Tübingen theologian.  He records having 
read Strauss’ biography of Ulrich von Hutten (1488-1523), an important predecessor and then 
supporter of Martin Luther’s “Reformation.”302  Hutten was a violent critic of the papacy and 
engaged in actual military attacks on the Church within the Holy Roman Empire, most especially 
as a leader of the “Knight’s Revolt” against the Archbishop of Trier in 1522-23.  He was a 
significant writer of humanist satires as well, and Schmitt went on to read his Letters of Obscure 
Men (Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum), which inspired him to write his own satirical work in 1913, 
titled Silhouettes (Schattenrisse),
303
 under a pseudonym in part derived from the last name of one 
of Hutten’s characters, “Petrus Negelinus.” 
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Concomitantly, Schmitt developed a deep interest in modernist art and avant-garde 
bohemianism, especially expressionism, from adolescence.  At Attendorn he befriended Carl 
Franz Kluxen (1887-1968), the son of a textile storeowner, who would later write a book on 
Richard Wagner (1818-83) and who, like Schmitt, became a lifelong amateur collector of modern 
art.  Kluxen introduced Schmitt to the music of Wagner, and then, more potently, the thought of 
controversial Austrian philosopher, Otto Weininger (1880-1903).
304
  Schmitt’s Wilhelmine diaries 
reveal that his views on sex and sexual morality were deeply shaped by reflecting upon Weininger’s 
infamous 1903 book, Sex and Character.
305
  Weininger fostered some of Schmitt’s worst 
intellectual proclivities, certainly his racial anti-Semitism, but also his vanity and self-adoration in 
believing himself destined to be a “universal genius.”  Most especially for present concerns, 
Weininger identified Jews with the “feminine,” which he defines as the unethical and irrational, as 
passivity.  To Weininger, the “feminine” has been a terrible influence on modern life because 
women lack a true ego, or soul, and individuality.  Schmitt reflects Weininger’s views on the 
feminine in his own lifelong treatment of women, even describing one of his later mistresses as 
“having no soul.”306  
Given that Attendorn was a Prussian state school, Schmitt was also exposed to the 
nationalist and Protestant interpretation of German history, particularly in Heinrich von Trietschke 
(1834-96).  In 1912, Schmitt published a short story titled “Der Spiegel” (“The Mirror”) in a 
literary and cultural arts magazine, Die Rheinlande.  The education of the story’s protagonist, 
Franz Morphenius, is described thus:   
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In the religion class from 8 to 9 in the mornings he believed in the Trinity (he also believed in a four-, five- 
and six-unity); in the second, Mathematics class, he laughed merrily over the mockery of religion of the 
somewhat frivolous teacher; in history class he glowed over Patriotism, so that his eyes were often filled with 
tears; and in reading Horace he enjoyed as a cosmopolitan Halkyone [mythological Greek concept of a 
woman who is aloof and reserved, out of reach, introspective, disdainful].  On the whole, he felt comfortable; 
he often had sentimental moods . . .
307
 
 
Although the standard narrative believed based on Schmitt’s postwar recollections that his faith 
survived his secular education at Attendorn intact,
308
 given the evidence now available, it is far more 
likely that Schmitt’s own high school experience is identical with the description he gives of 
Morphenius’s.  Schmitt’s education at Attendorn is thus analogous to Friedrich Nietzsche’s at 
Schulpforta a generation earlier: vestigial faith destroyed by the impact of modern scientific 
learning, Darwinism, and rationalist biblical criticism; combined with a deep interest in the classics, 
languages, modernist art, and philology.
309
 
After graduation from Attendorn, the eighteen-year-old Schmitt decided to attend the 
Friedrich-Wilhelm University (now called Humbolt) of Berlin “the pinnacle of the German 
university system.”310  His application indicates he intended to apply his language-heavy Attendorn 
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studies to the discipline of philology.
311
  However, Schmitt’s wealthy uncle, André Steinlein (dates 
unavailable), suggested the far more practical jurisprudence.
312
  When Schmitt arrived on campus 
on April 25, 1907, he recalled Steinlein’s advice and registered in the law department.  Late in life 
he recalled that he “found the study of law wonderful because it started with Roman law in the first 
semester.  That was for me a pleasure: Latin—an immense joy.”313  Any conflict over his decision to 
opt for jurisprudence instead of philology was immediately assuaged when he recognized how 
useful the latter was for the study of law.  He was awed by Berlin as a “new world” and considered 
the university “a temple of higher spirituality.”314  Yet, Schmitt would transfer to Munich after the 
Winter Semester of 1907/08, and then settle at the University of Straßburg in the Winter Semester 
of 1908/09. 
In the winter of 1946-7, Schmitt wrote a short recollection upon the two semesters he spent 
studying law at the University of Berlin.  He describes himself as having arrived as “an obscure 
young man from humble origins” with allegiances to neither “the ruling class nor the opposition.” 
Poverty and humility were the guardian angels that held me in the dark.  This means that I, standing in 
complete darkness, looked from the darkness into a brightly lit room.  For an audience and observers this is 
the best position. The actors in the brightly lit room did not feel the slightest compulsion towards me.  They 
had a very different audience in mind . . .  .  In this way I could look at them better than they themselves . . . 
[study] the social and historical life of the people, the behavior of microphysical processes of world history on 
macro historical events.  Anyway, it was an advantage to be in the dark.  L' obscurité protégé Mieux [the 
darkness protected better].
315
 
 
Schmitt goes on to claim that he did not want to leave the darkness and be integrated into the 
social life of Berlin:  
Of even greater benefit was that I had no thought of striving for the light from my darkness.  I was a Catholic 
educated young man from West Germany, who by his parents, grandparents and spiritual relatives had strong 
memories of Bismarck’s culture war.  The Kulturkampf had not been a bloody civil war.  But the conflict was 
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still sharp enough to distance a young Catholic from the ruling class.  . . .  [I]t took many personal encounters 
and a long-standing process of dialectical confrontation, before I really understood . . . [that] . . .  although a 
hostility and conscious opposition did not result, [I had] sufficient distance from the myths of the 
Bismarckian Empire and the national liberal atmosphere of the University of Berlin.  I participated in the 
spectacle that Berlin offered to me without identifying myself with it.
316
  
 
The sentiments and autobiographical claims expressed in “1907 Berlin” are fundamental to the 
standard narrative and the text is frequently quoted as evidence for his Catholicity.  For example, 
Schmitt’s claimed sense of cultural alienation when he first studied in Berlin as a provincial 
Catholic caused Bendersky to speculate that he had sought and found at Straßburg an approach to 
the law more amenable to his Catholic beliefs.
317
  Mehring correctly rejects such a speculative 
extrapolation and believes that the far more prosaic, but likely, reason for Schmitt’s final transfer to 
the University of Straßburg was financial; it was simply a much cheaper location for him.
318
   
“1907 Berlin” also promotes the claim that Schmitt’s familial “strong memories of 
Bismarck’s culture war” made him immune to the nationalist myths of the Protestant ruling class.  
However, this claim also fails to match the contemporary evidence.  We already dealt above with 
the ambivalent record of his great-uncle priests as regards the Kulturkampf as well as his lack of 
sympathy for the likely embattled and protective stance the priests at the Collegium Bernadinum 
took towards the faith.
319
  More to the point, however, is that Schmitt was a lifelong admirer of 
Bismarck.
320
  In a diary entry from January 1914, the twenty-six year old Schmitt records that having 
read Bismarck’s letters “to his bride has been good for me.  He is a good person.”  He goes on to 
criticize Bismarck for his “intense rage” and for being “addicted to power” as detrimental to his 
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actions against “Roman clericalism” and “in the labor union dispute,” but the entry overall strikes a 
tone of admiration.
321
 
Later, in 1929’s “Der unbekannte Donoso Cortés” (“The Unknown Donoso Cortés”), 
Schmitt’s tone is sympathetic when he notes that Bismarck: 
. . . feared a Catholic system of foreign policy.  The possibility of such a system appears to have been a 
dominant theme in Queen Eugenia’s [the Spanish-born French Empress, Eugénie, wife of Emperor 
Napoleon III] political thought, and it led to fantastic plans, all of which were aimed at uniting all the Catholic 
powers: France, Austria, Bavaria, the Rhinelands, Spain, and Latin America.  . . .  The mere thought of such 
a powerful Catholic network of foreign powers must have been disturbing and worrisome to Bismarck . . . 
[and was] an important root of the German Kulturkampf.
322
 
 
Schmitt then turns to Donoso’s view that the best scenario for European peace—and for the cause 
of German Catholics, although Schmitt does not acknowledge this aspect—is continued federalism 
in Germany. 
In particular, [Bismarck] knew how deeply these politicians [Donoso, Russian ambassador Peter von 
Meyendorff as well as the Empress Eugénie] were convinced that Protestant and Catholic Germany must 
form two separate states.  In this case, Bismarck was rightly concerned about a dangerous enemy of German 
national unity, just as the idea of a unified Germany appeared to be dangerous and unnatural to Donoso and 
his friends—an Unacceptable folly for Germany and Europe.323   
 
Schmitt is routinely taken to be a student of Donoso, and many of the former’s radical views are, 
wrongly, assumed to be derived from the latter.  Yet, Schmitt’s differences from the Spaniard are 
both legion and significant; among which his total and consistent lifelong rejection of the political 
principle of federalism ranks near the top, given it is a principle at the very core of modern 
German political Catholicism, and is in accord with the general Catholic social principle of 
subsidiarity. 
In a letter sent to Schmitt on June 23, 1932, Karl Eschweiler (1886-1936)—a theologian 
who would soon become a “brown priest”—told his friend, “Bismarck will be in heaven, because 
his Kulturkampf was for Protestants inevitable and for the Catholics derived from error, thus a 
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venial sin.”324  Eschweiler’s dismissal of the Kulturkampf as a minor injustice is a view shared by 
Schmitt if his essays on Donoso Cortés are any indication.  For in addition to the essay of 1929 
Schmitt sides with Bismarck against Donoso over the cause of German nationalist unification, 
along the Kleindeutsch lines, in his earlier text: “Donoso Cortés in Berlin (1849).”325  Bismarck 
understood Donoso as promoting the idea that the battle over “papal power and the ending of 
creedal struggles . . . must be fought ‘on the sands of Mark Brandenburg.’”326  Schmitt sides with 
Bismarck and evangelical Prussia against the Spanish Catholic diplomat when he notes: “The fact 
that the name of Donoso Cortés is referred to in this connection [the 1870 war with Austria]—a 
name strange and foreign to most readers of Bismarck’s memoirs—is a sign of Bismarck’s deepest 
instincts and a noteworthy aftereffect of the years of revolution.”327   
Returning to Schmitt’s time spent as a student in Berlin, he also mentions having there 
discovered Max Stirner (pen name of Johann Kaspar Schmidt, 1806-56) and finding his thought to 
be: “a true refreshment.”328  In Stirner’s radical Hegelian magnum opus The Ego and Its Own, he 
attacked liberal individualism as based on universalist abstractions derived from Christianity.  In 
opposition, Stirner pointed to the concrete differences and singularities amongst peoples.  These 
views are consistently evident in Schmitt’s own anti-individualism, decisionism, and emphasis on 
the concrete, as well as, his Hobbesian concern that the conceivably radical impact of Christianity 
be controlled by the state.
329
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While a student in Straßburg, Schmitt continued and deepened his interest in 
contemporary artistic trends.  He became best of friends, in the winter semester of 1908-9, with 
fellow law student Fritz Eisler (1887-1914), who, along with additional law students Kluxen and 
Eduard Rosenbaum (dates unavailable) worked with Schmitt on the production of an unpublished 
(and subsequently lost) serialized novel called Worm, about someone with a head of water and 
hollow tooth through which he sucks to slake his thirst.
330
  Eisler later partially co-authored 
Schmitt’s 1913 expressionist work in literary parody, Silhouettes.  Schmitt also formed a coterie 
with Straßburg writers René Schickele (1883-1940) and Ernst Stadler (1883-1914). 
The law faculty at Straßburg was dominated at the time by the elder statesmen of German 
legal positivism, Paul Laband (1838-1918).  However, Schmitt gravitated to Professor Fritz van 
Calker (1864-1957) as his mentor and director.  Schmitt took from Calker his interest in a political 
approach to the law as Calker specialized in how “political values” are the sources of positive 
laws.
331
  Schmitt was graduated summa cum laude with a law degree from Straßburg in 1910, on the 
strength of his dissertation On Guilt and Degrees of Guilt: A Terminological Investigation (Über 
Schuld und Schuldarten: Eine terminologische Untersuchung).  On Guilt is a work that already 
points towards the secularity of his thought as well as several of his fundamental, politically 
modern, concepts and concerns.    
    
On Guilt and Degrees of Guilt 
Schmitt’s dissertation set out to investigate, in criminal law, the uniformity or accuracy of 
usage between the concepts of “intent” and “negligence” as applied to determinations of the degree 
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of guilt (or “debt” owed) of the offender.332  He immediately makes clear that his investigation will 
be critical of the psychological approach of the dominant party of Positivists within German legal 
theory, such as expressed by Gustav Radbruch (1878-1943).  Radbruch moved neo-Kantianism in 
a positivist direction by arguing that terms like “negligence” are devoid of all normative content, but 
rather, are conceptually and psychologically “pure” legal terms.333  Legal positivism had dominated 
German legal theory since the 1870’s, especially in the work of Carl Friedrich von Gerber (1823-
1891) and Paul Laband, who treated positive law statutes “as the highest expression of the state’s 
will.”334  As a result, positivists “had sought to eliminate all traces of natural-law language—indeed, 
political and moral commentary of any kind—from the study of law.”335  It is crucial to recognize 
that Schmitt does not criticize positivism in the name of natural law theory, as a Catholic legal 
theorist likely would; rather, he begins—even in this earliest of his books—to establish a stance 
within modern legal theory that recognizes the role of political decision in establishing positive law.  
That is, Schmitt attacks the positivists for treating the law (and constitution) as well as the legal 
system itself as if it was simply a given, or a self-sustaining “machine,” rather than the result of both 
political will and judicial decision.     
In On Guilt, Schmitt builds from an initial recognition that since the fundamental principle 
of German criminal law is “no punishment without guilt,” then guilt must be, “something internal 
and subjective”336 specifically, “evil will.”  But how is a criminal’s evil will determined?  Schmitt 
muses over various psychological or normative interpretations of legal concepts to then reach the 
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answer: criminal will is determined by a judge’s application of the Criminal Code to an 
examination of the facts of the given “concrete situation” presented by the actions of the accused.337  
Positivists treated the law itself as the “norms” and so make “the formal analysis of the meaning of 
legal terms in statutes the exclusive focus of jurisprudence.”338  Schmitt’s basic reply to positivism is 
that it fails to account for the fact that the interpreter of the Criminal Code (of the norms) must be 
located above them; that the judge thus determines in act what content the words of the statutes 
contain.
339
  While Schmitt is, from a certain angle, a strong critic of positivism, and seems to be 
recalling the traditional Catholic emphasis on equity and prudential judgment, he has not rejected 
positivism’s essence.340  Rather, Schmitt pointed out that positive law itself is in a state of flux, it still 
needs to be made determinate, and only authority (judicial or political) can make the needed 
decision.  Schmitt posits no source for norms beyond the will of the human authorities responsible 
for creation of the positive law, unlike a natural law theorist, whether Kantian or Catholic.  He 
attacks modern liberal positivism for attempting to drive personality out of the law, leaving it self-
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referential and a matter of technique.  Schmitt’s mentor, Calker, taught him to examine the 
political origins of law and we can see here the roots of his mature decisionism: “he argued that the 
discretionary prerogative of a judge to determine a sentence highlighted the moment of decision as 
a free-floating element in the legal process.”341   
 
Schmitt’s life in Düsseldorf (1910-12) 
 After graduation from the University of Straßburg, and his first state exam in the spring of 
1910, Schmitt moved to Düsseldorf in July to begin the required five years of legal training under a 
judge or prosecutor.  He was sworn in as a clerk for the prosecutor of the Higher Regional Court 
of Düsseldorf on August 25, 1910 and worked in the district courts of Lobberich, Wegberg, and 
Mönchengladbach.  Then, from May 1911, Schmitt served as clerk to the Public Prosecutor and 
Judicial Councilor Hugo Lambert (dates unavailable) of the Düsseldorf Court of Appeals.  Upon 
his arrival in Mönchengladbach, Schmitt made the acquaintance of manufacturer Arthur Lamberts 
(dates unavailable).  Lamberts was impressed enough by the young law clerk to pay for the 
publication of his dissertation.  He also gave Schmitt access to the local upper class society, 
including the twin concert pianists, Helene and Marta Bernstein (dates for both unavailable).
342
  
The twin’s father was a wealthy man of business who had left the Jewish community in 1886, prior 
to marrying, and converted to Protestantism.  Schmitt began a courtship of Helene.  His letters to 
his sister make clear they were soon all, but engaged, to be married.  However, Helene’s parents 
intervened and told Schmitt that he was an unsuitable match for their daughter given his poverty 
and lack of prospects; further contact was forbidden.
343
  Indeed, the clerkship was unpaid, so 
Schmitt kept his options open by simultaneously working to establish an academic career.  He 
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resumed studies at the University of Straßburg in 1911, now for a doctorate of law.  In a letter to 
his sister of October 27, 1911,
344
 Schmitt indicates having then completed a second legal text, 
published in 1912 as Law and Judgment: A Study of the Problem of Legal Practice (Gesetz und 
Urteil: Eine Untersuchung zum Problem der Rechtspraxis).
345
  This text further develops his belief 
in a voluntarist concept of political or judicial will and decision. 
 
Law and Judgment 
In Law and Judgment, Schmitt investigates the question: “[upon] which normative principle 
is modern legal practice based?”346  That is, how can the correctness of a decision be determined?  
To start, he claims the positivist approach failed to recognize that a meaningful distinction exists 
between the question “when is the decision right?” and the question “when is the law interpreted 
correctly?”347  For Schmitt, such a distinction is imperative as there are plenty of judicial decisions 
rendered in which a judge is not relying on the law itself but on external rules, “cultural ideals,”348 or 
some other form of extra-legal induction.  Yet, these latter cases, which break free of the positive 
law, are exactly the ones of interest to him. 
Since there is general agreement that some sort of standard must be present under which 
the question of the correctness of a judicial decision can be subsumed, Schmitt lands upon a 
criterion autochthonous to legal practice.  He first reviews and rejects the argument that the 
intention of the lawmaker is determinative, because this approach risks relying on the fiction of an 
“ideal” legislator, not an authentic historical one—in no small part due to an often incomplete 
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record of just what, exactly, lawmakers intended.
349
  But he also denies that it is a matter of the 
subjectivity of the judge alone, despite the judge’s task of interpreting a law in a specific and unique 
set of concrete circumstances.
350
  Instead, Schmitt stresses the methodological difference between 
legal doctrine and legal practice, and argues that the criterion for determining the correctness of a 
decision is whether or not a “modern legal jurist” would agree with it: “A judicial decision is correct 
today if it can be assumed that another judge would have decided the same.  Another ‘judge’ here 
means the empirical type of quite learned modern jurist.”351  Schmitt’s proposed criterion stands as 
a version of the expertise of the jurist and the principle of collegiality and communicability amongst 
judges.  It is this foundation for a judicial decision that gives the legal system a “tendency to 
stability” in practice.352   
As with On Guilt, Schmitt is developing a more personalist and decisionist approach to the 
law in Law and Judgment.  He also is consistent with his later works by favoring a sociological and 
concrete practical account, in which first principles or universal extralegal norms are notable by 
their absence.  Schmitt emphasizes the relevant person (here the judge) who themselves may make 
a decision based on norms, but he does not investigate how one could get to those norms to begin 
with (such as from culture, religion, or philosophy).  For example, the only mention of natural law 
in the entire text is a single footnote in which he is dismissive of this traditional Catholic approach 
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to the establishment of political and ethical norms.
353
  Instead, a judge simply decides in a way that 
other judges will agree with and which will make decisions predictable.
354
   
 Within the positivist and neo-Kantian factions in modern German legal thought, Schmitt’s 
book was very well recieved.  A substantial review of Law and Judgment was soon penned by a 
student of the positivist Laband, Walter Jellinek (1885-1955), “a dean among German jurists,” who 
“remarked that Schmitt’s book on law and judgment ‘towered far above’ the cross-section of 
countless works on the subject.”355  The book was also very well received by the neo-Kantian 
contingent of German legal theory in a review for Kant Studien, by Felix Holldack (1880-1944).
356
  
Holldak noticed that Schmitt paid particular attention to times when a judge has to make a 
decision where “the law is silent.”357  Schmitt at this early stage is already moving towards his 
treatment in Political Theology of the exceptional case as determining the norm.
358
   
 
Schmitt’s life in Düsseldorf continued (1912-15) 
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While Schmitt was making progress on a path towards either a legal or academic career, he 
also showed the breadth of his intellectual interests during his time in Düsseldorf, especially in 
literary and bohemian directions.  In early 1912, Eisler introduced Schmitt to the poet Theodor 
Däubler (1876-1932), and the three took a summer trip to the Alsace region.  Däubler made 
another visit to see Schmitt in 1913.  For his part, Schmitt became a true devotee of the author of 
the—now forgotten—16,000 verse epic poem from 1910, Northern Lights (Das Nordlicht).  Schmitt 
wrote a short piece on Däubler in 1912, intended for publication in the magazine Der Brenner 
(The Torch), published by Ludwig von Ficker (1880-1967), but it never appeared.
359
  He later 
incorporated the piece into his book length study on Northern Lights, published in 1916.
360
  
Schmitt also came into contact with the naturalist author Wilhelm Schäfer (1868-1952), who 
convinced him to write for the cultural magazine he edited, Die Rheinlande (The Rhineland).  A 
total of six pieces appeared between 1911 and 1913.
361
  In addition, Schmitt published an article 
each on the Kantian philosophy of Hans Vaihinger (1852-1933),
362
 Wagner,
363
 and philosopher 
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860).
364
   
Of more practical interest for his legal and then academic career, Schmitt added two 
articles in legal theory after publishing Law and Judgment.
365
  On the strength of the book Schmitt’s 
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advisor, Calker, invited him to begin lecturing on criminal law and philosophy.  Schmitt declined 
given it did not pay well enough.
366
  He did, however, manage to compose a third legal text over the 
course of January 10
th
 to May 10
th
 1913.  It was published in 1914 as: The Value of the State and 
Importance of the Individual (Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen).
367
   
 
The Value of the State 
 Schmitt dedicated The Value of the State to his fiancée as “Pabla v. Dorotić” and 
borrowed a line of Däubler’s Northern Lights as a revealing opening quote: “First is the command, 
the people come later.”368  With such a quote Schmitt forcefully sets the tone for the ensuing anti-
individualism of the text, but it equally speaks to his political modernism, or Hobbesianism, since 
he duly prioritizes the political over the social.  Schmitt then begins The Value of the State by 
speaking of the necessity to critique contemporary life.  He announces that he will address defects 
in the “spirit of the times” of a “mechanistic age,” in which man is primarily understood as “free, 
skeptical,” and “an enemy of authority.”369  Schmitt rejects this liberal individualist anthropology, 
particularly in the third chapter, in which he compares the individual to the State.   
Schmitt there describes the State as “the highest earthly power,” a “super individual.”370  He 
proposes the State is a servant of “right” or of the individual, it cannot be both, and is rightly only 
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the former.
371
  In fact, “[t]he State is . . . the only subject of legal ethics, the only one who has rights 
in an eminent sense.”372  In an abstract published in Kant-Studien, Schmitt could not be clearer in 
summarizing the book’s statist conclusions:  
The State is the idea of the function of right.  It is the only legal subject in the specific sense, the only one who 
is entitled and obliged immediately by right.  The individual is only a function of the State.  . . . The book 
ends in the conclusion that neither the right nor the state recognizes the individual as subject of original or 
autonomous values.
373
 
 
This view is a common, but radical, modern view of the individual (qua citizen) as creature of the 
State.  Schmitt’s description of the relationship between the State and right374 has, however, led 
some commentators to believe that he is maintaining a normatively grounded, even a Catholic, 
point of view.
375
  Indeed, a year earlier in his diary Schmitt had recorded belief in law as normative, 
“an end in itself,” meant to shape “a state that corresponds to the norm.”376  In the text, Schmitt 
does compare the State and the Church, noting the latter can claim its catholicity as a basis of 
superiority over and against the former.  That is, as there is only one Church but hundreds of 
individual countries, the Church is, on this basis, superior.
377
  The Church’s self-assurance is the 
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basis of its legal order
378
 and also of the Church’s potestas indirecta (indirect power) as a moral 
authority with jurisdiction on whether the State’s laws correspond to the moral or natural divine 
law.
379
 
However, while Schmitt does cover the above discussion, it is also evident that he does not 
actually believe the Catholic Church’s conclusions, especially its belief in its superiority to the State.  
Rather, he presents the Church’s self-understanding as a useful model for emulation in both its 
unity and self-assurance.  The Church demonstrates a pure example of what the State should 
assume in its own concrete decisions, namely, certainty and the belief in its infallibility.  Schmitt 
even anticipates On Dictatorship and Political Theology by speculating the origin of the political 
doctrine of monarchical absolutism is founded upon “the doctrine of the Thomistic-Catholic 
Church” on the “infallible pope” who “is only an instrument, Vicar of Christ on Earth, servus 
servorum Dei (Servant of the servants of God).”380  Furthermore, as Balakrishnan astutely points 
out, there is simply no content given to the “higher law” as discussed by Schmitt.381  The higher law 
exists, in The Value of the State, merely as a cipher or null.  A contemporary reviewer recognized, 
                                                 
378
 From Balakrishnan: “According to Schmitt, one of the central problems of natural-law doctrine – the legitimacy of a 
title to power, and the conditions of obedience to those who have it – was simply not an issue for jurisprudence: ‘The 
question of how to help the empirical individual is no longer one of legal philosophy, just as little as the question of 
how the holder of power can be made to stick to the law’” (Balakrishnan, Enemy, 15). 
379
 Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates, 82. In this context Schmitt refers to the Spanish Jesuit and Thomist, a leading figure 
in the School of Salamanca, Francisco Suárez (1548-1617).  Bendersky believes Schmitt is open to the consideration 
“that in doubtful cases the Catholic Church could decide what constituted right, because it embodied universal ethical 
norms” (Bendersky, Theorist for the Reich, 11. 
380
 Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates, 95.  Another lesser example is that Schmitt discusses the charisma of the office of 
pope as of interest to lawyers by dint of being a form of “anti-naturalism” that has analogues in the law, such as the 
independent “will” of the law (ibid., 102). 
381
 Balakrishnan thinks the language of The Value of the State “often suggests a certain sympathy for neo-Thomist law, 
a ‘higher law’ which the state has the duty to ‘realize’ in the form of positive law.  But many of the substantive 
conclusions of this work were in fact stringently positivist . . . because Schmitt wrote ‘The state is a legal structure 
whose significance resides entirely in the task of realizing law.’  . . . [Yet] “[t]his ‘higher law’ which the state translates 
into positive law was so indeterminate, as Schmitt conceived it, that it could be known only through the decisions of 
the state; in other words, it was a logical fiction with no relation to the ethical precepts of the Catholic natural-law 
tradition.”  See Balakrishnan, Enemy, 15. 
101 
 
as well, Schmitt entirely lacked a “theory of norms.”382  His references to the Catholic Church were 
formal and legalistic, a recasting or transformation of the Church in its utility for the State.  This 
same approach is taken in all of Schmitt’s purportedly Catholic Weimar texts.383 
Although Schmitt critiques a particular rendition of modern philosophical anthropology, 
that of liberal individualism, his own political modernism is on display throughout The Value of 
the State.  First, he recognizes the foundational importance of the State
384
 and treats it as a special 
Power, the only “factual will” from which a complex of norms can emanate.385  This construction 
defines the relationship between the State and the law; law emanates from the will of the sovereign 
Power, the laws “contents are set by an act of sovereign decision.”386  Secondly, Schmitt claims the 
State is “the only entity in the eminent sense,” legitimated by being “the first servant of the law.”387  
The State as the sole “entity” or corporate person is a clear rejection of the pre-modern view of 
politics, in which society is ontologically prior to, and superior to, the governing part.  In Catholic 
thought—according to the principle of subsidiarity—there are multiple political “persons”; hence, 
the family is the foundational unit for the political community and the Church is the preeminent 
corporate “person” (or “unity of order”).388   
Given that we now know the extent to which Schmitt admired Stirner, and the philosopher 
viewed individualism as a dangerous abstraction for ethics derived from Christianity, it is 
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implausible to view Schmitt’s anti-liberalism as in-line with a Catholic corporatist critique.  Indeed, 
Schmitt treats the individual as gaining its meaning only within the tasks of the state,
389
 claiming that 
placing the value of the individual in his function in the state does “not destroy the dignity of the 
individual, but only shows the way to a justified dignity.”390  The author of Rerum Novarum would 
be surprised to learn that human dignity is justified by one’s function within the modern state.  
Schmitt’s choice of words is telling, since he lacks a theological understanding of justification, so 
rather than human nature perfected by grace, he proposes the State as providing that function.  In 
so doing, Schmitt also displays at this early date, “an anthropological pessimism that he attributes 
later to writers such as Donoso Cortes and Hobbes.”391   
The Value of the State was very well received amongst jurists, even by the school of legal 
thought led by Austrian liberal, Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), which stressed the rule of law and 
restraint of executive authority.  Schmitt sent a review copy to Georg Lukács (1885-1971) who 
henceforward became an interested reader.  Schmitt even received an approving letter from 
laicized priest Carl Jentsch, (1833-1917) a member of the schismatic Old Catholics, in 1875, and 
known as a supporter of “rabid Pan-German land conquest.”392  Jentsch tells Schmitt that he is 
pleased to see the jurist understands politics not “biologically,” but “idealistically,” as subject to 
“immutable standards.”  He also notes that despite his own opposition to the papacy he does 
respect how the Catholic Church is “able to protect the territory of conscience” against the 
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powerful State; both points show Jentsch did not fully apprehend Schmitt’s own views.393  Overall, 
within mainstream German Catholic intellectual life, Schmitt’s The Value of the State went 
unnoticed. 
At the time of The Value of the State’s composition, Schmitt was struggling to make ends 
meet.  He was only rescued from poverty by the generosity of Privy Counsellor Hugo am Zehnhoff 
(1855-1930), a Center Party Reichstag Deputy, who began, in 1913, to periodically send him legal 
work, and attempted to foster a paternal relationship towards the young law clerk.  Schmitt’s 
financial concerns in these years are a dominant theme of his diaries and oppressed his thoughts, 
particularly once he became involved with and then engaged to his first wife.   
 
Schmitt and His First Wife, Pauline Marie “Cari” Dorotić 
In February 1912, at the age of twenty-three, Schmitt began a relationship with a dancer 
(likely cabaret or vaudevillian) in Düsseldorf.  In a letter to his sister, Auguste, of May 19, Schmitt 
mentions having begun a romance with a Spanish dancer, which a later letter names “Pabla.”394  
Schmitt describes Pabla—the Spanish version of the name Pauline—as a dancer who lives out of a 
suitcase, traveling through the capitals of Europe.  She speaks German badly, so has been taking 
lunch with Schmitt in his room, after which he reads to her to help teach her the language.  He 
disingenuously adds that his sister need not be scandalized by these private encounters.
395
  Shortly 
after, Schmitt suddenly drops any mention of a Spanish dancer and Pabla morphs into a dancer 
called “Cari” who claims to be the Viennese born daughter of a noble Croatian landowner Johann 
Francis von Dorotić.  Cari told Schmitt that she was born in 1888, to make herself five years 
younger, and claimed her parents died young, after which, she was raised in Munich by an aunt 
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whose cruelty she fled from into the dance halls.  The consensus view agrees that the two dancers 
are one and the same despite the discrepancies of going from being Spanish and speaking poor 
German, to being a Croatian-Austrian noble raised in Munich, thus fluent.  Schmitt would learn, in 
1922, while investigating her background for divorce proceedings, that rather than a countess, the 
woman he knew as Pauline Carita “Cari” Maria Isabella Dorotić was baptized in Vienna as a 
Protestant with the name Pauline Marie on July 18, 1883 (she died in 1968), as the illegitimate 
daughter of Auguste Marie Franziska Schachner (dates unavailable).  She was later legitimized 
when Shachner married a Croatian plumber from Zagreb named Johann Dorotić (dates 
unavailable).  From 1889, Cari was raised in Munich, where her father worked. 
Schmitt and Dorotić became deeply involved in a rapid manner.  They spent Christmas 
1912 together, rather than Schmitt returning to Plettenberg to be with his family.
396
  His letters to 
Auguste and diaries record a deep sense of social inferiority in general,
397
 but also specifically 
towards Cari given his belief that she was of noble lineage.
398
  Schmitt’s sense of inferiority fed his 
social ambition, such as suggested in a diary entry maligning the memory of Helene Bernstein who 
is “false gold” (as a wealthy bourgeois) compared to the noble Dorotić’s “pureness.”399  In addition 
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to ambition, his very involvement with what Zehnhoff described as a “Tingle-Tangle” (low 
vaudevillian or cabaret) dancer,
400
 reflects Schmitt’s dedicated bohemianism.  Likewise, Schmitt’s 
sexual activity with Dorotić is also evidence of his generally secular turn of mind as concupiscence 
will always be a major motivating factor in the rejection of religion, especially Catholicism.  
A review of Schmitt’s diary over a five month period, from September 1913 to January 
1914, reveals a short interlude from Schmitt’s long running movement away from Catholic religion, 
in which he attempts a degree of continence and mass attendance.  It is worth looking at in detail 
because it is a point, after which, there is no strong evidence he ever returned to a penitent and 
orthodox practice of the religion of his early childhood.
401
  Schmitt’s diaries record his deep desire 
for Dorotić and the lustful, even manic, nature of their relationship.402  He had a lifelong habit of 
recording his sexual activities in his diaries in a euphemistic but succinct manner.  Entries in 
September and October 1913, for example, record sex with Dorotić as having “been naughty”403 or 
as having had a “merry,”404 “wonderful,”405 or “glorious”406 ejaculation.407   
                                                                                                                                                             
authenticate her origin” it does seem reasonable to agree that it is “[h]ard to believe that Carl fell for it” (ibid., 58).  
Rather, the relevant vices exhibited in his diaries (social ambition, lust, sexual rapacity, vanity, imprudence) are 
exhibited for the entirety of Schmitt’s adult life. 
400
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Schmitt announces their engagement in a letter to his sister of October 28, 1913, informing 
Auguste she will meet his fiancée upon return to Plettenberg, as Dorotić will be living for a 
prolonged period with their parents.
408
  He bought a ring and worked to arrange a quick wedding, 
but then Dorotić “discovered” that her Austrian passport had been lost.  The wedding was put off 
indefinitely as she must try and get new identity papers.  Schmitt describes himself at the time as 
living as a “married bachelor.”409   
While working in Düsseldorf, with Cari at his parent’s home, Schmitt dreads her being 
“around the abominable, wicked, vicious and evil mother and too spoiled little Anna [Schmitt’s 
twelve year old youngest sister].”410  The disdain Schmitt had for his mother411 seems to have 
primarily been a matter of considering her “strict,”412 disagreeing with her traditional morality, and 
her desire for him to attend Mass and practice the faith.
413
  When he visits Plettenberg a couple of 
weeks later, Schmitt records having rose early and attended Mass with Cari much to “the great joy” 
of his mother; yet, later that night, Schmitt secretly rendezvoused with his fiancée on the stairs and 
quietly hurried her to his bed.
414
   
Schmitt soon seems to have experienced a bout of conscience and was moved to try and 
practice continence as well as Catholic religion, perhaps after his mother discovered the couple’s 
fornication.  For example, on December 4, 1913, he records: “In the card room, suddenly read 
the Church fathers enthusiasm about virginity again and was deeply moved.”415  On Christmas day, 
Schmitt attended mass with Cari where: “We worshiped with great devotion, it was lovely.  The 
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importance of the Catholic Church was again renewed in me.”416  He attends early morning mass 
again the next Sunday, December 28.  Subsequent entries show that he was attempting to remain 
continent at home with Cari and they attended mass again on New Year’s Day, a holy day of 
obligation.
417
  The next Monday, January 5, 1914, we find Schmitt reading in the Bible for 
consolation.  He quotes Proverbs 14: 11: “House of the wicked shall be destroyed, but the hut of 
the upright shall flourish.”418   
At this point Schmitt received quite a jolt.  On Wednesday January 7, an express letter 
from Cari arrived, asking him to come to Plettenberg because his mother had accused her of being 
pregnant.  Another express letter arrived soon after, from his father, telling Schmitt to stay.  In 
response to these missives he cried, and despairingly wrote in his diary: “So this is the end.”419  
Rather than the end, the next day Schmitt arrived at the family home and had “a small scene with 
mother.”  He describes his father’s actions during the confrontation as “weak,” and “sappy.”420  
Schmitt attended low mass again on Sunday January 11, where it so happened that a pastoral letter 
on “the Christian family and the prevention of conception was read.”421  After the drama with his 
mother, and a period of time in which he seemed to have been trying to bend his will towards 
sexual continence, his reaction to this reminder of Catholic natural law ethics was to be “deeply 
scared.”422  Later that week, Schmitt is again reading the Bible, this time before going to sleep, but 
he notes that he went to bed with great desire for Cari and then adds the next morning that he was 
“horny” for her.423  Unfortunately, both Schmitt’s practice of sexual continence and of the Catholic 
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religion during these years was short-lived.  Schmitt’s diaries very rarely record Mass attendance 
beyond the few weeks covered above, and then, primarily on a few high holy days such as 
Christmas.
424
  These stand as an intermittent exception to the general trend of Schmitt’s will and 
thought towards a complete rejection of the Catholic faith.   
Eight months into his relationship with Dorotić, Schmitt recorded in his diary a portentous 
reflection given his developing and soon to be lifelong sexual behavior.  He ponders why “the man 
who stays faithful to a single woman has fear of her and for losing her and so is asocial,” but the 
“healthy” man who even “cheerfully goes to war . . . is always polygamous, takes harmless delight 
in paying common whores” and suffers from no “devastating jealousy.”425  The reflection, of course, 
points well beyond the lustful activity of a young couple in love.  Although he had attempted for a 
period to practice continence and even for a short span of time was attending Mass, he soon 
conformed his thought and will to the above sentiments on male sexuality.  His first recorded 
instance of procuring the services of a prostitute is on Sunday September 6, 1914.  He had long 
desired engaging one, and his reaction covers relief from a feeling that had long oppressed him, as 
well as waves of feeling “ashamed, happy, cleansed,” but when returning home he goes to bed 
thinking of his fiancée with the “happy intention” to “never again!” make use of a prostitute.426  
Now the periods of continence become farther apart.  A few months later an exception to the 
norm occurs when Schmitt shows restraint first by leaving Cari’s when she wanted him to stay the 
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night, and then, having “controlled [him]self” and gone home after encountering a prostitute 
looking for a john.
427
   
On December 7, 1914, Schmitt took and passed the final written assessor’s exam.  
Anticipating passing the final oral exam, he moved in with Dorotić in January 1915.  His 
benefactor, the devout Catholic Zehnhoff, criticized Schmitt’s decision to cohabitate with Cari.428  
In fact, Zehnhoff had often tried to dissuade Schmitt from marrying a “Tingel-Tangle” dancer.  He 
even suggested that the jurist could be matched with his niece in what certainly would have been an 
advantageous marriage as well as being to a co-religionist instead of the Protestant Dorotić.429  
Rather than respect his benefactor’s advice, Schmitt’s diaries record bitterness at feeling indebted 
to Zehnhoff’s patronage; on one occasion, Schmitt even records homicidal thoughts directed 
toward him.
430
   
Soon after moving in together, Dorotić succeeded in gaining forged documents to match 
her identity and age as she had claimed them to be.  They then obtained a marriage license and 
had the civil ceremony on February 13, 1915, at the Cologne registry office.  The next day, Schmitt 
reported to the military barracks in Munich, but was able to obtain a few days leave for the 
Catholic marriage ceremony, at the Marienkirche in Düsseldorf, on February 20.  Afterwards, they 
honeymooned in Düsseldorf for a few days before Schmitt traveled to Berlin to complete his 
clerkship, by taking a final oral assessor’s exam, on February 25, at the Court of Appeals.  
 
Schmitt’s Inner Life in Düsseldorf (1910-15) 
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One of the more surprising elements his diaries reveal is the severity of his suicidal 
tendencies and manic depression, particularly in the 1910’s, which will be dealt with in more detail 
below.  It is in the context of these frequent bouts of melancholy and even despair we find Schmitt, 
at times, willing to implore God for release from mental anguish.  For example, after excoriating 
himself for his desperate sense of guilt and wickedness to not be worthy of Cari by reason of 
laziness, dishonesty, and a lack of geniality, Schmitt cries: “O dear God, help me, Lord Jesus.  
Lord Jesus?”  But, he then states the belief that nothing or no one is there to help.431  The diary 
entry for June 13, 1914 is arguably the most nihilistic and despairing of all.  It covers, particularly 
well, how his interest in religion was motivated by bouts of despair or conscience, while also 
reflecting his deep alienation from Catholicism: 
. . . I am lost and half [dead].  I stagger and hesitate like a wounded man, my brain is tired, dull, faded, 
withered.  No faith, no despair, no rage, no indignation, only one pitiful nothing.  I can believe in everything 
and believe in nothing.  No one can say how terrible this is, and I have lured a kind trusting child to me and 
thrown her with myself into this destruction.  I am a murderer.  I am destroyed, become nothing and have 
murdered the soul of a child.  Where shall I flee [?]; to the Catholic Church [?].  But I really cannot.  Just as 
well to the great Dalai Lama or to a Mexican god.  Nothing more, nothing at all.  Not even more thinking 
about my emptiness.  End, insanity.  Finish.  Off.  Conclusion.  Make off with yourself.  What are you still 
doing here [?], you bum, you bankrupt, you fraud.  Every conversation that you must engage in is fraud; 
because you converse as if you would save something, yet know nothing, and believe neither in you nor in the 
one with whom you speak.  So why the vulgarity [?]. 
 
In my terrible agony and anguish of the soul, I can talk to no one.  No one believes me; I seem so nice and 
friendly, I am too genial to expect anyone to listen to me.  I know people demand of one that they be a fresh, 
healthy, hopeful man that feels youthful enthusiasm like them, and I am obedient and appear [as such] . . . 
And I am really just a poor, helpless, desperate good-for-nothing.  And at night I scream to the silent, 
unknown gods for help and advice, plead to the Mother of God and all the saints; but I might as well pray to 
a wooden box.  Why does one sit so alone in the world and beg with looks to all sides for help and still 
remain alone.  If anything is left in me it is this fear that drives me around, the debilitating, devastating terror 
that consumes the residue and leaves nothing more of me.  I am finished.
432
    
 
Several months later he berated himself in a melancholic fashion as being “too weak,” often 
thinking of Saint Augustine—presumably of The Confessions—and yet declaring he, Schmitt, 
“know[s] nothing,” and can “do nothing,” and concludes “I am just nothing.”433  Soon after, when 
he is wrought with concerns over his coming state assessor’s exam as well as pending marriage to 
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Cari, he records: “In my anguish I make vows and say prayers.”434  But as the extended quote from 
June shows, these moments also elicited admissions of deep doubt as well: “I have no trust in God 
and am a ridiculously bad person”435; or the entry of May 27, 1915, where he expresses frequent 
confusion over whether to turn to faith and apply it to his religious questions.
436
   
Schmitt’s intellectual connection to the faith was even more superficial than his ambivalent 
emotional attachment.  As will become clear in later chapters, his “Catholic” works are actually 
secular-minded utilizations of the institutional or canonical framework of the Church, or a few 
theological concepts, as a model or ideal for the secular state.  This approach to the Church is 
found as early as a 1912 diary entry where Schmitt reflects upon Faust’s “solution” as referring “to 
the state, which is also an overcoming of temporality.  The ideal is of the Papal States.”437  Beyond 
secular appropriation of Catholicism, he also expressed his simple lack of belief in his diaries, 
often prompted into expression by melancholy or despair.  
Schmitt had long suffered from depression; the earliest mention was in the first year for 
which we have a diary, 1912, when he was twenty-four.
438
  His depression probably predates this 
given an entry from 1914 records Schmitt being reassured by the fact that he is still alive despite 
living for years “in the same despair as now.”  He thinks it will “probably always remain so 
throughout life until death.”439  Frequently, his depression leads to suicidal thoughts,440 and he 
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reached a nadir after learning in a letter of October 7, 1914, that his good friend, Fritz Eisler, had 
died in battle at the front.
441
  Completely distraught over Eisler’s death, Schmitt expresses strong 
thoughts of suicide, wondering how it is that he is the one alive.  Grieving is a common theme in 
the ensuing entries.
442
  When Schmitt receives back his letters to Eisler, marked “dead,” he declares 
in his diary, on October 19, 1914: “Christianity has nothing to do with Europe.  The present war 
proves it.  Perhaps Catholicism.  But ugh disgusting!”443  He soon follows up with one of his most 
pronounced anti-Catholic entries, on December 5, 1914: 
There is no succession of Christ in the legal sense.  But the Catholic Church understands her papacy in the 
legal sense as succession from Christ who legalizes the pope by a coherent chain of endorsements.  Isn’t this 
outrageous?  Has anyone already recognized this in all its wickedness[?]  If one has a trace of intelligence and 
they see the palaces of the bishops and cozy houses of the parish priests, they would scream with laughter or 
anger if the well-fed residents of these houses come out and preach poverty and describe themselves as privy 
councilors of Christ.  Really, secret conventional councils of Christ.
444
 
 
Schmitt’s material concerns and social envy are present in this entry as well as his lifelong 
agreement with the negative interpretation of the Catholic Church found in Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s 
(1821-81) parable of the Grand Inquisitor.
445
  He immediately continues in the same entry:  
I believe in Providence.  There is a purely physiological need.  It preaches a number of good days.  Find 
sociology!  The man is interested in scientific problems, so he is a professor.  Great!  The Catholic Church is 
done once a good sociologist explains it; that would be one more task.
446
 
 
Schmitt is even moved to reflections against the Church when reading modern French literature, 
such as Gustave Flaubert’s The School of Sensibility447 and Stendhal’s The Red and the Black.448   
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Although Schmitt’s politics would always be anti-liberal, the same cannot be said for his 
religious beliefs, such as they were.  He was an early convert to the Gallicanism of the heretical 
Catholic theologian, Johann Joseph Ignaz von Döllinger (1799-1890).  Döllinger was a Church 
historian, theologian, priest and canon lawyer.  However, he was excommunicated in 1871, due to 
his extreme rejection of the dogma of papal infallibility.  Döllinger was a strong proponent of state 
superiority to the Church, who caricatured papal infallibility as indicating that the pope would 
dominate over secular rulers.  Döllinger’s excommunication was a key moment leading to the 
development of the “Old Catholic” schism.  Schmitt was very sympathetic to Gallican views, given 
that he records in his diary entry for Thursday October 2, 1913, how he had “read Döllinger, 
angry about the Roman Church.”449  On the subsequent Sunday, Schmitt attends Mass—in itself a 
rare occurrence—with Cari, and has a chance to demonstrate how good a student of Döllinger he 
has become.  He records, “a terrible Catholic priest talked about politics in the pulpit,” and they 
“were shocked from the Church.”450  Cari described the priest as “a profane being” and Schmitt 
returned to his reading of Döllinger that afternoon.
451
  Two months later, we find Schmitt reading 
Hugues-Félicité Robert de Lamennais (1782-1854), another liberal and Gallican theologian.
452
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In addition to Gallicanism, Schmitt’s diaries reveal the extent to which Gnosticism 
persuaded him.  Schmitt read “everything he could get his hands on”453 about the Gnostics.  
Döllinger was one source, but the primary source was the liberal Protestant church historian, Adolf 
Karl Gustav von Harnack (1851-1930).
454
  Schmitt records in his diary on Sunday, December 14, 
1913, reading Harnack on Gnosticism “with great enthusiasm until late in the evening.”455  
Harnack’s treatment of the ancient Gnostics, most especially Marcion of Sinope (85-160), is one of 
the more profound influences on Schmitt’s thought.  In Marcion’s reading of biblical texts he 
could not square the God preached by Jesus Christ with that of Jehovah, the God of the Jewish 
scriptures.  He discerned two distinct gods being described, a “god of love” revealed by Jesus and 
the Jews’ “god of law.”  The first of these divine principles, the god of love, favors humans, but 
only as spiritually concerned, while the material world and bodies are subject to the god of law.  
The all-merciful god of love desires a wholly spiritual existence for humankind, while the god of 
law is subject to wrath and vindictiveness.  The god of law is credited by the Gnostics with creating 
and ruling the material world. 
Harnack believes Marcion came to his views based on a motive he attributes to St. Paul, 
namely, resentment of the Jewish overtones of Christian faith.  Marcion sees the Law as vindictive 
and wrathful and believes Paul describes a God that cannot possibly be the same as this Jewish 
God of the Law.  Therefore, the Gnostic sought to purge Christianity of any and all influence from 
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Judaism.  First, this meant simply dropping the Jewish scriptures from the Bible.  Secondly, most 
of the Christian canon had to likewise be excised or highly revised.  Marcion’s exercise in editing 
resulted in discarding all of the accepted Gospel accounts and other works of the New Testament, 
except for a now unrecognizable version of the Gospel of Luke and ten of the Pauline Epistles, 
with the latter edited to a lesser degree.  Harnack defends Marcion’s version of the Christian canon 
as the true Gospel untainted by Judaism and these readings likely added fuel to Schmitt’s own 
lifelong anti-Semitism.
456
   
Of even more certain impact is Marcion’s basic duality of a god of love and one of law.  
Expressionist painter and writer Richard Seewald (1889-1976), of Munich’s “New Secession” 
(Neue Sezession) group founded in 1913, recalled an evening late in the First World War when he 
debated with Schmitt the nature of God:   
The evening remains unforgettable to me in which he, the great jurist, cited justice as the quintessence of God 
and disregarded my modest protest lodged for love as a law according to God’s justice.  I will never forget our 
walk down the Ludwigstraße where he discoursed with great enthusiasm about Marcion.  And are not these 
two seemingly random memories really the key to his behavior?
457
 
 
Seewald is not the only acquaintance whom Schmitt enthusiastically regaled with Gnostic theology 
during the war years, as early as October 1914 he records having spent a Sunday telling the sister of 
his deceased friend Eisler all about the Gnostics.
458
  Five months later he recounts having had lunch 
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with Fritz’s brother, George Eisler (1892-1983), to whom he “put [his] theory of the God of Justice 
and the other God of this world.”459  In fact, his diaries record a serious personal identification with 
Gnosticism as well as an intellectual commitment to its views. 
In an entry from July 1914 Schmitt relates having met a nephew of Zehnhoff, who 
happened to be a Benedictine monk.  The manner in which the monk talked and joked about his 
own mother made the easily scandalized Schmitt “shudder to think of [him] as a monk or at the 
altar.”460  Schmitt’s reaction to the thought of such a representative of the priesthood was to find it 
“hilarious” and to declare he “was shocked.”461  He then “noticed with the utmost certainty that [the 
monk] refrains from shaking [my] hand,” and though Schmitt does not know why he would 
undermine him by so acting, he suspects that it “[p]robably is the instinct a cleric has against 
Gnostics.”462  A month later Schmitt claims the Gnostics were the correct interpreters of Christ:  
I think I feel it: For a few days of the human life one has not only their own personal fate but the fate of one’s 
people and of millions put in their hands.  The days go by fast.  Then one feels the general consciousness of 
guilt.  Whoever then holds out and is strong is rewarded; whoever does not bear it and is bad, goes under.  
Nobody knows anything about it, but the turn comes to everyone, at least to everyone who understands these 
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words of mine at all.  Then he should pull himself together, because it gets difficult.  This is, by the way, 
already really pronounced from Jesus.  The Gnostics did know it.
463
 
 
Schmitt, here, gives voice to the extent to which Gnosticism provided him with an appealing 
rationalization of human sinfulness and guilt, as well as, first reveals his interest in the concept of 
fate, which we will soon examine.   
To the Gnostic a strict dualism exists between the material and spiritual orders, with the 
human body and its sensual actions considered intrinsically evil.  This dualism allows the complete 
psychological separation of one’s spiritual existence from one’s bodily actions, hence, sin and the 
guilt that accompanies it—certainly sexual as the most powerful of sensual appetites—can be treated 
by the Gnostic as unreal and as not touching upon the soul.  Jesus preached the all-forgiving and 
merciful god of love who will simply forgive all transgressions of a bodily nature since man’s 
physical existence is only subject to the lesser god of law and Satan.  Schmitt again alludes to 
Gnosticism in January, 1915
464
, and makes another explicit avowal of his belief, in March, while 
reflecting upon the trials of military service: 
When will this horrible nonsense end? . . .  Walked around, thinking about the state, militarism, St 
Augustine.  I flew into a rage again, raped; what a shame.  How atrocious is the state, and the Church tolerates 
it out of inertia . . .  [The military] will recognize the world, it has grasped the god of this world, the law.  But 
God does not suffer.  I become Gnostic, die for my beliefs.
465
 
 
The entry then records a prayer and ends with a reflection: 
Tonight I recognized the God of this world, the God of Law and that he wears it with love, beauty and 
comeliness.  I know the God of Love but can only remain silent over him.  You puzzle over injustice?  So 
you believe in the God of this world.  Thou art not a Christian! (No, Gnostic).
466
   
 
And in a related fashion, Schmitt frequently records in his diary deeply Manichean attacks on the 
body, such as: “I am disgusted by my flesh.  I feel nailed to the flesh.  Disgusting.  I must die, 
rotten, stinking, away, and it does not help.”467  
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 Theodor Däubler was also a strong Gnostic influence on Schmitt.
468
  In his 1916 work of 
literary criticism on Däubler’s Northern Lights, Schmitt situates the poem in the spirit of the 
religious volatility of “Alexandria in the first Christian centuries . . . where the Gnostics, Christians, 
and pagan philosophers” battled and raged.469  He then refers to the Gnostic Marcion as, for 
Catholic’s, the “patriarch of all heresy” because of his dualist conception of a world in which the 
human soul is helplessly manipulated by the devil unless it obeys the dictates of the god of law.  
Schmitt’s treatment in his Däubler commentary of evil and his pessimistic anthropology is also 
expressed in terms of Gnostic dualism.
470
  Further proving that his postwar recollections are 
untrustworthy, Schmitt claims—in Ex Captivitate Salus—his interpretation of Northern Lights was a 
Christian one, and Däubler had not contradicted him, but that only now has he come to realize it 
is actually a poem “shining in the dim light of mankind’s Gnosis.”471  He now believes the poem 
was Promethean themed, and ultimately about mankind saving itself.  The problem with this 
postwar recollection is that, in 1912, Schmitt had written an unpublished short piece on Däubler 
that was finally made available by the collating efforts of Piet Tommissen, in 1988.  In it, Schmitt 
describes the philosophical point of view expressed by Northern Lights as the merging of spirit 
with an elemental force common to the natural philosophy of the pre-Socratics, the Gnostics of 
early Christianity, and nineteenth-century idealism.  The jurist then asserts this syncretic 
philosophy’s superiority to the barbarian materialism of the present.472   
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The various strands of Schmitt’s early psychological and intellectual life came together on 
Thursday October 8, 1914, when he has an experience, which has been likened to Saint 
Augustine’s “tolle lege” (“take up and read”) moment of conversion.473  While grieving at night over 
the death of his friend Eisler, Schmitt first wrote a letter to Dorotić in “deepest distress” and then 
opened up Soren Kierkegaard’s (1813-55) Concept of Dread, chapter 3, part 2 where he 
“suddenly hit on the spot about fate and genius.”  His reaction is to declare: 
Praise be to God, I am saved.  I was blessed, I immediately wanted to write to Däubler, but I tore up the 
letter.  I may tell it to no one.  I know now that I am right with my faith in destiny, my conviction that 
everything depends on whether I am a good person or not.  Alone I know it.
474
 
 
Concept of Dread’s subtitle reveals that the book is a psychological study of original sin.  
Kierkegaard believes that the pagan concept of fate is the object of dread, and dread of fate, in 
paganism, is a negation of Providence.  It took Christianity to break free from the contradictory 
pagan concept of being “guilty” by fate, by means of a deeper recognition of each person, as both 
an individual and the species in one, whereby, one can share in the guilt of the first person and 
thus suffer from original sin.  Therefore, the pagans do not have a deep enough concept of guilt 
and sin for an adequate psychology. 
Kierkegaard now brings the concept of “genius” into the equation.  A genius is one who 
constantly discovers fate within their own subjective immediacy and who recognizes the need for 
fate to restrain their omnipotence.  As a result, the genius is essentially pagan, for he does not 
understand himself religiously in terms of sin and providence, but rather, under the concepts of 
dread and fate.  Kierkegaard’s example of such a person is Napoleon.  Schmitt was already deeply 
                                                 
473
 Hüsmert characterizes it as such in his “Preface” to: Schmitt, Tagebücher: Oktober 1912 bis Februar 1915, 3. 
474
 Entry of Thursday October 8, 1914, in: Ibid., 222.  Schmitt was already an avid reader of the Danish philosopher.  
The first mention of enthusiastically reading Kierkegaard occurs on Saturday October 3, 1914.  Schmitt is reading 
Stages on Life’s Way, the sequel to Either/Or where Kierkegaard exemplifies his theory of the aesthetic, ethical, and 
religious forms of life (ibid., 216).  The next day he quotes from Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Angst and records 
having read it aloud to Cari on Tuesday October 6, 1914 (ibid., 219).  A year later Schmitt records being thrilled to 
discover and purchase a copy of Kierkegaard’s Critique of the Present, translated by a fellow resident of Munich, 
Theodor Haecker (1879-1945).  See the entry of Tuesday May 11, 1915 in: Schmitt, Die Militärzeit 1915 bis 1919, 66.  
Schmitt soon struck up an acquaintance with Haecker based on his love for Kierkegaard. 
120 
 
interested in the concept of fate and he now connects it to a belief that he is personally destined for 
genius,
475
 and speaks of starting to again, “trust in my fate.”476  Of course, in so doing, Schmitt was 
embracing a paganism which was exactly what the Danish philosopher is critiquing. 
Rather than to Saint Augustine, a more appropriate connection to draw from Schmitt’s 
Kierkegaardian moment of conversion might be to novelist Nathaniel Hawthorne’s (1804-64) 
invention, Arthur Dimmesdale, in The Scarlet Letter.  The flawed Reverend Dimmesdale ascends 
the scaffold, in the dead of night, in order to relieve his oppressive sense of guilt and believes he 
sees a red letter “A” written in the sky by a meteor.  Hawthorne’s narrator interprets the 
psychology of despairing guilt when combined with hubris:  
But what shall we say, when an individual discovers a revelation, addressed to himself alone, on the same vast 
sheet of record!  In such a case, it could only be the symptom of a highly disordered mental state, when a 
man, rendered morbidly self-contemplative by long, intense, and secret pain, had extended his egotism over 
the whole expanse of nature, until the firmament itself should appear no more than a fitting page for his soul's 
history and fate.
477
 
 
A Catholic intellectual contemporary to Schmitt, neo-Thomist philosopher Josef Pieper (1904-97), 
explains how disordered sensuality corrupts the reason:  
Unchaste abandon and the self-surrender of the soul to the world of sensuality paralyzes the primordial 
powers of the moral person: the ability to perceive, in silence, the call of reality, and to make, in the retreat of 
this silence, the decision appropriate to the concrete situation of concrete action.  This is the meaning 
inherent in all those propositions which speak of the falsification and corruption of prudence, of the 
blindness of the spirit, and of the splitting of the power of decision.
478
  
 
Schmitt’s intellect conformed over time to the influence of his unbridled will, and Gnostic thought 
fed into his ethical rationalizations while also shaping his political views.   
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Especially by means of undergirding his pessimistic views on human nature, the Gnostic 
concept of the god of the world as a god of law and justice
479
 is easily adapted to Schmitt’s secular 
political interests, and provides a metaphysical basis for his statism.  In a diary entry from a month 
before the beginning of the First World War, Schmitt speaks of the wisdom of Machiavelli’s 
opinion: 
If all men are good in the world, so it would be wickedness to lie and cheat.  If, however, everything is 
apparently just rabble and mob, it would be folly to be noble and decent.  From this theory speaks the 
outrage of a noble mind, good, disappointed man, over the blind, unteachable, irrefutable and unassailable 
meanness that everyone that is in the world can watch every day and every hour around them.
480
 
 
Schmitt goes on to claim this pessimistic view is one of which he finds “nothing is more 
understandable and sympathetic” to his thought.481  His later friend-enemy distinction is thus likely 
derived from Harnack’s works on Gnostic dualism.482  Finally, as Linder suggests, in Schmitt’s 
postwar debate with Hans Blumenberg (1920-96) and Erik Peterson (1890-1960), found in 
Political Theology Two, the jurist “lets the cat out of the bag” on his lifelong attachment to 
Gnosticism as intellectually foundational.
483
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Chapter 3. 
Biographical & Textual Placement of Schmitt 1915-19 
 “Do not give your enemies the chance to grasp you . . .”484 
—Carl Schmitt (1948). 
 
Schmitt in Munich (1915-21) 
With the coming of the First World War, Schmitt’s academic mentor, Fritz van Calker, 
had been designated a Major in Munich.  Calker counseled Schmitt to volunteer into his infantry 
regiment so that he could protect the twenty-six year old from being sent to the front.  During basic 
training, Schmitt claimed a back injury, and so on March 23, 1915, Calker was able to secure a 
transfer for him to the Deputy General Command of the First Bavarian Army Corps in Munich 
(the other two Commands were located in Würzburg and Nürnberg).  Schmitt would remain there 
until being discharged from military service on June 4, 1919.  In November 1915, Calker also 
invited Schmitt to begin a postdoctorate in Straßburg.  The Value of the State was subsequently 
accepted as his postdoctoral thesis (habilitationschrift) on February 16, 1916.  Afterwards Schmitt 
frequently lectured at the University of Straßburg until it was closed, by virtue of being located in 
territory ceded to France towards the end of the war, on November 11, 1918.  
During his military career, Schmitt rose to the rank of Sergeant, and was placed in charge 
of a surveillance office which handled issues of censorship of various pacifist and socialist 
publications, both foreign and domestic.
485
  In 1918, he was awarded the highest decoration that 
someone at the rear could garner, the Iron Cross second class, for having conscientiously 
performed his duties as censor.  After the war, Schmitt’s professional direction was momentarily 
up in the air.  His commanding officer at the Deputy General Command, Captain Christian Roth 
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(1873-1934), became the Bavarian Minister of Justice.  His old benefactor, Hugo am Zehnhoff, 
was now the Prussian Minister of Justice in Berlin.  Both were excellent references if he decided to 
enter the judicial bureaucracy.  Thus, Schmitt first applied for a position in the newly established 
Ministry of Welfare.  However, he withdrew the application when a friend, the economist Moritz 
Julius Bonn (1873-1965)—who had recently been appointed director of the Munich Graduate 
School of Economics—offered him a position as full-time lecturer.  The position allowed Schmitt 
to remain in Munich, so he accepted, and dedicated himself to an academic career, lecturing there 
from September 1919 to September 1921.  Schmitt’s lectures at the Graduate School reflected his 
mandarin interests, focused as they were on the early modern political theory of the State and 
philosophical anthropology. 
 
Schmitt’s Inner Life in Munich 
 
Schmitt’s military work gave him practical insight into the politics of looking for, and 
combatting, internal enemies,
486
 but it is a mistake to think of him as a militarist or even much of a 
nationalist during the First World War.  His overall mindset during the war has been justly called 
“metaphysical pessimism.”487  He loathed military service488 and frequently complains that the 
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military is “more demanding than the Catholic Church.”489  Contrary to his published writings, 
Schmitt bemoans “[t]he destruction of the individual, the clumsy rape of private life is already so 
terrible that it will probably never get better.”490  During his initial training stint in barracks, he 
recorded with disgust: “Germany is the land of justice, the destruction of the individual; it achieved 
exactly what I in my book [The Value of the State] set as an ideal of the state.”491  When Schmitt 
ponders the reason that everything is demanded of a person during war, he records: “What for?  
For nothing, for the Fatherland; O God, what a state, and you are powerless.”492 
Just as he had in Straßburg and Düsseldorf, Schmitt continued to seek the company of 
artists and writers through his years in Munich.  He hobnobbed in cafes with “the leading figures of 
German expressionism”493 as part of the Bildungsbürgertum “deeply alienated from the bourgeois 
culture of the German Reich.”494  Schmitt primarily belonged to a circle gathered around the poet 
Däubler, including: the Austrian modernist painter, Albert Paris Gütersloh (1887-1973); translator 
of Greek literature, Hans Rupé (dates unavailable); novelist, Alice Berend (1875-1938); musician, 
Walter Harburg (dates unavailable); poet, Konrad Weiß (1880-1940); and editor and author, 
Franz Blei (1871-1942).  Through Blei, he became acquainted with the Austrian modernist 
novelist Robert Musil (1880-1942),
495
 as well as a number of Catholic intellectuals, including: 
translator of Kierkegaard and John Henry Cardinal Newman, essayist and cultural critic Theodor 
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Haecker (1879-1945); Germany’s leading publisher of Catholic authors, Jakob Hegner (1882-
1962); and historian and philosopher of religion, Otfried Eberz (1878-1959), who was also 
associated with Hochland, the leading Catholic magazine.  Through his wartime work monitoring 
pacifist groups, Schmitt also came to know Hochland’s editor, Karl Muth (1867-1944).496 
Schmitt’s circle of friends was not particularly inviting to his wife; in fact, jealousy was a 
common experience for the couple.  Early on from Schmitt, when Cari danced with his friend 
Fritz Eisler,
497
 and later from her, over Schmitt’s close friendship with George and Lily Eisler after 
Fritz’s death.498  It also seems that Berend saw through Cari’s deception.  The novelist depicted her 
as a trickster and Schmitt as a romantic, lovesick “unworldly professor who is betrayed by the 
world,”499 in her 1919 work The Fortune Cookie (Der Glückspilz).  For his part, Schmitt had long 
harbored his own suspicions towards Dorotić, even if not specifically about her family origins.  He 
even had to travel to Cologne on October 30, 1914 where Cari had been accused of shoplifting; 
the issue was finally resolved in May 1915.  The engaged couple had made frugal wedding plans on 
Saturday January 10, 1914,
500
 but in a series of entries over the next two weeks, Schmitt repeatedly 
voices distrust of his fiancée, as well as disgust with people in general and himself.  Reflecting on 
the psychology of it, he declares “man can never be sure of a woman.”501  Only four months into 
their married life, Schmitt’s diary reveals: “Often we argue, without words, but in looks. . . .  What 
a misery, have suicidal thoughts.”502  Despite having found momentary respite in Kierkegaard, 
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Schmitt’s depression and suicidal tendencies continued throughout the war and his marriage,503 as 
well as his Manichean attacks on corporeal existence
504
 and manic mood swings.
505
  Schmitt 
experienced his years as a court clerk, then military and married life, in an emotional and 
psychological state of siege. 
As far as his religious views go, for the most part, one finds only scattered evidence of a 
residual “cultural” Catholicism, the thin superficial veneer or vestiges of a dismissed or inactive 
faith and confessional affiliation.
506
  However, the occasion of a world war did give rise to the only 
unalloyed complimentary remark Schmitt makes towards the Catholic Church in these years.  As a 
parenthetical to the diary entry that mused upon the German State achieving the destruction of the 
individual, Schmitt notes, apologetically, that the Catholic Church could not effectively oppose it 
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“because she had no real power or . . . because it was too much the mother.”507  Yet, he was still 
impressed that given the size of the Catholic Church, it “resists the military state without 
cannons.”508 
Then, in an entry in July 1916, one can see an early appearance of what will soon become 
well-known as “political theology,” and in a version that is as close to “political Catholicism” as 
Schmitt ever treads.  He quickly elides from religious or theological reflections into profane 
political applications when he jots down:  
Who still knows what Protestantism is?  It has gone so far that the Catholics must teach the Protestants . . . 
because enthusiasm has nothing to do with duty, nothing to do with Catholic spirituality . . . .  The Catholic’s 
individuality is not expressed in the contents of his faith but in the devotion to the Church, in the free choice 
of the Church as a mediator, as the woman in the choice of a man.
509
 
 
Schmitt shifts quickly to social and political commentary, further exhibiting an abstract, clinical, 
and disconnected manner towards religion: 
Only a religious people is a free people.  A people that is not pious falls immediately into the most degraded 
slavery.  There is no help for those who have not yet recognized this fact.  Do not complain about the 
extreme pressure you live under, but know that your godlessness, your Protestantism, your racial mysticism, 
your relativism, your godless vertigo is a result of the logic of Kantianism, Wagnerianism and other 
impostors.
510
 
 
His thoughts then turn to the State.  He describes it as the “manliest” of institutions and notes the 
opposition to it expressed by the young.
511
  Schmitt immediately returns to a critique of 
Protestantism:   
They [Protestants] have no relationship to the visibility of the Church, to God’s visibility.  They always say 
that it is a minor matter; that it is not the core which is invisible, ineffable, and in this way they do not fight evil 
and leave it in the world.
512
  
 
The logic of complaining that the “manly” State is opposed by the young, followed with the 
connection between “visibility” and “fighting evil,” suggests that Schmitt believes Protestantism is a 
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motivating factor in anti-authoritarian or individualist modern political liberalism; which, he thinks 
leads to moral and political passivity.  Even if this diary entry does not seem strong enough to bear 
such an interpretation, all becomes clear in the essay Schmitt wrote shortly thereafter: “The 
Visibility of the Church: A Scholastic Consideration.”513 
 
“The Visibility of the Church: A Scholastic Consideration” 
Schmitt begins “Visibility,” as with most of his writings, with a straightforward and 
memorable opening statement of what term(s) he will be exploring: “Everything that can be said 
about the visibility of the Church stems from the following two tenets: “Man is not alone in the 
world” and “The world is good, and what evil there is in the world is the result of the sin of man.”514  
We find here recognition of the central importance of the Incarnation for Christianity, plus an 
orthodox presentation of Catholic philosophical anthropology (creation and human nature are 
good, evil comes of sin).  From these tenets Schmitt first stresses the public nature of the Church 
as a partial means of subjugating private religious experience or mysticism.  “A religious experience 
should not be obtained from a psychic phenomenon.”515  Therefore:   
Whether someone can be called a true Christian has nothing to do with the intensity of impatience with 
which he seeks to bind himself to God but rather with the path he takes.  The path is determined by the law 
of God, that is, the pan rema
516
 with which Christ admonished the tempter when he challenged Christ to make 
bread from stones.  It means the rejection of the immediacy, which Christ the mediator and His means (the 
Church) would overcome in order to still the hunger for God.
517
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There is an undercurrent present of Schmitt’s anti-individualism518 and of finding security in 
conformity to law, which soon is brought to the forefront; for, as Francis Slade points out, 
“Visibility” is not a “religious tract” but an effort “to think through the meaning of modernity.”519  
For Schmitt, the individual is subject to and even subjugated by law, both from nature or 
the State:  
Everything lawful in this world destroys everything individual.  . . .  A natural law no less than its prototype—
the juridical law regulating human relations—respects a distinction between persons.  The first, most primitive 
allusion to a contract made the participating individuals into contracting parties . . .  The fact that man is not 
alone in the world leads to the conclusion that it is no longer a question of his individuality.
520
 
 
To Schmitt “[o]nly God is alone,” and no matter our mistaken views on human solitude these are 
mere “indications of a sinful world and of the longing for God, who is alone.”521  That is, 
perception of a solitary and individual existence is a false one, and yet, this recognition is at the 
center of modern political theory which presupposes a primordial social contract.  Now we come 
to the political point of Schmitt’s discussion so far: 
If a Christian obeys authority because it is grounded in and bound by God, he obeys God and not authority.  
This is the only revolution in world history that deserves to be called great—Christianity provided a new 
foundation for mundane authority.
522
 
 
The Christian religion, for Schmitt, is reduced to the possibility of its being turned into a 
sacralization of authority in general and of the sovereign State in particular.  He seems to fail to 
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recognize that authority, and obedience to it, actually accord with human nature, quite an unusual 
lapse for a conservative.  He exaggerates in characterizing the Christian approach to temporal 
authority as “revolutionary”; individualist anarchism was not the political norm prior to the advent 
of Christianity.  Instead, Schmitt here gives voice to his fundamentally secular interest in 
Christianity for its possible utilitarian effect on the political quiescence of the masses. 
Schmitt then goes more in depth upon the nature of the Church’s “visibility” and its 
relationship to the individual believer: 
[The individual’s] relation ad se ipsum [to himself] is not possible without a relation ad alterum [to the other].  
To be in the world means to be with others.  From a spiritual standpoint, all visibility is construed in terms of 
a constitution of community.  The members of the community derive their dignity from God and thus cannot 
be destroyed by the community.  But they can only return to God through the community.  Thus arises a 
visible Church.
523
 
 
To be a member of the Church is to constitute one’s individual dignity through means of a shared 
communal life.  “The visibility of the Church is based on something invisible.  The concept of the 
visible Church is itself something invisible. . . .  Thus the Church can be in but not of this world.”524  
The Church “represents” (to utilize a key term for Schmitt that will soon appear in Political Form) 
something metaphysical made substantial within the mundane world.  “An arrangement making 
the invisible visible must be rooted in the invisible and appear in the visible.  The mediator 
descends, because the mediation can only proceed from above, not from below.”525  Interestingly, 
Schmitt is describing, quite accurately, the traditional self-understanding of the Church as the 
“mystical Body of Christ.”  A concept derived in part from Saint Paul the Apostle (5-67)526 and 
developed through scholastic theology, it would later be defined by Pius XII (r. 1939-58) in his 
encyclical Mystici Corporis Christi (On the Mystical Body of Christ).  Yet, Schmitt is fully aware 
early modern thought secularized or adapted to political purposes the concept of the mystical 
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body.  In scholastic theology two parallel concepts had developed, that of the “mystical body” 
(corpus mysticum) as the body of persons making up the Christian Church and the “real body” 
(corpus verum) of the body of Christ present in the Eucharist.  Early modern absolutist thought 
secularized the idea by naming the king as the representative of the “mystical body” of the nation.527 
Indeed, in “Visibility,” Schmitt is primarily responding to the Protestant canon lawyer 
Rudolph Sohm (1841-1917) who had, in Schmitt’s view, reduced the corpus mysticum to a 
“corpus mere mysticum” a merely mystical or ideal body in his 1909 book On the Nature and 
Origin of Catholicism (Wesen und Ursprung des Katholizismus).
528
  Schmitt recognizes the 
centrality of the Incarnation
529
 and the Catholic understanding of the Church when he complains: 
Every religious sect which has transposed the concept of the Church from the visible community of believing 
Christians into a corpus mere mysticum basically has doubts about the humanity of the Son of God.  It has 
falsified the historical reality of the incarnation of Christ into a mystical and imaginary process.  . . . [T]hat is 
no longer the physical, visible incarnation, which the most inward of all Christians, Kierkegaard, maintained 
with such fervor.
530
 
 
The point of this passage, however, is not to signal his agreement with Kierkegaard’s religious views 
even if they happened to agree with orthodox Catholicism.  This passage is attacking a typically 
Protestant formulation, such as Sohm’s, against the established and visible hierarchical authority of 
the Church, primarily because of how damaging Schmitt finds the attack once transposed (back) 
into political theory; it smacks of liberal individualism.  Protestantism typically denies the historical 
and visible Catholic Church; “it has succeeded in making the visibility of the Church into 
something invisible in a material sense, thereby making it necessary to distinguish between true 
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visibility and factual concreteness.”531  On the contrary, Schmitt maintains that although the visibility 
of the Church remains an ideal, “a task whose fulfillment . . . is always incomplete,”532 a church 
entails “a visible, that is, juridical community.”533 
In “Visibility” Schmitt gives priority to the law, to a legal structure which deals with human 
fallenness by being superior to it: “The lawfulness of the visible world in the Christian conception 
is thus by nature good.  The juridical regulation of human relations existed before evil and sin, and 
was not its result”534; and in spiritual matters, “the great institution of mediation [is] the Church, a 
corporate entity.”535  This is the closest Schmitt ever draws to the natural law and contributes 
heavily to the essay being the most authentically Catholic piece he ever wrote.  Unfortunately, 
Schmitt’s “closest” to political Catholicism is still quite far removed.  There are two variants of 
political Protestantism (political modernity) at issue here, the early modern variant of absolute 
monarchy and late modern liberal individualism. Schmitt accepts the transposition from theology 
of the former and is only attacking the latter.  For despite the overt defense of the visibility of the 
Catholic Church against Protestant inwardness and anti-authoritarianism, Schmitt’s point is political 
and neither scholastic nor theological.   
Schmitt attacks what he thinks is the root source of modern liberal individualism that 
undermines any settled legal or political order.  Slade helpfully quotes Hegel for illustration: “the 
distinctively Protestant principle . . . now the principle universally admitted, to hold fast to 
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interiority as such, rejecting, and regarding as impertinent and lifeless, externality and authority.”536  
Protestant subjective religious inwardness had a corollary in ontology as a form of idealism, or 
more precisely, internalism, which claims the external world “points to nothing, signifies, or stands 
for, nothing . . . [internalism] divests the world of significance except as it is derived from 
inwardness itself.”537  From ontology this Protestant internalism enters political thought as the 
“worldliness” described by Max Weber (1864-1920) as central to the Protestant work ethic.538  To 
Schmitt this worldliness, or “economic thinking,” simply amounts to late modern liberalism.  
Contrariwise, scholastic realism “takes the things of this world as real and their reality consists in 
their signifying, manifesting, or pointing to, other realities.  Their being makes something other 
than themselves visible.”539 
Schmitt’s Catholicity in this essay goes no further than to present an orthodox 
interpretation of the visibility of the Church as a divinely ordered mediating institution in the 
world; he then puts this interpretation to use as a metaphor to reinvigorate the intellectual 
foundations of the politically modern unitary and absolute sovereign state.
540
  Thus Sandrine 
Baume correctly and brilliantly described Schmitt’s thought as not really political theology, or 
political Catholicism, but rather political ecclesiology.
541
  The Catholic Church is important for 
                                                 
536
 Slade is quoting from Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy.  See: Slade, “Catholicism as a Paradigm,” 114. 
537
 Ibid. 
538
 It is unlikely to be coincidence that Schmitt had begun to attend Weber’s lectures in Munich before writing 
“Visibility.” 
539
 Slade, “Catholicism as a Paradigm,” 114.  Thus scholastic realism attends to the existence of form in things, and for 
epistemology it holds to a belief in universals. 
540
 Cumin connects “Visibility” with Political Form as proof that Schmitt has a Catholic basis in his admiration of the 
Church owning the “ethos of authority in all its purity” (Cumin, Carl Schmitt, 45).  He does not recognize that in so 
doing Schmitt is secularizing the Church’s form.  Ulmen’s introduction to Political Form is far more reliable in how it 
connects “Visibility” to the later book for he recognizes that the concept visibility “is understood in the sense of 
concrete manifestation in history, of externalization of the idea, of realization in the public sphere.”  So the Church is 
“a spiritual institution manifest in a mundane ‘visible’ form.”  See: Gary L. Ulmen, “Introduction,” to Schmitt, Political 
Form, xi. 
541
 Sandrine Baume, “On Political Theology: A Controversy between Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt,” History of 
European Ideas, 35 (2009), 374.  Manemann also notices that “Visibility”: “announces an aloofness in Schmitt with the 
official Church” (Manemann, Carl Schmitt und die Politische Theologie, 109). 
134 
 
Schmitt only in so far as it is a useful structural model for the State.  This basic aspect of his 
thought runs through his major works of the early years of the Weimar Republic. 
 
Schmitt as Public Intellectual 
Schmitt’s first foray into Catholic publishing outlets occurred after his friend, Franz Blei,542 
agreed to edit a quarterly Catholic journal, Summa, published by Hegner.  The magazine lasted for 
only a single year over 1917-18,
543
 but in that short span Blei was able to secure three articles from 
Schmitt.  The first piece, “Right and Power” (“Recht und Macht”),544 is a reprint of the first chapter 
of The Value of the State.  The second article was “Visibility” discussed above.  The third one, 
“The Buribunks: A Historico-Philosophical Meditation” (“Die Buribunken: Ein 
geschichtsphilosophischer Versuch”),545 is a satirical piece mocking the popularity of keeping 
diaries as a form of self-assertion amongst the historical and scientific milieu.  Although it is satire, 
Schmitt’s lack of Catholic belief does still show up in his prefatory coupling of “ultramontane 
narrowness” with “Old Lutheran stubborness” as the only things that could cause one to fail to see 
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the power of the argument regarding the nature of “buribunk” he is about to make.546  These 
articles in Summa are part of a process through which Schmitt slowly became more prominent as a 
public intellectual by publishing outside of strictly academic legal journals.  However, they do not 
signify an attempt to become a Catholic intellectual as he would not publish in a Catholic outlet 
again until 1922. 
Over the course of the years 1917-20 Schmitt attended Weber’s most famous lectures 
delivered in Munich, including: “Science as a Profession,” “Germany’s New Political Order,” and 
“Politics as a Vocation.”  In 1919-20 he even took part in Weber’s final lectures and faculty 
seminar at the Graduate School.  Schmitt’s major works henceforward often show a distinct 
Weberian influence, as we have already seen in “Visibility,”547 especially in their intellectual-
historical approach.  The great sociologist’s influence possibly helped motivate Schmitt’s attempts 
to branch out into the role of a public intellectual.  Along with Weber, Schmitt’s fascination with 
Kierkegaard also continued to influence his writing choices. 
In 1918, Schmitt edited the autobiography of the German Pietist, Johann Arnold Kanne,
548
 
and compared him to Kierkegaard for his critique of modern rationalism and materialism.  
However, Schmitt believes that ultimately Kanne’s project of confronting this “evil spirit of the 
nineteenth century, was reserved for another, Kierkegaard, who as a new church father articulated 
anew the same eternal truth for his age.”549  Kanne also made an appearance in Schmitt’s major 
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work of the year, Political Romanticism (Politische Romantik),
550
 a text largely built on the back of 
Kierkegaard’s treatment of the romantic personality in The Concept of Irony (1841).551  This is the 
first book Schmitt wrote with the clear intention to address a general audience and not specifically 
an audience of experts in a particular field.
552
  The book introduces Schmitt as a public intellectual 
interested in commenting upon and possibly influencing political opinion.  Schmitt sent Political 
Romanticism to the publisher in July 1918, and it went to press in August, before finally appearing 
in early 1919. 
 
Political Romanticism 
Schmitt begins his study of the political manifestation of romanticism by taking note of the 
fact that, in Germany, it is identified with political conservatism or reaction, while in France it 
accords with revolutionary liberalism.  He seeks to identify a common core of beliefs or attitude, 
which can account for such divergent political orientations.
553
  Since he believes “[t]he elucidation 
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of romanticism, like that of every important situation of modern intellectual history, must begin 
with Descartes,”554 Schmitt points to the cogito and modern philosophy’s turn to a subjectivist 
rationalism as the first pillar upon which romanticism was built.  What next occurred was a 
reaction that set in against rationalism under four different modes, only one of which actually 
qualified as a basis for the emergence of romanticism.  This mode of anti-rationalism was the 
“emotional-aestheticist (lyrical) reaction,” which maintained the subjectivist modern turn but 
rejected its rationalism.  Schmitt thinks this progression first appeared in the thought of British 
philosopher (and leading Whig) Lord Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper, 1671-1713).
555
  
Schmitt focuses immediately on the fact that Shaftesbury was “particularly hostile” to the political 
thought of Hobbes, especially his “anti-idyllic idea of a person who is ‘evil by nature,’ a struggle of 
all against all,” that is, for a pessimistic philosophical anthropology.556 
From this aesthetic foundation, Schmitt turns to Rousseau as the next prominent developer 
of romanticism.  The Genevan philosopher gave to romanticism its rejection of classicism, 
especially, by adding the element of individualism so important to the emerging romantic 
attitude.
557
  Schmitt believes that from Rousseau’s thought on, romanticism’s growth in influence is 
a result of an underlying shift or: “metaphysical development from the seventeenth to the 
nineteenth century [which] led to entirely new ideas of God and the absolute.”558  God was 
displaced from the metaphysical center by the concepts of humanity and history: 
The highest and most certain reality of traditional metaphysics, the transcendent God, was eliminated.  More 
important than the controversy of the philosophers was the question of who assumed his functions as the 
highest and most certain reality, and thus as the ultimate point of legitimation in historical reality.  Two new 
worldly realities appeared and carried through a new ontology without waiting for the conclusion of the 
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epistemological discussion: humanity and history.  Completely irrational when considered in terms of the 
logic of the rationalistic philosophy of the eighteenth century, but objective and evident in their 
superindividual validity, in reality they dominated thought as the two new demiurges.  The first, human 
society, came to the fore in different forms: as the people, community, and humanity, but always with the 
same revolutionary function.
559
 
 
While “humanity” was the new political god of revolutionaries whose “omnipotence was . . .  
proclaimed in Rousseau’s The Social Contract,” “history” was the “conservative demiurge.”560 
In the French Revolution this substitution of humanity for God made “politics a religious matter”; 
hence the “bloody zeal” and “fanaticism” with which it unfolded.561  And from the standpoint of 
reaction, Schmitt points to the insight of Louis de Bonald
562
 that political positions are built on 
metaphysical assumptions: 
From the standpoint of his Christian political philosophy, Bonald saw the Jacobinism of 1793 precisely as the 
eruption of an atheistic philosophy.  He had worked out an analogy between the theological and 
philosophical idea of God and the idea of the political order of society.  It led to the conclusion that the 
monarchist principle corresponds to the theistic idea of a personal God because it requires a personal 
monarch as a visible providence.  A monarchist-democratic constitution is supposed to conform to the deist 
assumption of a transcendent God.  An example is the Constitution of 1791, according to which the king was 
just as powerless in the state as the God of deism was in the world.  For Bonald, that is crypto-antiroyalism, 
just as deism is crypto-atheism.  The ‘demagogic anarchy’ of 1793, however, was open atheism: no God and 
no king.  This ‘identity in the principles of the two societies, religious and political,’ has its justification in the 
methodological identity of numerous theological and legal concepts, especially constitutional concepts.
563
 
 
Bonald, along with Maistre and Burke, turns toward history, duration, and tradition as the 
ontological substrate determining human society and the Volksgeist. 
Schmitt continues his intellectual history of the development of romanticism through 
Johann Fichte (1762-1814), Georg Hegel (1770-1831), and Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854).  What 
romanticism took from German Idealism was, firstly, the recognition that “there was no longer any 
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way back to the traditional God of Christian metaphysics”564; and secondly, the deep belief in 
individualism.  Therefore: 
The essential feature of the intellectual situation of the romantic is that in the struggle of the deities he does 
not commit himself and his subjective personality.  His position is the following.  Under the impression of 
Fichte’s individualism, the romantics felt strong enough to play the role of the creator of the world 
themselves, and to bring forth reality out of themselves.
565
 
 
The romantic is known to seek escape from the present reality into specific idealized “concrete” 
realities, such as ancient Greece or the Middle Ages, but as conjured out of their own will; their 
own subjective reality becomes the totality: 
In the romantic, everything—society and history, the cosmos and humanity—serves only the productivity of the 
romantic ego.  Rousseau says of himself: ‘But what shall I play with when I am alone at last?  With myself.  
With the entire universe.’ . . .   For the romantic, intercourse with nature is actually intercourse with himself.  
Neither the cosmos, nor the state, nor the people, nor historical development has any intrinsic interest for 
him everything can be made into an easily managed figuration of the subject that is occupied with itself.
566
 
 
And now Schmitt hones in on what precisely is distinctive and essential about the romantic 
personality that can appear in one context as revolutionary and in another as reactionary.  After 
displacing the traditional God as the center of all being the romantic does not so much substitute 
“humanity” or “history” for God; but, rather, they take that position themselves as a new demiurge, 
a creative force which “takes everything as an occasion.”567 
Schmitt borrows his concept of “occasion” from the group of Cartesian philosophers aptly 
classified as “occasionalist,” including: Arnold Geulincx (1624-1669), Géraud de Cordemoy (1626-
1684), and Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715).  Unlike the later romantics: 
In the philosophers just mentioned, God—in the sense of traditional Christian metaphysics—is retained.  In 
their works, therefore, the distinctive qualities of the occasionalist attitude toward the world are exhibited only 
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indirectly.  This is because, although the world and what occurs in it are indeed only an occasion, they are an 
occasion for God, in which order and law are recovered.
568
 
 
For the romantics, they exhibit an occasionalism in which “the main factor of the occasionalist 
system,” God, is subjectified.  “In the liberal bourgeois world, the detached, isolated, and 
emancipated individual becomes the middle point, the court of last resort, the absolute.”569  Schmitt 
thus defines romanticism as “subjective occasionalism,” and a romantic personality is one “the 
essence of which is passivity.”570  Given a revolutionary context, the romantic will be swayed to the 
left and in a conservative context, towards reaction.  In short, the romantic “unconsciously submits 
to the strongest and most proximate power”571 and lacks in decisiveness.  He sees politics as an 
occasion for self-expression, but from a passive core rather than principles.  Thus, “[t]he ‘endless 
conversation,’ [is] a typically romantic idea.”572 
It is at this stage of his study that Schmitt develops a line of thought, which leads many to 
read him as a Catholic intellectual.  Indeed, he does engage in a limited form of apologetics by 
defending Catholicism against the charge of being romantic. 
Catholicism is not something that is romantic.  Regardless of how often the Catholic church [stet] was the 
object of romantic interest, and regardless of how often it also knew how to make use of romantic tendencies, 
the Church itself was never the subject and bearer of a romanticism, no more than this was the case for any 
other world power.
573
 
 
The conversion of leading romantics, such as Müller and Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Schlegel (1772-
1829), had led German commentators to believe a connection existed between “political 
romanticism and the ‘theocratic-theosophic’ conception of the state—as if ‘Roman Catholic’ and 
‘theosophic’ were not just as antithetical as ‘classical’ and ‘romantic.’”574  Schmitt is quite correct to 
reject as error the belief that Catholicism supports a theocratic state or politics and he is well served 
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here by his Francophile and classicist tendencies.  He recognizes the romantic view of the Church 
perceives in it “a vast, irrational community, a world-historical tradition, and the personal God of 
traditional metaphysics” and therefore as a “magnetic force” attracting them in their passivity and 
desire to avoid making “decisions.”575  At this point, Schmitt makes it clear why romanticism ends 
when Catholicism begins: “[w]ith the definitive renunciation and the perception of an either-or, the 
romantic situation was brought to an end” precisely by Catholic conversion, because if they wanted 
to be a pious Catholic then “they had to give up their subjectivism.”576  Suggestively, Schmitt 
becomes even more derisive of Müller’s in his later years after the economist’s conversion: “When 
he had become an unconditional and sincere Catholic, his lack of scientific and political 
productivity was manifested in a cheap hyperorthodoxy.”577  This is the point at which Political 
Romanticism becomes a very interesting text for our study. 
To begin, Müller becomes Schmitt’s whipping boy, as he purportedly “represents political 
romanticism as a type with rare purity”578; a type for which political actions and decisions amounted 
merely to “journals.”579  Schmitt’s attacks on Müller are vicious580 despite the fact that the 
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economist’s views were actually anti-liberal and anti-individualist.  He was a generally orthodox 
thinker who contributed strategically to the development of a Catholic concept of solidarity.  
Schmitt likely was aware of the resonance which Müller’s economic thought had for contemporary 
German Catholic trade unionism and thus political Catholicism.  Furthermore, despite being 
known as a political romantic, Müller did believe in the traditional Catholic view “that the external 
unity of society rested upon the inner unity of faith.”581  Although, at this point in my study of 
Schmitt’s thought, it remains speculative to suggest that Schmitt is attacking political Catholicism 
and the Center Party by proxy, in the person of Müller, this possibility should be entertained—and 
kept in mind—given what we shall soon find in his Weimar texts and deeds.  For, Schmitt 
consistently rejects Catholic corporatism in virtue of statism, as well as dismisses Christian labor 
movements just as readily as he does socialism.  Schmitt’s contemporary and close friend, novelist 
Ernst Jünger (1895-1998), took just such a polemical motive as a given, when he later told Schmitt 
that whether the jurist’s criticisms of the romantics were in all cases applicable is irrelevant because 
the “focus of your designs is well within the future.”582 
In the text, Schmitt begins his presentation of Müller’s thought by noting that he “contrasts 
the state as ‘idea’ with the lifeless, mechanical ‘concept’ of the state.”583  This view happens to 
accord with Schmitt’s own,584 yet Müller goes on to argue that: 
                                                                                                                                                             
how often his own ambition and vanity is attested to by his friends, Schmitt seems to once again be protesting too 
much.  A final example of Schmitt’s description of the romantic Müller which just as perfectly fits his own character 
and biography is: “All in all, he was nothing more than a zealous servant of whatever system happened to be in power, 
always ready to discard that part of his ideas which might stand in the way of its smooth functioning and to assimilate 
the rest.  He made some reservations only in the Catholicism of his later years” (ibid., 49).  All but the last caveat is 
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The state is supposed to be the ‘totality of all human affairs,’ the embodiment of psychic and intellectual life; 
and all oppositions—especially the opposition of the estates (nobility, clergy, and bourgeoisie) necessary for 
the articulation of the organism, but also the opposition of person and thing—are combined in a grand, vital, 
and organic unity.  Insofar as the nature of this state is life, diversity, and movement, it belongs to Schelling’s 
philosophy of nature.  But—and this is Müller’s distinctively romantic quality—it is not construed as in 
Schelling.  This state is the object of the most fervent love.  It can demand everything from us.
585
 
 
The view of society as an “organism” occurs frequently in romantic conservative thought, but is 
heterodox from the perspective of Catholic social and political theory.  Schmitt does reject the view 
of either state or society as an organism, but only because he believes romantic organicism as 
ultimately destructive of the State by virtue of being based on base emotion or whimsy.  He makes 
this clear in a later criticism: 
An emotion that does not transcend the limits of the subjective cannot be the foundation of a community.  
The intoxication of sociability is not a basis of a lasting association.  Irony and intrigue are not points of social 
crystallization; and no societal order can be established on the basis of the need, not to be alone, but rather to 
be suspended in the dynamic of an animated conversation.  This is because no society can discover an order 
without a concept of what is normal and what is right.  Conceptually, the normal is unromantic because every 
norm destroys the occasional license of the romantic.
586
 
 
Yet, just as he had done in The Value of the State, Schmitt provides no guidelines or basis for the 
establishing of norms.  Ultimately, his consistent statism leads to a similar error in the relationship 
of social parts and wholes found in romantic conservative organicism, as it makes norms and the 
dignity of the person subsistent on the prerogative of the sovereign State. 
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We get closer to why Schmitt is silent about how norms are established by moving on to his 
discussion of Schlegel’s understanding of the State in its relationship to the Church.  Schlegel 
makes a concession that there exists “the possibility of a justified resistance [to the State], for as a 
Catholic he cannot doubt that one must obey God more than man.”587  While resistance is 
theoretically possible, Schlegel maintains that it “is only the Church . . . that should decide whether 
such a case obtains.”588  While such an admission may suggest Schlegel sees the Church as a 
“political reality” alongside or above the State, he actually: 
. . . rejects as ‘unhistorical’ de Maistre’s resolute advocacy of the Church’s right of control.  In relation to 
secular states, the Church is not supposed to have any legal control and any position as arbitrator.  That was 
justified until the sixteenth century.  It is no longer feasible, however, for our times, nor can it return.  In the 
end, therefore, nothing is changed.  The paramount activity of the government is not endangered by the 
opposition between Church and state.  And yet this very government, the only thing that is permitted to act, 
experiences the same fate as the God of the occasionalist system.  It is not supposed to do anything that is 
‘arbitrary,’ ‘mechanical,’ and ‘absolute.’  Actually, it should simply abandon itself to historical development. 589 
 
Now we are getting to the crux of the matter.  Schmitt agrees with Schlegel that the time is long 
since passed in which the Church could “endanger” the State by being a moral authority or an 
indirect power.
590
  Hence, the only entity that could establish norms is the State itself.  But 
romanticism as construed by Schmitt is both passive at the level of the individual, and, what is far 
worse it transposes this passivity and indecisiveness to the public actor, the State.  For, Schlegel 
held: 
The government is the higher, inclusive third factor, elevated above the oppositions of the parties.  It should 
pay heed to the parties of neither the right nor the left.  Above all, it should not choose to be a moderate 
center, because in this position it would be only a passive center.  Schlegel also regards it, however, as 
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inadmissible to speak of an active center.  ‘The solution to the big problem does not lie at the ends and the 
extremes and not in the middle, but rather only and exclusively in the depths and the heights.’ 591 
 
It is the threat of an indecisive or passive State, which makes political romanticism so dangerous to 
Schmitt’s way of thinking, as it hamstrings the State from achieving its function of establishing order 
and norms by decisive action.
592
  Schmitt thus sees no need to discuss how norms are determined, 
as he believes it is always the State’s prerogative; sovereign decision establishes the norm.  The 
state creates social unity and can act as national mythmaker only not in the manner specific to 
romanticism.
593
  The need for decisive action of a unitary sovereign state is a consistent motif of 
Schmitt’s Weimar thought, and he identifies the passivity and indecisiveness in the face of threats 
to the State, found in romanticism, with bourgeois liberalism, his primary ideological opponent.
594
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There are further reasons, even if admittedly more peripheral, to put aside the standard 
narrative’s assumption of Schmitt’s Catholicity when reading Political Romanticism.  First, in 
addition to drawing heavily upon Kierkegaard, Schmitt admits to relying on David Friedrich 
Strauss’ book Julian the Apostate: The Romantic on the Throne of the Caesars (Mannheim, 1847) 
“for the conceptual scheme of Political Romanticism.”595  Along with these Protestant thinkers, 
Schmitt presents an oddly skewed portrait of the manner in which the priest-theologian 
Malebranche had been accused of heterodoxy for his system of occasionalist philosophy.  What is 
odd in Schmitt’s presentation is that while Malebranche had been suspected of trending towards 
pantheism as well as compromising human free will in a manner which would imply God is the 
cause of sin, Schmitt chooses, instead, to focus on a purported error in Malebranche that the jurist 
finds politically troubling. 
For Malebranche, moral laws constitute an eternal order in which not even God can alter anything. . . .  In 
Malebranche, the generality of the idea of ‘order’ is only apparently a case of Cartesian rationalism.  In fact, it 
signifies the dissolution of the activity of God into a general harmony.  . . .  Such arguments were based on a 
conviction that the orthodox perceived as ungodly.  How does it happen, Fénelon asked, that the 
philosophers want to limit God’s authority?  It is true that in this way God is subjected to a general order, and 
that the authoritative command and all activity become impossible.  Here there is an analogy with the 
thinking of political revolutionaries who attempted to subject the monarch to the general will.  It is the ancient 
opposition for which Tertullian found the classical formulation: audaciam existimo de bono divi praecepti 
disputare, neque enem quia bonum est, idcirco auscultare debemus, sed quia deus praecipit [I consider it 
presumptuous to debate the goodness of a divine precept.  We should attend to it, not because it is good, but 
because God has prescribed it].
596
 
 
Embedded in this quote is what has come to be referred to by philosophers as the “Euthyphro 
Dilemma,” from its appearance in Plato’s dialogue of that name.  The dilemma is generally 
expressed in the form of the question: “Is what is good commanded by God because it is good or 
is it good because it is commanded by God?”  Catholic Thomistic theology resolved this dilemma 
by grabbing both “horns” simultaneously; that is, by treating divine perfection or justice and the 
good as metaphysical equivalents.  Hence, a command of God is also an acknowledgement of His 
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own perfectly good nature; it is not actually distinct from that nature.  One odd result is that 
Malebranche, as here presented, is more orthodox than Schmitt. 
Schmitt accepts a resolution of the Euthyphro dilemma known as “divine command 
theory,” one common to early modern Protestant thought.  This approach abhors any whiff of a 
limitation being placed upon the will of God to the point of grabbing just one horn of the dilemma, 
without concern for giving an impression that divine will is arbitrary.  This ungrounded and open-
ended power to determine norms, without reference beyond one’s own sovereign will, gets 
transferred from divinity to the State in early modern political theory.  The implication from 
Schmitt is that we should obey the dictates (laws) of the State simply because they are issued by the 
State and not by any consideration of their justice.
597
  He especially rejects the late modern political 
revolutionaries who “attempted to subject the monarch to the general will,” which is a compromise 
of the State’s unitary sovereignty.   
Furthermore, Schmitt relies on two theologians, François Fénelon (1651-1715) and 
Quintus Tertullian (160-220), who both were equally subjected to reprimand for heterodoxy by the 
Church as Malebranche.  We already noted Schmitt’s interest in Protestant or heterodox Catholic 
theologians, reflected in his diaries above, and find that his reliance on them yet continues.  
Although the standard narrative assumes Schmitt’s bona fides as a Catholic intellectual when 
reading Political Romanticism, the Catholic press ignored it upon its release, but his friend, Franz 
Blei, did write a review for a secular outlet.
598
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Chapter 4. 
Biographical-textual placement of Schmitt in Weimar (1919-23) 
“So I am a godless clerical.  Like you, dear friend.”599 
—Franz Blei, in a letter to Carl Schmitt dated December 7, 1921. 
 
Postwar Munich and Early Weimar Political Catholicism 
Schmitt completed Political Romanticism in July 1918, a month before the German Army 
Command called for a ceasefire.  In the beginning of October, the new government began to be 
formed, but by the end of the month soldiers were in mutiny.  On November 7, socialist journalist, 
Kurt Eisner (1867-1919), was asked to declare the Wittelsbach monarchy deposed and lead a 
provisional council government of workers, peasants, and soldiers in Munich.  On November 9, 
the German monarchs did abdicate, a Republic was declared, and the socialists immediately made 
a push for power.  On January 12, 1919, the Bavarian Landtag election saw the socialists obtain 
35.5% of the vote, but split between two parties, while the Catholic Bayerische Volkspartei 
(Bavarian’s People’s Party or BVP) emerged as the strongest single party with 35% of the vote.  
This electoral result initially defused the revolutionary situation, but it also reflected the early 
postwar disarray of the Center Party, the institutional home for mainstream German political 
Catholicism. 
In the beginning stage of postwar revolutionary turmoil, the Center Party’s structure had 
almost entirely dissolved into its component local parts with no significant national presence or 
leadership.  At the same time, separatist movements were emboldened in former Center Party 
strongholds, such as, Silesia, Bavaria, and the Rhineland.  The separatist movements remained 
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minority parties in their respective regions, but were still significant factors in interwar German 
Catholic politics, given their influence on the fairly lukewarm attachment to the Republic amongst 
Catholics.
600
  The premier such party was the afore-mentioned BVP, which proved to be a difficult 
political partner for the Center, nationally, and a consistent drain on their support in Bavaria.
601
 
What saved the Center nationally during the November Revolution of 1918-19 was the 
new Prussian Cultural Minister, a Socialist named Adolph Hoffmann (1858-1930), took the 
opportunity to announce not only social and economic, but religious, revolution in Prussia.  
Hoffmann wanted to “stop all subsidies to the church, confiscate church property and buildings, to 
convert church holidays into nature festivals, to abolish theological faculties, and to deprive the 
clergy of their status as officials and of their eligibility for public office.”602  The threat of a renewed 
Prussian Kulturkampf, emanating from a “Red Berlin,” galvanized Catholics and reenergized the 
Center as a national party of opposition.  The removal of Hoffmann from office and rescinding of 
his anti-clerical November decrees helped to appease Catholics and dampen the separatist fervor 
just in time for the Weimar National Assembly (February 6, 1919 to June 6, 1920) tasked with 
constructing a new constitution. 
However, when Eisner’s machinations resulted in his assassination, fifteen days after the 
National Assembly convened (February 21), the Communists retaliated with violence, declared the 
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Bavarian Soviet Republic, and Munich turned into a “laboratory of the revolution.”603  The 
paramilitary Freikorps had already put down the “Spartacist” workers’ revolution in Berlin in 
January by declaring martial law and then assassinating Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1919) and Karl 
Liebknecht (1871-1919).  They entered Munich on May 2, and killed six hundred people to put 
down the revolution.  Schmitt even experienced “at first hand the tension and insecurity generated 
by the political polarization of the city when his office was broken into by a band of revolutionaries, 
and an officer at a nearby table was shot.”604  Such a traumatic episode likely hardened Schmitt’s 
belief in the primary importance of a strong State to guarantee social order. 
The original draft for the constitution by Hugo Preuss (1860-1925) also valued the central 
and sovereign State, for it: “had proposed a highly unitary state, virtually destroying the federal 
structure of imperial Germany.”605  Although the Center and BVP were dedicated to states’ rights, 
Bavaria would end up losing its original reserved rights from when it had joined the Reich in 1871.  
The best the Catholic parties could do was insert article 18 which allowed for the theoretical 
possibility of separation but was, practically speaking, null.  Yet, the Center was surprisingly 
effective in defending more institutional Catholic interests, especially in education, and shaped the 
constitution as, likely, the best it could have hoped for when their main partners in its creation 
were the left-liberal Deutsche Demokratische Partei (German Democratic Party or DDP) and the 
socialist Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany or SPD).  
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The Center was also weakened by the fact that the Versailles Treaty had reduced the Catholic 
population of Germany by almost twenty percent through ceding territory to France and Poland.
606
 
Therefore, at the onset of Weimar, the Center found that the basis of much of its prewar political 
platform—which had given it a firm grip on eighty percent of the Catholic vote—had eroded or 
disappeared.  On federalism, it had far less capacity in the newly centralized state and also moved 
towards centralization on numerous social and economic issues.  Protection of ethnic Catholic 
minorities was lost as an issue given the Alsatians and Poles were gone.  Anti-Prussian militarism 
meant little in a Germany demilitarized by foreigners.  There was no longer a strong Kulturkampf, 
at least once Hoffmann was removed from office.  Indeed, the war greatly weakened German 
Protestantism, and the Center had largely succeeded in defending Catholic interests within the new 
Constitution.
607
 
The Party had always been socially diverse and more populist and democratic in its 
constituency than any other German party.  It represented a broad range of distinct social and 
economic classes with an equally wide range of political sentiments and interests.  The Center’s 
most determined foe, Bismarck, had fairly accurately opined: “There are not two souls in the 
Center but seven ideological tendencies which portray all the colors of the political rainbow from 
the most extreme right to the radical left.”608  And so, unsurprisingly, the Center lost some 
supporters to both the Nationalist parties of the right as well as to the socialist left.
609
  Yet, the 
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Center deserves to be considered the institutional home for mainstream political Catholicism in 
Weimar as it still claimed over sixty percent of the Catholic vote.  It was also the most pivotal 
Weimar party given that over half of the Republic’s short-lived governments (eight Chancellorships 
in fourteen years) were Center-led coalitions, and they participated in each one, except the last 
three of Papen, Schleicher, and Hitler.  Additionally, the Center’s Heinrich Brauns (1868-1939) 
held the critical office of Minister of Labor through twelve cabinets from 1920-28.
610
  Rather than 
enjoy the newly found influence of the Center and political Catholicism’s mainstream presence 
during the Weimar era, Schmitt obsessed over the fragility of the Republic and speculated on the 
necessity of a political dictatorship to ensure the survival of the German State. 
 
Schmitt’s Postwar Focus on Dictatorship 
As the Weimar Era dawned, Schmitt faced Germany’s political future with a deep sense of 
pessimism and dread.  Rather than an end to the “state of decay” that he had recognized in the 
outbreak of the First World War, the cessation of hostilities only deepened Germany’s existence 
in a “state of exception.”611  For Schmitt had to take into account the new postwar reality of his 
nation’s existence under the jurisdiction of “alien decision” in the guise of the Versailles Treaty and 
the Geneva-based League of Nations.  The National Assembly ratified the Weimar Constitution 
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on July 31, 1919, and its enforcement took effect on August 14, three days after being signed into 
law by the Republic’s first president, Friedrich Ebert (1871-1925).  Yet, from his perspective as a 
constitutional lawyer, Schmitt held significant reservations about the efficacy of the constitution to 
bring an end to this state of exception.  As if to ratify his pessimism, civil unrest did, indeed, 
quickly flare up again when the right-wing Kapp Putsch temporarily forced the government from 
Berlin in March 1920, and triggered a left-wing revolt in the Ruhr.   
These difficult early months for Germany’s fledging Republic were decisive in forming 
Schmitt’s political and legal thought and radicalizing themes and tendencies already displayed in 
his Wilhelmine writings.
612
  As early as 1912, he had recorded in his diary “the time is ripe for 
dictatorship” given the decadence of the German people: in their pursuit of entertainment simply 
to “kill time”; their tolerance of laziness; their desire for money without purpose; and of their 
demand for the “equality of nations, instead of the equality of rights.”613  In 1914’s The Value of the 
State, Schmitt described the political “state of decay as an apocalyptic time of immediacy.”614  Then, 
in 1915, he wrote with ironic intent that Germany should keep the military “state of siege” law for a 
few years after the war ends.
615
  What had originally been ironic became deadly serious in the 
aftermath of the war. 
A significant byproduct of Schmitt’s exposure to issues of martial law at the Deputy 
General Command was his, “abiding interest in dictatorship and in the Ausnahmezustand (the 
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state of exception).”616  In 1915 and 1916, Schmitt began to work out an argument that exceptions 
to constitutional law and restraint of the state could be made in a concrete emergency in order to 
protect or safeguard the constitution itself, without actually abrogating the constitution or 
necessarily establishing dictatorship.  For example, in “Dictatorship and the State of Siege: A 
Constitutional Study” (“Diktatur und Belagerungszustand: Eine staatsrechtliche Studie”),617 Schmitt 
begins with the “state of exception designated as a state of siege,” existing during wartime or 
dictatorship.
618
  He then engages in a historical and comparative study of French and English 
experiences in order to work out the distinction between a state of siege and dictatorship.  Schmitt 
shows a particular interest in the issue of separated powers versus the combined executive, 
legislative, and judicial within various forms of dictatorship. 
In his habilitation lecture, “The Effects of Martial Law in the Ordinary Criminal Process” 
(“Die Einwirkungen des Kriegszustandes auf das ordentliche strafprozessuale Verfahren”),619 
Schmitt studies examples of the kind of legal guarantees, such as regards search and seizure or 
judicial independence, which are suspended or reduced under martial law.  He believes that the 
State authority has a personal responsibility to suspend constitutional provisions “only in the public 
interest,” while noting that the “public interest” itself expands during a time of war.620  Schmitt also 
points out that in some cases “the repeal of a constitutional provision by the specialization of the 
allowable exception is precisely bound and limited.”621  He also published an additional two short 
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articles on martial law and the state of siege at this time.
622
  Whether Cicero’s adage, in a time of 
war the law falls silent (inter arma enim silent leges), is true, Schmitt proved it is not the case that 
lawyers are equally mute. 
In a lecture course in the fall of 1919, on political thought since the Reformation, Schmitt’s 
notes suggest his sympathies lie with early modern absolutism and not political Catholicism.
623
  In a 
lecture on Jean Bodin, Schmitt began with how the “pessimistic assessment of human nature” is 
justification for the “absolutist idea,” and notes that this was already present in Machiavelli.624  His 
treatment of the Church and Jesuit thinkers within modern political thought stresses, in the former, 
the pope as an “absolute monarch” analogous to the absolute king, and, with the Jesuits, their 
militarist language as soldiers for the pope.
625
  While detailing the characteristics and powers of the 
sovereign, which can exist as one, a few (aristocracy), or the many in democracy, Schmitt stresses, 
that in whatever form, the State itself will be a unity of power.  The State’s laws are not subjected to 
any higher power and even its own laws do not bind the sovereign.
626
  Schmitt then turns to Bossuet 
and Hobbes to further the claim all state power is absorbed by the sovereign, and “he is a sort of 
god.”627  Even though Bossuet still sees this power as derived from God, and that the sovereign 
must obey Him, the rub is in the notion: “the omnipotence of the king is as little arbitrariness and 
despotism as the omnipotence of God,”628 which easily slides into the equation of rule (power) with 
reason. 
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The last sentence of Political Romanticism points in the direction Schmitt’s thought would 
soon take.  “Everything that is romantic is at the disposal of other energies that are unromantic, 
and the sublime elevation above definition and decision is transformed into a subservient 
attendance upon alien power and alien decision.”629  Given his equation of the “romantic” with the 
bourgeois and liberal, we can substitute the one for the other in this sentence and understand 
Schmitt to be concerned over the restoration of a strong and decisive—a sovereign—German state.  
Since submitting Political Romanticism for publication, Schmitt was witness to the revolutionary 
tumult outlined above.  So he returned to the early modern origins of the State during a period of 
time in which Germany’s unity, sovereignty, and political stability were in doubt.  From out of 
these experiences, and while teaching a course examining the new constitution, Schmitt completed 
his next book in the summer of 1920; a book which argued the value, and sometimes the necessity, 
of political dictatorship. 
 
Dictatorship 
Dictatorship: From the Origins of the Modern Idea of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class 
Struggle
630
 appeared in print in 1921.  Throughout the book, Schmitt discusses two kinds of 
dictatorship.  The first he calls “commissarial” and is a conservative form limited to being a 
defender or restorer of the regime, and its constitutional order, as it had existed prior to a major 
internal or external disturbance.  The contrasting second form of dictatorship is called “sovereign.”  
It is when the dictator is a revolutionary force wholly unfettered by prior constitutional or 
institutional political restraint, therefore, free to refashion the political order and regime. 
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Schmitt begins his examination of dictatorship with the Roman office by that name, which 
was integrated into the normal functioning of the ancient Republic.  In a time of serious danger 
from riot or war, the Senate could request the Consul to appoint a dictator, which would have no 
more than a fixed six month term of complete control of the government.  The clear intention was 
that the Dictator was accounted for and restrained by the Roman constitution (unwritten though it 
was), and is, therefore, the paradigmatic case for commissarial dictatorship.  The office of Dictator 
did prove its value when Fabius Maximus (ca. 280-203 BC) was twice appointed to lead the 
defense of Rome against Hannibal (247-ca. 181 BC) in 221 and 217 BC.
631
  Eventually, the 
commissarial dictatorship gave way to a sovereign form instituted in the Caesars who 
revolutionized Rome away from its republican order. 
From ancient dictatorship, Schmitt jumps to dictatorship as discussed in modern political 
thought.  He begins with Machiavelli’s treatment of it as a constitutional means of defending the 
Venetian Republic.
632
  Schmitt then introduces several ideas essential to his political thought.  First, 
he notes the well-known shift in Machiavelli, from talking of the good instincts of the people in the 
Discourses on Livy, to treating man as naturally evil in The Prince.  Schmitt points out that the 
natural wickedness of man is axiomatic for any argument for political absolutism, as found in 
Martin Luther, Hobbes, Bossuet, Maistre, and Friedrich Julius Stahl (1802-61).
633
 
Next, Schmitt discusses the “political arcanum”634 or “reasons of state” (imperial arcana or 
arcana dominationis) he claims to have found in Gaius Tacitus (ca. 56-117): “Every science has its 
arcana: theology; jurisprudence; trade; painting; military leadership; medicine.  All use some tricks, 
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even deceit and betrayal to achieve their goal.”635  Schmitt maintains that every State must have its 
arcana and largely operate as a secretive power.  In order to placate the people, the State gives the 
“simulacra” or “decorative . . . semblance of freedom,”636 for example, in various monarchical or 
aristocratic governments, by means of limited participation in politics by the people, and freedom 
of speech.  The lesson to be drawn for Schmitt is that the State cannot be kept safe unless the 
ruling party is kept safe.
637
 
Lastly, Schmitt claims to have learned from an early modern academic German jurist on 
public law, Arnoldus Clapmarius (1574-1604): “Who controls the state of emergency 
[Ausnahmezustand] therefore dominate[s] the State.”638  Therefore, the means by which one 
determines who, or what, is sovereign within a political community is to find who makes the 
“decision” of when an emergency condition exists and when it has ended.  Schmitt brings in 
Hobbes to further elucidate this critical point on political sovereignty: “The law is not a norm of 
justice, but command a mandatum of him who has the highest violence.”639  Ultimately, 
manifestations of the State, such as the law, are reducible to the sovereign.  All aspects of political 
community are likewise a result of sovereign mandate, or decision, such as: “Someone is innocent 
when the state judge has acquitted him”; there is no private right of conscience; and “all private 
property comes only from the state.”640 
Hobbes claimed in De Cive that the sovereign must have “decision,” otherwise, the war of 
all against all will erupt, given the people disagree amongst themselves and are driven by contrary 
views and motives.  Hence, “the law is by nature a command” and “the government’s interest is 
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only in that a command is issued.”641  The law is: “born out of nothing.  It is by definition 
‘dictated.’”642  Schmitt notes that despite his legal positivism, Hobbes still attributes rationalism to 
sovereignty by accepting the modern assumption that power is founded on the “more or less tacit . 
. . constitution of absolute power by the people.”643  Schmitt adds, however, that this assumption of 
a rational foundation will later be “shaken” by Maistre.  He then pointedly notes that Hobbes’s 
sovereign is far more “reminiscent of the system of Caesarism and a sovereign dictatorship, the 
basis of which is an act of absolute delegation.”644  Whether or not Schmitt agrees with this 
Hobbesian version of legal positivism is at the heart of the question of whether he can be 
understood as a Catholic intellectual and proponent of some form of political Catholicism.   
Schmitt immediately gives the reader an answer to this central question by dismissing, as an 
irrelevant consideration, the claim that sovereign decisions are made for the end of the common 
good.  The only issue of moment is the question of who, in the last instance, has the power to 
decide and to choose means.
645
  Thus, Schmitt addresses the single most important concept within 
Catholic political thought in order to blithely set it aside.  Compare Schmitt’s disinterest in natural 
ends to Leo XIII, who claimed it is: “to the common good for which social authority is 
constituted.”646  The state of emergency is pivotal for Schmitt because he sees it as placing the 
bedrock principle of absolute sovereign decision in clearest relief.  The emergency frees the 
sovereign from any prior promises made, such as not raising taxes, or abiding by the rule of law; 
that is, the power of sovereign decision is existentially open to situations as they concretely arise.
647
  
As Schmitt had just noted, however, this sovereignty is redolent of Caesarism. 
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The jurist next examines the manner in which dictatorship is believed to be manifested in 
the Catholic Church’s doctrine of the plenitudo potestatis (plenitude of power) of the pope over 
spiritual matters.  Protestants like John Wycliffe (ca. 1320-84) and Jan Hus (1369-1415), and a 
heterodox Catholic like Marsilius of Padua (ca. 1270-ca. 1342)—lay theologian and jurist for 
Ludwig IV (r. as Holy Roman Emperor 1328-47)
648—believed that the Pope’s use of legates, or 
commissioners to extend his jurisdiction over local councils was the act of a tyrannical dictatorship.  
Schmitt accepts this line of thought, for, he believes Pope Innocent III (r. 1198-1216) had 
transformed the papacy into a modern sovereignty and, therefore, likens the critics of the 
ultramontane Church to later advocates of constitutional and parliamentary republican restraints 
over the sovereignty of monarchs.
649
 
In Part Three, Schmitt turns his attention to the manner in which sovereign dictatorship 
developed within the political thought of the eighteenth century.  In large measure, he ties its rise 
to the ever increasing centralization of the State.
650
  Centralization was partly due to the manner in 
which the concept of the “general will” destroyed private will; indeed, general will is “always right, it 
cannot be wrong, it is reason itself,” akin to natural law.651  Schmitt astutely recognizes this increased 
centralization could serve the absolutist purposes of monarchy or republic alike.  Just as he had in 
Political Romanticism, Schmitt likens the eighteenth century vision of the State as equivalent to the 
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“deistic metaphysics of the universe” in which the state runs as a perfectly lawful “machine.”652  This 
absolute and “rational” machine of the State is implicitly dictatorial, in the manner in which 
Machiavelli or Hobbes treated the term, as synonymous with sovereignty in general.  However, 
Schmitt still keeps the distinction between the commissarial and sovereign forms of dictatorship.  
He recognizes that, in The Social Contract, Rousseau describes dictatorship on a commissarial 
basis hemmed in by a preexisting constitution which the dictator serves.
653
  It is only later that the 
French revolutionaries used the absolute State to surpass the commissarial and establish sovereign 
dictatorship.
654
  However, the development of modern sovereign dictatorship began even earlier 
than Jacobinism with France’s island neighbors to the north. 
In Part Four of Dictatorship, Schmitt finds the first example of the modern sovereign 
dictator as arising out of the English Civil War (1642-51), in the person of Oliver Cromwell (1599-
1658) and his “Protectorate” (1653-9).655  What occurred in the Protestant Revolution in England is 
understood, by Schmitt, as the onset of modern popular sovereignty, which designates “the 
people” as the pouvoir constituant (constituent power).  This leads him to discuss theoreticians of 
constituent power such as the Abbé Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (1748-1836) and the later German 
jurist Georg Jellinek (1851-1911).
656
  The introduction of the concept of constituent power 
reshaped dictatorship.  Schmitt argues that commissarial dictatorship is now understood as one in 
which the dictator acts unconditionally as a “commissioner” of the constituent power, but the 
sovereign dictator acts unconditionally as itself the “commission” of the constituent power.657 
At this point Schmitt introduces—albeit largely in passing or in footnotes—several themes 
that will be central to his next book, Political Theology.  First, he draws from Donoso Cortés the 
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analogy of a dictator’s suspensions of the law as akin to God’s suspensions of natural law in a 
miracle.
658
  Then, in a fascinating footnote that runs across three pages of the book, Schmitt 
examines the way in which philosophical anthropology plays a role in how various modern 
philosophers have approached the concept of dictatorship.  From the standpoint of Enlightenment 
philosophers that believe in the perfectibility of humanity, Schmitt remarks that dictatorship is 
systematically justified by the task of “conscious human activity” to “cause positive advance.”659  
Although he does not refer to Rousseau in this note the discussion reminds one of the General 
Will “forcing” one “to be free.”660  Schmitt mentions a response to this form of dictatorship as 
found in Bonald’s abhorrence of Enlightenment rationalism, and quotes German neo-Kantian 
philosopher Emil Lask’s (1875-1915) description of this modern state as an “education factory.”661 
Schmitt next covers the views on dictatorship of the “great Catholic philosophers”: Bonald, 
Görres, and Donoso.  He believes that they had recognized in modern rationalism and the 
absolute and centralized State, a government that was essentially dictatorship and which could only 
be overcome in its turn by an opposed dictatorship.  Hearkening back to Political Romanticism, 
Schmitt claims the Catholic counter-revolutionaries believed that a dictatorship born from an 
organic historical development is what would overcome the rationalist mechanistic dictatorship, 
which the socialists believed was coming to fruition in the proletariat.  The jurist then turns to the 
French anarchist, Georges Sorel (1847-1922), who shared with the Catholics a sense of the 
“irrational” nature of history in his own attack on Enlightenment mechanism, albeit from an 
opposite political pole.  To Schmitt, the significant difference between the irrationalism of Sorel 
and that of the Catholics, is the former’s belief that hierarchy is inherently dictatorial, and 
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therefore: “the organization of the Catholic Church with its separation of the theological clergy 
from the laity” is a form of dictatorship.662  Finally, Schmitt ends this note by mentioning that Hans 
Kelsen (1881-1973) had written “by far the best” critique of Marxism in his 1920 book Socialism 
and the State: A Study of the Political Theory of Marxism.  What Schmitt takes away from Kelsen 
is that the anthropological optimism in human nature is “suddenly” made “to serve democracy.”663 
Part Five of Dictatorship gives a detailed account of the manner in which the commissarial 
and then the sovereign forms of dictatorship developed over the course of the French Revolution.  
This leads to a final section on dictatorship, as it exists in a “state of siege,” which largely 
incorporates the arguments made in Schmitt’s earlier writings on the topic.  Of note in the section 
is Schmitt’s review of military dictatorship in modern contexts, with the general intent to 
differentiate it from sovereign dictatorship.  He again focuses primarily on the French Revolution, 
but he also mentions Abraham Lincoln (1809-65) as a military dictator.
664
  Overall, Schmitt clearly 
favors commissarial dictatorship as acceptable and describes sovereign dictatorship as: “the 
pretension of sovereignty as a principle of unlimited state power.”665 
Schmitt ends the book with a short discussion of dictatorship within the context of 
constitutionalism.  He again refers to Donoso’s “Speech on Dictatorship,” in which the Spaniard 
describes Article 14 of the French Restoration Charter of 1814 as allowing for dictatorship.
666
   This 
topic allows Schmitt to publish his first examination and interpretation of Article 48 of the new 
German constitution of 1919, an article that famously grants the Reich President the power to 
declare an emergency situation and suspend constitutional rights.  Schmitt interprets Article 48 as 
contradictory due to the presence of both commissarial and sovereign forms of dictatorship within 
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its parameters.  The intent of the article seems to be, for Schmitt, to allow limited commissarial 
dictatorial rule in true emergency situations.  However the article is also vague in crucial aspects so 
that no strictly defined limits to dictatorial intervention are provided.
667
 
Finally, Schmitt ends his study on dictatorship with a very interesting summary of the 
history of the modern State.  He believes “the historical value of absolute monarchy” is “that [it] 
destroyed the feudal and class powers and thereby created sovereignty in the modern sense of a 
unitary State.”668  In other words, Schmitt recognizes the triumph of modern absolutism as residing 
in its destruction of social pluralism, by reduction of political community to the relationship 
between a unitary sovereign State and the individual.  All intermediary corporate bodies were 
privatized and excluded from the political community and rule.  This development of a dyad 
between State and individual allowed for the rise of the bourgeois (liberal) rule of law in 
republicanism, as Schmitt finds exemplified in the work of Nicolas de Condercet (1743-94).  This 
form of controlling social factions and groups replaced the traditional “armed despotism” to the 
“legal despotism” of a Social Contract.  Such a change in methods of control could occur because 
“the individual, isolated by the general equality,” requires “very little power to force him to obey” 
by means of the “unified whole”—the State—that hovers above him.  Hence, “so-called political 
siege rules, such as an enforcement of civil and criminal law procedure” which even allowed the 
State the stability to “provide guarantees of civil liberty.”669 
Schmitt concludes, however, on an ominous note, which points beyond commissarial 
dictatorship, for already in the nineteenth century the rise of a Proletariat engaged in the social 
revolutions of 1832 and 1848 suggests that “a very new political condition” and “new constitutional 
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terms” had been created; specifically, the “state of siege.”670  Schmitt’s implication being the “social” 
is now straining against the modern unitary sovereign State’s monopoly of what qualifies as “rule” 
or “the political.”  And so, the concept of “dictatorship” remains paramount, both from the 
rhetoric of a “dictatorship of the proletariat” in Marx and Engels, or as having been used since 
1830 to describe the military actions and rule of Marie-Joseph La Fayette (1757-1834), Louis-
Eugène Cavaignac (1802-57) and Napoleon III (r. 1852-70).  Dictatorship since the revolutions of 
the early nineteenth century has even been spoken of in such varied forms as: “dictatorship of the 
government, the road, the press, the capital, the bureaucracy.”671  Such changes or developments in 
late modernity “in the political context of the experiences of the World War,” and viewed “from a 
general theory of the State . . . presupposes the notion of a sovereign dictatorship.”672 
 
Weimar’s Catholic Revival 
Schmitt began the Weimar era with a wholly secular focus on defending the sovereignty of 
the modern absolute State, while actual politically Catholic currents moved in a number of 
directions.  This divergence is on display in the first review of a book of Schmitt’s appearing in the 
Catholic press, by the lawyer and Mayor of Regensburg, Otto Hipp (1885-1952).  In the January 
1923 issue of Hochland, Germany’s widest circulating Catholic monthly, Hipp praises Schmitt’s 
On Dictatorship for having mentioned the likes of Augustine and Aquinas, as well as its witty 
treatment of Cromwell and Article 48.
673
  Overall, Hipp is really only interested in the rise of 
Communism, and so the bulk of the review focuses on Schmitt’s discussion of the “Dictatorship of 
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the Proletariat” since this was “one of the main problems or our political life.”674  Beyond this single 
review, Schmitt’s book was ignored in Catholic outlets. 
The Center remained the institutional home for mainstream political Catholicism, but the 
Republic provided the context for the clearest demonstration of the distinctive prudential channels 
in which German political Catholicism could run.
675
  Since the late nineteenth century, German 
Catholics had organized themselves, ever more, into various social and economic associations: 
women’s organizations, youth movements, trade unions and worker’s associations, groups for 
Catholic families, for farmers, former soldiers, soccer clubs, pigeon-racing, and so on.
676
  These 
organizations came into their own in the Weimar years, given the Republic’s defense of civil 
liberties, but also due to papal encouragement. 
When Cardinal Ambrogio Ratti (1857-1939) was elevated to the papacy as Pius XI (r. 
1922-39), he immediately dedicated his pontificate to the social reign of Christ the King (Regnum 
Christi) in the encyclical Ubi Arcano Dei Consilio (On the Peace of Christ in the Kingdom of 
Christ), promulgated on December 23, 1922.  Ubi Arcano expanded upon the ecclesiology as well 
as the Christology of the Church, particularly as it had been formulated from Leo XIII on, by 
placing emphasis on the traditional ordering of the social and political realms under the rule of 
Christ’s example; that is, under the guiding principles of natural and divine positive law.  The 
Church as mystical bride of Christ and the popes as Christ’s Vicar maintained the claim (or 
charism) of moral authority and tutor to secular leaders and the people alike.  In the increasingly 
democratic polities of Europe, Pius expanded this dynamic to include the direct encouragement of 
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lay Catholic action, given the shared receipt of the chrism of baptism between lay and cleric alike.
677
  
Ubi Arcano announced to Catholics the Church expected them to engage in social and political 
action to assert the Catholic faith’s “ascendancy over the values and structures of State and society.”  
Pius showed particular favor for smaller Catholic social movements and groups which sought to 
“bring about a recatholicization of modern life.”678 
Catholic workers’ associations prominently evidence Catholic Action in Weimar Germany.  
Amongst Catholic intellectuals, it primarily took the form of the older Center-oriented “think 
tanks,” such as the Volksverein or the Association of Catholic Academics (Katholischen 
Akademikerverbandes).  The idea of Catholic Action particularly grew in strength amongst young 
educated Catholics who often voiced impatience with Center politics: 
Instead, they called for radical reforms or even for a ‘Catholic revolution’ which would sweep away the 
established order in the name of the Catholic political, social and economic principles articulated since the 
late nineteenth century by the Popes in their encyclical letters.
679
 
 
These motivated young Catholics sought “the active implementation of social and political beliefs 
derived from their religious faith”680 and were a byproduct of the two most important European 
spiritual renewal movements after the war: the Liturgical Renewal Movement and the Catholic 
Youth Movement. 
The movement for renewal of Catholic liturgy was motivated essentially by a “classicist” 
spirit of recovering aspects of medieval worship which had fallen idle after the Protestant 
Reformation—one such example is the use of Gregorian chant.  Pius X had especially encouraged 
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such research and adaptation into the Roman liturgical rite.  Of the two movements, the Liturgical 
was the most cosmopolitan and ultramontane; it created strong international ties, particularly 
between Catholics of Germany, France and Belgium.  In Germany, the first major event to 
encourage the movement was a conference on liturgy, in 1914, at the Maria Laach Benedictine 
Monastery called for by its Abbot, Idlefons (Peter) Herwegen (1874-1946).  However, both the 
Liturgical Renewal and the Catholic Youth Movements of Weimar Germany would be most 
decisively encouraged and led by the efforts of dogmatic theologian Romano Guardini (1885-
1968).  Given his name, it is unsurprising that he was born in Verona Italy, but his parents moved 
to Germany while he was an infant and he lived there the rest of his life.  Ordained a priest of the 
Diocese of Mainz in 1910, Guardini there became friends with Abbot Herwegen.  He established 
himself as a leader of liturgical renewal with the publication of The Spirit of the Liturgy (Vom 
Geist der Liturgie) in 1918, a foundational text of all subsequent liturgical reform straight through 
to the Second Vatican Council (1962-5) and beyond.
681
 
As for the Catholic Youth Movement, Guardini began his involvement in 1916 with the 
youth organization, Quickborn.  The name refers to the “Fountain of Youth,” and it had been 
founded in 1909 as a teetotaler movement.  By 1920, Guardini was the recognized spiritual leader 
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of the greatly expanded movement, and became Quickborn’s official “pastoral leader” from 1923-
33.  In the 1920’s Guardini guided Quickborn through an internal “struggle for supremacy 
between a religious-Socialist and internationalist wing, led by Nicolaus Ehlen [actually Nikolaus, 
1886-1965], and a nationalist right wing.”682  The result was the organization reflected Guardini’s 
moderate conservative political Catholicism and religious classicism.
683
  Quickborn and the 
Catholic Youth Movement in general remained far less nationalist than did their Protestant 
counterparts of the Wandervogel.  In fact, the Catholic youth groups considered their Protestant 
counterparts to be religiously indifferent and neo-pagan, the latter due to their excessive 
nationalism.
684
  Throughout Guardini’s tenure with Quickborn he maintained a residence at the 
Burg Rothenfels, a castle near Würzburg which the movement had purchased as the base for its 
operations.  Additionally, he assumed the editorship of the movement’s official journal Comrades 
of the Shield (Die Schildgenossen) in 1924, “which then quickly evolved into a national Catholic 
periodical devoted to theology and culture.”685  Neither the Catholic liturgical or youth movements 
were especially political, despite internal factions, but proponents of both remained generally 
supportive of the Center.
686
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Guardini completed his Habilitationschrift at the University of Bonn in 1922, and was a 
lecturer for its Catholic Theological Faculty.  He became acquainted with the thirty-four year old 
Schmitt when the latter began to teach there in the spring of 1922.  In addition to Guardini, 
Schmitt soon came to know a number of prominent Catholic intellectuals in Bonn.  He became 
particular friends with professor of Church History and priest-theologian, Wilhelm Neuß (1880-
1965), along with priest-theologian, Karl Eschweiler, and the lay theologian, Erik Peterson.  
Schmitt also had students in Bonn that were well-connected to Weimar’s Catholic intelligentsia, its 
social movements, and the Center Party.  Of chief importance among these were Russian-Jewish 
convert to Catholicism, Waldemar Gurian (1902-54), Werner Becker (1904-81), and Paul Adams 
(1894-1961). 
Gurian was involved in the Catholic Youth Movement through which he came to know 
Becker, who served for a time as Guardini’s secretary.  He brought to Becker’s attention Schmitt’s 
book Political Form in 1923, and the “result of reading it was a visit to” its author.687  Becker had 
already studied the law in Freiburg and Berlin, and now joined Schmitt’s Bonn seminar, where he 
was described as “one of the most talented”688 of the jurist’s students.  Becker was one of only three 
Schmitt students in Bonn to be graduated summa cum laude,
689
 in 1925, earning his doctorate with 
an Arbeit on Hobbes theory of State.
690
  In the mid to late 1920s, both Becker and Gurian worked 
for the Kölnische Volkszeitung (Cologne People’s Daily), that venerable Catholic daily which dated 
back to the 1860s, and rose to prominence during the Kulturkampf.  Becker also became an editor 
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in 1927 of a Catholic journal, Abendland.  Adams was likewise associated with Abendland and 
would become an editor for Germania, the leading Berlin newspaper of the Center Party.  Credit 
in large measure should go to these three students for the positive reputation Schmitt held amongst 
Weimar Catholics—to the extent that such a reputation existed—as they served for a time as 
enthusiastic publicists of his writings and views.  It would be a serious error, however, to assume on 
the basis of his Bonn acquaintance with politically Catholic-minded intellectuals active in Weimar’s 
Catholic journalism, that Schmitt should be counted as a fellow traveler.  At best, Schmitt was a 
half-hearted poseur, and at worse, a wolf in sheep’s clothing within the intellectual life of Weimar’s 
Catholic milieu. 
 
Schmitt in Greifswald and Bonn (1921-23) 
From 1916-22, Schmitt’s personal biography is largely in the dark as there are few 
resources in the Nachlass and he did not keep diaries for this stretch of time; perhaps rejecting the 
habit as romantic as he had critiqued it in “The Buribunks.”691  1919 is the year in which Schmitt’s 
marriage is believed to have begun to fail irrevocably.
692
  In 1920, it seems Dorotić faced several 
legal proceedings for accusations of robbery, violent theft, and forgery, and Schmitt secured a 
defense lawyer for her.
693
  The dissolution of his marriage contributes to the dearth of personal 
materials from the time, as Schmitt made an effort to efface his records of any mention of Cari.  
He would soon begin to only refer to her, derisively, as “the Lady” (die Dame).694  However, they 
cohabitated until Schmitt was awarded his first full professorship at the University of Greifswald for 
the winter semester of 1921-22.  Dorotić remained in the Munich apartment until early 1923. 
                                                 
691
 Ibid., 105. 
692
 Ibid.  Koenen claims that the marriage was already a failure in 1917 (Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt, 86). 
693
 Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, 119. 
694
 Ibid., 330. 
172 
 
The thirty-three-year-old Schmitt left Munich, and his wife, for Greifswald in the summer 
of 1921.  He spent only one semester there before taking a position at the University of Bonn, 
where he began lecturing in May 1922.  A common view of the standard narrative is that in the 
years after he wrote his critique of romanticism, Schmitt had been struggling to overcome such an 
inclination in his own life.
695
  Related to this presumption is the belief that Schmitt also experienced 
a religious—Catholic— revival due to writing his two most “Catholic” books, Political Theology and 
Political Form, in 1922.
696
  But, the evidence of his behavior and personal views in these crucial 
years suggests otherwise. 
Presumably through the novelist Friedrich Kiener (dates unavailable), Schmitt met the 
twenty-six-year-old Irish-Australian graduate student, Kathleen Murray (1895-unavailable), in 
August 1921, and they immediately began an intense affair.
697
  In September they took a day trip 
down Schmitt’s beloved Moselle River and were already discussing marriage plans.  At the end of 
October, Schmitt separates from his wife.  Yet, he still signs a letter as late as November 5, 1921 
with his informally adopted hyphenated surname “Schmitt-Dorotić” that he had been using since 
1915.
698
  Schmitt begins to investigate grounds for divorce, and as a result of his research finally 
begins to doubt the veracity of his wife’s claims to be a descendent of royalty.  He even 
“approached the Croatian Consulate but could not learn anything definite there.”699  In May of 
1922, he romantically speaks of committing bigamy, but overall, “there is a clear association 
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between the divorce process and wedding planning.”700  The next month: “In his distress, the 
constitutional lawyer . . . appealed . . .  to his friend Moritz Julius Bonn with the request that he 
check with his Croatian relatives for the family Dorotić from Stabica or Agram.  Schmitt's 
‘philanthropic pastor’ knew only too well what that request for help meant.”701  Schmitt was deeply 
disturbed that Dorotić was not of royal lineage and recorded in a diary entry for July 3, 1922: 
“There are countless Dorotić in Zagreb, the name is as common as Müller here.  What failure.”702 
Murray was working on her Arbeit under the philologist, Ernst Robert Curtius (1886-
1956),
703
 when she met Schmitt.  Schmitt translated her English writing of the text into German and 
she asked him to freely change it as he saw fit to help her get Curtius’s approval.  He went on to 
assist her analysis of Hippolyte Taine (1828-93) and English Romanticism, to such a significant 
extent, that there is some question as to whether the final result is truly hers.  Additionally, he 
promoted her to academic acquaintances and convinced his own publisher, Duncker & Humblot, 
to issue her Arbeit in November 1924, and they even discussed co-authoring a novel. 
However, his great assistance of Murray fed his insecurity and doubts of her dedication to 
him.  Schmitt frequently interpreted the relationship as an unequal one, in which he had the bulk 
of responsibilities.  He considered himself secondary to his utility for her, in assisting her academic 
career.  Such doubts make an appearance in the draft of a novel Schmitt wrote in early 1922, titled 
“A Loyal Gypsy” (Der treue Zigeuner): 
The plot was of a woman looking to attain absolution for her sins through a pilgrimage.  Her husband, the 
faithful gypsy, must support her.  On the journey several men fall to her charms.  The husband and wife die.  
Posthumously the world argues for the ‘canonization’ of the enchanting woman.704 
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Schmitt’s vanity, melancholy, and tendency to misogyny are all on display in this treatment for a 
romantic novel.  His musings over Murray often turned grandiose by romantically speaking of 
himself as oscillating between a “shadow of God”—that looks down on him—and his worldliness in 
a dependency on women.
705
 
After being graduated, Murray had no legal means to stay in Germany, and returned to 
Sydney in June of 1922.  Thus, their time together amounted to a little less than a year.  Schmitt 
records always thinking of her that summer and he sent her weekly love letters declaring he will 
divorce his wife and marry her.  Yet, he also soon engages in a “disappointing” affair with a doctor, 
Carol (Lolo) Sauer (dates unavailable),
706
 and on January 23, 1923, he met his second wife, the 
“good girl Duška,” Dušanka Todorović (1903-50).  Schmitt hired the nineteen-year-old Serbian 
student to translate documents related to his divorce proceedings and promptly began to romance 
her.  Even as late as May 1923, however, Schmitt continued to pine for Murray and considered 
marrying her.  The day after his initial seduction of Todorović, at the end of July 1923, the two 
travelled together to Yugoslavia, perhaps in part, to acquire copies of birth certificates relating to 
his wife.
707
  Only after consummating his affair with Todorović does he come to choose her.  In 
August, he rebuffed an Australian priest residing in Germany who Murray had asked to appeal to 
Schmitt on her behalf.  Mehring shows that Schmitt’s doubts of Murray were ill founded as she 
evidently spent the rest of her life waiting and pining for him to return to her.
708
 
Other than the evidence of Schmitt’s concupiscence in this period, another important 
source for insight into his character and thought are the letters written to him by the editor and 
author, Franz Blei.  He had been editor of the literary and pornographic magazines Amethyst and 
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The Opals in 1905-06, and then of Hyperion from 1908-09, the latter being the first magazine to 
publish modernist author, Franz Kafka (1883-1924).
709
  Schmitt and Blei became good friends in 
Munich, and after the three essays contributed to Summa, the jurist went on to write (at least) one 
of the chapters of Blei’s 1920 satirical work, The Great Bestiary of Modern Literature.710  Much 
like Schmitt, the Viennese Blei had abandoned Catholicism in 1888 at the age of seventeen.  
However, unlike the jurist, Blei was generally left-wing in politics; he even knew Vladimir Lenin 
(1870-1924) personally.  Despite a different politics, the two did share a characteristic 
bohemianism and intellectual Gnosticism.  The former commonality is seen in their love for 
literary and artistic modernism as well as a shared licentiousness.
711
  The latter similitude is 
evidenced in Blei’s 1918 criticism of Schmitt’s “Visibility” essay, from a vantage point which 
stressed the Gnostic-revolutionary view of Christianity and its suggested dualism between God and 
the world.
712
 
Blei’s letters to Schmitt are “very personal”713 and primarily discuss Catholicism, women, 
drinking, and literature.  In more than one letter, Blei treats Catholic orthodoxy with sarcasm or 
dismissive irony, and emphatically makes it clear that he is, “in no way a Christian writer and never 
even seemed to have the ambition to be,”714 despite having worked for Catholic journals like 
Summa.  In a letter of December 7, 1921—four months after Schmitt had begun his affair with 
Murray—Blei describes himself as by nature a sensualist and certainly “no Christian or Stoic” and 
concludes: 
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I have no relationship to what is called redemption and consider the statement that Christ had to die [for us] 
on the cross, a vulgar posterior swindle to dodge around the baseness of execution.  . . .  So I am a godless 
cleric.  Like you, dear friend.
715
 
 
Unfortunately, the letters written by Schmitt to Blei are lost, but some evidence can be culled from 
the available materials to suggest that Schmitt would indeed agree with being characterized as a 
“godless clerical.”  Most importantly, in 1970’s Political Theology Two, Schmitt claims his book, 
Political Form, grew from the essay “Visibility” as well as out of conversations with Haecker, Weiß, 
and Blei.
716
  Mehring’s unprecedented archival research suggests Blei is, by far, the most important 
for Schmitt of these contemporary interlocutors over Catholicism and the Church.
717
  One 
commentator even sees Political Form as: “entirely a continuation and deepening of Blei’s 
‘Katholischer Meditation’ (1908).”718  Given how deeply, and often, they discussed Catholicism and 
a shared Gnosticism, it is reasonable to think Blei would have a privileged insight into his friend’s 
religious beliefs. 
Further anecdotal evidence of Schmitt’s secularity can be found in his diaries for 1922-24.719  
During this period, he reread The Red and the Black, in a new edition of Stendhal’s works Blei 
had published in 1921.  Schmitt identified himself with the novel’s protagonist Julien Sorel—the 
“intellectually gifted, poor and proud soldier of fortune”720—interested only in social advancement 
and with no compunction in regards to religious hypocrisy or adultery.  Soon after having left the 
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Protestant atmosphere of Greifswald for the more Catholic Bonn, as well as having written Political 
Form, Schmitt records: “I am really not in this Central milieu”; and “[h]e even speaks of 
atheism.”721  Blei’s biographer concluded: “Blei and Schmitt felt reminiscent about their Catholic 
origin where it is less about beliefs and religious convictions then about the promise radiating out 
from Catholicism of established hierarchies of value and a binding orientation in life.”722 
Schmitt was an avid reader— dating at least to the summer of 1922723 when he was writing 
Political Form—of Charles Maurras, as well as the paper of the same name as his movement, 
Action française.  In a 1924 letter to Ludwig Feuchtwanger (1885-1947), his editor at Duncker & 
Humblot, Schmitt explained his interest in Action française.  He claims the movement’s paper “is 
the most interesting newspaper that exists today,” and describes Maurras as a “great writer.”724  
Schmitt even offers to send Feuchtwanger a book Maurras penned if he has an interest in reading 
him.  It is unclear whether the Jewish editor took Schmitt up on his offer, but neither could have 
failed to be ignorant of Action française’s vocal anti-Semitism.725  Nor is it very likely that Schmitt 
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was unaware of the Church’s consistent and recurrent criticisms of the French political right, 
including strong condemnations of Maurras and his movement. 
Over the course of the “Dreyfus Affair,” Pope Leo XIII wrote several letters to France’s 
episcopacy and Catholic population, in which he expressed his concern over the anti-Semitism and 
radical actions of the country’s political right.726  He called on Catholics to support the republican 
government as the rightful authority and abjure monarchism, “expressed his support for Captain 
Dreyfus,” and even “gave a famous interview to the French secular newspaper Le Figaro defending 
the Jews” in 1892.727  Leo’s approach to the French right was continued by his successors.  Pope St. 
Pius X “accused [Action française] of ‘hatred,’ and in 1914 seven of Maurras’s publications were 
put on the Index.”728  The Holy See’s “thirty-year effort to stifle”729 Action française culminated with 
a blanket condemnation of the movement in 1927 and the mass excommunication of its entire 
body of supporters.
730
 
The Indexing of a number of Maurras’s books, in 1914, clearly had no impact on Schmitt 
in the early 1920s.  In fact, Schmitt’s mention of atheism, at the time, is made particularly poignant 
by the fact that Maurras is well known for a quote: “Je suis catholique, mais je suis athéiste” (I am 
Catholic, but I am an atheist).  The Frenchman is also remembered for the motto “Politique 
d’abord” (“politics first”) and we shall soon see that both of these pithy quotes could be used to 
illustrate the mindset of a “godless clerical” which Schmitt displays in Political Form—that essay 
which the standard narrative considers his most Catholic.  The jurist’s secular appropriation of 
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superficial aspects of the Catholic Church considered ecclesiastically owes more to “the political 
model of Action française than the model of the Center.”731  Schmitt was likewise unswayed by the 
papal condemnation of Maurras’s movement in 1927, despite a public reserve: “Schmitt did speak 
amongst his close circle of friends, and only there, disparagingly of the Church’s condemnation of 
Action française and thus expressed his sympathy for Charles Maurras.”732 
In addition to “intensively”733 reading Maurras in the summer of 1922, Schmitt also read a 
book by (now Blessed) John Henry Newman, which his wife sent him as a birthday present in July 
of 1922,
734
 despite his having begun divorce proceedings against her.  The great British Cardinal 
took German Catholicism by storm in the nineteen-twenties and thirties.  Through a flurry of 
translations, “a whole generation of German readers found in Newman the modern counterpart to 
Augustine, providing a convincing subjective and personal expression of the Divine Ordo [divine 
order] delineated in Aquinas.”735  Even restricted to close proximity to Schmitt the impact of 
Newman was tremendous.  It was reading Newman that led to the conversion to Catholicism of 
Theodor Haecker,
736
 Schmitt’s close friend in Munich, who was first a translator of Kierkegaard 
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and then of the Cardinal.  Prominent theologians Erich Przywara (an admirer of Schmitt’s Weimar 
work) and Romano Guardini (colleague and acquaintance of the jurist) were also early translators 
and popularizers of Newman in Germany.  The editor of Hochland, Carl Muth, was another 
Newman aficionado and friend of Schmitt’s in the late nineteen-teens and twenties.  To this list we 
must also add his student, Werner Becker.  After completing his legal studies, Guardini convinced 
Becker to begin studying philosophy and theology in 1926.  Reading Newman assisted Becker in 
his discernment of a priestly vocation.  He studied theology in Bonn, Paris, Tübingen, Köln, and 
Berlin before his 1932 ordination as a priest in Aachen.  In 1938, Becker joined the Oratory of St. 
Phillip Neri in Leipzig, which had only recently been founded in 1930.  The Oratory was a 
community of priests and lay people who lived and worked under the auspices first established by 
Newman.
737
 
Moving forward in time, momentarily, to the era of the Third Reich, the impact of the 
British theologian on German Catholic intellectuals was so profound that: “[t]hroughout the 
thirties and forties Newman’s translators and friends supplied the spiritual and religious depth 
necessary to sustain an inward resistance to the claims of Nazism.”738  A connection between being 
                                                                                                                                                             
Newman’s writings as had been suggested to him.  Schmitt did not give him an answer (Schmitt and Mohler, Carl 
Schmitt—Briefwechsel, 63).  However, Schmitt records in a diary entry five weeks later: “I really am a shepherd of 
Being.  That Ernst Jünger can take in Leon Bloy today, for example, is an effect of my Pastoring.  That Theodor 
Haecker converted to Catholicism did not happen without me as a guardian.  I am a shepherd of Being.  I also carry 
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an enthusiast of Newman and an opponent of Nazism exists for every single one of these early 
friends or acquaintances of Schmitt.
739
  Theodor Haecker provides, perhaps, the most poignant 
example.  When he was silenced and forbidden to write by the Nazis in 1938, Haecker was still 
allowed to translate, and continued to use Newman as a means of resistance by proxy, particularly, 
the theologian’s writings on conscience.  Haecker belonged to a group of intellectuals opposed to 
Nazism that met at the home of Muth during the Second World War.  Haecker read excerpts of 
the stridently anti-Nazi wartime journal he kept—published after the war as Journal in the Night—as 
well as from Newman at group meetings.
740
  The circle included the famous siblings Hans and 
Sophie Scholl (1918-43 and 1921-43, respectively).  The Scholls’ exposure to Newman by means 
of Haecker and Muth was a significant factor in their being moved to active resistance to the Nazi 
regime and then suffering martyrdom by beheading (via Fallbeil).
741
  Even Blei—the Gnostic and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Switzerland during the war; and student of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Edith Stein (1891-1942).  Stein was a 
Catholic convert from Judaism in 1922 who was encouraged by Pryzwara to translate Newman’s Idea of a University as 
well as many of his letters.  She became a Discalced Carmelite nun in 1933, taking the name Teresa Benedicta of the 
Cross, but later was murdered at Auschwitz for being racially Jewish.  She was beatified May 1, 1987 and canonized a 
saint on October 11, 1998. 
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godless clerical—found Newman absorbing, and would break off his friendship with Schmitt when 
the latter joined forces with the Nazis in 1933.
742
 
Returning to the early Twenties, Schmitt proved completely immune to the positive 
influence that resonated from Newman amongst such a wide swath of German Catholic thinkers in 
Weimar.  In Political Theology, we find Schmitt’s only published reference to Newman at this 
time.  Tellingly, it happens to be one in which he suggests quite a forced interpretation of the 
Cardinal as a reactionary Catholic proponent of political dictatorship.
743
  In his Nachlass, the sole 
contemporarily recorded comment by Schmitt, upon first reading Newman in 1922, relates he 
suspected the celebrated Catholic theologian of being “a Jew.”744  This exceedingly odd reaction to 
Newman is not the only example of Schmitt having declared a Catholic thinker to be “a Jew.”  In a 
diary entry from 1915, about having discussed “the Jews” with his (actually) Jewish friend George 
Eisler, he remarks in a parenthetical that: “Scheler is also a Jew”—referring to the Catholic 
philosopher Max Scheler (1874-1928).
745
  Historian Jerry Z. Muller has suggested, given Schmitt 
was a racial anti-Semite, he could have been commenting on the similarity of the Englishman’s 
surname to the German “Neumann,” and considered it a Jewish name.746  This plausible 
supposition is bolstered by the fact that Newman’s name was at times misspelled, such as with 
                                                                                                                                                             
awaiting execution.  It was only the pleading by their Lutheran pastor that conversion would break their mother’s heart 
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Przywara’s 1923 book Religionsbegru ̈ndung: Max Scheler, J. H. Neuman.  Alternately, I suspect 
that Schmitt may have been applying his interpretation of Gnosticism, such as in Marcion’s 
preaching a dualism of a Christian God of Love and the Jewish God of Law.  In either case, 
Schmitt’s immunity from the religious inspiration commonly felt by German Catholics as a 
response to reading Newman seems to be further demonstrated in a letter of 1924, in which he 
writes: “[a]fter the bad experience of the October issue of Hochland I am [concerned] about the 
society in which I will appear in the November issue,” adding in likely explanation of his 
disappointment, “I do not know if you have noticed that in the October issue men like ‘Newman 
and Haecker’ were discussed.”747 
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statement about the weakness of the November issue to an unrelated comment that in it Haecker and Newman are 
discussed.  However, the reference to “men like” Newman and Haecker seems more likely to correspond to a 
“Gesellschaft” than does the unnamed Wittig alone.  Furthermore, Blei expresses annoyance with Haecker and his 
commitment to Newman in a letter to Schmitt of May 7, 1922, see: Blei, Briefe an Carl Schmitt 1917-1933, 42-3. 
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Chapter 5. 
Schmitt’s “Catholic” Works: Political Theology and Political Form 
“The most drastic way to reject a proposition is not to dismiss it brusquely as disproven and merely brush it aside, but 
on the contrary to take it over and work it into an essential and grounded connection with one’s own argument – i.e., 
to take it over. . .”748 
—Martin Heidegger. 
 
Transition from On Dictatorship to Political Theology 
Since the appearance in print of On Dictatorship in 1921: the Allies had assigned to 
Germany a war reparations debt of 132 billion Marks; a third of Upper Silesia had been ceded to 
Poland, resulting in clashes between Polish insurgents and the German Freikorps; and the 
Republic’s first Finance Minister, Matthias Erzberger (1875-1921), was assassinated by right-wing 
terrorists for having signed the armistice.  Schmitt’s thought moved from dictatorship to the issue 
of political sovereignty and the apparent loss of it by the contemporary German State.  Inspired by 
his studies with Weber, he now delved into the connections between theological views and theories 
of State in the two books which have most inspired the standard narrative claims of Schmitt’s 
Catholicity or status as a political theologian.
749
  As we shall find in this chapter, however, the 
reputation for Catholicity of these two texts is wholly undeserved.  Even though they happen to be 
the jurist’s most theologically interested books, they are closer to being works of political 
Protestantism than political Catholicism. 
                                                 
748
 Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence and Concept of Φύσις in Aristotle’s Physics B1,” trans. Thomas Sheehan, in 
Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 224. 
749
 For example, Lönne, in his review of Schmitt’s relationship to Catholicism during Weimar, begins by summarizing 
Political Romanticism, Political Theology, and Political Form.  He glosses each in a manner that suggests their 
Catholicity in order to set up his standard narrative conclusions in the remainder of his essay; and this despite the fact 
that the evidence he tallies overwhelmingly counsels an opposite conclusion from the one he draws.  See: Lönne, “Carl 
Schmitt und der Katholizismus,” 11-35. 
185 
 
Schmitt constructed the essays that make up 1922’s Political Theology: Four Chapters on 
the Concept of Sovereignty
750
 (Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität) 
in two periods of writing.  The first three chapters were put to paper while in Greifswald (summer 
1921 to spring 1922) and intended for a Max Weber tribute.  They were subsequently published 
in 1923 in the second volume under the title “Sociology of the Concept of Sovereignty and 
Political Theology.”751  Schmitt wrote the final chapter once he moved to Bonn in the spring of 
1922 and it first appeared in a special issue on “Catholic Legal Philosophy” of a secular academic 
journal.
752
  All four essays were then collected and issued in the fall of 1922.  Schmitt noted in the 
foreword to this first edition of Political Theology that he had written it together with Political 
Form in March of that year.  Mehring informs us that at this time, however, Schmitt was working 
with Kathleen in Marburg on her dissertation; so he believes the date of March 1922 only refers to 
a time of compositional decision.
753
  Thus, it is once Schmitt moves to Bonn to begin lecturing in 
May, that he wrote the last chapter of Political Theology and also Political Form. 
 
Political Theology 
The first sentence of Political Theology is quite famous indeed: “Sovereign is he who 
decides on the exceptional case.”754  This principle has the double meaning of deciding whether an 
exceptional case exists, as well as what is to be done.  As in Dictatorship and even his earliest 
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books—such as Law and Judgment and The Value of the State—Schmitt is convinced by the early 
modern arguments of Bodin regarding the absolute and unified nature of State sovereignty; it 
trumps any other considerations.  He notes that from the onset Bodin recognized the connection 
between sovereignty and “the exception” for in states of exception, “it is clear that the state 
remains, whereas law recedes.”755  Although Bodin tried to hold to a traditional (pre-modern) view, 
in which “commitments are binding because they rest on natural law,” Schmitt believes the French 
jurist understood “in emergencies the tie to general natural principles ceases.”756  To Schmitt: “The 
existence of the state is undoubted proof of its superiority over the validity of the legal norm.  The 
decision frees itself from all normative ties and becomes in the true sense absolute.”757  This view is 
classically modern political positivism or statism; norms exist because a sovereign makes them a 
reality: 
The exception appears in its absolute form when a situation in which legal prescriptions can be valid must 
first be brought about.  Every general norm demands a normal, everyday frame of life to which it can be 
factually applied and which is subjected to its regulations.  The norm requires a homogenous medium.  . . .  
For a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who definitely decides 
whether this normal situation actually exists.
758
 
 
Here, again, we find displayed Schmitt’s rejection of the natural law (“general natural principles”).759  
Also on display, at least by implication, is his rejection of social pluralism as he believes the rule of 
law is an accomplishment of the State built upon a “homogenous medium,” because “[t]here exists 
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no norm that is applicable to chaos.”760  Social peace and stability, homogeneity, is primarily an 
achievement of the State over a recalcitrant or chaotic material substrate (the people). 
The rejections of natural law and social pluralism are both quite uncharacteristic for a 
German Catholic given the country’s national development along Protestant and Prussian lines.  In 
fact Schmitt goes further, as he was consistently dismissive of even the most fundamental principle 
of Catholic thought; a principle one finds embedded in all strains of German political Catholicism.  
For shortly before the above passages, he rejected the common good: 
Everyone agrees that whenever antagonisms appear within a state, every party wants the general good—therein 
resides after all the bellum omnium contra omnes.  But sovereignty (and thus the state itself) resides in 
deciding this controversy, that is, in determining definitively what constitutes public order and security, in 
determining when they are disturbed and so on.
761
 
 
Schmitt’s reduction of the bonum commune to “public order and security” reflects a fundamental 
agreement with Hobbes and also exhibits complete disregard for the Catholic understanding of the 
concept.  This is particularly noticeable when one recalls, for Hobbes, the war of all against all is 
pre-social and existed in a primeval (theoretical) state of nature.  Schmitt’s version of realism, his 
“philosophy of concrete life,”762 has no use for general principles of order beyond those imposed 
by unified political sovereignty post-social or above society. 
To Schmitt, the most pressing problem Germany faced in the first years of Weimar was a 
fundamental lack of clarity as regards political sovereignty.  Clarity can best be gained by 
meditation upon the “exception” within the political order: 
A Protestant theologian who demonstrated the vital intensity possible in theological reflection in the 
nineteenth century stated: ‘The exception explains the general and itself.  And if one wants to study the 
general correctly, one only needs to look around for a true exception.  It reveals everything more clearly than 
does the general.  Endless talk about the general becomes boring; there are exceptions.  If they cannot be 
explained, then the general also cannot be explained.  The difficulty is usually not noticed because the general 
is not thought about with passion but with a comfortable superficiality.  The exception, on the other hand, 
thinks the general with intense passion.’763 
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The extended quote from a “Protestant theologian” originates in Kierkegaard’s work of 1843, 
Repetition: A Venture in Experimental Psychology.  The Danish philosopher is thus Schmitt’s 
source for the existentialist insight that “[t]he exception is more interesting than the rule.  The rule 
proves nothing; the exception proves everything.”764  The political exception reveals the sovereign.  
Since liberal constitutions typically frustrate the ability for a decision to be made in states of 
exception, often by means of a system of “checks and balances,”765 they generally fail to make clear 
where sovereignty lies.  The Weimar Constitution suffered from this exact flaw in that Article 48—
meant to deal with states of emergency—“attempts to repress the question of sovereignty by a 
division” in which the President declares the exception, but the Reichstag can “at any time demand 
its suspension.”766 
Schmitt’s second chapter, “The Problem of Sovereignty as the Problem of Legal Form and 
of the Decision,” builds upon this discussion of sovereignty and the exception by turning to a more 
academic review and discussion of contemporary German juristic thought.  He examines several 
recent works on the “theory of the state,” or sovereignty, with primary focus placed on the 
Austrian, Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) and, secondarily, the German, Hugo Krabbe (1857-1936).  
                                                                                                                                                             
Kierkegaard’s Influence on Social-Political Thought, ed. Jon Stewart (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 177-208; 
Burkhard Conrad, “Kierkegaard’s Moment: Carl Schmitt and His Rhetorical Concept of Decision,” Redescriptions: 
Yearbook of Political Thought, Conceptual History and Feminist Theory, 12 (2008), 145-71; and Rüdiger Kramme, 
Helmuth Plessner und Carl Schmitt: eine historische Fallstudie zum Verhältnis von Anthropologie und Politik in der 
deutschen Philosophie der zwanziger Jahre (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1989), 174-8.  Schmitt’s treatment of the 
state of exception as theoretically foundational for sovereignty was in turn an influence on the political thought of 
philosopher Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) and was recently revisited by Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben.  See 
respectively: Samuel Weber, “Taking Exception to Decision: Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt,” Commemorating 
Walter Benjamin, Diacritics, 22.3-4 (Fall-Winter, 1992), 5-18, which includes Weber’s translation of Benjamin’s 
“Brief vom 9.12.1930 an Carl Schmitt”; and Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
764
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 15. 
765
 Ibid., 7.  Schmitt claims, for example, that Locke failed to account for the importance of the exceptional situation 
that could necessitate extra-legal action by the sovereign (ibid., 13-14).  However, that is not the case as Locke has a 
chapter in The Second Treatise of Government, “Of Prerogative,” which clearly makes room for exceptional actions 
beyond the law.  Locke’s views on the exception and dictatorial decision of the sovereign are discussed in: Leonard C. 
Feldman, “Schmitt, Locke, and the Limits of Liberalism,” Konturen, 1 (2008).  Accessed online as of 25 September 
2011 at: http://konturen.uoregon.edu/vol1_Feldman.html. 
766
 Ibid., 11. 
189 
 
Schmitt treats these two as leading examples of liberal jurisprudential attempts to eliminate 
sovereignty understood in a “decisionist” vein.  By 1922 Kelsen was a leading European jurist, “a 
highly influential member of the Austrian Constitutional Court” and prominent student of the neo-
Kantian Rudolf Stammler (1856-1938).
767
  In 1920, he published a significant work titled The 
Problem of Sovereignty and the Theory of International Law (Das Problem der Souveränität und 
die Theorie des Völkerrechts): “in which he set out the foundations for what he would later call a 
‘pure theory of law,’ a theory of law from which all subjective elements would be eliminated.  
Kelsen sought, in other words, a theory of law that would be universally valid for all times and all 
situations.”768  In Schmitt’s reading, Kelsen believes that “[t]he state is nothing else than the legal 
order itself”769 and thus he “negates” sovereignty: 
The result of [Kelsen’s] deduction is that ‘the concept of sovereignty must be radically repressed.’  This is in 
fact the old liberal negation of the state vis-à-vis law and the disregard of the independent problem of the 
realization of law.
770
 
 
Schmitt’s point is that law and order must first be established prior to the institution of the rule of 
law, and he believes such an establishment occurs only by means of sovereign decision.  Thus, 
sovereignty preexists the norm-governed (normal) and lawfully ordered state.  Krabbe says much 
the same as Kelsen, and Schmitt recognizes they are engaged in the Kantian project of attempting 
to transform authority and rule of law into “autonomy.”771 
Schmitt next introduces the concept “form” and, putting to the side the aesthetic sense of 
the term,
772
 he turns to Weber who proposed three possible types of form for legal and political 
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state theory.  The first usage is a “neo-Kantian” understanding of form as a “transcendental 
‘condition’ of juristic cognition.”773  The second sense is “regularity, an evenness, derived from 
repeated practice and professional reasoning.”774  The final usage of form is: “the ‘rationalistic,’ that 
is, technical refinement . . . oriented toward calculability and governed by the ideal of frictionless 
functioning.”775  Schmitt does not see fit to consider the first usage and believes the last two are the 
senses applicable to a modern legal bureaucracy; they amount, in practice, to no more than a 
consideration of utility.
776
  He is dissatisfied with all of these versions of “form” as none amounts to 
properly “political” form.  The key failing is these versions seek objectivity in norms and avoid 
subjectivity or “personality” as a remnant of authoritarian absolutist claims to rule.  Schmitt, on the 
other hand, does not fear this genealogy; rather, he argues that: “the conception of personality and 
its connection with formal authority arose from a specific juristic interest, namely an especially 
clear awareness of what the essence of the legal decision entails.”777  Thus, the concept of a 
“personal” and “absolute” authority derives from a specific understanding of “legal decision,” 
which we must now attend to. 
Schmitt points out—reminiscent of On Guilt and Law and Judgment—how each individual 
legal (judicial) decision is an exercise in a personal authority making a decision in a specific 
concrete circumstance with regard to the application of laws (norms).  This superficially seems to 
agree with a pre-modern, and hence “Catholic,” understanding of prudence (phronēsis, practical 
intellect or, when specific to judges, aequitas, equity) by means of which the first principles (norms) 
are applied to a specific context.  Crucially, however, Schmitt’s “decision” cannot be equivalent to 
“choice” as understood by both Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics: Book III, chapter 3) and Catholic 
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philosophical anthropology because he severs it from rational deliberation: “The decision becomes 
instantly independent of argumentative substantiation and receives an autonomous value.”778  So 
how does Schmitt arrive at his view?  He abandons pre-modernity for political modernity. 
Schmitt reduces all decision to what pre-modern thought would recognize as simply a 
special case (an exception) that helpfully illustrates the natural necessity for Authority.  For 
example, the existence of automobiles clearly demands a decision be made, for the sake of the 
common good, about which side of the road they are to be driven upon.  It is equally clear that 
such a decision is political (takes coordination of all by an authority) and arbitrary in the sense that 
neither option—the right or left side of the road—has decisive natural and rational grounds upon 
which to base the Authority’s “choice”; they are equally good options adequate to the political end.  
Aristotle would recognize such a decision between two equal goods as voluntary, deliberated 
choice, yet, by being in a limited sense arbitrary, is atypical for ethical (political) decision-making.  
The final choice is simply a matter of will but does illustrate the natural necessity (and good) of 
Authority.  When ethical decisions (and the political is a species of the ethical) are voluntarist, 
personal (subjective), arbitrary, and a mere assertion of will and Authority, yet still objectively just, 
then they must be decisions about which of two or more authentically equal good means will be 
instantiated. 
To approach from a different direction, the pre-modern mind could best illustrate the 
nature of “prudential objectivity”779 by rare, and thus, “exceptional” (but again in a sense different 
from Schmitt’s) issues of justice, such as those involving weighing property rights against loss of life.  
Think, for example, of Jean Valjean in Victor Hugo’s (1802-85) Les Miserables taking another’s 
bread to feed his starving nieces and nephews.  Aquinas would characterize this act as neither a 
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violation of property rights nor theft.
780
  Likewise, the typical just “decisions” of ethical actors—be 
they private individuals, judges, statesmen or sovereigns—are examples of such deliberate and 
objective “choices” arrived at by prudence.  Schmitt, however, treats all decisions of Authority as if 
they are simply matters of will, like in the exceptional case of driving lanes, rather than examples of 
a deliberative process directed by prudence resulting in choice.  In the first chapter he had already 
claimed every sovereign decision was an exercise in personal autonomy; these decisions are 
autonomous simpliciter, as they occur in concreto without regard even to principles of natural or 
divine law.  Now, he claims that legal decision is analogous to sovereign; to restate the quote above: 
“the essence of the legal decision entails” an “autonomous” decision “independent of 
argumentative substantiation.” 
Schmitt’s acceptance of a voluntarist and nominalist modern viewpoint is further shown by 
his immediate turn to a discussion of the importance of “personality” in the making of a decision.  
He continues his line of argument by reducing “juristic scientific thought” to two basic types.  The 
first is the “decisionist” exemplified in Hobbes, who “discovered the classic formulation of the 
antithesis: autoritas, non veritas facit legem [authority, not truth, decides the law].”781  Schmitt does 
not actually specify here what “the other type” of juristic thought is, but it must presumably be the 
“normative” kind he had found in Kelsen and Krabbe; a type which would characterize both pre-
modern and Catholic natural law jurisprudence as well.
782
  He then ends the chapter by making 
clear his favoring of Hobbes’s approach.  Rather than simply rejecting the claims of modern 
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liberalism as it sought to handicap or fragment political sovereignty and deny personality, Schmitt 
notes that Hobbes “rejected all attempts to substitute an abstractly valid order for a concrete 
sovereignty of the state.”783  This includes: 
. . . [t]he demand that state power be subordinate to spiritual power because the latter is of a higher order.  
To this reasoning [Hobbes] replied that if one ‘power’ (potestas) were to be subordinate to another, the 
meaning would be nothing more than that the one who possesses power is subordinate to the other who 
possesses power: ‘He which hath the one Power is subject to him that hath the other.’  To speak of superior 
and inferior and attempt to remain simultaneously abstract is to him incomprehensible (‘we cannot 
understand’).  ‘For subjection, Command, Right and Power are accidents not of Powers but of Persons.’  He 
illustrated this with one of those comparisons that in the unmistakable soberness of his healthy common 
sense, he knew how to apply so strikingly: Power or order can be subordinate to another just as the art of the 
saddler is subordinate to that of the rider; but the important thing is that despite this abstract ladder of orders, 
no one thinks of subordinating the individual saddler to every single rider and obligating him to obey.
784
 
 
By siding with Hobbes against Bellarmine Schmitt is completely removed from political 
Catholicism, however heterodox.  To Schmitt, the decisionist and political existentialist: “What 
matters for the reality of legal life is who decides.”785 
The last two chapters of Political Theology are the ones that most contribute to the 
impression of Schmitt as a Catholic or religious thinker.  The third chapter contains the titular 
essay in which Schmitt presents his understanding of how theological concepts become transferred 
into political theory.  He famously posits: 
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only 
because of their historical development . . . but also because of their systematic structure, the recognition of 
which is necessary for a sociological consideration of these concepts.
786
 
 
In seeing political theology behind all “significant concepts of the modern theory of the state,” 
Schmitt applies an intellectual-historical “sociology of concepts” in which he maintains the 
analogous origins of thought in both fields, namely, politics and theology.
787
  Schmitt had already 
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made this claim in Political Romanticism as well as discussed the example of “the omnipotent God 
becomes the omnipotent lawgiver.”788  He revisits this case here along with adding a second 
example first mentioned in Dictatorship, “the exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the 
miracle in theology.”789  Of these two secularizations from theology to politics, the first is by far the 
more philosophically foundational and profound for political modernity.  However, both are 
under attack; and contemporary (late-modern) liberal jurists even accuse theoreticians of political 
absolutism to be illegitimately engaged in theology.
790
 
Schmitt’s primary target is again Kelsen, who argued for a wholly normative neo-Kantian 
understanding of positive law as operating akin to law in natural science where there is no 
arbitrariness at all.  Schmitt critiques Kelsen for transferring to human affairs (politics and law) 
metaphysical concepts from modern rationalist materialism: 
At the foundation of [Kelsen’s] identification of state and legal order rests a metaphysics that identifies the 
lawfulness of nature and normative lawfulness.  This pattern of thinking is characteristic of the natural 
sciences.  It is based on the rejection of all ‘arbitrariness,’ and attempts to banish from the realm of the 
human mind every exception.
791
 
 
Kelsen comes to his views by thinking that he can appropriate into legal theory, and the theory of 
the state, “Hume’s and Kant’s critique of the concept of substance.”792  Schmitt’s response to 
Kelsen is: 
. . . [H]e fails thereby to see that the concept of substance in Scholastic thought is entirely different from that 
in mathematical and natural-scientific thinking.  The distinction between the substance and the practice of 
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law, which is of fundamental significance in the history of the concept of sovereignty, cannot be grasped with 
concepts rooted in the natural sciences and yet is an essential element of legal argumentation.
793
 
 
Schmitt counters that behind all modern theories of jurisprudence (including Kelsen’s) is a unified 
sovereign power—the State—which intervenes continuously in the lawful order, just as God 
intervenes through miracles.  “The ‘omnipotence’ of the modern lawgiver, of which one reads in 
every textbook on public law, is not only linguistically derived from theology.”794  In its various 
“parts”—“lawgiver, executive power, police, pardoner, welfare institution”—the State maintains itself 
always as an omnipotent unity.
795
  Schmitt’s argument deserves to be unpacked a bit farther. 
When Schmitt claims that Scholastic thought held an entirely different “concept of 
substance” from modern natural science, he is both correct and incorrect, due to a lack of 
precision.  Schmitt refers the reader back to places in Dictatorship where he discussed the 
appropriation of the concept of the “plenitude of power” (plenitudo potestatis) from the pope to 
the monarch.  However, this is not the “concept of substance in Scholastic thought,” it is the 
political appropriation of a specific understanding of divine substance, common to the late-
medieval critics of Aristotelian-Thomistic Scholasticism, and their early modern Protestant and 
secular counterparts, like Marsilius of Padua.  Thus, a more specific origin for this proto-modern 
transference than the pope’s (misconstrued) “plenitude of power” would be the fideistic and 
voluntarist conception of divine omnipotence, first seen in William of Ockham (1288-1347). 
For Ockham, the pre-modern concept of “substantial form” suggested that God’s acts 
corresponded to a prior intellectual concept or form.  This ontology implies a restriction on divine 
freedom and activity.  God’s acts would be constrained by “forms” rather than left radically free, 
voluntary, and autonomous.  In a similar vein, Ockham was an ethical voluntarist in maintaining 
that right and wrong were wholly a product of divine will and not a matter for reason to discern in 
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accord with natural law; a view with a clear analogue in Schmitt’s legal positivism.796  It is but a short 
step from this early modern theological nominalism and voluntarism to the secular appropriation 
in Hobbesian absolutism and Bodin’s concept of sovereignty.  Thus, it comes as no surprise that 
Ockham and Marsilius were allies in defense of secular political absolutism against the claims of 
authority and indirect power of the Pope.  And so, once again, we find a remark of Schmitt’s one 
may casually take to be “Catholic” actually obscures its entirely non-Catholic origin and secular-
minded gist.  Rather than defending the Scholastic understanding of substance against late-modern 
scientific rationalism and materialism, Schmitt is defending an early modern—or possibly late 
medieval but anti-Scholastic—appropriation to the State of a heterodox understanding of divine 
substance.
797
  The early modern absolute sovereign is a “Mortall God”798 with a wholly unrestrained 
will. 
Schmitt next turns to the second example of a politico-theological concept by pointing out 
modern rationalism and deism denied miracles in theology, and likewise, “rejected the exception 
in every form”799 in political theory.  In theology, the miracle is an intervention directly by God in 
the natural lawful order that He created; likewise, the exception is “the sovereign’s direct 
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intervention in a valid legal order”800 he establishes and secures.  For Schmitt such a rejection of the 
exception is tantamount to the complete denial of State sovereignty and authority. 
The rest of the chapter describes the intellectual history of late modernity in terms of how 
these theological “shadows” were manifested in changing theories of State, as Europe transitioned 
from “[c]onceptions of transcendence” to those of an “immanence-pantheism or a positivist 
indifference toward any metaphysics.”801  The first pivotal figure in this metaphysical sea change is 
Rousseau.  Much as he had done in Political Romanticism, Schmitt treats the Genevan’s 
philosophy as prototypical of eighteenth century theory of State in the manner of its appropriation 
of theological concepts: 
‘Imitate the immutable decrees of the divinity.’  This was the ideal of the legal life of the state that was 
immediately evident to the rationalism of the eighteenth century.  This utterance is found in Rousseau’s essay 
Political Economy.  The politicization of theological concepts, especially with respect to the concept of 
sovereignty, is so striking that it has not escaped any true expert on his writings.  Said Emile Boutmy [French 
political scientist, 1835-1906], ‘Rousseau applies to the sovereign the idea that the philosophes hold of God: 
He may do anything that he wills but he may not will evil.’802 
 
Rousseau’s theory of state thus reintroduces a sense of “natural” restraint of the divine that is more 
in line with the Cartesian occasionalist response to the “Euthyphro Dilemma,” as discussed 
above.
803
 
Since Rousseau, however, modern scientific rationalism has dismissed all forms of 
metaphysics even that of the Deists, and this metaphysical stance has itself entered State theory, as 
now: 
The general validity of a legal prescription has become identified with the lawfulness of nature, which applies 
without exception.  The sovereign, who in the deistic view of the world, even if conceived as residing outside 
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the world, had remained the engineer of the great machine, has been radically pushed aside.  The machine 
now runs by itself.
804
 
 
This development led to a democratic foundation for the State in which the “decisionistic and 
personalistic element in the concept of sovereignty was thus lost.”805  Instead, the “people” become 
the secular god.
806
  For Schmitt this is a dangerous political development since before: “In the 
struggle of opposing interests and coalitions, absolute monarchy made the decision and thereby 
created the unity of the state.”807  He is skeptical about whether such State unity can be achieved on 
the basis of popular sovereignty.  In part, his doubts spring from the concomitant denial of 
miracles, which a belief in the lawfulness of nature suggests.  To Schmitt, the political repercussion 
of such a denial is the rejection of the “exception,” of failure to recognize when a state of exception 
exists, and the decisiveness to deal with such a threat to order and security. 
The development of state theory in the nineteenth century continues to move in an 
increasingly profane direction, first to Hegel’s immanence-pantheism, and then to open atheism in: 
Auguste Comte (1798-1857), Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-65), and Mikhail Bakunin (1814-76).  
In the aftermath of this nineteenth-century slide to secularism Schmitt finds: 
Conceptions of transcendence will no longer be credible to most educated people, who will settle for either a 
more or less clear immanence-pantheism or a positivist indifference toward any metaphysics.
808
 
 
For political theory this means the loss of belief in the legitimacy of absolute State sovereignty and 
a clear trend towards anarchism.  Schmitt dates the beginning of this accelerated decay of the 
sovereign State to the 1848 revolutions, and this allows him to end the chapter by introducing 
dictatorship as the only response likely to arrest the slide.  He claims as the source of this insight 
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the Spanish diplomat and counter-revolutionary political theorist Donoso Cortés, who becomes 
the primary object of investigation in the final chapter. 
Schmitt ends Political Theology with a chapter “On the Counterrevolutionary Philosophy 
of the State” as found in the nineteenth century Catholic political theorists Maistre, Bonald and 
Donoso.  He had already claimed these three were the source of the “most interesting political 
application of [political-theological] analogies”809 and he now examines them as the antithesis to 
materialist revolutionary thought.  Recalling a point he made in Political Romanticism, “German 
romantics possess an odd trait: everlasting conversation,”810 Schmitt praises the 
counterrevolutionaries for recognizing “their times needed a decision.”811  In fact, he thinks that 
Catholic thought in the nineteenth century generally countenanced dictatorship by having 
postulated an absolute choice, ala Newman, “between catholicity and atheism” as a “great 
alternative that no longer allowed of synthesis” and “sounded more like dictatorship than 
everlasting conversation.”812  The most important aspect of this chapter for refuting the standard 
narrative is, despite a focused discussion on these Catholic thinkers, Schmitt misconstrues or 
misrepresents the ideas of all three of them in telling ways. 
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He begins with Bonald as the “founder of traditionalism”813 within the Restoration.  To his 
credit, Schmitt recognizes that in Catholic theology “traditionalism” was a heresy that had already 
been refuted as early as the Reformation by an obscure theologian and French bishop named 
Pierre Duchâtel (1480-1552) as well as in its Restoration form in 1858 by the Abbé Joseph Lupus 
(1810-88).  The heresy is a version of fideism in which the human mind is believed utterly 
incapable of any rational knowledge of metaphysical, religious and even ethical truths.  Yet, 
Schmitt actually attempts to defend Bonald’s traditionalism.  His first argumentative move is to 
create a strawman of “extreme traditionalism” which: “In the final analysis . . . actually meant an 
irrational rejection of every intellectually conscious decision.”814  The appeal of a strawman 
argument is it now allowed Schmitt to correctly assert that Bonald is not an “extreme traditionalist.”  
He then presents what he takes to be the Frenchmen’s view: “For Bonald tradition offered the sole 
possibility of gaining the content that man was capable of accepting metaphysically, because the 
intellect of the individual was considered too weak and wretched to be able to recognize truth by 
itself.”815  Such a view may, or may not, be rightfully called “extreme traditionalism”; however, it is a 
perfect match for the theological heresy.
816
 
Schmitt next contrasts Bonald to various German romantics and idealists and praises him 
for avoiding their historical and anthropological optimism.  Instead, Bonald “depicts the course of 
humanity in history” in a “horrifying picture” of “a herd of blind men led by a blind man!”817  Given 
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his pessimism Bonald wrote: “I find myself constantly between two abysses, I walk always between 
being and nothingness.”  Schmitt cites this rather Kierkegaardian quote, with approval, as one of 
the traditionalists’ “moral disjunctions [that] represent contrasts between good and evil, God and 
the devil; between them an either/or exists in the sense of a life/death struggle that does not 
recognize a synthesis and a ‘higher third.’”818  Therefore, once again, we find that instead of shying 
away from Catholic heresy (or heretics) Schmitt ploughs ahead, and what meets with his approval 
in Bonald is a radical rejection of human reason (an irrationalism or fideism), which logically leads 
to a radically pessimistic philosophical anthropology and ethical, or political, existentialism. 
Schmitt now turns to Maistre on the specific claim that “[t]he two words infallibility and 
sovereignty were ‘perfectly synonymous.’”819  His reference is to the first chapter of Maistre’s 1819 
classic On the Pope (Du Pape), and Schmitt interprets the Savoyard as maintaining that “every 
sovereignty acted as if it were infallible, every government was absolute” and thus “the relevance of 
the state rested on the fact that it provided a decision” akin to that of the infallible decision of a 
pope, beyond which there is no appeal.
820
  Schmitt continues with the claim: “In practice, not to be 
subject to error and not to be accused of error were for [Maistre] the same.”821  Therefore, the 
political lessons to be learned from Maistre are that the temporal sovereign is absolute and 
practically speaking infallible, and that “authority as such is good once it exists” because it has the 
power of making the “decision.”822  Lastly, Maistre provides the anthropological antithesis to “[a]ll 
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the anarchist theories . . . [which] revolve around the one axiom: ‘The people are good, but the 
magistrate is corruptible.’”823 
Although Maistre had originally been a critic of absolute monarchy, after the French 
Revolution, he became a political legitimist.  As his political views shifted to a defense of divine 
right absolute monarchy, Schmitt is correct that the Savoyard now accepted the State’s practical 
infallibility.  However, Maistre does not think a king is actually infallible; only the pope has that 
virtue, and he has it in only a very specific manner on matters of faith and morality.
824
  Maistre’s 
point is the people’s obedience to the king must be complete, as if he is infallible, since his 
sovereign authority is absolute.  Like Schmitt, Maistre is emphasizing civil obedience and 
prioritizing social order.  Yet, Schmitt’s presentation of Maistre is misleading and the first clue is 
the very title of the book. 
Maistre’s counter-revolutionary authoritarianism was not as open-ended a form of statism 
as Schmitt here implies.  In On the Pope, Maistre makes it clear that the Church and its “absolute 
sovereign,”825 is a crucial and necessary part of legitimating the power of the monarch.  Maistre goes 
to great lengths to defend the temporal power of the pope, while, simultaneously, differentiating it 
from “pretensions to temporal omnipotence,”826 as the Church’s critics feared, as well as from 
impeding upon or undermining the constant obedience of the people to their absolute temporal 
sovereign.  However, as “delegates of the Divinity,”827 popes still have the just power to reprimand 
kings, even to the point of anathematizing them by means of excommunication; an action that 
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would signal the king could now be deposed with justice.  Furthermore, Maistre vehemently 
attacked the “ecclesiology of national churches, and he accused kings and princes of a ‘great 
rebellion’”828 as they had begun to separate themselves from the authority of the Holy See.  Many 
even encouraged Protestants in their struggle against the Church which had led their nations, 
“inevitably . . . towards servitude or rebellion.  The just equilibrium which distinguishes European 
monarchy can only be the effect of the superior cause [the spiritual authority of the pope] I am 
pointing out.”829  Schmitt is, therefore, only partly justified in giving a foreshortened version of 
Maistre’s thought; insofar as it may have been an impossible task the Savoyard set for himself to 
maintain both the modern conception of absolute State sovereignty and an orthodox view of the 
pope’s temporal power. 
Schmitt’s exaggerates, as well, Maistre’s dim view of human nature.  Maistre premised the 
necessity and goodness of political authority on humanity’s mixed—not depraved—nature of “being 
at once moral and corrupt, of right understanding and perverse will”830 as well as on his belief that 
“man is at least always just in his intentions as often as he is not personally interested.”831  Both 
claims are incompatible with an absolute anthropological pessimism.
832
  Additionally, Maistre may 
believe that sovereignty is univocal, whether in the monarch or the pope, but he does not accept 
wholesale the adaptation of theological concepts into secular political theories.  For example, he 
directly attacks Protestantism for having developed a political doctrine of popular sovereignty by 
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first reversing the relationship between the Pope and the Church, then understanding “Church” to 
mean “people,” and finally secularizing this ecclesiology to the people and the State.833 
Having dealt with Bonald and Maistre in a slim three pages, Schmitt spends the remaining 
ten pages of Political Theology on Donoso.  He begins by claiming that from Maistre’s legitimist 
philosophy to Donoso a change occurred that led the Spaniard to promote the political necessity 
of dictatorship.  The change was: 
That radical heightening [of the political decision which] manifested itself in the increasing significance of the 
axiomatic theses on the nature of man.  Every political idea in one way or another takes a position on the 
‘nature’ of man and presupposes that he is either ‘by nature good’ or ‘by nature evil.’ 834 
 
Enlightenment rationalists had treated mankind as ignorant and so allowed for the State as 
educator, so a certain form of elitist political despotism was made allowance for.  But with the 
radical anthropological optimism of socialists and anarchists in the 1849 Revolutions and 
afterward, an equally radical form of dictatorship became necessary in response.  Schmitt claims: 
Donoso Cortés, in contrast, opposed Proudhon, whose antitheological anarchism would have to be derived 
consistently from the axiom of the good man, whereas the starting point for the Catholic Spaniard was the 
dogma of Original Sin.  But Donoso Cortés radicalized this polemically into a doctrine of the absolute 
sinfulness and depravity of human nature.
835
 
 
Crucially, Schmitt has created a false dichotomy or opposition between absolute optimism 
(Proudhon) and absolute pessimism (Donoso).  Against this opposition Schmitt then acknowledges 
that the orthodox Catholic view on original sin and human nature was best explained at the mid-
sixteenth century Council of Trent (1545-63), called to combat Protestant heresies.  The Council 
“asserts not absolute worthlessness but only distortion, opacity, or injury and leaves open the 
possibility of the natural good.”836  The jurist thus maintains that an Abbé of Orleans, Jean Pierre 
Laurent Gaduel (1811-88), was correct to criticize his contemporary Donoso for “his exaggeration 
                                                 
833
 Maistre, Pope, 119. 
834
 Schmitt, Political Theology, 56. 
835
 Ibid., 57. 
836
 Ibid. 
205 
 
of the natural evil and unworthiness of man.”837  Donoso does have a very pessimistic view of 
human nature in his later writings, yet, Schmitt is actually able to find a way to exaggerate and 
distort the Spaniard’s pessimism and portray him as a theological and philosophical misanthrope 
closer to the views of John Calvin (1509-64) than to the Trent Fathers. 
Schmitt goes to great, in fact inordinate, lengths to make the reader accept that Donoso 
believed in the utter depravity of human nature, beginning with the claim: “What Donoso Cortés 
had to say about the natural depravity and vileness of man was indeed more horrible than anything 
that had ever been alleged by an absolutist philosophy of the state in justifying authoritarian rule.”838  
He then reaches a crescendo of exaggeration by referring to Donoso as a “spiritual descendant of 
the Grand Inquisitors,” and claiming further: 
[Donosos’s] contempt for man knew no limits: Man’s blind reason, his weak will, and the ridiculous vitality of 
his carnal longings appeared to him so pitiable that all words in every human language do not suffice to 
express the complete lowness of this creature.  Had God not become man, the reptile that my foot tramples 
would have been less contemptuous than a human being: ‘El reptile que piso con mis pies, seria á mis ojos 
menos despreciable que el hombre.’  The stupidity of the masses was just as apparent to him as was the silly 
vanity of their leaders.  His awareness of sin was universal; he was even more horrified than a puritan.  No 
Russian anarchist in asserting that ‘man is good’ expressed a greater degree of elementary conviction than the 
Spanish Catholic who said: Since God has not said it to him, whence does he know that he is good?  ‘de 
donde sabe que es noble si Dios se lo ha dicho?’  The despair of this man, as can be gathered from his letters 
to his friend Count Raczynski [Polish conservative politician, 1786-1845], often bordered on insanity; 
according to his philosophy of history, the victory of evil is self-evident and natural, and only a miracle by 
God can avert it.
839
 
 
Schmitt accomplishes this mischaracterization by presenting Donoso’s views in a peculiarly 
foreshortened manner—rather than in their full theological context—and uncharitably reading them 
in a selective fashion. 
The above passage is a very rare one in which Schmitt provides some textual evidence of 
an interpretation he gives of Donoso, but the two quotes used are highly selective 
ones.  Additionally, the full context of the lines “the reptile I tread on would be less despicable in 
my eyes than man” and “how does he know he is noble, if God has not told him?” suggest a 
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different interpretation than Schmitt’s.  They are found in a chapter of the Spaniard’s Essays 
dealing with “The Incarnation of the Son of God, and the redemption of the human race.”840  The 
language Donoso uses may be exaggerated in its negativity but the entire passage is framed in such 
a way as to accomplish two ends: first, to reflect his faith by giving glory and praise to the unmerited 
love and mercy of God towards man as revealed in the Incarnation and redemptive death of 
Christ, and second, to polemically paint an optimist anthropology that denies revelation as itself 
nothing more than an unjustifiable faith given the contrary evidence of natural reason and human 
history. 
On the first point Donoso echoes the traditional humble sentiment expressed in the 
Exsultet hymn of the Easter Proclamation of the Roman Rite of the Catholic Mass, which sings “O 
happy fault that merited such and so great a Redeemer” (O felix culpa quae talem et tantum meruit 
habere redemptorem).  The hymn and its liturgical usage dates at least as far back as Saint 
Augustine and was explicated theologically by Aquinas to demonstrate how all evil is ultimately 
resolved into good by God’s Providence.  On the second point, Donoso maintains balance 
through his theological framework as shown in the following lines: 
The glorious mystery of the incarnation of the Son of God, is the only title of nobility the human race 
possesses.  Far from wondering at the contempt modern Rationalists display for man, if there be anything I 
cannot explain nor conceive, it is the guarded prudence and the timid conduct they manifest in this matter.
841
 
 
And he repeatedly makes use of an “if/then” grammatical structure to give polemical force to the 
criticism he levies against a secular or atheist anthropological optimism, which claims to be based 
solely on natural reason. 
If God had not taken human nature, and, taking, raised it to Himself, and raising it has not impressed on it a 
ray of His divine nobility, [then] we must confess that to express human vileness words cannot be found . . .  I 
can say for myself, that if my God had not taken flesh in the womb of a woman, nor died on the cross for the 
whole human race, [then] the reptile I tread on would be less despicable in my eyes than man.
842
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Donoso next readily admits that this doctrine of human dignity “weighs heaviest on my reason,” 
since whenever he looks at the behavior of people within history he is “filled with sickening 
horror” at human pride, ambition, and violence.843  He then concludes with the second line quoted 
by Schmitt clearly directed towards the optimism of liberalism and socialism: 
To believe in the nobility of those stupid crowds, it was necessary for God to reveal it to me.  No one can 
deny that revelation, and believe in his own nobility.  How does he know he is noble, if God has not told 
him?  There is one thing exceeds my reason, and confounds me—that there should be any one who thinks it 
requires less faith to believe in the incomprehensible mystery of human dignity, than in the adorable mystery 
of a God-Made Man . . .  This proves that man always lives subject to faith; and when he thinks he abandons 
faith for his own reason, he only abandons faith in the divinely mysterious, for faith in the mysteriously 
absurd.
844
 
 
The arguments made in Essays repeatedly attempt to display the foundational premises of 
liberalism or socialism as ultimately just assertions of a particular faith; the better for Donoso to 
then oppose them with a politics based on Catholic theology.
845
  He is clearly engaged in this 
argumentative technique in the passages from which Schmitt recoils with shocked 
embarrassment.
846
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th
 century author such as Donoso agreeable and 
popular.  Moreover, it is presented as dogma and as system, rather than as an occasional romantic-pessimistic 
impression.”  See: Schmitt, “Unknown Donoso,” 82. 
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Although human dignity may be hard for Donoso’s reason to accept, he consistently 
exhibits his respect for this anthropological principle, based upon his Catholic faith.  Orthodox 
Catholic philosophical or theological anthropology does not start with whether man’s nature is in 
itself good or evil, our created nature is simply good as imago Dei.  The debate starts from the 
doctrine of the Fall and original sin over to what extent these have compromised man’s originally 
good nature by means of this “inherited” (second) nature.  Donoso treats the issue in just this 
manner and recognizes “Man . . . is good in his essence and bad by accident.”847  We will just take 
two more representative quotes from Essays displaying Donoso’s orthodoxy: 
Man was redeemed, which . . . signifies, at least, that by redemption he acquired the power of breaking those 
chains, and of converting ignorance, error, pain, and death into means of his sanctification by the good use of 
his liberty, ennobled and restored.
848
 
 
[Man] . . . so elevated is his dignity, so noble his nature, so sublime his origin, and so glorious his end, that 
God Himself thinks with his thoughts, sees with his eyes, walks with his feet, and operates with his hands.
849
 
 
Given that Schmitt also rejects anthropological optimism, his attacks on Donoso for exaggeration is 
passing strange, especially when he sides with Gaduel in questioning Donoso’s orthodoxy. 
Gaduel was acting under the orders of the Bishop of Orleans, Felix Antoine Philibert 
Dupanloup (1802-1878).
850
  Both were theological liberals and Dupanloup was later vocally 
opposed to the dogma of infallibility when it was discussed at the First Vatican Council (1870); 
although he did accept it once decreed.  Dupanloup ordered Gaduel to publicly attack and 
condemn Donoso’s Essays, and so the Abbé launched extended and vituperative attacks on 
Donoso in a series of articles in January and February 1853.  The furor spawned in French 
Catholic circles over the publication of Essays reflected the internecine fight between reactionary 
and ultramontane monarchists such as Donoso’s publisher—and editor of the journal L’Univers—
                                                 
847
 Donoso, Essays, 133. 
848
 Ibid., 40. 
849
 Ibid., 68. 
850
 Dupanloup was best known for introducing the cause for canonization at Rome of Joan of Arc (1412-31). 
209 
 
Louis Veuillot (1813-83), and liberals, like Gaduel and Dupanloup’s friend Montalembert.851  
Donoso was caught in the middle, for although friends with Veuillot he always maintained a closer 
relationship with the liberal Montalembert for they “differed mainly over Donoso’s conviction that 
liberalism could not be separated from revolution and democracy.”852  To Montalembert, Donoso 
even confided in a letter of 3 January, 1853, there are some Catholics such as Veuillot who fancy 
themselves “more royalist than the king, more papal than the pope, and more zealous in the 
service of God than God himself.  These are the enfants terribles of the Church and . . . of the 
State.”853  However, Gaduel’s attacks amounted to a public accusation of heresy to which Donoso 
felt compelled to respond by seeking the judgment of the Vatican regarding his book’s merits. 
Since Schmitt was aware of Gaduel’s criticisms of Donoso, it is highly unlikely he was 
unfamiliar with the fact the “Donoso Cortés affair” did reach Rome and was brought to the 
attention of Pope Pius IX.  Asked to decide whether or not Donoso was guilty of heretical views, in 
particular with regards to his purported misanthropy and radical pessimism,
854
 Pius assigned the 
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official Vatican journal Civiltá Cattolica to review the book in its pages.  The resultant review was 
laudatory, and praised Donoso for, like Maistre, “sowing fertile seeds among the laity.”855  Although 
the Essays did contain “exaggerations in theology and an innate disposition to affirm and 
dogmatize recklessly” and showed that Donoso was not so well-versed in Scholasticism as could be 
hoped, he obviously knew the Church Fathers as “his [reportedly] controversial idea of human 
liberty was that of Saint Thomas Aquinas and of Saint John Damascene [John of Damascus, 676-
749).”856  Furthermore, the review directly chastised Gaduel for submitting “the nontechnical 
terminology of a layman to a Scholastic inquisition.”857  In 1860, Pius even allowed the 
republication of the Essays in Rome. 
Schmitt was on firmer footing in taking from Donoso his critique of parliamentary 
liberalism.  The Spaniard believed that liberalism had become incapacitated by the deliberative 
process from defending itself against the enemies of society and government order.  Since Donoso 
in the Essays foresaw a “bloody decisive battle . . . between Catholicism and atheist socialism”858 
tough measures would be called for, possibly even dictatorship.  However: 
According to Donoso Cortés, it was characteristic of bourgeois liberalism not to decide in this battle but 
instead to begin a discussion.  He straightforwardly defined the bourgeoisie as a ‘discussing class,’ una clasa 
discutidora.  . . .  A class that shifts all political activity onto the plane of conversation in the press and in 
parliament is no match for social conflict.
859
 
 
Schmitt finds in Donoso a brilliant image to illustrate how liberal emphasis on discussion can lead 
to a failure to act decisively: 
Liberalism, with its contradictions and compromises, existed for Donoso Cortés only in that short interim 
period in which it was possible to answer the question ‘Christ or Barabbas?’ with a proposal to adjourn or 
                                                                                                                                                             
demonstrates the limits to his pessimism, for it is simply on the natural human order as he recognizes that God as 
center and circumference is always united to creation either in grace, mercy, or justice.  The result following from 
Providence’s control is “true order never ceases to exist, and that true disorder exists not at all” (ibid., 161).  Rather, as 
we saw above at Chapter Two, Schmitt is the one who embraced Gnostic Manicheeism. 
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appoint a commission of investigation.  Such a position was not accidental but was based on liberal 
metaphysics.
860
 
 
An existential moment of decision requires a belief in transcendent order of some kind, but liberal 
metaphysics accords with agnosticism.  Donoso recognized this deficit in the inconsistencies in 
France’s “July Monarchy” of Louis Philippe I (r.1830-48).  Phillipe’s Orleans monarchy replaced 
that of the overthrown Restorationist Bourbon, Charles X (r. 1824-30), and did so under the 
auspices of a liberal constitution.  Donoso likened this monarchy to deism as “[i]ts liberal 
constitutionalism attempted to paralyze the king through parliament but permitted him to remain 
on the throne.”861  Deism’s political analogue in constitutional monarchy may simply be unavailing 
in maintaining or reestablishing order given the July Monarchy ended in the face of radical social 
decay or rebellion. 
Schmitt continues his exposition on Donoso with a fair description of the Spaniard’s 
opinion on the ambivalent course set by nineteenth century constitutional liberalism:  
Although the liberal bourgeoisie wanted a god, its god could not become active; it wanted a monarch, but he 
had to be powerless; it demanded freedom and equality but limited voting rights to the propertied classes in 
order to ensure the influence of education and property on legislation, as if education and property entitled 
that class to repress the poor and uneducated; it abolished the aristocracy of blood and family but permitted 
the impudent rule of the moneyed aristocracy, the most ignorant and the most ordinary form of an 
aristocracy; it wanted neither the sovereignty of the king nor that of the people.  What did it actually want?
862
  
 
Schmitt then gives an accurate treatment of Donoso’s answer to this question: 
[J]ust as liberalism discusses and negotiates every political detail, so it also wants to dissolve metaphysical truth 
in a discussion.  The essence of liberalism is negotiation, a cautious half measure, in the hope that the 
definitive dispute, the decisive bloody battle, can be transformed into a parliamentary debate and permit the 
decision to be suspended forever in an everlasting discussion.
863
 
 
At this point, if Schmitt had only left off, then he would have provided a reasonable look at 
Donoso’s critique of the parliamentary liberals of his day.  Instead, Schmitt remarks: “Dictatorship 
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is the opposite of discussion”864 and launches into a defense of the contemporary necessity of an 
open-ended conception of political dictatorship. 
Schmitt begins by strongly complaining about the loss of “decision” in contemporary 
political thought: 
Today nothing is more modern than the onslaught against the political.  . . . There must no longer be political 
problems, only organizational-technical and economic-sociological tasks.  . . . The core of the political idea, 
the exacting moral decision, is evaded in both.
865
 
 
It is useful to recall that Schmitt is often portrayed as at heart a “moralist”866 and such a 
characterization feeds into the standard narrative.  However, there is no content to a phrase such as 
“exacting moral decision” nor is this decision one to be made or commented upon by the political 
theorist.  It is wholly the domain and perquisite of Sovereignty.  Social and political life exists, for 
Schmitt, after such foundational decisions are made by the sovereign Power.  There is also no 
given metaphysical structure or natural order available to the Sovereign by which he can make his 
decision; nor to reflective persons by which it can be critiqued.  Schmitt, as a political “realist,” but 
anti-materialist, only goes so far as to maintain that some type of metaphysical assumption can be 
discerned behind all varieties of political form, and he favors those which best allow the State to 
exhibit the strength necessary to impose social order. 
Schmitt uses Donoso as a “mask”867 through mischaracterizing his own radical views as 
originating in the Spaniard: 
The true significance of those counterrevolutionary philosophers of the state lies precisely in the consistency 
with which they decide.  They heightened the moment of the decision to such an extent that the notion of 
legitimacy, their starting point, was finally dissolved.  As soon as Donoso Cortés realized that the period of 
monarchy had come to an end because there no longer were kings and no one would have the courage to be 
king in any way other than by the will of the people, he brought his decisionism to its logical conclusion.  He 
demanded a political dictatorship.
868
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The jurist then ends Political Theology by going a step beyond On Dictatorship, where he 
concluded by suggesting sovereign dictatorship must be a presupposition of late modern politics.  
Now, he settles on the necessity of such an open-ended—revolutionary—dictatorship.  In Donoso 
and Maistre, Schmitt claims to: 
. . . see a reduction of the state to the moment of the decision, to a pure decision not based on reason and 
discussion and not justifying itself, that is, to an absolute decision created out of nothingness.  But this 
decisionism is essentially dictatorship, not legitimacy.
869
 
 
It would take us too far afield to demonstrate how inaccurate Schmitt’s characterization of Donoso 
is from the Spaniard’s actual beliefs and actions.  Suffice it to say, for present purposes, that when 
Schmitt notes “legitimacy” was “dissolved” and “there no longer were kings” he is confusedly 
referring to the failing of the legitimacy of the early modern conception of the absolutist monarchy 
founded upon divine right; constitutional monarchy (as Donoso’s political party had long 
supported) was under attack but certainly not yet past defense.  The end of monarchy in Europe 
occurred with the revolutions at the end of the First World War, and in Spain this was only a 
temporary set-back given the later restoration of the Bourbon House with Juan Carlos I (r. 1975-
2014).
870
 
The conclusions to be drawn from looking at Schmitt’s abuse of Maistre and Donoso’s 
traditional political theology and philosophical anthropology are twofold.  First, it undermines a 
too constrictive interpretation of Schmitt as political theologian.  He ignores so much of the 
orthodox theological speculations within which Donoso presents his views and even attacks the 
Spaniard for straying into theology; both points support the claim that Schmitt is primarily writing 
and thinking in a secular juridical mode.  Secondly, his willingness to take sides with Gaduel 
                                                                                                                                                             
dictatorship, and the legitimist principle of succession becomes at such a moment empty dogmatism.  Authority and 
anarchy could thus confront each other in absolute decisiveness and form a clear antithesis” (ibid., 66). 
869
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against Donoso, even though he cannot fail to know that the controversy within the Church over 
Donoso’s views was decided in the Spaniard’s favor, make it unlikely that Schmitt intended to 
engage in “political Catholicism.”  In his Wilhelmine diaries, Schmitt had already shown a decided 
preference for liberal and Gallican theologians,
871
 as well as Gnostic, so perhaps he sides with 
Gaduel as a means of hiding his own complete lack of interest in orthodox theology.  Ultimately, 
Schmitt’s distortion of nineteenth century Catholic reactionary and conservative political thought 
serves to set-up his own philosophical anthropology as he would continue to develop and apply it 
to politics in his Weimar writings.
872
 
 
Reaction to Political Theology and Introduction to Political Form 
Similar to the first edition of Political Romanticism, Political Theology failed to be 
reviewed by any Catholic publications.  This fact is passing strange given that the secondary 
literature on Schmitt views the book as positive proof of his grounding in religious thought 
generally, or even Catholic thought in particular—given its treatment of the nineteenth century 
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 This assumption has long been a prop to the 
standard narrative treatment of Schmitt as a Catholic thinker.  Günter Maschke (born 1943), a left wing activist who 
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Schwab described him in Challenge of the Exception, 25) Schmitt should be remembered as the Donoso of the 
twentieth century.  Maschke, through friendship with Schmitt, thus became a vehicle for one strain of Schmitt’s 
attempts to rehabilitate his image late in life by a revisionist interpretation of the jurist as a Catholic and religious 
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Catholic counter-revolutionaries.  Interestingly, Political Theology, was admiringly reviewed in a 
Protestant outlet by Emanuel Hirsch (1888-1972), a professor of Protestant theology at Göttingen 
University from 1921-45.
873
  Hirsch was one of the few contemporary theologians deeply inspired 
by Schmitt’s revival of the concept of political theology.  He soon adopted the jurist’s views on 
dictatorship and “his ‘Kierkegaardian’ and metajuristic emphasis on personal decision of 
conscience in politics, and his theory of secularization”874 in order to formulate a National Socialist 
political theology.  Schmitt never offered a specific political theology for the Nazi regime to 
implement;
875
 rather, he expected such a project of social engineering and political myth-making to 
be carried out by the State itself.  He did befriend Hirsch in the Thirties, however, when the 
theologian joined the Nazi Party and used his writings to help forge in a Schmittian vein, “a people 
united in worldview and order of life”; a task proper to a “political theologian” in the Nazi Reich.876  
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In 1932 the pro-Nazi Catholic theologian “brown priest,” Karl Eschweiler, also wrote a much 
belated review of Political Theology for a secular radical nationalist journal Der Ring,
877
 and then 
published the review in a Protestant journal as well.  Weimar’s Catholic intellectual community 
would only begin to take notice of Schmitt with the publication of his next book, Roman 
Catholicism and Political Form. 
In his preface to the original edition of Political Theology, Schmitt claims that he had 
written those four essays in conjunction with that of Political Form.  He actually only wrote the last 
chapter of Political Theology in Bonn, in the Spring of 1922, at the same time as Political Form.
878
   
Most commentators who do read these two works in tandem do so by emphasizing “Theology” of 
the first title and “Roman Catholicism” in the latter as the key to their conjunction; however, this is 
a fundamental mistake.
879
  Francis Slade correctly pinpoints the true source of affinity in the subtitle 
of the first and second clause of the latter: 
                                                                                                                                                             
with the jurist’s self-serving remark after the war that with the publication of his “writing about Roman Catholicism”—
meaning Political Form—the Protestant theologian Hirsch “moaned loudly” due to recognizing in it “the beginning of a 
new age of the Catholic Counter-Reformation.”  See:  Schmitt, Carl Schmitt Im Gespräch, 56. 
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The connection between these two works does not lie in the conjunction of Political Theology and Roman 
Catholicism for, while the Church may be a paradigm for the political idea understood as the idea of 
representation, it is not a paradigm for rule in the civitas terrana.  Nor is it Catholicism that stands behind 
Schmitt’s political theory.  The connection is the conjunction between Sovereignty and Political Form.  
Schmitt as a political theorist is not a Catholic thinker.
880
 
 
Philosopher Hans Blumenberg claimed, “political theology is a metaphorical theology”881 and this 
certainly characterizes Schmitt’s version.  His interest in both books are those of a secular jurist 
who happened to appreciate the impact of theology on modern political thought (as explored in 
Political Theology), and recognized the utility of institutional aspects of Roman Catholicism as 
political metaphor (as in Political Form) for his particular brand of neo-Machiavellian and 
Hobbesian theory of state. 
Political Form 
Once more, Schmitt begins with an attention grabbing sentence: “There is an anti-Roman 
temper that has nourished the struggle against popery, Jesuitism and clericalism with a host of 
religious and political forces, that has impelled European history for centuries.”882  The temper 
which Schmitt speaks of treats “Rome [as] the Antichrist or the Babylonian whore of the 
apocalypse” which, in turn, serves as an “image” with “mythical power . . . deeper and stronger 
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than any economic calculation; its after-effects long endure.”883  The unsuspecting reader is thus 
faced with what looks like an opening statement suggesting Schmitt will defend Catholicism, and 
this would have especially been the case for contemporary Catholic intellectuals given the 
prominence of German Protestant critiques of the Church in the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, especially those of Rudolph Sohm, Adolf von Harnack, and Friedrich Heiler (1892-1967). 
We already met the dogmatic German jurist, Rudolph Sohm, above when discussing 
Schmitt’s essay “Visibility.”  Sohm studied Roman, German, and canon law and “achieved equal 
fame in all three.”884  He was also known as a prominent Protestant historian of the Church.  His 
fame in matters ecclesial was best secured from his 1892 work Canon Law (Kirchenrecht).  The 
second volume appeared posthumously in 1923, just after Schmitt had written Political Form.  
Canon Law sparked quite polemical exchanges between theologians for several decades after its 
appearance; debates further fueled by his 1909 work: The Nature and Origin of Catholicism 
(Wesen und Ursprung des Katholizismus).  In these books Sohm maintained a thesis of an 
original “invisible Church of Christ” which was bureaucratized by the legalistic nature of the 
Catholic Church.  He believed that the Church had absorbed, to its everlasting detriment, the 
emphasis on legality of the Roman Empire and that the Church’s law was incompatible with the 
authentic nature of a Church based on what he called the Holy Spirit’s gift of “charisma.”  For 
Sohm, the legalistic “Roman” Church was really a “prison Church.”885 
In addition to Sohm, two other Protestant thinkers had an invigorating cultural influence in 
inter-war Germany as critics of the Catholic Church.  One was the Lutheran theologian, Adolf von 
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Harnack, from whom Schmitt read avidly, as detailed above.  In the early twentieth century, 
Harnack wrote multiple volumes on the history of the Christian Church and dogma.  He was 
particularly critical of the intermixing of Greek philosophy with Christian dogmatic theology as 
continually evidenced in Catholicism’s rational theology.  Harnack treated the Catholic Church as 
a secularization and degeneration from the original Christian religious impulse (true to his 
Gnosticism) and he even describes it as an opportunistic “complex of opposites.”886  In Political 
Form we will soon find that Schmitt reverses Harnack’s connotation, and details admiringly the 
manner in which he believes the Church successfully maintains opposites in a positive tension. 
Lastly, we must keep in mind the Lutheran High Church theologian, Friedrich Heiler, who 
began life as a Catholic but credited the Swedish theologian, Nathan Söderblom (1866-1931) with 
motivating his conversion to liberal evangelicalism.  In 1919, his book Prayer appeared, and was in 
its fifth edition by the time Political Form was published in 1923.  When Schmitt stresses the 
Church as a juristic and visible institution, he is in part responding to Heiler’s writings, especially 
Prayer, in which the theologian appropriates the mystical aspects of Catholicism as its only valuable 
aspect.
887
 
With a background context of these three Protestant theologians’ attacks on the Catholic 
Church it is not surprising that many commentators, such as Dahlheimer, understand Political 
Form to be an apologetic response to prominent anti-Catholic polemics.
888
  However, it is a 
complete misconstrual of the essay if it is read as anything more than acidentally interested in 
defending the Church from Protestant attack.  To put it most simply, Schmitt admired stability and 
the embodiment of power, wherever it could be found, even in the Catholic Church considered 
institutionally.  Therefore, Dahlheimer makes an astute and critical observation when he 
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problematizes the apologetic stance of Political Form by recognizing “Schmitt’s method and 
perspective was . . . not theological, but political-legal.”889  The very opening sentence, which can 
lead one to think Schmitt has an apologetic aim, actually demonstrates his secular-mindedness; 
indeed his like-mindedness with the afore-mentioned Protestant critics.
890
  This similitude is 
demonstrated firstly by virtue of Schmitt’s chosen terminology and then by his illustration of the 
“anti-Roman temper.” 
Schmitt carefully chooses to use the phrase “anti-Roman” instead of “anti-Catholic,” and is 
consistent in his usage of the attribute “Roman” throughout Political Form.  Schmitt is 
undoubtedly aware that it was Protestants who began to call the Catholic Church “Roman” in order 
to distinguish it from national churches such as the English “Catholic” Church or the German 
Lutheran (also known as Evangelical Catholicism); it is a manner of speech common, as well, to 
Gallicanism.  As was shown in Chapter Two above, Schmitt’s Wilhelmine diaries were replete with 
this exact same non-Catholic usage of the adjective “Roman,”891 for he was Gallican rather than 
ultramontane.  The difference between the phrases “anti-Roman” and “anti-Catholic is therefore 
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quite significant; the former suggests a secular and political point is being made rather than a social 
or religious one. 
Beyond the contextual clue that Schmitt’s loaded choice of words provides, lays the strictly 
textual and overt manner in which he illustrates the “anti-Roman temper.”  Schmitt believes that 
the premier example of this “anti-Roman” sentiment being put to a political use was found, neither 
in France’s dominant contemporary secularism nor Germany’s nineteenth century Kulturkampf, 
but seventeenth century England when it was subject to Puritan Oliver Cromwell’s “demonic 
rage.”892  Despite the harsh sounding phrase Schmitt treats the Roundhead with tacit approval; for 
he complains that: “Since the eighteenth century, the [political use of anti-Romanism] has become 
ever more rationalistic or humanitarian, utilitarian and shallow.”893  The sole exception to 
increasing political rationalism since Cromwell, he finds in Dostoyevsky’s “portrayal of the Grand 
Inquisitor,” which allows: “the anti-Roman dread [to] appear once again as a secular force.”894  Late 
modern bourgeois liberalism thus seeks to deny the importance of myth and irrationality in driving 
politics.  Rather, it favors “economic calculation” and technique (technical expertise and 
rationality); as a result, instead of a “demonic rage” against the Catholic Church: 
For the whole of the parliamentary and democratic nineteenth century, one most often heard the charge that 
Catholic politics is nothing more than a limitless opportunism.  Its elasticity is really astounding; it unites with 
opposing movements and groups.
895
 
 
This charge of being opportunistic is indeed accurate, even if politically uninspiring in its 
rationalism. 
It is true, as Schmitt recounts in detail, that Catholics have been found to preach “the 
alliance of throne and altar” in monarchies, while simultaneously standing, “wholly on the side of a 
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firm democracy” in “the peasant democracies of the Swiss cantons or in North America.”896  One 
can find all political alignments or groupings at times allied with ideologically diverse Catholics, 
from royalists to republicans; some Catholics even being “tactically aligned” with socialists or 
having “parlayed with Bolsheviks.”897  Schmitt illustrates this apparent opportunism with an 
unattributed and cynical quote: “One appropriates all freedoms of one’s opponent in the name of 
the opponent’s principles and denies them to him in the name of one’s own Catholic principles.”898  
He continues by simply noting how often “bourgeois, socialist, and anarchistic pacifists” point out 
such “contradictory figures and associations” amongst “partly monarchist, partly communist” “neo-
Catholic literati,” or other Catholic “sociological” types.899 
The initial defense that Schmitt offers for the charge of political opportunism is to suggest it 
is not unusual “[i]n the tactics of political struggle” for any party or group that has a firmly 
established worldview to be able to “form coalitions with the most disparate groupings.”900  
Therefore, not only Catholicism but Socialism and Nationalism also have the capacity to form 
widely varied political groupings.  What makes such coalitions possible is that: 
From the standpoint of a world-view, all political forms and possibilities become nothing more than tools for 
the realization of an idea.  Some of what appears inconsistent is only the consequence and manifestation of a 
political universalism.
901
 
 
As a result, behind a variety of Catholic political alliances lies only one consistent principle or idea, 
“the power of Catholicism,” a phrase Schmitt does not here define.902  However, he does find 
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agreement amongst a wide range of thinkers about the source of Catholicism’s political 
universalism, namely: 
The Roman Catholic Church as an historical complex and administrative apparatus has perpetuated the 
universalism of the Roman Empire.  French nationalists like Charles Maurras, German racial theorists like 
H[ouston] Stewart Chamberlain [1855-1927], German professors of liberal provenance like Max Weber, a 
Pan-Slavic poet and seer like Dostoyevsky—all base their interpretations on this continuity of the Catholic 
Church and the Roman Empire.
903
 
 
Schmitt accepts this “consensus” view and therefore two comments are in order.  First, Schmitt is 
reducing the Catholic religion and the Church’s political views to an extension or even an epigone 
of the Roman Empire.  Thus, he continues with the claim: 
To every worldly empire belongs a certain relativism with respect to the motley of possible views, ruthless 
disregard of local peculiarities as well as opportunistic tolerance for things of no central importance.  . . .  
Every imperialism that is more than jingoism embraces antitheses.
904
 
 
Secondly, he adopts this view on the “political universalism” of Catholicism from a manifestly odd 
assortment of thinkers (nationalist, racialist, liberal, and Russian Orthodox) if he is meant to be 
read as a type of “Catholic” intellectual.  Finally, he approaches the Church primarily as an 
imperial force for a particular—but still unspecified—kind of universalism. 
Since the Church is an imperial presence, Schmitt looks first at localist and nationalist 
reactions to it.  He writes, sympathetically, that nationalist movements exhibit a “justifiable 
reaction” against ultramontanism in a “feeling of anxiety with respect to the universal administrative 
apparatus” of the Church.905  “Many a national patriot must feel ignored and cheated in the strongly 
centralized Roman system.”906  But on the other hand, many Catholic ethnic groups (such as the 
Irish and Polish) “have Catholicism to thank for a large part of their national strength of 
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resistance.”907  Catholicism sparked nationalist resistance even in the cases of “Cardinal Mercier 
[1851-1926] of Mechlin as well as Bishop Korum [1840-1921] of Trier,”908 where these two 
bishops: “impressively represented national honor and self-confidence . . . in the face of an 
opponent who in no way appeared as an enemy of the Church but rather sought an alliance with 
it.”909  We find here two more indications of Schmitt’s lack of Catholicity.  First, the jurist clearly 
acts on an unspoken premise that nationalism is good.  Secondly, for both bishops mentioned the 
opponent in question was imperial Germany; thus Schmitt is quietly making a rather perverse 
counterfactual claim that Wilhelmine Germany not only did not appear opposed to Catholicism, 
but also actually desired an alliance with the Church.
910
 
Schmitt now returns to the anti-Roman temper and remarks, despite the fact that any 
“imperialism . . . embraces antitheses,” anti-Romanism “would have become infinitely deeper if 
one had grasped completely the extent to which the Catholic Church is a complex of opposites, a 
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complexio oppositorum.”911  The Church as an institution (ecclesiology) embraces political 
opposites such as in having: 
. . . [A]n autocratic monarchy whose head is elected by the aristocracy of Cardinals but in which there is 
nevertheless so much democracy that, as Dupanloup put it, even the least shepherd of Abruzzi, regardless of 
his birth and station, has the possibility to become this autocratic sovereign.
912
 
 
Opposites are also embraced in the breadth of political views amongst individual Catholics, such as 
“a rigorous philosopher of authoritarian dictatorship” like Donoso as well as “a ‘good Samaritan’ 
of the poor with syndicalist connections, like the Irish rebel Padraic Pearse [1879-1916]” both 
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being “staunch Catholics.”913  Beyond ecclesiology, Catholic theology further exhibits the 
complexio oppositorum, such as in: “the Marcionitic either-or . . . answered with an as-well-as”914; a 
stance on human nature favoring neither side of the “antithesis of man ‘by nature evil’ and ‘by 
nature good’”915; and a “limitless ambiguity [which] combines with the most precise dogmatism and 
a will to decision as it culminates in the doctrine of papal infallibility.”916  Schmitt revealingly claims 
this last aspect demonstrative of flexibility and authority in the Church is “ultimately” the “most 
important,”917 and we shall recall this statement, in due course, below. 
At this point, Schmitt finally returns to the issue of defining the “political idea of 
Catholicism,”918 which separates it from other imperialisms: 
. . . [T]he essence of the Roman-Catholic complexio oppositorum lies in a specific, formal superiority over 
the matter of human life such as no other imperium has ever known.  . . . This formal character of Roman 
Catholicism is based on a strict realization of the principle of representation, the particularity of which is most 
evident in its antithesis to the economic-technical thinking dominant today.
919
 
 
So what does he mean by “representation”?  Schmitt works towards an answer to this central 
question in the elliptical fashion typical of this essay.  He first revisits some of the intellectual 
history he had covered in Political Romanticism in order to establish that Catholicism’s complexio 
oppositorum is not a Romantic or Hegelian form of synthesis.  Even Görres makes an appearance, 
but not as a hero of German political Catholicism who inspired the founding of the Center Party; 
rather, as an object of criticism for having postulated a synthesis between Catholicism and 
Protestantism in a “higher third.”920  Such a syncretic approach to religion is common to the 
contemporary age, which struggles over resolving a fundamental “dichotomy between a 
                                                 
913
 Ibid. 
914
 A reference to a Gnostic, or Kierkegaardian, view which Schmitt himself accepted.  See above at Chapter Two.  
915
 Ibid., 7-8. 
916
 Ibid., 8.   
917
 Ibid. 
918
 Ibid., 6.  I believe this “political idea” corresponds with what he earlier referred to as the “power of catholicism” but 
had failed to define. 
919
 Ibid., 8. 
920
 Ibid., 9. 
227 
 
rationalistic-mechanistic world of human labor and a romantic-virginal state of nature.”921  Schmitt 
then recalls the distinction he made in “Visibility,” of Protestant inwardness and economic 
worldliness as cause of this modern dualism in which Catholicism shares neither interest nor 
concern.
922
  Rather than choose between mechanism and nature, Catholicism considers it a false 
dichotomy: “human labor and organic development, nature and reason, are one.”923 
Behind the Church’s rejection of this modern dualism is its different understanding of 
reason, which some moderns took to mean an embrace of irrationalism.  “[A]n original and 
prolific . . . thinker,” revolutionary Syndicalist, Georges Sorel: 
. . . sought the crisis of Catholic thought in the new alliance of the Church with irrationalism.  In his view, the 
argumentation of Catholic apologetics until the eighteenth century was to demonstrate faith based on reason, 
but in the nineteenth century the Church benefited from irrationalistic currents.  In fact, every conceivable 
type of opposition to the Enlightenment and rationalism reinvigorated Catholicism.
924
 
 
The Romantics are partly to blame, says Schmitt, and he reiterates here an argument of Political 
Romanticism that corrects “Rousseauism and Romanticism” for simply taking pleasure in 
Catholicism “as they would in a magnificent ruin or an authenticated antique.”925  Thus, Schmitt 
corrects Sorel by recognizing the Syndicalist belonged to the “fraternity” of “American financiers 
and Russian Bolsheviks” who “find themselves in a common struggle for economic thinking, that 
is, the struggle against politicians and jurists.”926  Far from embracing irrationality, the Church has 
“suppressed superstition” and was “always on the side of common sense” against fanaticism.927  
However, its understanding of reason is not the same as modern scientific materialism and 
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rationalism, the “methodology” of which “dominates contemporary thinking.”928  Instead, Schmitt 
calls it “Roman”; as “[e]ven Max Weber has ascertained that Roman rationalism lives on in the 
Roman Church.”929 
Catholicism avoids the dualism of “rationalism” and “irrationalism” understood along 
modern scientific lines of thought, rather: 
The rationalism of the Roman Church morally encompasses the psychological and sociological nature of man 
and, unlike industry and technology, is not concerned with the domination and exploitation of matter.  The 
Church has its own rationality.
930
 
 
Schmitt agrees with Weber in calling Catholic rationality “Roman,” defined as: “a particular mode 
of thinking whose method of proof is a specific juridical logic and whose focus of interest is the 
normative guidance of human social life.”931  The Church’s success against fanaticism is due to the 
fact “its rationalism resides in institutions and is essentially juridical; its greatest achievement is 
having made the priesthood into an office—a very distinctive type of office.”932  An institutional 
priesthood shaped by canon law is best personified in the office and person of the pope—“truly the 
most astounding complexio oppositorum”—for the papacy is personal, yet “independent of 
charisma.”933  The pope exists both as “an unbroken chain linked with the personal mandate and 
concrete person of Christ” and fills a representative role or function as Vicar of Christ.934  It is this 
capacity to make representation personal that has been lost in late modernity, and is a capacity for 
distinctions in which lies, “the rational creativity and humanity of Catholicism.”935 
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Late modern thought is fundamentally constrained to an “absolute economic materiality,” 
and a “totally rationalized production” which amorally serves: “one or another demand, always 
with the same earnestness and precision, be it for a silk blouse or poison gas or anything 
whatsoever.”936  Schmitt brings up Sorel and the vital importance of motivating beliefs or myths 
again in a passage that is easily, but mistakenly, read as exhibiting Schmitt’s Catholicity: 
Today, one can say it is perhaps more among Catholics that the image of the Antichrist is still alive.  If Sorel 
sees evidence of a vital force in the capacity for such ‘myths,’ he is unjust in asserting that Catholics no longer 
believe in their eschatology and that no one of them still awaits the Last Judgment. 
 
Schmitt refutes Sorel’s claim by naming Catholics with a keen sense of the eschatological, 
including: Donoso, Louis Veuillot (1813-83), Léon Bloy (1846-1917), and Robert Hugh Benson 
(1871-1914).  Furthermore, while Protestants see the Church as the Antichrist, Catholics look at 
modern economy and technology the same way: 
Genuine Catholic anxiety derives from the knowledge that here the concept of the rational is warped 
fantastically, in a manner alien to Catholic sensibility, because a mechanism of production serving the 
satisfaction of arbitrary material needs is called ‘rational’ without bringing into question what is most 
important—the rationality of the purpose of this supremely rational mechanism.937 
 
What Schmitt is cognizant of here, at least implicitly, is that modern thought rejected “purpose” in 
nature which pre-modern thought understood as “ends,” telein.938 
From here, we can more directly move past Schmitt’s meanderings to come sooner to his 
point.  For economic rationality even attempts to reduce politics to a question of productive 
technique.
939
  Yet the political is essentially immaterial, for: 
No political system can survive even a generation with only naked techniques of holding power.  To the 
political belongs the idea, because there is no politics without authority and no authority without an ethos of 
belief.
940
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The economic view of politics is common to socialism, capitalism, and even contemporary 
parliamentary liberalism.  All three flatten Sovereignty by making economic calculation decisive for 
the State.  Schmitt maintains that all such attempts to avoid the “political” are either disingenuous 
or lack self-comprehension.  Whether capitalists or socialists gain political power and pursue their 
economic goals: “. . . [W]hat they do will be politics nevertheless, and that means the promotion of 
a specific type of validity and authority.”941  Here we have Schmitt’s central point in Political Form. 
Keeping in mind the arguments made in Political Theology, Schmitt maintains that politics 
is always a matter of existential decision, of sovereign determinations of what is “valid,” and of who 
has “authority.”  His point here also foreshadows The Concept of the Political’s famous distinction 
between friend and foe, since the modern warring economic partisans represent the fight of the 
“social” against the “political.”  They are engaged in the war of all against all, and seek power in 
order to universalize their particularist material purposes and views.  These late modern forces of 
de-politicization fail to recognize that: “the political is considered immaterial, because it must be 
concerned with other than economic values.”942  By way of contrast, the Church does not shy away 
from promoting a “specific type of validity and authority”; therefore, “Catholicism is eminently 
political.”943 
Since “[n]o great social antithesis can be solved by economics”944 Schmitt develops his own 
version of a political “third way” beyond the modern mechanism and materialism of both 
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communism and liberalism.  And he looks at the Church, not as a faithful son or communicant 
but as a familiar outsider,
945
 to illustrate his “Roman” third way: 
The political power of Catholicism rests neither on economic nor on military means but rather on the 
absolute realization of authority.  The Church also is a ‘juridical person’ . . . the Church is a concrete 
personal representation of a concrete personality.  All knowledgeable witnesses have conceded that the 
Church is the consummate agency of the juridical spirit and the true heir of Roman jurisprudence.  Therein—
in its capacity to assume juridical form—lies one of its sociological secrets.  But it has the power to assume this 
or any other form only because it has the power of representation.  It represents the civitas humana.
946
 
 
The juridical form of the Church and its concept of a personal and representative authority—“[t]he 
pope is disposed to be sovereign of the Pontifical State”947—are the crucial features for Schmitt of 
the politically needful in Germany.  He seeks State Sovereignty with the “capacity to assume 
juridical form,” which is accomplished by means of the power of representation, the power to 
embody another reality—even a myth.  “The Catholic Church is the sole surviving contemporary 
example of the medieval capacity to create representative figures—the pope, the emperor, the 
monk, the knight, the merchant.”948  What the Church represents—“God become man in historical 
reality” or the “human city” (civitas humana)—is not actually important, Schmitt’s point is that it has 
proven itself capable of representation.
949
 
A discussion of “juridical” persons is precisely the point at which Schmitt would introduce 
Catholic social thought as regards subsidiarity and mediating “corporate” or social bodies if in fact 
he was a politically Catholic theorist.  The fact that he does not do so is telling.  Instead, Schmitt 
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stays at the most abstract level of political consideration where only the highest representative and 
authoritative figures exist.  For, although political modernity had maintained into the eighteenth 
century “some classical figures, like the ‘législateur’”950—who was Rousseau’s representative of the 
General Will—there have only been occasional attempts since then at “embarrassingly telling 
imitation[s]” of the Church; such as in the positivism of Comte and its noble and admirable—but 
failed—promotion of a “religion of humanity.”951  Insightfully, Schmitt recognizes that this change in 
late modern thought corresponds to the arrival of nationalism, for, when the French third estate or 
bourgeoisie declared itself to be the “nation”: “[I]t abolishe[d] the very idea of estates, which 
requires a plurality of estates to constitute a social order.  Bourgeois society was thus no longer 
capable of representation.”952  Thus Europe generally, but Germany most pressingly, finds itself in a 
situation in which the liberal, individualist, late modern bourgeoisie has lost the capacity for belief 
in, and acceptance of, representative authority.  Simply in rejecting authority the bourgeoisie 
already rejects representation, as the latter idea “is so completely governed by conceptions of 
personal authority that the representative as well as the person represented must maintain a 
personal dignity.”953 
Schmitt’s interest hence lies in political analogues to the Church and its pope as a means of 
recovering early modern representative authority.  And all is not lost, for the jurist believes 
representation can still be recaptured by the State, in fact: “God or ‘the people’ in democratic 
ideology or abstract ideas like freedom and equality can all conceivably constitute a 
representation.”954  The needful thing is to maintain personalism in sovereignty and avoid 
mechanization for “[o]nce the state becomes a leviathan, it disappears from the world of 
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representations.”955  Far better would be to learn from “the political idea of Catholicism and its 
capacity to embody the great trinity of form: the aesthetic form of art; the juridical form of law; 
finally, the glorious achievement of a world-historical form of power.”956  The Church has endured 
by its capacity to instill belief in its mythic claims.  A capacity built on its “great trinity of form”: 
aesthetic, juridical, and as world-historical power. 
In political modernity a “plurality of estates,” that is, a multiplicity of juristic “persons” or 
corporate groups, are no longer necessary (or at least admitted) for construction of a social order.  
Instead of pre-modern social pluralism, political rule itself creates and enforces a unified, univocal, 
and homogenous society; the citizen is determined into existence by the Sovereign.  As early as 
1914, in Value of the State, Schmitt had accepted political modernity’s contention that “[t]he State 
is . . . the only subject of legal ethics, the only one who has rights in an eminent sense.”957  That is, 
the State—the Sovereign—is the sole juridical person.  So we now find ourselves in possession of the 
basic idea that Schmitt expresses in Political Form, that the Catholic Church is a ready source from 
which to draw political inspiration in the fight to reestablish the unified and sovereign State, 
because its essential form is as an authentic embodiment of the principle of “representation.”  
Indeed, the Church was a model for Comte’s attempt and the same could be said for aspects of the 
political visions and strategies of a liberal like John Stuart Mill (1806-73), or even socialists like 
Karl Marx (1818-83) and Friedrich Engels (1820-95).  Schmitt next goes into greater detail about 
ways in which the Church manifests its capacity for representation. 
First, Schmitt recalls a complaint of Political Theology that he derived from reading 
Donoso, namely, the liberal bourgeoisie’s incapacity for effective discourse and decision.  The 
Church, in contrast, is capable of: 
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. . . rhetoric in the sense of what one might call representative discourse, rather than discussion and debate.  It 
moves in antitheses.  But these are not contradictions; they are the various and sundry elements molded into 
a complexio and thus give life to discourse.
958
 
 
Secondly, he revisits the Church’s capacity for accommodating a variety of political and social 
forms, since, even though it can never ally itself “with industrial capitalism,” the Church: 
. . . will continue to accommodate itself to every social and political order, even one dominated by capitalist 
entrepreneurs or trade unions and proletarian councils.  But accommodations will be possible only if and 
when economically based power becomes political . . .  [For] [t]he new [sovereign] order cannot confine itself 
to management of the process of production and consumption, because it must be constituted formally: every 
order is a legal order; every state, a constitutional state.  Once this step is taken, the Church can align itself 
with this new order, as it has with every order.
959
 
 
The needful in politics cannot be avoided, there must be sovereign decision constituting the 
political order, determining the “normal” situation—as he referred to it in Political Theology—and a 
resulting juridical order.  “Should economic thinking succeed in realizing its utopian goal and in 
bringing about an absolutely unpolitical condition of human society, the Church would remain the 
only agency of political thinking and form.”960  Such a result would be tragic, in part, because it is 
not, at all, desired by the Church.
961
  But also, possibly the worst aspect of the decline of the State 
in modernity, is that liberal parliamentarism developed out of a republicanism that had originally 
claimed to be “representational” government; yet, it had allowed sovereignty to be subverted by 
economic thought. 
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In contemporary parliamentarism, Schmitt believes “representation” has been hollowed 
out and lost its’ early modern content (recall Rousseau’s Legislator).  Originally, modern 
parliamentarism maintained representation by holding: 
. . . that the members of parliament are representatives of the whole people and thus have an independent 
authority vis-à-vis the voters.  . . .  This means that the personification of the people and the unity of 
parliament as their representative at least implies the idea of a complexio oppositorum, that is, the unity of 
the plurality of interests and parties.  It is conceived in representative rather than economic terms.  The 
proletarian system of soviets therefore seeks to eliminate this remnant of an age devoid of economic thinking 
and emphasizes that parliamentary delegates are only emissaries and agents, deputies of the producers . . . 
administrative servants of the process of production.
962
 
 
In its earlier modern form a parliament could contend with the king over who truly represented 
“the nation” without entirely undermining the unitary sovereignty of the State because both parties 
claimed—analogously to the claims of the Church—to represent “from above” and maintain 
personal authority.
963
  However, both nineteenth century liberalism, and then, socialism and 
anarchism progressively subverted this early modern understanding of representation. 
In the springtide of socialism, young Bolsheviks turned the struggle against the idea, even against every idea.  
So long as even the ghost of an idea exists, so also does the notion that something preceded the given reality 
of material things—that there is something transcendent—and this always means an authority from above.  . . .   
An intelligent person with political instincts who fights against politicians immediately recognizes in any 
appeal to the idea the claim to representation and authority—a presumption that goes beyond proletarian 
formlessness and the compact mass of in‘carnate’ reality in which men have no need of government and 
‘things govern themselves.’964 
 
The new mechanical government will simply be a matter of rule by: 
. . . public opinion, the opinion of private individuals.  Public opinion, in turn, should be governed by a 
privately owned free press.  Nothing in this system is representative; everything is a private matter.
965
 
 
 Now recalling his critique of Protestant inwardness in “Visibility,” Schmitt critiques the rise of a 
cult of privacy. 
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Schmitt believes that in both liberalism and socialism “privacy” has become the modern 
replacement of religion for: “If religion is a private matter, it also follows that privacy is revered.  . . 
. Private property is thus revered precisely because it is a private matter.”966  And: 
. . . The great betrayal laid to the Catholic Church is that it does not conceive Christ as a private person, does 
not conceive Christianity as a private matter, something wholly and inwardly spiritual, but rather has given it 
form as a visible institution. . . .  Like every worldwide imperialism that has reached its goal, the Church seeks 
to bring peace to the world.  To the enemies of all forms, this raises the specter of the devil triumphant.
967
 
 
Schmitt’s radical attack here on the notion of “privacy” (in property and in the person), at first 
blush, can seem to be simply a defense of the Church from being relegated to private, “invisible,” 
status.  However, Schmitt is thinking along lines foreign to Catholic social thought.  He signals his 
divergence by agreeing with “a high-minded Protestant like Rudolf Sohm” who “could define the 
Catholic Church as something essentially juridical.”968  Schmitt ignores the Church’s deep 
commitment and protective stance towards private property, the privacy of the family, and person, 
such as found in Rerum Novarum (1891).  The Church recognizes the family as pre-political, as 
the fundamental corporate entity of social order, and as maintaining an intrinsic dignity, personal 
authority, and even a private existence.  It is not specifically “privacy” but individualism, which the 
Church attacks as a liberal or anarchistic error in understanding the relationship between parts and 
wholes. 
By throwing the baby out with the bath water, Schmitt swings to an organicist or monist 
opposite extreme of State-directed publicness from the anarchist’s individualism.  Rather than 
expressing the Catholic view, Schmitt propounds a form of State pacification derived from 
“worldwide imperialism” treating political representation as one in which the “part” cannot claim 
to be a “whole.”  Only the sovereign, and to a lesser extent, jurists like Schmitt, reserve the right to 
such private and public dignity; the latter because he describes jurists as “theologians of the existing 
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order,”969 and thus natural enemies of all revolutionaries.  Then in a passage that foreshadows his 
later accommodation with Nazism, Schmitt likens jurists to the Catholic Church: 
Owing to its formal superiority, jurisprudence can easily assume a posture similar to Catholicism with respect 
to alternating political forms in that it can positively align itself with various and sundry power complexes, 
provided there is a sufficient minimum of form ‘to establish order.’  . . . Once the new situation permits 
recognition of an authority, it provides the groundwork for a jurisprudence—the concrete foundation for a 
substantive form.
970
 
 
Sovereignty establishes itself in a concrete existence which then becomes the ground from which 
jurisprudence, the rule of law in a normal social situation, can develop. 
Schmitt does, however, recognize one way in which a mistake can be made when drawing 
lessons for politics from the example of the Church.  Specifically, he does not actually favor a 
“worldwide imperialism” or international Sovereign, unlike Socialists and Communists.  Schmitt 
admits, if there were to be an international tribunal of justice, for example, then: 
Its authority would . . . be based on the direct representation of this idea [of a justice independent of 
individual States], not on the delegated authority of individual states. . . .  Consequently it must present itself 
as an original and thus also a universal court of justice.
971
 
 
The Church is a special case of universality and “imperialism”: 
Catholicism goes further because it represents something other and more than secular jurisprudence—not 
only the idea of justice but also the person of Christ—that substantiates its claim to a unique power and 
authority.
972
 
 
Only at the level of an individual nation can an analogous form of representation to that of the 
Church be instantiated in a Sovereign capable of representing the “people” or “nation.”  The State 
can accomplish this by putting into practice the verbs and gerunds found in the following sentence 
about the Church: “The Church commands recognition as the Bride of Christ; it represents Christ 
reigning, ruling and conquering.”973 
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The final pages of Political Form cover a variety of minor topics and issues tangential to the 
major themes and essential interest of the essay, and, in some cases, are also a repetition of an 
earlier digression.  The topics worth mentioning in this study include: philosophical anthropology, 
political esotericism, and a vision of the future battle lines in European politics. 
Schmitt reflected on the first topic, at the beginning of the essay, when noting as an 
example of the Church’s “complex of opposites,” it took a stance on human nature favoring 
neither side of the “antithesis of man ‘by nature evil’ and ‘by nature good.’”974  He then claimed this 
anthropological question “is in no sense answered by a simple yes or no in the Tridentine 
Creed.”975  Yet, 1100 years before the Council of Trent this issue was resolved in the Councils of 
Ephesus and Chalcedon’s refutation of the heresies of Eutychianism and Monophysitism.  And 
Catholicism’s understanding of the essential goodness of human nature is in fact referenced in the 
Tridentine Creed by its adoption of the Nicene as its starting point, for it bears the line: “Et 
incarnatus est de Spiritu Sancto ex Maria Virgine, et homo factus est” (“And became incarnate by 
the Holy Spirit of the Virgin Mary: and was made man”).  Human nature must be considered in 
fact good, for otherwise, God would not have taken it upon Himself in the Incarnation.  Perhaps 
Schmitt meant to refer only to the post-lapsarian state of fallen human nature—not human nature 
simply—as explained in the decrees of the Council of Trent rather than the Creed it promulgated.  
For in Session V’s First Decree, “Concerning Original Sin,” the Church does explain how Adam’s 
transgression resulted in his heirs being imbued with “concupiscence” or an inclination to sin.  
After all, Schmitt does correctly contrast the Catholic view on “this decisive question for political 
theory” as one which sees “human nature as only wounded, weakened, and troubled” to the 
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“Protestant doctrine of the total depravity of natural man.”976  Rather than side with the Church, 
Schmitt expresses a far more Protestant pessimism, towards the end of Political Form, when he 
references Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor, a literary figure he consistently admires, as one who 
“knows that man is by nature evil and vile, a cowardly rebel who needs a master.”977 
The second topic appears in the final pages of the essay when Schmitt notes in a 
Nietzschean vein: 
The eighteenth century staked much on self-confidence and the aristocratic concept of secrecy.  In a society 
that no longer has such courage, there can be no more ‘arcana,’ no more hierarchy, no more secret 
diplomacy; in fact, no more politics.  To every great politics belongs the ‘arcanum.’978 
 
The jurist here decries the triumph of a politics which is non-representational, it is “nothing but 
human” or “merely” human in its simple concern for material needs and wants.  To achieve 
greatness in politics, to have representation, requires rule from above in a hierarchical and 
authoritarian fashion.  Schmitt accepts that to achieve such in the contemporary democratic and 
liberal era requires the leadership of an esoteric, or Gnostic, elite.  Since arcane powers from the 
past—a list that includes Catholicism as well as its great modern adversary Freemasonry—are 
“inconsequential” mere “phantoms”979 now, a new power must arise to again achieve a great 
politics. 
Schmitt hazards here no guesses as to what the great politics of the future might specifically 
look like, nor does he predict who might reintroduce representation and political form.  Instead, 
he hearkens backwards into Europe’s mid-nineteenth century past.  There he finds a key insight 
into the future in Bakunin’s political atheism and the Church’s response.  The Russian anarchist 
had characterized the theism of the Italian Freemason and nationalist, Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-
72), as “like every theistic belief, only evidence of servitude and the true source of all evil—all state 
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and political authority.  It was metaphysical centralism.”980  In a turn towards irrationalism, Bakunin 
even attacked Marx and Engels by virtue of their having been intellectuals: “The anarchist can only 
utter the word ‘cervelle’ [brains] with sibilant fury.  Behind this word he rightly suspected the claim 
to authority, discipline, and hierarchy.  To him, every type of cerebralism is hostile to life.”981  
Faced with the anarchist and atheist threat, the Church acted decisively, even against its own prior 
inclinations: 
I know there may be more Christianity in the Russian hatred of West European culture than in liberalism 
and German Marxism.  I know that great Catholic thinkers deem liberalism a more malevolent enemy than 
avowed socialist atheism.  I know this formlessness may contain the potential for a new form that might also 
give shape to the economic-technical age.  . . . There is, nevertheless, a type of decision the Church cannot 
avoid—a type of decision that must be taken in the present day, in the concrete situation, in every single 
generation.  With respect to such decisions, the Church opts for one side or the other, even though it does 
not declare itself for any of the contending parties.  Thus it stood on the side of the Counterrevolution in the 
first half of the nineteenth century.  On this basis, I maintain: In that remote skirmish with Bakunin, the 
Catholic Church and the Catholic concept of humanity stood on the side of the Idea and West European 
civilization, closer to Mazzini than to the atheistic socialism of the Russian anarchist.
982
 
 
Schmitt dreads an anarchistic destruction of sovereign authority above all things and so ends 
Political Form with this fascinating plea for an openness, on the part of the Church—or at least 
Catholics—to unite with and support counter-revolutionary forces capable of reestablishing State 
sovereignty against anarchism.  His reference to Mazzini, the hero of Italian unification, is possibly 
intended to indicate that Catholics should support even a nationalist and fascist political force, 
given Benito Mussolini’s (1883-1945) March on Rome of October 22 to 29, 1922 occurred before 
Hegner received Schmitt’s final draft for publication in November. 
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 Chapter 6.  
Schmitt’s “Struggle for an Authentically Catholic Intensification” 
“A clever tactician gives up nothing as long as it is not completely useless.”983 
—Carl Schmitt, Diary entry for May 23, 1949 
 
1923: A Year of Crisis for Germany, and Schmitt’s Response 
Political Form has always been the main influence on Schmitt’s reputation amongst 
Catholics.  One of the earliest proofs of this fact is a letter of June 1, 1923, in which a former 
colleague of Schmitt’s in Munich, Konrad Beyerle (1872-1933), invited the jurist to speak to the 
General Assembly of the Görres Society in Münster.  Beyerle was a member of the Reichstag for 
the BVP, from 1920-24, and would serve as the Vice-President of the Görres Society in 1924.  
This prominent political Catholic extended the invitation after having read Schmitt’s “witty” 
Political Form,
984
 and it likely led to the jurist’s contributing two articles to the State Encyclopedia 
the Society produced in 1926.
985
 
The essay is also central to the standard narrative.  The mistake is in failing to recognize 
that even if one believes Schmitt draws an adequate picture of how the Church understands itself 
(he does so at parts), this entire treatment is placed in brackets in service of what he is really 
interested in; namely, a secular statist appropriation of the “juridical form” of the Church and its 
preeminent example of sovereign authority in the representative power of an infallible, personal, 
and decisive Pope.
986
  He is interested in a return to early modern State absolutism and consistently 
rejects any interference in this secular power from the Church or political Catholicism. 
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After Political Form, Schmitt’s attention turned to the previous century’s development of 
liberal parliamentarism.  When this next extended essay, The Intellectual-Historical Situation of 
Present-Day Parliamentarism (hereafter as Parliamentarism), is read as the third in a series with 
Political Theology and Political Form, then, one can see that Mehring has an excellent point when 
he categorizes Schmitt’s research interests, in 1922-23, as dominated by a fascination with the 
intellectual and political life of the nineteenth century.
987
  However, the historical context within 
which Schmitt wrote Parliamentarism is even more pertinent than it was for the prior two. 
Contextually (or concretely as Schmitt might say), the year 1923 was one of sharp crisis for 
the young Republic.  In January, France and Belgium sent troops in to occupy the Ruhr, in order 
to guarantee reparation payments were made.  The occupation set off a fierce local resistance—
including a general strike—which would culminate in several failed putsch attempts for Rhenish 
separation in October 1923, in cities such as: Düsseldorf, Bonn, Trier, Koblenz, and more.  The 
French actually encouraged some of these revolts.  It was also a year in which extreme nationalist 
groups were emboldened and militantly active, most famously with the Hitler-led “Beer Hall” 
Putsch in Munich of November 8-9.
988
  The hyperinflation that began at the end of 1922, continued 
unabated in 1923, and reached its peak in November, at over 4 trillion Marks to the US dollar. 
Schmitt had already studied dictatorship for years, but the events of this tumultuous year 
certainly did nothing to diminish his strong interest in this controversial form of political rule.
989
  
The German People’s Party (Deutsche Volkspartei, DVP) appointed Gustav Stresemann (1878-
1929) Chancellor in August.  Stresemann—a nationalist liberal—“proclaimed a saving 
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‘dictatorship’”990 in conjunction with President Ebert’s declaration of a state of emergency, based on 
Article 48 of the Constitution in September.
991
  Ebert’s declaration would last until February 1924, 
although Stresemann would be replaced as Chancellor at the end of November 1923. 
Schmitt’s former military commander Christian Roth, who had become the Bavarian 
Minister of Justice after the war, was, by this time, on the extreme German right and a source of 
information for Schmitt as Roth would end up getting involved in Hitler’s November putsch.992  For 
Schmitt’s part, his diary records on November 12, 1923, his view that “Hitler is a hysteric.”993  Even 
if he was not convinced by Germany’s most extreme brand of nationalist agitation at this time, he 
did spend 1923 developing his own nationalist sentiments, and was particularly absorbed by Italian 
fascism.  In April 1923, he read Mussolini’s speeches in preparation for writing Parliamentarism.  
The vital difference between the two extreme nationalist movements, for Schmitt, is possibly his 
desire to see nationalism remain within the framework of the State and to specifically serve “as an 
antidote against a failure of parliamentarism.”994  While Schmitt was admiring fascism, the Church 
subtly critiqued the radical nationalist politics of the time with the timely beatification by Pope Pius 
XI on May 13 of the great Italian Jesuit and Cardinal, Robert Bellarmine.
995
  As we already 
witnessed the year before in Political Theology, Schmitt was adamantly opposed to Bellarmine’s 
ultramontane presentation of the indirect power of the papacy over the secular and political order 
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of nations; so his beatification provides a nice contrast to the modernist state theory Schmitt put on 
exhibit in Parliamentarism.  He completed a draft of the essay in April and had finished the book 
by the end of May.  Parliamentarism was in print by the end of October, 1923. 
 
Parliamentarism 
In the original introduction to Parliamentarism,
996
 Schmitt makes his interest in what is 
transpiring in Italy immediately apparent, by noting how contemporary parliamentarism is attacked 
by all political sides, before sharing a quote: 
One finds the simplest summary of the current situation in a speech that Senator Mosca [Gaetano Mosca, 
1858-1941] made in the Italian Senate on November 26, 1922, concerning the domestic and foreign policy of 
Mussolini’s government.  . . .  He says the most dangerous threat to parliament is ‘syndicalism’ which derives 
‘from the economic organization of modern society.’997 
 
As Schmitt had already, repeatedly, demonstrated in his Weimar work, especially Political Form—
written just prior to Parliamentarism—he quite agreed with Mosca’s condemnation of the reduction 
of politics to economics.  Despite being known primarily as a theorist of political liberal elitism, 
Mosca’s thought was frequently cited in order to defend fascism.  Then in a subtle reveal of his 
antipathy to political Catholicism, Schmitt ties in this hated syndicalism with Germany’s tradition of 
“corporatist ideas,” which of course includes traditional Catholic social thought.998 
The first chapter deals with Schmitt’s distinction between liberalism and democracy.  He 
suggests that the reign in France of Napoleon III (r. 1852-70) demonstrates democracy is simply 
organizational and can be used even by “conservative and reactionary” governments just as much 
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as by liberal.
999
  The contemporary significance of democracy, according to Schmitt, is all 
jurisprudence of public law must have a concept of legitimacy and that issue is now dominated by 
democracy or popular sovereignty.
1000
  Caesarism is even quite consistent with democracy.
1001
  
Schmitt thinks this division between liberalism and democracy is even present in contradictions 
within the Weimar Constitution that either favor the Reichstag (and hence liberalism) or, at times, 
favor the Reich President (and hence democracy).
1002
 
Since a discussion of democracy entails legitimation of authority, or State sovereignty, 
Schmitt says he must start with political theology.
1003
  And so, in Chapter Two on “The Principles of 
Parliamentarism” he adduces the fundamental supposition of contemporary Parliamentarism (its 
ratio) is deliberative discussion as the basis of establishing truth.  Schmitt argues this, in fact, is a 
metaphysical stance: “It is essential that liberalism be understood as a consistent, comprehensive 
metaphysical system.  . . .  [Truth is] “a mere function of the eternal competition of opinions.”1004  
Schmitt relies most in this chapter on the views of French political theorists François Guizot (1787-
1874), who also argued that parliament is essentially based on a principle of discussion, and 
Maurice Hauriou (1856-1929) who covered the liberal principles of nineteenth century 
parliamentarism, such as the separation of powers in a division of executive and legislative.
1005
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More fascinating, for our purposes, than his claims regarding the metaphysical assumption 
behind late modern parliamentary liberalism in this chapter, is that Schmitt merges scholastic and 
classical political thought with the “enemy,” by claiming that contemporary liberalism seeks to 
“replace the concrete person of the king with an impersonal authority and a universal reason, 
which according to Aristotelian-scholastic tradition constitutes the essence of law.”1006  He then 
follows this claim up with a repetition, from his earlier books, about the nature of sovereignty: 
The usual definition of sovereignty today rests on Bodin’s recognition that it will always be necessary to make 
exceptions to the general rule in concrete circumstances, and that the sovereign is whoever decides what 
constitutes an exception.
1007
 
 
Given this presentation, the deeper issue distinguishing constitutional from absolutist political 
thought regards the law.  “The crucial distinction always remains whether the law is a general 
rational principle or a measure, a concrete decree, an order.”1008  And, to Schmitt, Hobbes claim is 
the convincing one, “Law is not Counsell, but Command.”1009  Schmitt’s conviction is based on the 
concrete difference between the legislative and executive acts of sovereignty, which are best 
brought out by periods of social crisis, certainly like Germany in 1923: “Different opinions are 
useful and necessary in the legislative; but not in the executive, where especially in times of war and 
disturbance action must be energetic; to this belongs a unity of decision.
1010
  Liberalism, as he 
argued in Political Theology, naively believes it can do without “decision.” 
This leads to the discussion, in the next chapter, of the reemergence of the concept of 
dictatorship within Marxist thought.  Schmitt astutely points out that Hegel and Marx, with their 
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dialectical thought, are not really prophesying the future, but, rather, trying to read the past: “If an 
epoch can be grasped in human consciousness, then that furnishes proof for a historical dialectic 
that this epoch is historically finished.”1011  He illustrates, by concluding, a Marxist is basically only 
stating “of the proletariat that it will be the absolute negation of the bourgeoisie.”1012  This 
description also perfectly fits Schmitt and his historicist approach as he consistently uses his 
intellectual-historical studies of these early Weimar years to conclude one or another human 
political or social possibility has been dispensed with.  For example, his constant claim that 
Donoso had the insight to recognize monarchical legitimacy was “no more.”  Or, for a few more 
examples: his claim that metaphysical and transcendental understandings (not just the belief in 
God) are a thing of the past; mass democracy has to be used for political justification; and the “era 
of the State” is on the cusp of passing away.  The result of all of these changes in the late modern 
mind boils down, in Marxism, to a simple conclusion which Bolshevism and Lenin recognize: 
The new rationalism destroys itself dialectically, and before it stands a terrible negation.  The kind of force to 
which it must resort cannot any longer be Fichte’s naïve schoolmasterly ‘educational dictatorship.’  The 
bourgeois is not to be educated but eliminated.
1013
 
 
This turn to dictatorship in Marxist rationalism is a development Schmitt has respect for, although 
to be fair, he is even at this time not at all a militarist or comfortable with the violence that could be 
entailed. 
In the final chapter of Parliamentarism, Schmitt continues to evaluate the contemporary 
situation in its turn towards political irrationalism.  He describes the change from a nineteenth 
century liberal or Marxist rationalism as a: “new evaluation of rational thought, a new belief in 
instinct and intuition that lays to rest every belief in discussion and would also reject the possibility 
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that mankind could be made ready for discussion through an educational dictatorship.”1014  This 
radical development is personified in the anarchism of Proudhon and Bakunin, for whom any and 
all “unity is slavery,” and theistic belief is “metaphysical centralism.”1015  From these early anarchists 
Schmitt moves to a later one, Sorel, and just as he had in Political Form, he treats the Frenchman 
with great admiration.  He finds at the center of Sorel’s thought—partly by the influence of 
philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941): 
. . . a theory of myth that poses the starkest contradiction of absolute rationalism and its dictatorship, but at 
the same time because it is a theory of direct, active decision, it is an even more powerful contradiction to the 
relative rationalism of the whole complex that is grouped around conceptions such as ‘balancing,’ ‘public 
discussion,’ and ‘parliamentarism.’1016 
 
The “idea” in Political Form is now the myth in Parliamentarism, and forces that can concoct and 
transmit a myth as a unifying source of political decision which will ultimately shape politics and 
history. 
Only in myth can the criterion be found for deciding whether one nation or a social group has a historical 
mission and has reached its historical moment.  Out of the depths of a genuine life instinct, not out of reason 
or pragmatism, springs the great enthusiasm, the great moral decision and the great myth.  In direct intuition 
the enthusiastic mass creates a mythical image that pushes its energy forward and gives it the strength for 
martyrdom as well as the courage to use force.  Only in this way can a people or a class become the engine of 
world history.  Wherever this is lacking, no social and political power can remain standing, and no 
mechanical apparatus can build a dam if a new storm of historical life has broken loose.  Accordingly, it is all 
a matter of seeing correctly where this capacity for myth and this vital strength are really alive today.
1017
 
 
Schmitt does not believe this capacity for creating myth is alive either in the liberal bourgeoisie or 
the Proletariat favored by Sorel. 
However, Schmitt does give the socialists and anarchists credit for understanding how to, at 
least, make themselves present and ready to fight for the future of politics.  From a (deeply flawed) 
reading of Donoso he relates that liberalism fails in this regard simply because: “Discussing, 
bargaining, parliamentary proceedings, appear a betrayal of myth and the enormous enthusiasm on 
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which everything depends.”1018  Like the Spaniard, Schmitt was focused on the coming “great battle” 
with atheistic socialism and anarchism, “which only the metaphysical cowardice of discursive 
liberalism could deny was coming.”1019  But, from Schmitt’s radical perspective, he denies Donoso’s 
belief that the atheist anarchist Proudhon is truly his political enemy.  Rather, the jurist presents the 
two nineteenth century political theorists as equivalent reversals of each other, more akin to a 
balanced Manichean dyad, opponents but not definitive enemies, especially as “both demanded a 
decision.”1020  In fact, Schmitt goes further by likening Donoso to Sorel: 
Instead of relative oppositions accessible to parliamentary means, absolute antitheses now appear.  ‘The day 
of radical rejection and the day of sovereign declarations is coming.’  No parliamentary discussion can delay 
it; the people, driven forward by its instincts, will smash the pulpits of the sophists—all of these are opinions of 
Donoso-Cortés, which might have come word for word from Sorel, except that the anarchist stood on the 
side of the people’s instinct.  For Donoso-Cortés radical socialism was something enormous, greater than 
liberal moderation, because it went back to ultimate problems and gave a decisive answer to radical 
questions—because it had a theology.1021 
 
The mention of Sorel brings Schmitt back closer to the present situation as he speaks to what is 
missing in the Weimar Republic by praising the anarchist thusly: “The warlike and heroic 
conceptions that are bound up with battle and struggle were taken seriously again by Sorel as the 
true impulse of an intensive life.”1022 
Schmitt’s language, in this 1923 text, has markedly increased in nationalist ferocity as well 
as existentialist focus.  For, he continues by agreeing with Sorel’s finding that “professional politics 
and participation in parliamentary business . . . wear down great enthusiasm into chatter and 
intrigue and kill the genuine instincts and intuitions that produce a moral decision.”1023  And 
further: “Bellicose, revolutionary excitement and the expectation of monstrous catastrophes belong 
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to the intensity of life and move history.”1024  This historical surge comes from the masses and not 
intellectuals, a “heroic spirit was born of the irrational life energy of an anonymous mass” and, 
“[e]very rationalist interpretation falsifies the immediacy of life.”1025  Although Sorel may have 
himself strictly opposed dictatorship, staying true to his anarchistic principles, it is, at least, the case 
“[t]he great psychological and historical meaning of the social theory of myth cannot be denied.”1026  
The bourgeoisie is one such myth, which proves the case, much as “Rome” had in Political Form.  
In the final pages of Parliamentarism, Schmitt turns his attention to the question of from 
whence the next great political myth will emanate?  He believes that the answer lies in nationalism, 
one of the possible “ideas” which could give form to the political he had mentioned in his last 
book.  Schmitt recognizes nationalism as the next great myth possible first in what Sorel says of 
Lenin, who was basically allowing: 
Russia again could be Russian, Moscow again the capital, and the Europeanized upper classes who held their 
own land in contempt could be exterminated.  Proletarian use of force had made Russia Muscovite again.  In 
the mouth of an international Marxist that is remarkable praise, for it shows that the energy of nationalism is 
greater than the myth of class conflict.
1027
 
 
From here, he actually returns to earlier examples of the unifying power of nationalism, in: the 
wars against Napoleon of the Spanish and Germans; Irish rebellion against England in 1916, led by 
Patrick Pearse and James Connolly (1868-1916); and Italian Fascism.
1028
  Schmitt considers this last, 
and most current, example as also the best or superior form, for: “wherever it comes to an open 
confrontation of the two myths [Bolshevism and nationalism], such as in Italy, the national myth 
has until today always been victorious.”1029  Schmitt’s fascination with fascism strikes a particularly 
ominous note when he recognizes how racism can actually strengthen the psychological impact of 
nationalist sentiment: 
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Italian fascism depicted its communist enemy with a horrific face, the Mongolian face of Bolshevism; this has 
made a stronger impact and has evoked more powerful emotions than the socialist image of the bourgeois.  
Until now the democracy of mankind and parliamentarism has only once been contemptuously pushed aside 
through the conscious appeal to myth, and that was an example of the irrational power of the national myth.  
In his famous speech of October 1922 in Naples before the March on Rome, Mussolini said, ‘We have 
created a myth, this myth is a belief, a noble enthusiasm; it does not need to be reality, it is a striving and a 
hope, belief and courage.  Our myth is the nation, the great nation which we want to make into a concrete 
reality for ourselves.’  In the same speech he called socialism an inferior mythology.  Just as in the sixteenth 
century, an Italian has once again given expression to the principle of political realism.
1030
 
 
From Schmitt, it is high praise indeed to be likened to his hero Machiavelli.  He is impressed with 
fascism as it established itself the polar opposite, or contradiction, of anarchism, in being able to 
rekindle enthusiasm in authority and stoke “the new feeling for order, discipline, and hierarchy.”1031 
Almost as an afterthought, Schmitt notes the rather tepid danger he sees in the 
development of political myths: 
Of course the abstract danger this kind of irrationalism [in anarchism or fascism] poses is great.  The last 
remnants of solidarity and a feeling of belonging together will be destroyed in the pluralism of an 
unforeseeable number of myths.  For political theology that is polytheism, just as every myth is polytheistic.
1032
 
 
This warning is tepid, for it is nothing more than his constant complaint against social pluralism.  
Schmitt, here, only claims as possible the same kind of divisions amongst political movements 
selling a myth as he already sees as concomitant with the party politics of contemporary 
parliamentarism with their multitude of sectarian interests.  For Schmitt, there is no possible 
scenario in which the State, the Sovereign authority, can handle social pluralism because he rejects 
the Catholic principle of subsidiarity.
1033
  The key for him, then, will be the capacity of a movement 
to forge a myth that unites as broad a swath of Germany as possible, in order to reestablish the 
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firmly unitary and sovereign—decisive—State that can impose its will and homogenize the masses.  
To end, a crucial distinction must be made in the manner in which “myth” exists as an aspect of 
Donoso’s thought versus its place in the thought of political extremists such as Sorel, Mussolini, or 
Schmitt.  For the Catholic Spaniard, the power of myth, in his case the power of Catholic religion, 
is cultural, that is, it is wholly in the realm of the pre-political and social.
1034
  For the latter group of 
proto- or outright fascists, myth is political myth.  They are Nietzschean in their common over-
emphasis on the role of myth in politics.
1035
 
 
Schmitt in Bonn (1924-25) 
In his personal affairs, Schmitt’s secular divorce case proceeded apace.  On March 27, 
1923, he had gone back to the Munich apartment only to find that Cari had sold all their 
possessions and left,
1036
 so it was no surprise that she offered no defense of his action against her.  
Therefore, on January 18, 1924, the Bonn Regional Court declared their marriage “null and void” 
on the grounds of fraud perpetrated by Dorotić.1037  The judgment took legal effect two months 
later on March 2.  Although, in a year, he would marry his then lover “Duška” Todorović, Schmitt 
was already carrying on affairs at her expense.  For example, with Todorović’s girlfriend (a Miss 
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Tadic) and a dancer named Sonninhaus “who reminds him of Cari.”1038  Already, early in 1924, 
Duška began to exhibit the “dangerous tubercular disease”1039 which would cause her to frequent 
sanitariums the remainder of her life.  On March 18, Schmitt records in his diary that she coughed 
blood.  Within a couple of weeks, he visits Berlin, and through Franz Blei is introduced to the 
city’s nightlife.  As a result he spends “ten days in a passionate affair with a ‘Countess’ called Hella 
Ehrik.”1040  Todorović was placed in a sanitarium in August and remains there through the end of 
the year; thus missing Schmitt’s first interview in pursuit of an ecclesiastical annulment of his 
marriage.  His case considers two issues: her misidentification, and whether her purported 
aristocratic origins were a sine qua non condition of marriage.
1041
  An official of the Archdiocese in 
Cologne conducted the examination on November 4, 1924.  Schmitt describes it as “very detailed, 
very decent.”1042 
The standard narrative treats Schmitt as a supporter of the Center.  Yet, Schmitt never 
joined a political party in Weimar much less the Center.  He would only join one party in his 
lifetime, the Nazi Party.  Rather, in the new Republic, Schmitt fit in best with the general attitudes 
of the mandarin social milieu of German academic life.  As Bendersky notes: 
Many professors were repulsed by the petty, often irresponsible partisanship of parties representing special 
socioeconomic, ideological, and religious interests.  From the narrow viewpoint of such academicians, this 
party bickering was enough to condemn democracy itself; it threatened the unity of the nation and 
undermined the authority of the established order to which they were totally committed.  It also confirmed 
their belief that a strong state must stand above parties and represent the interests of the nation as a whole.
1043
 
 
Parliamentarism reflects these mandarin views.  The trial of Hitler and other Nazi leaders for their 
failed putsch began on February 26, 1924 and lasted until April 1.  Schmitt followed the case with 
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keen interest, not for Hitler’s sake, but because of the involvement in the coup of nationalist hero, 
General Erich Ludendorff (1865-1937), and Bavarian nationalist politician, Gustav Ritter von Kahr 
(1862-1934).  At the time, Schmitt had a Nazi-supporting student with whom he routinely 
discussed such current events.
1044
  In early March, Schmitt refused the overtures of Bonn’s Center-
supporting students, of the Windthorst League and the Young Academics, who had listed him as a 
proposed Reichstag candidate to the Berlin Center Party Board.
1045
  The next month, Schmitt reads 
a paper at a meeting of the German Teachers of State Law (Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer) in Jena, 
which could further indicate why he had no interest in office.  In “Die Diktatur des 
Reichspräsident nach Artikel 48 der Reichsverfassung” [“The Dictatorship of the President 
pursuant to Article 48 of the Constitution”] he argues for the president to act as a commissarial 
dictator to resolve Germany’s frequent social crises.1046 
Although Schmitt declined to get involved in practical Catholic politics, he did sporadically 
publish editorials and other pieces commenting on political issues in Catholic outlets.  The first 
such piece appeared on October 26, 1924, in the Kölnische Volkszeitung.  “Nochmalige 
Reichstagsauflösung: Ein staatsrechtlicher Hinweis” [Repeated Dissolutions of the Reichstag: a 
Note on Constitutional Law] dealt with interpretative issues in how the Reichstag can be 
dissolved.
1047
  Schmitt notes that this maneuver is a frequent necessity, given the extent to which 
contemporary party politics has undermined or hamstrung the government’s ability to act.  In 
March of 1925, Schmitt’s editorial “Reichspräsident und Weimarer Verfassung” [“The President 
                                                 
1044
 Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, 164. 
1045
 See:  Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt, 39; also, Balakrishnan, Enemy, 54-5. 
1046
 See note 3 above for publication details. 
1047
 Carl Schmitt, “Nochmalige Reichstagsauflösung: Ein staatsrechtlicher Hinweis,” Kölnische Volkszeitung, 836 
(October 26, 1924).  This piece was combined with a later piece of Schmitt’s, “‘Einmaligkeit’ und ‘gleicher Anlaß’ bei 
der Reichstagsauflösung nach Artikel 25 der Reichsverfassung” [‘Uniqueness’ and ‘Alike Reasons’ in the Dissolution 
of the Reichstag under Article 25 of the Constitution], Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 8.1-2 (1925), 162-74, and finally 
published as “Reichstagsauflösungen” in: Schmitt, Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze, 13-28. 
255 
 
and the Weimar Constitution”] was likewise published in Cologne’s Catholic daily.  Here, Schmitt 
claims, the first holder of the office of President, Friedrich Ebert, had given it a special character: 
On a provisional basis, a special new type of a republican president was born.  The president as a kind of 
neutral support authority between the various bodies and factors known to the Weimar Constitution, national 
government, parliament, the Reichsrat, the state government.
1048
 
 
As noted above, Ebert did indeed make liberal use of Article 48 to rule by emergency decree.
1049
  
When Lönne examines the editorials authored by Schmitt, which found a home in the Kölnische 
Volkszeitung,
 1050
 he concludes that they were “without exception” discussions of certain 
constitutional questions, from his particular polemical viewpoint, which displayed “ruthless 
contempt for the weakness of parliamentary democracy.”1051  Thus, far from suggesting that Schmitt 
was motivated by political Catholicism, the confrontational and polemical tone he took towards 
parliamentarism, in a Center Party publication, is better evidence of the secularity of his mind.
1052
 
Finally, Schmitt did accept an invitation from the Rhenish Center Party in Cologne, to 
deliver a speech on the occasion of the millennial anniversary celebration of the Rhineland, which 
was held on April 14, 1925.  The organizers published his speech as the fourth in a series of 
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pamphlets
1053
 on the “Rhenish Problem,” and it was the second (and last) Weimar era book of 
Schmitt’s released by a Catholic publisher. 
 
The Rhineland as Object of International Politics 
The Rhineland was, indeed, a problem in the early years of the Weimar Republic.  
Rhenish Catholics, in particular, were disaffected from the regime and national Center Party, as 
they were subject to events such as: French invasion of the Ruhr in January 1923; several failed 
putsch attempts for Rhenish separation in October 1923 in Düsseldorf, Bonn, Trier, Koblenz, and 
more cities, even encouraged, in some places, by the French; and the rise of the Nazis in the 
region.
1054
  “Rhinelanders believed that the Reich government was failing to take responsibility for 
them”1055 in these years and, in his speech, Schmitt tapped into that angst and the separatist fervor 
simmering in the region.  Given the standard narrative regards Schmitt as, at earliest, beginning a 
process of becoming secular-minded from about six to eight months after this speech, The 
Rhineland as Object of International Politics provides an unique opportunity to assess his 
Catholicity since it was a polemical speech to a largely Catholic audience. 
Rhineland focuses upon the novel manner in which Germany found itself subject to foreign 
intervention under the terms of the Versailles Treaty and the auspices of the League of Nations.  A 
routine approach of Schmitt’s Weimar writings was to distinguish decadent contemporary 
European political affairs from those of the nineteenth century under a stronger system of nation-
states.  To that effect, Schmitt draws a distinction in his speech between current methods of 
imperialism versus the older form.  Rather than direct annexation or control, imperialist states now 
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use hidden and dishonest means, including: protectorates, mandates, leases, and intervention 
agreements.  These methods are exemplified, for Schmitt, by the manner in which the United 
States exercises control over certain nations in its hemisphere or, even better, England’s 
domination of Egypt.  The latter had been nominally free since 1922, when the British 
protectorate was officially dissolved, yet, “old words and mental habits are carried forward” and 
used to “hide the political reality.”1056  Egypt may be called a “free and sovereign state,” but England 
maintains control just as firmly as before—if not, in fact, more securely by reason of deception—
given the four rights the British reserved for themselves: defense of the Suez Canal; protection of 
foreign interests; protection of Egypt against foreign attack; and administration of the Sudan.
1057
  All 
of which rights served as justifications (or pretenses) for intervention and suspension of Egyptian 
sovereign autonomy. 
Although Schmitt refrains from suggesting the nineteenth-century form of imperialism be 
considered ideal, he praises its “advantage of openness and visibility” because it allowed 
maintenance of what he understands as the condicio sine qua non of “the political”; namely, the 
older imperialist power annexed the conquered people, and thus took over, rather than divided or 
abrogated, “political responsibility and representation.”1058  The current imperialism is thus 
inherently anarchical, or destabilizing, as it denies the subjected nation benefit from any actual (that 
is, responsible and representative) Sovereign power, even if only foreign; there is no State to create 
and maintain social order.  Since the western powers’ interventions into the Rhineland followed 
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the contemporary means,
1059
 the unintended consequence of making the Rhineland into an “object 
of international politics” could be the complete destruction of the German State, social revolution, 
and anarchy.
1060
 
Rhenish Catholics were certainly capable of being appealed to in secular terms on 
conservative, nationalist, and regionalist grounds as Schmitt does in this speech.
1061
  However, given 
its context and audience it is remarkably lacking in appeal on intellectually or politically Catholic 
grounds.  The speech contains only three elements that can be proposed as possibly Catholic, 
however, they are all stalking horses for his particular brand of political Hobbesianism. 
The first such element is Schmitt’s appeal to, what he believes, is the now defunct 
distinction between Christian and non-Christian peoples in European political thought. 
[T]he old traditional idea that, more than you know, has dominated nineteenth-century international practice, 
namely the division of humanity into Christian and non-Christian peoples, of equality between Christianity 
and civilization, and thus the basis of respect for the Nations of Europe, all this is omitted.
1062
 
 
The implication of this change being that Germany is now being treated in a manner previously 
reserved for uncivilized and infidel peoples.  It is not clear whether Schmitt actually believed in 
such a division of humanity and nations, but what is clear is his use of the distinction as an 
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argument for Germany’s right to national self-determination.  The second stalking horse, and most 
prominent pseudo-Catholic element in the speech, is Schmitt’s multiple references to what he calls 
“the Christian concept of authority.”1063  He contends contemporary debased political rhetoric 
obfuscates the new methods of foreign domination.   The result is the most serious of “moral 
dangers” since “no human coexistence is possible without an open and clear authority.”1064  In fact, 
Schmitt informs his audience a basic Christian duty becomes impossible: 
Christian theologians require, as a truly moral duty, that we must respect authority both externally (reverentia 
externa) and inwardly (reverentia interna).  Being subject to the authorities is a general Christian duty because 
‘all authority is from God’ (1 Romans, 13).  There is thus the great moral danger that in this modern 
development the Christian concept of authority is eliminated.
1065
 
 
Schmitt, here, presents the “Christian concept of authority” only as an obligation to obey on the 
part of the individual.  That is, he is actually not describing, let alone defining, what “authority” 
consists in beyond that it should be “open and clear.”1066  Just what he has in mind by authority only 
becomes plain in his treatment of tyranny. 
Schmitt believes that contemporary liberal political theory is ignorant of “the numerous 
theological and legal discussions of the Middle Age and the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,” 
hence: 
They talk about the limits of obedience, which is owed to the authorities, of the abuse of official violence, of 
the right to resist authority.  . . . They speak of ‘tyrants.’  The tyrant abuses his power, but he exposes himself 
also as an at-large political factor; a risk of the political.  He requires obedience and loyalty, right or wrong, 
but at least in full openness.  He claimed sovereignty and represented it.  The public, which is located in this 
representation, is assumed as a matter of course.  It really belongs to the concept of authority.  Modern 
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methods only go to conceal the real Power and make the public representation of the State an empty façade.  
. . . The key feature of today is that the real rulers remain hidden . . .
1067
 
 
As the added emphasis shows, Schmitt is not rejecting modern political theory in favor of Catholic 
traditionalism; rather, he is promoting a particular strand of early modern absolutist thought which 
he absorbed most clearly from Hobbes.  At the dawn of political modernity Hobbes asserted that 
“the name of Tyranny, signifieth nothing more, nor lesse, than the name of Sovereignty”1068 and the 
representation of sovereignty, the State, is simply to be obeyed since political authority itself calls 
into existence—or as Schmitt writes here “locates”—the public; the State constitutes the citizen.  
Therefore, there is no tyranny, there either is a sovereign representative of the people or there is 
no State at all. 
Amazingly, Schmitt does make mention of the common good in this speech, and his 
reference to the fundamental concept of Catholic social thought, which he routinely rejected, is the 
final stalking horse.  Shortly after appealing to Woodrow Wilson’s belief, that making a people 
subject to competing foreign states is “particularly immoral,” as proof against rule of Germany by 
international commission, Schmitt concludes: 
What belongs to a real state authority, and what is possible even with a single tyrant, namely that the purpose 
of his reign is to determine the overall welfare of the people, the bonum commune, becomes impossible as 
the result of such an intergovernmental entity.
1069
 
 
The fact that Schmitt believes the political determination of the common good is possible under 
tyranny is testimonial to his rejection of classical and scholastic, hence traditionally Catholic 
political principles.  Tyranny has been understood from Augustine to Aquinas, from Bellarmine to 
Pope Leo XIII as the exact opposite of political rule for the common good.  Rather, tyranny is rule 
for the personal good of the tyrant(s) (regime).  For example, in Rerum Novarum Leo XII claims: 
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The State as rightly apprehended [is] . . . any government conformable in its institutions to right reason and 
natural law, and to those dictates of the divine wisdom which we have expounded in the encyclical On the 
Christian Constitution of the State. 
 
Only if we accede to the dictates of Humpty Dumpty, for whom a word “means just what [he] 
choose[s] it to mean,”1070 can we accept that Schmitt’s understanding of tyranny equates to 
government conforming to Leo’s “right reason,” “natural law,” and principles derived from “divine 
wisdom.”  Of course, Schmitt ignores this properly Catholic understanding of political rule.  The 
only issue he acknowledges as pertinent is whether sovereignty, as he understands it, exists; for his 
sovereign is beyond ethical appraisal—beyond good or evil.  The only exception Schmitt 
acknowledges, by which a sovereign can possibly be judged by the people, is in terms of the 
Hobbesian principle protego ergo obligo (“protection, therefore obedience”).  If the state fails to 
keep the people secure then, at least theoretically, a sovereign has ceased to exist. 
Catholic political theorists, such as Aquinas, have often suggested patient suffering or 
prudential obedience to tyranny
1071
 as opposed to the risks—known and unknown—of rebellion.  
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Schmitt distorts this common teaching into a straitened rendition of the Christian idea of authority.  
It is thus worth recalling that the Christian cult of martyrs proves there always exists absolute limits 
to obedience given to tyranny.  Possibly even more revealing than his twisted presentation of the 
most fundamental Catholic political principle is his indictment of the traditional German form of 
subsidiary and localized political authority, namely, federalism.  For, Schmitt adds to rule by 
foreign domination other systems of governance such as federalism and “mixed commissions” as 
likewise destructive of civic obedience and political authority.
1072
  Behind his speech lies Schmitt’s 
political modernism.  He refrains from defining the political regime by its proper natural end, and 
any conceivable means by which political rule might be decentralized or depersonalized is 
anathema.  To Schmitt, the supreme danger of the contemporary methods of foreign domination, 
which has made the Rhineland into an object of international interest, is that they obfuscate State 
power and when there is no clear identification of the State then civil obedience, and hence, civil 
society is jeopardized. 
 
Schmitt in Bonn, 1925-26: Catholic Intensification and Excommunication 
In his postwar diaries, Schmitt adapted a line from a poem of Konrad Weiß to claim: “This 
is the secret keyword to my entire mental and authorial life: the struggle for an authentically 
Catholic intensification.”1073  Indeed, to openly attack federalism to an audience full of Catholics of 
regionalist and even separatist sensibilities, such as would attend this Rhenish Center Party 
function, fits an agenda of “intensification,” as do Schmitt’s editorials in the Kölnische 
Volkszeitung.  Mehring would seem to partially agree as he claims, “Schmitt commits himself in 
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Bonn to an engaged Catholicism.”1074  However, Schmitt’s postwar claim can only be used 
accurately if one understands this project as a desire to “authentically intensify” Catholic politics, 
rather than a claim of his being “authentically Catholic” in thought as the standard narrative would 
have one believe.  As Peter Hohendahl notices, this “Catholic intensification” is certainly “a 
decisive step beyond traditional Catholicism.”1075  I claim it is actually a leap beyond Catholicism, 
Christianity—or even just religion—of any stripe.  Schmitt was an Erastian—not in theology where he 
was Gnostic at best—but in his belief in the subservience of the Church to the State.1076  As will be 
made quite clear in the next chapter, Schmitt’s presence and involvement in the Catholic 
intellectual life of Weimar was always far more circumspect, half-hearted, or motivated by strictly 
mundane motives than one would come to believe based on the standard narrative.  He was not a 
sincere believing Catholic nor did he attempt to develop his reputation as a Catholic intellectual, or 
seek to profit from the happenstance esteem that Political Form had bought for him in that milieu, 
in a whole-hearted or robust manner.  In fact, the behind the scenes story of Schmitt’s relationship 
to Political Form’s publisher and its eventual reissue, by the German Episcopate’s publishing arm, 
provide evidence for my claim regarding his lack of bona fides as a Catholic intellectual. 
Jakob Hegner founded Hellerau Printing in 1912 and then the Hellerauer Verlag Jakob 
Hegner in 1918, both of which eventually failed in 1930.  He has been described as more of a 
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“lover of beautiful books” than skilled in the book trade,1077 yet, he became the most significant 
name in Catholic publishing in Germany’s interwar years.1078  Hegner introduced to a German 
audience France’s interwar “Catholic Renewal” (Renouveau Catholique) in religious-themed 
literature.   He did so by distributing the works of novelist Georges Bernanos (1888-1948), poet 
and dramatist Paul Claudel (1868-1955)—whom he translated himself—as well as the earlier 
philosopher and essayist Ernest Hello (1828-85).  Hegner was also the primary publisher of several 
of Weimar’s most important German Catholic theologians, such as Guardini and Przywara.  In the 
Thirties, after his own firm went bankrupt, he joined the large Leipzig publishing house of Oscar 
Brandstetter Verlag and continued his efforts by establishing as house writers the young Catholic 
philosopher Josef Pieper,
1079
 as well as Theodor Haecker. 
Franz Blei introduced Schmitt to the publisher and, as the young legal scholar impressed 
Hegner, he reprinted Schmitt’s habilitation thesis, The Value of the State, in 1917.  Also, three of 
the jurist’s essays appeared in the journal Blei edited for Hegner, Summa, in 1917-18.1080  Despite 
this early show of support, Hegner would only have the opportunity to publish one of Schmitt’s 
Weimar texts.  Political Form was slated to be published by a recently begun academic (and 
secular) yearbook of intellectual history, Die Dioskuren, to which Schmitt had first submitted it, 
when Hegner apparently requested a chance to publish it.  Schmitt pulled it from the yearbook 
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and sent it to Hegner in November of 1922.
1081
  From reception of the essay, Hegner clearly 
believed that there existed a gentleman’s agreement between himself and Schmitt that Political 
Form was the first of a series of treatises, which the jurist would pen, and he would publish.  
Thenceforward, Hegner’s letters to Schmitt document an increasing frustration that he had not 
shown any inclination to meet this expectation.
1082
  The publisher even suggested projects that 
Schmitt could have easily handled if he desired to produce the expected tracts.  These ideas 
included revisiting the subject of romanticism in politics,
1083
 as well as expanding upon the 1917 
essay “Visibility” by addressing the “Invisibility of the Church.”1084  Provocatively, Schmitt did in fact 
soon write an essay fitting the bill of the first suggestion; however, not for Hegner, but rather, as an 
article published in Hochland.
1085
 
Political Form generated enough interest to allow Duncker & Humblot to issue a second 
edition of Political Romanticism in 1925.  In anticipation of the event, Schmitt consented to have 
the preface for the new edition printed in Hochland, the leading German culturally Catholic 
magazine, in November of 1924.  “Romantik” appeared after Schmitt had rebuffed earlier requests 
for submissions on the part of Hochland’s editor, Karl Muth, and was clearly motivated by a desire 
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to promote the new edition.  This essay makes clear how Schmitt was able to gain a reputation at 
this time as a preeminent classicist defender of the Church against the charge of romanticism.
1086
 
For example, Schmitt looks at several defective approaches to defining romanticism; one of which 
runs through a series of antinomies, such as, “romanticism or classicism, romanticism or 
rationalism.”1087  This antinomy produces grievous errors: 
The Catholic Church is not rationalism either, and especially not the rationalism of the eighteenth century.  
And so it happens that this miraculous structure of Christian order and discipline, dogmatic clarity, and 
rigorous morality is also declared to be romantic, and the image of Catholicism is also installed in the 
romantic pantheon along with every conceivable genius, sect, and movement.
1088
 
 
Another example of his appeal to the Catholic mind is found after he explains his definition of 
romanticism as “subjectified occasionalism,”1089 where the entire world becomes but an occasion for 
the activity and productivity of the romantic: 
It is only in an individualistically disintegrated society that the aesthetically productive subject could shift the 
intellectual center into itself, only in a bourgeois world that isolates the individual in the domain of the 
intellectual, makes the individual its own point of reference, and imposes upon it the entire burden that 
otherwise was hierarchically distributed among different functions in a social order.  In this society, it is left to 
the private individual to be his own priest.  But not only that.  Because of the central significance and 
consistency of the religious, it is also left to him to be his own poet, his own philosopher, his own king, and 
his own master builder in the cathedral of his personality.  The ultimate roots of romanticism and the 
romantic phenomenon lie in the private priesthood.
1090
 
 
Schmitt acknowledges the traditional Catholic view that romanticism results from the closely linked 
earlier errors of “reformation, [and] revolution . . .”.1091  However, “Romantik” is not the work of a 
Catholic thinker at all for Schmitt’s clear interests lie in a very different and secular political 
direction from that of an apologist for the Church. 
Schmitt concerns himself with the manner in which romanticism manifests itself in modern 
political theory.  He identifies the politics of “subjective occasionalism,” romanticism, with the 
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modern liberal bourgeoisie.
1092
  His criticisms of romanticism develop his political views as found in 
Political Theology, Political Form, and Parliamentarism; for, the romantics have “not brought forth 
a grand style,” and the bourgeois era is “no longer capable of representation.”1093  This defect results 
from the individualizing, or subjectivizing, of the metaphysical occasionalism which grounds 
romantic thought.  The original occasionalists, such as Malebranche, treat God as the “final, 
absolute authority, and the entire world and everything in it are nothing more than an occasion for 
his sole agency.”1094  With the romantics, this structure is maintained, but something else replaces 
God at the center and as the sole agency; be it “the state, perhaps, or the people, or even the 
individual subject.”1095  Schmitt is being descriptive and he explains that this process of replacing the 
occasionalist God with some other singular form of total authority is exactly what he means by 
“secularization.”1096  Given that this is the political situation in which contemporary bourgeois 
liberalism finds itself, Schmitt, ever the political realist, looks for a revival of political “form” or 
“representation” within the context of secularized modernity.  The original occasionalist thinkers, 
“recovered law and order in God, the objective absolute,” and even now “in the same way, a 
certain objectivity and cohesion always remain possible whenever another objective authority, like 
the state, takes the place of God in such an occasionalist attitude.”1097  A recovery of the early 
modern absolute state as the sole political agent in its role of replacement for the occasionalist (not 
Catholic) conception of divine authority (as politically modern secularization) is the primary 
objective of Schmitt’s Weimar writings. 
Returning to Hegner, the publisher intended to cultivate Schmitt as a Catholic author and 
hoped he would take on the role of an apologist for the Church, given his recently cemented 
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reputation for defending it against the charge of romanticism.  Schmitt could have become a house 
writer for Hegner’s press in the manner that Pieper and Haecker so successfully became in the 
Thirties; for it was widely recognized that “whatever [Hegner] published was not something to be 
ignored,” but rather commanded the immediate attention of Germany’s Catholic intellectuals.1098  
Instead, Schmitt continually rebuffed the interest Hegner took in him and the publisher’s 
entreaties went unrewarded.  Worst of all, while Hegner was repeatedly writing to Schmitt to honor 
their agreement and send him more works the jurist was preparing to have Political Form reissued 
by another publisher. 
Although Schmitt claimed dissatisfaction with sales of Political Form as cause to withdraw 
the essay from Hegner and have it reissued in Theatiner-Verlag’s Catholic Thought series,1099 
Mehring astutely speculates that Schmitt may have had a more personal motive.  It is possible he 
hoped the book’s publication in a series that included numerous prominent Catholic theologians, 
and brought with it the imprimatur of the German Catholic Bishop’s Conference, would positively 
influence the outcome of his ongoing annulment proceedings.
1100
  On Easter, April 12, 1925—two 
days before he delivered his Rhineland speech—Schmitt became engaged to Todorović.  He was 
still awaiting a reply from the Cologne Archbishop’s office about his request for a decree of 
annulment when he received a letter of May 23, 1925, from the publisher of the Catholic Thought 
series, Fr. Franz Xaver Münch (1883-1940), notifying him that the book could go into production 
immediately if he so wished.  Schmitt quickly replied in the affirmative.
1101
  Münch also happened 
to be a founding member, and then Secretary, of the Association of Catholic Academics 
(Katholischen Akademikerverband) and in this same letter he invited the jurist to deliver a lecture 
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at the Association’s meeting.1102  Schmitt agreed to honor the request and so travelled to Münster, 
in late September 1925, to deliver a lecture “on the Church as advocate of peace, probably also 
with regards to his [annulment] process.”1103 
Schmitt received the proofs for the reissue of Political Form in early July 1925 and 
Hegner’s last appeal was made a month later, in a letter of August 10, in which he now suggested 
that Schmitt could develop ideas contained in the excerpt from The Rhineland as Object of 
International Politics that had appeared in Die Schildgenossen.
1104
  After this final attempt, Hegner 
resigned himself to Schmitt’s disinterest and what Mehring describes as an “old friendship” came 
to an end.
1105
  Hegner was not alone in being rebuffed or ignored in overtures made to Schmitt 
inviting him to take a more prominent place in Catholic publishing and intellectual life. 
At the behest of the Catholic philosopher Alois Dempf (1891-1982),
1106
 the novelist, cultural 
philosopher and intellectual historian, Hermann Platz (1880-1945),
1107
 began the journal 
Abendland: Deutsche Monatshefte für europäische Kultur, Politik und Wirtschaft in 1925 to 
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promote a Catholic cultural orientation.  The title of the journal means “the West,” (or the more 
archaic “occident”), and intends to suggest the similitude and unity in the western countries of 
Europe over and against the alien and communist “East.”  The Abendland circle sought to 
overcome European political disunity arising from competition between secular nationalism and 
Communist internationalism by building a culturally unified (Christian) and democratic Europe.  
By 1925, Platz was already well-known as a cosmopolitan and a supporter of the Center and 
parliamentary government.  He had established an internationalist reputation as an active member 
of the Liturgical Movement as well as championing contemporary French Catholic thought, the 
“renouveau Catholique.”  In his academic work, he also “formulated a Catholic critique of 
nationalism in dealing with French nationalism.”1108  In the political arena, Platz underscored his 
commitment to the Weimar Republic by giving a speech, in the Reichstag, on the anniversary date 
of the Constitution in 1925.
1109
 
Both Dempf and Platz were colleagues of Schmitt at the University of Bonn, Platz having 
been there when Schmitt arrived in 1922 and Dempf from 1926.
1110
  Other prominent Catholic 
intellectuals from the Abendland circle acquainted with Schmitt include: Karl Anton Prinz Rohan 
(1898-1975),
1111
 theologian Karl Eschweiler,
1112
 and his students Werner Becker and Paul Adams.  
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Despite these connections, Schmitt neither shared their vision of politics nor sought to assist their 
efforts.
1113
  As Dahlheimer observes, the concept “western” does not really have any place in his 
ultimately nationalist thought.
1114
  Yet, the Abendland circle initially saw, in Schmitt, a fellow 
traveler, perhaps due to that final passage of Political Form,
1115
 and vainly appealed to him as the 
leading “Catholic” figure in constitutional law to get involved with their fledgling journal. 
In a letter to Rohan of July 8, 1925 Schmitt weakly opines that the era of the magazine is at 
an end and so it is useless for him to write for Abendland, although he thinks it is an excellent 
endeavor.
1116
  Schmitt is more expansive on his refusal to write for the journal in a letter to the 
editor of Hochland, Carl Muth, of November 7, 1927.  He confides in Muth that, although he 
does generally approve of the content, he believed that it was rather too romantic as well as liberal-
minded in regards a hope in the efficacy of civil society and public debate.  Given his “deep 
conviction of the uselessness of all discussing,” he will not write for the magazine.1117  Additionally, 
Koenen links Schmitt’s refusal to be a part of the Abendland circle with his severe disappointment 
that Political Form was heavily criticized by a number of Catholic intellectuals, as we shall see in 
more detail in the next chapter.
1118
 
                                                                                                                                                             
movement and that journals such as Der Ring and Europäische Revue worked to promote this ideology amongst 
Catholics (especially since the Lateran Treaty with the Italian Fascists).  These radical nationalist journals also 
displayed interest in political theology from a Protestant direction (ibid. 112-22). 
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Whether Schmitt sought to curry favor with the reissue of Political Form under the 
imprimatur of the German bishops, or not, he received a decision against his petition for 
annulment from the Cologne Archbishop’s office on June 18, 1925.  The committee found 
Schmitt had made the case for viewing Cari as an impostor so far as her identity and heritage were 
concerned.  However, he had not proven that her “aristocratic origins were a condicio sine qua 
non for marriage.”1119  He still had an appeals process available, first to the German Episcopal 
office in Münster, which is where the case now proceeded, and then to the Apostolic Tribunal of 
the Roman Rota, the highest or last court of appeal within the Church.  For the last option he had 
asked and received the assistance of his old benefactor, and now Prussian Minister of Justice in 
Berlin, Hugo am Zehnhoff.
1120
 
Having already become engaged to Todorović he begins to receive advice, much as from 
Zehnhoff before his first marriage, against making another precipitous decision and marrying 
outside the Church.  In late September, Schmitt is alone in Bonn, and his cousin Andre Steinlein 
(1891-1964) “strongly warns” him against committing bigamy.1121  His Bonn colleague, the priest 
and theologian Wilhelm Neuß, also tries to talk Schmitt out of the marriage.
1122
  By December 
1925, Schmitt sees the annulment process as “pretty hopeless”1123 and over the Christmas holidays 
his cousin Andre again “urges caution.”1124  Then, in his diary entry for January 1, 1926, almost as if 
making a resolution, Schmitt records “I’m quite done with Christianity.”1125  This same month, he 
requests marriage documents at the registry office, and then informs his parents of the upcoming 
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wedding on February 3, only five days beforehand.  Three days later Schmitt receives a final 
warning against making a “break with the Church” from a local parish vicar, John Hinsenkamp 
(1870-1949) and records in his diary as a response: “It is a mercy, that I [am getting] away from 
priests.”1126 
The civil marriage took place perfunctorily on February 8, 1926, with only Schmitt’s 
younger sister Anna Margarethe (Annchen) attending—as she was living in Bonn at the time—along 
with Erik Peterson and a Bonn University botanist named Karl Heinrich Vormfelde (1881-1944) 
as groomsmen.  The group breakfasted afterward and then went their separate ways, as there was 
no wedding celebration.  The same afternoon, Schmitt works on a lecture on demilitarization he 
then gives that evening, at a Catholic student fraternity, in Cologne.
1127
  Schmitt describes the day 
simply as a “strange” one.1128  He does, however, buy the collected works of Machiavelli as an 
appropriate wedding gift to himself. 
It is unclear what really motivated Schmitt to marry Todorović or, simply, to remarry at all.  
Three days after the wedding on February 11, Schmitt has a “vile dream” in which Duška 
“suddenly, like Cari, wants ‘to learn dance and go on stage.’”1129  He records his reaction as “fear of 
their Serbian faces, in front of their Slavic cunning.”1130  It is also worth noting, in these first few 
months of his second marriage, Schmitt is still recording suicidal thoughts, such as, he is “pleased 
that he has a gun so he ‘can commit suicide one day.’”1131  The day after the wedding Duška is again 
coughing up blood and so soon returns to a sanatorium in Croatia where they learn on March 11 
that she “has a severe pulmonary hemorrhage.”1132  She returns to Bonn in the summer, but 
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remains hospitalized.  During his daily visits to his wife he meets a Magda Lizzi (dates unavailable) 
on August 10, 1926, and on September 1, he “begins a fiery affair”1133 with her that lasts until he 
leaves Bonn in the Spring of 1928, after accepting the Hugo Preuss Chair of Law at the Berlin 
School of Business Administration.  They meet daily and Schmitt minutely records his 
“‘ejaculations’ in semi-public places” such as “railway cars or [outside] in the open air” and 
wonders at his “‘perverted sexuality.’”1134  This behavior, plus frequenting prostitutes, is a constant 
throughout the remainder of Schmitt’s marriage to Todorović (she died in 1950) and beyond.  
When Duška returns home from the hospital in November and they have sex he records: 
“Ejaculation but there was no deliverance.  No deliverance without conquest.”1135  Schmitt quickly 
renews his affair with Magda. 
On July 10, 1926, Schmitt receives the second negative response to his annulment 
proceedings.  The Münster tribunal confirms the archdiocesan conclusion “Schmitt had not 
proven that he had only wanted to marry nobility.  An ‘implicit’ condition is not enough.”1136  It 
turns out that “A statement from cousin André is Schmitt’s undoing” as he “confirmed that 
Schmitt had never declared he would only marry a noblewoman.”1137  Of course, this tribunal’s 
findings were actually irrelevant and they were made in ignorance of the fact that Schmitt had 
already short-circuited the process by means of a non-canonical second marriage, an act that 
incurred automatic excommunication.  Needless to say Zehnhoff dropped his work on an appeal 
to the Roman Rota. 
                                                 
1133
 Ibid., 197. 
1134
 Ibid.  Mehring informs us that Erik Peterson told Schmitt stories of Karl Barth’s private life and Schmitt 
hypocritically thinks he is “disgusting” (ibid., 195).  Presumably Peterson told Schmitt how the famous Protestant 
theologian carried around a picture of his first love his whole life despite being married to another woman as arranged 
by his mother.  Barth also began an affair at 39 with a 25 year old Charlotte von Kirschbaum (1899-1975) in February 
1926 that lasted the rest of his life, and she even moved in as part of his family. 
1135
 Ibid., 197. 
1136
 Ibid., 196. 
1137
 Ibid. 
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The standard narrative’s dating of Schmitt’s alienation from Catholicism to his second 
marriage appears arbitrary when one has a fuller sense of his personal beliefs and behaviors 
throughout the Wilhelmine and Weimar eras.  Schmitt had lost his faith long before his 
nonchalant act of bigamy to incur excommunication.  The very pedestrian manner in which he 
remarried combined with the lack of sexual or marital interest he displayed for Todorović likewise 
suggests a deep-seated indifference towards religious form or of any interest in fitting in with 
Germany’s Catholic intellectual milieu, rather than a sudden change.  Another indication 
remarriage was not seen, by Schmitt, as quite the significant event one would expect is that he did 
not even notify his good friend Franz Blei of the nuptials.  Instead, Blei would learn of the 
marriage in late December 1926, through, amusingly, a dancer and mutual friend named Else 
Margerete Luize von Carlberg (1883-1970).
1138
 
Schmitt had sporadically received invitations from Catholic organizations to give addresses.  
The latest had been from a D. Stahl (full name and dates unavailable) from the Cologne Catholic 
Academics Association (Kölner Katholische Akademikervereinigung) for a meeting on January 13, 
1926, which Schmitt would cancel on short notice.
1139
  And, although he had rejected the Center’s 
earlier invitation to stand for office, he did agree to produce a constitutional law opinion for the 
Center Party on “an election dispute in Saarlouis” in the summer of 1925.1140  However, the scandal 
of his non-canonical second marriage soon became well-known.  The remarriage could not be 
overlooked and it “‘severely impaired’ Schmitt’s credibility as a Catholic constitutional lawyer,” his 
excommunication made him “infamous” amongst Catholic circles.1141  A Center Party attorney in 
Bonn, John Henry (1876-1958) discussed his utility for the party in a letter of May 21, 1927, to the 
                                                 
1138
 See Blei’s letter to Schmitt of January 1, 1927 in: Blei, Briefe an Carl Schmitt 1917-1933, 72. 
1139
 Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt, 38n82.  Koenen believes that the handful of invitations to speak to Catholic groups 
proves Schmitt’s bona fides; however, the jurist consistently displays a lack of personal effort to be involved in such 
groups, to seek out chances to talk at such events and, as in this case, even cancelled scheduled lectures. 
1140
 Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, 194. 
1141
 Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt, 87. 
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Party Chairman in the Prussian Landtag, Dr. Joseph Hess (dates unavailable).  Henry writes that 
an obstacle to asking opinions of Schmitt is his “professorial clumsiness” in connection with the 
“Dorotić scandal.”1142  Furthermore, since his “teaching license is for the entirety of public law, 
including [being] extended to Church law” his “stupidity” was problematic for him even at a 
Protestant dominated state school like the University of Bonn.
1143
  As a result, invitations and 
opportunities to partake in Center politics or speak to Catholic organizations became even less 
frequent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1142
 Ibid., 39n88. 
1143
 See: Ibid., 87.  Koenen also references a colleague of Schmitt’s Godehard Josef Ebers as indicating that for this 
reason Schmitt was quite ready to leave Bonn and relieved to move to Berlin in 1928 (ibid., 87n14). 
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Chapter 7. 
Schmitt in Weimar’s Catholic Press Prior to Excommunication 
“‘Sovereign is he who gives judgment in the exceptional case’—phrases such as that were not easily forgotten.  . . . I 
immediately understood the fascination, for good and evil, that must have radiated from this academic teacher.  But to 
attack his polished theses one needed considerable courage in facing banality.”1144 
—Josef Pieper, upon first meeting Schmitt (1943). 
 
General Review of the Bibliographic Evidence for the Standard Narrative 
One of the evidentiary pillars of the standard narrative is bibliographical and consists in 
both the extent to which Schmitt is perceived to have published within the Weimar Catholic press 
and the manner in which he was received, admired, and proven influential within the general 
Catholic intellectual milieu.  After all, if Lönne is correct to claim that Schmitt’s musings on 
contemporary times “possessed for Catholics a seductive fascination,”1145 then it should be 
evidenced in his contemporary bibliography.  For example, Bendersky’s Theorist for the Reich 
claimed: 
Almost half the articles Schmitt wrote in the 1920’s were published by the Catholic press, mostly by 
Hochland and the Kölnische Volkszeitung.  The staff at Germania, the major organ of the Center, also took 
note of the writings of this prominent exponent of political Catholicism.  Paul Adams, a Berlin editor for the 
paper, followed Schmitt’s publications with the utmost interest well into 1932.1146 
 
Similarly, Andreas Koenen’s biography of Schmitt claims that Political Theology and Political 
Form were both received by Catholics with “enthusiastic praise,”1147 this despite the former text 
receiving no reviews by the Catholic press.  Beyond positive reviews, Koenen moves further afield 
and cites Przywara, from 1933, as claiming that Political Form had made Schmitt known “as a 
                                                 
1144
 Pieper, No One Could Have Known, 175. 
1145
 Lönne, “Carl Schmitt und der Katholizismus,” 25.  Lönne’s essay represents well the oddity of the standard 
narrative’s longevity.  He insists on Schmitt’s Catholicity and his influence within the intellectual milieu and yet in his 
entire essay he only reviews two contemporary articles on Schmitt by Catholics that treat him favorably. 
1146
 Bendersky, Theorist for the Reich, 52.  Guy Oakes makes similar evidentiary mistakes in promoting the standard 
narrative when he claims: “As a professor at Bonn (1922-1928), Schmitt was an active supporter of political 
Catholicism and the policies of Heinrich Brüning, the leader of the Catholic Center Party” (Oakes, “Translator’s 
Introduction,” in Schmitt, Political Romanticism, xxiii).  Oakes evidence is simply that Schmitt published a number of 
items in the leading Catholic journal Hochland and the Kölnische Volkszeitung. 
1147
 Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt, 36-37. 
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‘Catholic thinker’ of the first rank.”  He also noticed that Schmitt’s colleague on the law faculty at 
Bonn, Godehard Josef Ebers (1880-1958), called him “the Catholic jurist and legal scholar” bar 
none.
1148
  Both Przywara and Ebers carry the moral authority of having been authentic supporters 
of political Catholicism, the Center, and opponents of Nazism, and so they do make good 
witnesses for the standard narrative.  However, if left as is, these statements prove misleading. 
First of all, Schmitt’s presence in Weimar’s Catholic press had more to do with the 
publicist efforts of a select few admiring students than his own attempt or intentions to be a 
Catholic public intellectual.  For example, as noted above at Chapter Four, Schmitt’s presence in 
the Kölnische Volkszeitung was primarily facilitated by two of his students, Becker and Gurian, 
who worked for the daily.  The same goes for Germania as one of its editors, Paul Adams, was 
another Schmitt student, friend, and confidant.  As we shall see below, the standard narrative is on 
firmer ground with Hochland; as Germany’s controversial but leading monthly Catholic 
magazine—with a circulation over ten thousand—actually did publish a significant number of articles 
by or on Schmitt.  However, the jurist had a personal connection to this magazine as well given his 
friendship with the magazine’s founder and editor, Karl Muth.  They had become acquainted in 
1917 when Schmitt was tasked with monitoring the activities of pacifist groups, while assigned to 
the general staff in Munich.
1149
 
Furthermore, Muth, made a point of allowing for a very ecumenical range of views and, 
especially in its’ early years, Hochland showed a particular tendency towards modernism.  This 
                                                 
1148
 Ibid.  Ebers was active with the Center, established a branch of the Görres Society in Cologne, and was Rector in 
1932-33 until his Nazi opposition caused him to be removed from office as part of the Gleichschaltung.  For more on 
Ebers, see: Alexander Hollerbach, “Über Godehard Josef Ebers (1880-1958): Zur Rolle katholischer Gelehrter in der 
neuren publizistischen Wissenschaftsgeschichte,” in Festschrift für Ulrich Scheuner zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Horst 
Ehmke (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1973), 143-62. 
1149
 Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, 173. 
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penchant led to the magazine being placed on the Church’s Index of Prohibited Books in 1911.1150  
The diversity of contributors included: existentialist philosophers (the journal was at the epicenter 
of Germany’s reception of Kierkegaard1151); modernist novelists; political theorists of right or left; 
heterodox liberal theologians like Joseph Wittig (1879-1949), excommunicated in 1926 
(reconciled in 1946); but also orthodox ones such as Romano Guardini.  The magazine paid 
particular attention to aesthetic and literary topics and so is perhaps best described as a journal of 
cultural Catholicism.  While Hochland had the widest circulation of Weimar’s Catholic journals, 
the presence of Schmitt’s ideas in it is not a direct proof of his political Catholicism or general 
intellectual Catholicity. 
Secondly, Bendersky’s estimate of articles Schmitt published in the Catholic press is in 
great need of revision.  The biographer’s estimate was based on Schmitt’s postwar recollections of 
his career as well as research in the 1950s and 60s by the jurist’s protégé, bibliographer, and later 
literary executor, Piet Tommissen (1925-2011).
1152
  The first major work that realized the error of 
                                                 
1150
 The term “modernism” here refers to the somewhat enigmatic or diffuse heresy described and condemned by Pope 
St. Pius X in his encyclical of September 8, 1907, Pascendi Dominici Gregis.  Pius issued Pascendi as a commentary 
on the list of condemned modernist ideas, Lamentabili Sane (Truly Lamentable), issued by the Roman Inquisition two 
months earlier.  The heresy’s enigmatic aspect led Pius to define it as “the synthesis of all heresies” (§39) but can most 
specifically be tied to the trends in liberal theology of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, such as from the well-
known “Tübingen School,” which tended towards denying that religion deals with “truth” and rather claims such is the 
provenance of modern sciences alone.  The obvious result of this line of thought is the privatizing and subjectivizing of 
religion to a matter of mere personal belief and the sundering of reason and faith, truth and meaning (value).  
Modernism was less a reasoned and developed theological approach or body of doctrine than it was a certain 
progressive style or attitude which wanted to “adapt” doctrine to the “faith and to him who believes” (§12-13), that is, 
to the subjective “religious sense” (ibid.) of the individual in his specific temporal context of modern life.  One 
unfortunate result of the heresy’s diffusiveness was that the fight against it in Catholic seminaries and theological 
faculties led to cases of overzealousness.  Such cases of overreach temporarily cast suspicion on many Catholic 
thinkers engaged in studying modernity who would later be vindicated as orthodox, most notably the Jesuit Henri de 
Lubac (1896-1991) and a young Joseph Ratzinger who would later become Pope Benedict XVI. 
1151
 Peter Šajda, “Romano Guardini: Between Actualistic Personalism, Qualitative Dialectic and Kinetic Logic,” in 
Kierkegaard’s Influence on Theology, ed. Jon Stewart (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), 48-51.  
1152
 Piet Tommissen, Versuch einer Carl-Schmitt-Bibliographie (Düsseldorf: Academia Moralis, 1953); “Carl-Schmitt-
Bibliographie,” in Festschrift für Carl Schmitt zum 70. Geburtstag: dargebracht von Freunden und Schülern, ed. Hans 
Barion et. al. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1959), 273-330; and “Erganzungsliste zur Carl-Schmitt-Bibliographie vom 
Jahre 1959,” in Epirrhosis: Festgabe für Carl Schmitt, volume two, ed. Hans von Barion (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
1968), 739-78.  Tommissen was first introduced to Schmitt by means of another postwar protégé, Armin Mohler in 
1950, and quickly established himself as a student and bibliographer of the ex-professor who had been forcibly retired 
to Plettenberg.  Tommissen’s work in compiling and publishing various pieces and letters from Schmitt’s literary 
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this initial estimate is Koenen’s 1995 biography, Der Fall Carl Schmitt.  In a note he acknowledges 
that Bendersky’s estimate “must be corrected”1153 based on his access to an unpublished study of 
the Tommissen bibliographical works by historian and theologian Anthony Liedhegener.  This 
study pushed the percentage of Schmitt articles published in Catholic venues down to thirty 
percent, or one-third.  Unfortunately, this estimate is also incorrect. 
The Catholic Academy of Rabanus Maurus held a groundbreaking conference, in May of 
1993, on the theme of “Catholicism, Theology and Church in the Work of Carl Schmitt.”  
Although Koenen was aware of the conference,
1154
 he apparently did not have access to the 1994 
publication of papers delivered.  For if he had, Koenen would have found within its pages an essay 
by historian Karl-Egon Lönne which further corrects Bendersky’s estimate, although, without 
stating a percentage.
1155
  In “Carl Schmitt und der Katholizismus der Weimarer Republik,” Lönne 
found that in both Schmitt’s longer pieces—published as monographs—or in his essays, articles, and 
shorter pieces—such as book reviews and editorials—the “vast majority appeared in legal, 
philosophical, and other technical journals.”1156  The summation provided by Lönne’s essay 
became influential in its turn
1157
 but still relied only on the Tommissen bibliographies then 
available.  It is only in the past decade that the extraordinary archival efforts of (yet) another 
postwar student of Schmitt’s, Alain de Benoist (born 1943)—French philosopher and founder of 
the “New Right” (Nouvelle Droite)—have allowed for more conclusive results.  Benoist’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
estate, in addition to gathering eclectic remembrances and other reflections by those who knew the jurist, in volumes 
titled Schmittiana, was a great contribution to Schmitt scholarship. 
1153
 Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt, 46n121. 
1154
 Ibid. 
1155
 Lönne, “Carl Schmitt und der Katholizismus,” 11-35. 
1156
 Ibid., 17.   
1157
 For example it has been relied on by Jürgen Manemann in Carl Schmitt und die Politische Theologie, 111-12.  And 
by Angela Reinthal in her notes to: Blei, Briefe an Carl Schmitt 1917-1933, 121. 
281 
 
bibliographies demonstrate the incompleteness of all prior claims regarding Schmitt’s published 
presence in the Weimar era Catholic press.
1158
 
If one follows the standard narrative’s assumption that at least until the latter half of 
Weimar Schmitt was a “Catholic intellectual,” and proponent of political Catholicism, then it 
stands to reason that he would have often written for Catholic venues.  Yet, the bibliographic 
evidence now suggests otherwise.  Thirteen of Schmitt’s fifteen Weimar-era books1159 were 
published by secular, legal, or academic publishing houses with only the remaining two issued by 
Catholic firms.
1160
  As with his books, the great bulk of Schmitt’s articles, reviews, and editorials 
appeared in secular newspapers or in academic, legal, or scientific journals and edited volumes.  
Such venues were home to a total of sixty-six Schmitt pieces
1161
 while only twenty-two appeared in 
Catholic publications.
1162
  Therefore, my review based on Benoist’s work shows rather than “almost 
                                                 
1158
 Benoist’s first foray was Carl Schmitt: Bibliographie seiner Schriften und Korrespondenzen (Berlin: Akademie 
Verlag, 2003), and then his majestic attempt at comprehensiveness is found in Carl Schmitt: internationale 
Bibliographie der Primär- und Sekundärliteratur (Graz: Ares, 2010). 
1159
 It should be noted that many of Schmitt’s “books” are only extended essays so the term here denotes texts of 
variable length that were stand-alone publications, monographs; hence, De Benoist groups them as “books and 
individual publications.” 
1160
 The two books are Political Form and the pamphlet issued by the Rhenish Center Party titled The Rhineland as 
Object of International Politics. 
1161
 This number consists of fifty articles and sixteen smaller pieces: book reviews; letters to editors; editorials; or 
remarks. 
1162
 Lönne tallies seventeen total Weimar pieces published by Schmitt in Catholic venues (Lönne, “Carl Schmitt und 
der Katholizismus,” 17) based on the Tommissen bibliographies, while I found twenty-two based on Benoist.  Lönne 
lists them as follows: seven in Hochland (including the Festschrift article); six in Kölnische Volkszeitung, the venerable 
Catholic daily which dated back to the 1860’s and rose to prominence during the Kulturkampf; two in Die 
Schildgenossen; and two in Abendland.  The discrepancy of five consists in Benoist listing one more piece as 
appearing in the Kölnische Volkszeitung, two entries in the Görres Society’s Staatslexikon, three articles in Germania—
the most important Berlin newspaper representing the Center Party and begun in 1871 to protest the Kulturkampf—
and one less article listed as in Abendland.  Since Lönne does not list all of the Kölnische Volkszeitung pieces by 
name and I do not have access to Tommissen’s bibliographies I cannot determine which one he missed.  The 
discrepancy in the number of articles appearing in Abendland is a result of Lönne arguably counting the same article 
twice.  Schmitt’s article “Der bürgerliche Rechtsstaat,” first appeared in Die Schildgenossen, volume VIII, number 2 
(March-April 1928), 127-33, and was then reprinted with only minor changes in Abendland; where Lönne counts the 
article in his totals for both journals Benoist treats them under one entry.  I follow Benoist in doing so not only 
because the changes were minor but because Schmitt also had this same article partially reprinted in Germania under 
the title “Über die Aufgaben der Demokratie,” and I likewise do not count that as one of the three appearing in the 
Berlin paper.  All three appearances of the article were within a short three month space of time from March to May, 
1928.  Incidentally, Manemann follows Lönne’s total of articles except that he adds one of the entries from the 
Staatslexikon, bringing the total he recognized to eighteen (Manemann, Carl Schmitt und die Politische Theologie, 
111-12). 
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half” (as Bendersky suggested), or even about one-third (as Koenen suspected), of Schmitt’s works 
being published in the Catholic press, the truer ratio is less than one in four, precisely 23.3%.
1163
  
Schmitt’s favoring of legal and academic venues suggests his interest and ambition lay far more in 
the direction of professional advancement than participation and notoriety within the Catholic 
intellectual life of Weimar. 
The attention that Schmitt’s books and thought received from Weimar publishing venues 
was also overwhelmingly secular and academic in nature.  This is evidenced by the fact that of the 
one-hundred and seventy-three reviews of his books published, only twenty-seven appeared in 
Catholic venues; which works out as 15.6%.
1164
  Such a lopsided distribution of attention strengthens 
the claim that Schmitt should be primarily treated as a constitutional law professor and jurist as 
opposed to a “political theologian” or “Catholic intellectual.”  The distribution of the reviews in 
Catholic publications also suggests that the standard narrative overstates the attention paid to 
Schmitt.  For one thing, the two books Schmitt had published by Catholic outlets, Political Form 
and Rhineland account for 28% of the total reviews in the Weimar Catholic press.  If we add in 
those reviews for the second edition of Political Romanticism—which is second only to Political 
Form in contributing to Schmitt’s reputation amongst Catholics—then the share of the total reviews 
rises to 44% in just three texts.  Furthermore, only one of the reviews of Political Form or Political 
Romanticism date to the first editions; thus 40.7% of the reviews in Catholic venues are of books 
published in the single year of 1925.  Also, slightly less than half of these reviews appeared in print 
                                                 
1163
 Twenty-four Catholic-published pieces from a total of one-hundred and three Schmitt publications in Weimar 
calculates out to a percentage of 23.3.  The percentage falls to 22.3 if we do not include the authorized reprint of an 
excerpt from Rheinland, as that certainly could be considered duplication within the count. 
1164
 The reviews are distributed (secular to Catholic) as follows: Political Romanticism (1919/second edition 1925) 
seventeen to four (all Catholic reviews were of the second edition); On Dictatorship (1921/1928) twelve to one; 
Political Theology (1922) seven to zero; Political Form (1923/1925) five to six; Parliamentarism (1923/1926) ten to 
two; Rhineland (1925) one to two; The Key Question of the League of Nations (1926) five to four; Plebiscite and 
Referendum (1927) two to zero; Constitutional Theory (1928) twenty-three to three; Hugo Preuss (1930) six to zero; 
The League of Nations and the Political Problem of Peacekeeping (1930) three to zero; The Guardian of the 
Constitution (1931) thirteen to one; Liberties and Institutional Guarantees of the Constitution (1931) two to none; 
Concept of the Political (1927/1932/1933) thirty-two to four; and Legality and Legitimacy (1932) eight to zero. 
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in just a two year span of 1925-6.  These facts support the claim that Weimar Catholic interest in 
Schmitt was more focused, constrained, and even fleeting than the standard narrative would 
suggest. 
A further piece of intriguing counter-evidence to the standard narrative can be gleaned 
from reviewing the Schmitt bibliography.  Of the twenty-four Schmitt publications in Catholic 
venues, a majority were written and published after his non-canonical second marriage in February 
1926.
1165
  This fact undermines the use of his publishing in Catholic outlets as proof of his 
confessional bona fides given the concomitant claim that the jurist became alienated intellectually 
from the Church upon his excommunication.
1166
  This same bifurcation exists in works on Schmitt, 
both explicitly or as reflecting his influence, published in Weimar’s Catholic press.  The total of 
such works is fifty-four, consisting in fifty-one reviews or articles plus three books.
1167
  Of these only 
35% (nineteen of fifty-four) appear before February 1926.  Related to the fact most of the works, 
by or on Schmitt, date to after the standard narrative considers him a specifically “Catholic” or 
generally theological thinker, is that the content of Schmitt’s writings in Catholic outlets generally 
fits best under the afore-mentioned rubric of attempting to “intensify” or radicalize the political 
thinking of Catholics.  To take just one example here, Koenen treats Schmitt’s prompt submission 
of an editorial piece on the four-hundredth anniversary of Machiavelli’s death to the Catholic daily, 
Kölnische Volkszeitung in June 1927, as proof of his Catholicity rather than the exact opposite, 
which is more realistic.
1168
 
                                                 
1165
 Nine publications date to before February 1926, thirteen to after, and two date to 1926 but I can not determine the 
exact month they were published; however, even if they are added to the “before” tally the result is thirteen to eleven. 
1166
 Mehring, for example, points to Schmitt’s disaffection from the Church as a cause for his avoidance of the Catholic 
press demonstrating that he too does not recognize the odd fact that most of his articles in that press appeared after his 
second marriage.  See: Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, 268. 
1167
 This total is based on Benoist plus six articles that somehow failed to be accounted for by the Frenchman’s later 
work yet are described by either Lönne or Dahlheimer.  Therefore, we are left with an indication that work is still to 
be done in improving the bibliography of Schmitt’s secondary literature. 
1168
 Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt, 47n123.  The editorial is: Schmitt, Carl, “Macchiavelli.  Zum 22. Juni 1927,” 
Kölnische Volkszeitung, 68.448 (June 21, 1927).  It is made available in: Schmitt, Staat, Grossraum, Nomos, 102-7. 
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Finally, no Catholic publication did more to make Schmitt known to Weimar Catholics 
than Hochland.  From 1922 to 1933, the magazine would print twelve reviews or articles on 
Schmitt, or that reflected his deep influence; as well as—from 1924 to 1929—six articles plus an 
essay in a Festschrift in honor of Muth, all written by the jurist himself.  Of the articles on Schmitt 
published in Catholic venues 24% are found in Hochland.  Likewise, of the pieces written by 
Schmitt for Weimar’s Catholic outlets, 32% graced the pages of Muth’s monthly.1169  If we again 
filter the data based on the date of his excommunication, then we find that 37% (seven of nineteen) 
of those pieces on Schmitt, in Catholic venues before February of 1926, are found in Muth’s 
magazine.  Hochland had even run five pieces on Schmitt’s work before the jurist published a 
single substantial Weimar essay in a Catholic venue; which, incidentally, appeared in Hochland’s 
November 1924 issue.
1170
  It would seem that something must give way as the bibliographical 
evidence suggests Schmitt’s impact on Weimar Catholic intellectual life was far more narrowly 
focused in outlets as well as temporally contained than previously understood.  In the remainder of 
this chapter, we will take a closer look at Schmitt’s presence in Catholic publishing, and his 
treatment in the self-same before his latae sententia excommunication. 
 
Positive Reaction to Political Form and the Standard Narrative 
                                                 
1169
 This total is based on fourty-four such pieces listed in: Benoist, Carl Schmitt: internationale Bibliographie.  Plus 
seven pieces not listed by Benoist but described as fitting the bill in: Lönne, “Carl Schmitt und der Katholizismus,” 11-
36; as well as Dahlheimer, Schmitt und der deutsche Katholizismus, 96-7. 
1170
 Schmitt, “Romantik,” in Hochland, 22.1 (November 1924), 157-71.  In Weimar’s Catholic press prior to 
“Romantik,” Schmitt had only a book review and an editorial in the Kölnische Volkszeitung—a paper for which his 
students Becker and Gurian worked. The review is “Die Auseinandersetzung zwischen dem Hause Wittelsbach und 
dem Freistaat Bayern,” [The Dispute between the House of Wittelsbach and the Free State of Bavaria] in issue 436, 
June 6, 1922.  It was a review of Konrad Beyerle’s 1922 book Die Rechtsansprüche des Hauses Wittelsbach (The 
Legal Claims of the House of Wittelsbach) and while they are both unavailable to me, they presumably touch upon 
the ongoing negotiations over what form of compensation the Bavarian government owed to the Wittelsbach family for 
having confiscated all of the royal property after the state ceased to be a monarchy in 1918.  See: Mehring, Aufstieg 
und Fall, 150.  Schmitt’s editorial piece is “Nochmalige Reichstagsauflösung: Ein staatsrechtlicher Hinweis,” [Repeated 
Dissolutions of the Reichstag: a note on constitutional law] 836 (October 26, 1924).  This piece is discussed above at 
Chapter Six. 
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Let us begin with the first Weimar publication of Schmitt’s to be issued by a Catholic press, 
Political Form.  This book clearly deserves pride of place as evidence of Schmitt’s purported 
intellectual Catholicity for it was reviewed six times in the Catholic press, more than any of his 
other titles.
1171
  It was also a key component of a widely influential positive review essay on Schmitt’s 
thought by the founder of Dadaism, Hugo Ball (1886-1927), which appeared in Hochland in 1924.  
Schmitt himself promoted Political Form as proof of his Catholicity in a 1971 interview, by 
claiming the essay stood as: “still quite a testament to the unbroken Catholic impulse that I had 
been granted.”1172 
Political Form was published in what turned out to be a significant year for Catholic 
apologetics as it coincided with the Protestant theologian Friedrich Heiler’s Catholicism: Its Idea 
and Appearance (Der Katholizismus, seine Idee und seine Erscheinung).  This book collected and 
systematically developed Heiler’s attacks on the Catholic Church as he ecumenically expanded the 
nature of the authentic Christian Church to include even moral non-Christians.
1173
  Karl Adam 
(1876-1966), a University of Tübingen professor of dogmatic theology, wrote the most important 
Catholic rebuttal to Heiler entitled The Spirit of Catholicism (Wesen des Katholizismus), which 
appeared the following year (1924) and quickly became a classic of twentieth century German 
Catholic theology.
1174
  The book has been in continuous print ever since its original publication 
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 Ibid., 89.  Also see the obituary by Annemarie Schimmel, “Friedrich Heiler (1892-1967),” History of Religions, 7.3 
(February 1968), 269-72. 
1174
 Adam, unlike Schmitt, felt compelled to stand up to the Nazi regime.  At the age of fifty-eight, “in 1934 his integrity 
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aroused that he was forced to flee to the Bishop of Rottenburg for protection.”  Excerpted from the Foreword by Dom 
Justin McCann, O. S. B., to his translation of Adam’s The Spirit of Catholicism (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 
1954), v-vi. 
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(eleven editions by 1946) and has been extensively translated.
1175
  Adam’s classic is a work of 
systematic theology directed at a lay audience (Catholic and non-Catholic alike), and, as such, was a 
profoundly successful work of apologetic ecclesiology.  Spirit of Catholicism fit in perfectly with the 
teaching encyclicals of Pius XI who made ecclesiology a focus of interwar Catholic theology by 
stressing the Church’s nature as the Mystical Body of Christ, as well as the role of Christ as King.  
Therefore, the context in which Schmitt published his essay on the juristic structure of the Church 
was one in which many of his contemporaries were likely to read it as an exercise in Catholic 
apologetics.  It thus also comes as no surprise that the standard narrative latches on to the positive 
reactions to the book. 
For example, Bendersky claims: “The impact of this short book was widespread and 
impressive.  The famous canonist Hans Barion [1899-1973], then a young seminarian in Cologne, 
claimed that a single reading of this work changed his entire outlook and set the tone for much of 
his future scholarship.”1176  The biographer further believes that Political Form was “nothing less 
than a reaffirmation of [Schmitt’s] allegiance to the Church”1177; and with reference to the 1927 
review by the Catholic Romanist, Latin translator, and historian, Herman Hefele (1885-1936), 
Bendersky concludes that: “With a single work Schmitt had acquired a reputation as a Catholic 
publicist.”1178  Bendersky even cites a positive review by the non-Catholic Berlin political 
correspondent, Friedrich Sternthal (dates unavailable), of a “democratic journal which usually took 
a hostile attitude toward political Catholicism”1179 as proof that Schmitt’s renown as a Catholic 
thinker spread beyond Catholic circles; for Sternthal wrote: “[Political Form] contains so many 
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keen observations . . . [that] no one should say a word about the Roman Catholic Church who has 
not read this little book.”1180 
The argument against Bendersky’s evidence includes the fact that while Barion may have 
achieved fame for his work in canon law, he also achieved infamy in the Thirties as a Nazi 
ideologist and Party member “brown-priest” at Braunsberg’s State Academy—which will be further 
discussed below.  In a similar fashion, Hefele was widely recognized within German Catholicism as 
an admirer of Maurras,
1181
 like Schmitt, as well as for his work on aesthetics and romance 
(Romanistik) studies.  So Schmitt’s entire focus in Political Form on aspects within the structure 
and functioning of the Church that he believes are specifically “Roman” could certainly have 
appealed to Hefele on non-Catholic grounds.  But, as we will see below, Hefele actually does not 
seem to understand what Schmitt means by “form” in his review, or at least, is simply more 
interested in developing his own views than spreading Schmitt’s.  Finally, Gary Ulmen does a 
better job than Bendersky in using Sternthal’s review by treating it as evidence of Schmitt’s political 
independence, his distance from the Center, rather than as proof of the Catholicity of Political 
Form.  After all, since Der Neue Merkur was an enemy of the Center, a positive review of 
Schmitt’s book suggests far better that it did not accord with the Catholic Party’s political line.1182 
More recently, Michael Hollerich continues the standard narrative through relying on 
Koenen, but he is at least able to recognize one of its problems: 
[Political Theology and Political Form] appeared within a year of one another, and, despite the enthusiastic 
praise that greeted them, it became apparent that their arguments did not sit all that easily with one another.  
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This was but the first of several indications that Schmitt, whose gift for brilliant and arresting dicta had made 
him a hot commodity among Catholic intellectuals and publicists, would prove to be an ambiguous voice.
1183
 
 
On the contrary, we have seen how Political Theology and Political Form are complementary in 
their radical Hobbesian modern statism, yet, Hollerich does well in recognizing the early ambiguity 
and radicality of Schmitt vis-à-vis Catholic thought.  However, he does still stick to the standard 
narrative by treating Schmitt’s ambiguity as something that would only really come to the fore in 
the later Weimar years, as: 
Eventually some of his erstwhile protégés and friends would come to suspect him of malign intent and would 
turn against him, most famously and damagingly, the Russian Jewish convert to Catholicism, Waldemar 
Gurian, who became Schmitt’s tormentor-in-chief from his exile in Switzerland.1184 
 
Thus, so the story goes, Catholics were enthusiastically receptive to Schmitt in the early Weimar 
years and would only slowly turn against him in the late Twenties and early Thirties, when he 
began to exhibit an attraction to Italian Fascism and vociferously promoted presidential 
dictatorship as a necessary remedy to the weakening of the State.  On the contrary, the Catholic 
reception for Political Form was far from uniformly positive, even prior to Schmitt’s 
excommunication. 
 
Analysis of Political Form ’s Early Positive Reviews 
The early reviews of Schmitt’s purportedly most “Catholic” text are as follows: Konrad 
Beyerle in the Allgemeine Rundschau in May 1923 and reprinted in Hochland in October;
1185
 
Waldemar Gurian in the Kölnische Volkszeitung in January 1925;
1186
 Karl Neundörfer in Die 
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Schildgenossen, July 1925;
1187
 Hermann Port (dates unavailable) in Gelbe Hefte: Historische und 
politische Zeitschrift für das katholische Deutschland in 1925;
1188
 and Emil Gerber (dates 
unavailable) in the Ausburger Postzeitung in August 1925 (reprinted in the next issue as well).
1189
  
From this list, Gurian’s name jumps out as he was a student of Schmitt’s at the time that he 
anonymously wrote and published a positive review of Political Form in the Catholic newspaper 
for which he worked.  Secondly, Neundörfer’s review is extremely critical of Schmitt’s book.  The 
three remaining reviews can all be considered positive ones, although I do not have access to 
Gerber’s.1190  However, Beyerle and Port’s “positive” reviews are fascinating reading as they make 
use of Schmitt’s book as a jumping off point, or what the jurist would have called an occasio; that 
is, they go beyond the text to develop their own authentically Catholic social and political views and 
so treat Schmitt as a participant in a dialogue he had no interest in joining. 
Beyerle’s review has the virtue of being written by a very prominent figure in German 
political Catholicism.  He was an historian, jurist, and politician active in both the Center and BVP.  
Beyerly helped construct the Weimar Constitution as a member of the Weimar National 
Assembly in 1919-20, was a member of the Constitutional Court from 1920, and held a seat in the 
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Reichstag from 1920-24.  He also served as Vice-President of the Görres Society and sat on the 
Advisory Board of the Catholic Academics Association (Katholischen Akademikerverbands); in 
short, Beyerle was certainly a well-connected and demonstratively Catholic Weimar intellectual.  
However, he was also in part repaying a debt as Schmitt had authored a review of his 1922 book 
Die Rechtsansprüche des Hauses Wittelsbach (The Legal Claims of the House of Wittelsbach) for 
the Kölnische Volkszeitung.
1191
 
His review of Political Form begins in a straightforward and expository manner until he 
notes that the reason socialists and nationalists can support either democracy or dictatorship is 
their worldviews make them “religious in nature.”1192  At this point, he begins to veer from Schmitt’s 
point when he notes that the Church thus serves its ordained end of saving souls, and, in political 
terms, supports that which assists the end and opposes that which hurts it.
1193
  This is a simple, 
direct, and manifestly orthodox summation of Catholic political prudence, which one would look 
in vain to find a version of in Schmitt’s text.  In fact, based on this straightforward view, Beyerle 
incisively dismisses what Schmitt cagily seeks to find in Political Form; for he concludes it is a 
mistake to try and define once and for all the “political idea of Catholicism” since the faith does 
not work like a political ideology.  Any attempt will simply reduce it to the “idea” as seen in effect 
in a particular context of time and place.
1194
 
Beyerle returns to a straightforward recitation of the arguments in Political Form, noting 
that representation means “belief in an authority from above,” of something transcendent (though 
Schmitt has belief in the State as such), and agreeing with Schmitt’s point that the Church seeks 
partnership not domination.
1195
  He also insightfully recognizes that Schmitt’s book is addressed in 
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large measure to the Protestant canon lawyer, Rudolf Sohm, as he insists on the juridical and 
rational, structured and public/visible nature of the Church.
1196
  But then, his conclusions again 
diverge from the jurist’s.  First, he points out that at best this amorphous character described by 
Schmitt is what can be pointed to as the “political idea of Catholicism,” thus by implication, not 
Schmitt’s concepts of “representation” or “form.”  Beyerle then applies this to Center politics by 
noting that it means neither a federal approach to politics or a centralized one are definitive for 
political Catholicism; rather, it all depends on the particular circumstances.
1197
  However, it always 
remains true that: “Catholic social teaching is, of course, inseparable from the morality of a 
political act.”1198  Nowhere does Schmitt ever acknowledge such a basic proposition of Catholic 
practical philosophy.  Beyerle then ends his review by placing Schmitt’s book in dialogue with the 
work of Catholic socialist Ernst Michel (1889-1964), among others.  By so doing, he clearly moves 
beyond Schmitt and ignores him to formulate his own conclusions.  Specifically, Beyerle maintains 
that the work of the world the Church is engaged in is to maintain the sacred and religious life.  In 
so doing it is not treating all political rulers as equals but instead, and by right, will “call the people 
and rulers to order if by their quarrels they act against the natural and divine law.”1199  Such a 
traditional Bellarminian belief in the indirect power of the Church is anathema to Schmitt. 
Hermann Port was a Berlin journalist associated with the Abendland circle as well as a 
bridge amongst Catholic intellectuals to the late Weimar Young Conservatives movement inspired 
by the radical nationalist political views of historian Arthur Möller van den Bruck (1876-1925).
1200
  
In 1925, he was able to provoke an extensive debate about the nature of the Center Party and its 
role in Weimar politics.  He promoted the Center as a mediating force essentially neutral from the 
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political extremes, which, as such, could “fill the vacuum left by the fallen monarchy and serve in 
‘splendid isolation’ as the ‘regulator’ of German politics.”1201  In his review of Political Form, Port 
focuses on the contemporary problem of formulating a “Catholic program” amidst the alienation 
created by modern industrial capitalism.
1202
  He poetically describes modern economy and the 
alienation it engenders in the mass of materialist consumers it creates.  In this contemporary state 
of affairs, “modern man created a worldview that matches his image exactly”; namely, deism, and 
thus the State becomes the machine running things.
1203
  They agree this modern view is taken to the 
extreme in Marxism, which gets rid of both God and the State by means of economic-political 
machine.
1204
  So far, Port is not straying much from Schmitt’s text, and it is not too much of a forced 
“Catholicization” of Schmitt’s views when Port opposes the economic approach with the principle 
“anima forma corporis” or “soul forms the body.”1205  Port wants the soul of a people to dominate 
the material or economic; hence, like Schmitt, “politics” or policy should come first and be 
directed by intellect, reason, ideas and not material considerations, all of which entails an 
authoritative leader of the people.
1206
 
Port now asks what Catholic policy should be, and it is at this juncture that he jumps from 
Schmitt to his own, and recognizable as “politically Catholic,” direction.  For, he immediately rules 
out all of the political extremes, including: National Socialists, fascists, liberal humanists, Masons, 
and so on.
1207
  The central fact of the matter, for Port, is that the Church represents God and 
religion, the guidance of the Holy Ghost, and this representation is the key to its authority.
1208
  As 
we saw above, Schmitt could not care less for what the Church actually claims to represent.  But 
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this insight means, claims Port, the contemporary political crisis is really a religious crisis of loss of 
faith in God.  He concludes by saying that human politics can only succeed when man recognizes 
that “he is a servant of God” and, as if echoing Pius XI’s Ubi Arcano Dei Consilio, claims that 
victory in the world is the same as that of the Church, it is Christ’s victory.1209  Overall, Port hardly 
addresses Schmitt’s book; instead he sticks to his review’s subtitle and presents a “reflection on the 
religious foundations of politics and economy.” 
Beyond his review of Political Form, Port reflected Schmitt’s influence while taking him in 
a different, and politically Catholic, direction in his own essay: “The Two-Party System and the 
Center.”  This article also appeared in 1925, and in it Port adopts Schmitt’s attacks on liberal 
parliamentarism in The Intellectual Historical Situation of Contemporary Parliamentarism 
(Hereafter Parliamentarism).
1210
  He even strikes a slightly völkisch note with a call for the Center 
Party to forge “the great German national community [Volksgemeinschaft] in the German nation-
State.”1211  This task is made less ominous, however, by Port’s claim that the Center can achieve the 
social and political unification of the German people because it is authentically religious.  That is, 
he “underscores the state saving function of Catholicism”1212 not the state saving form or “political 
idea” of Catholicism, as Schmitt would have it.  The distinction is crucial.  Schmitt wants the State 
to adapt what he takes to be the structure of absolute authority as well as capacity to inspire the 
masses to create social cohesion and obeisance of the Church, very much as had the early modern 
political theorists of the absolute State.  Port wants the Center to “Catholicize” the State by means 
of social authority, because the German Catholic Church is a “source of state rebirth.”1213 
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A further example of a Schmitt inspired occasio was written by his student, Werner 
Becker.  Although he actively engaged in promoting his professor’s views in the Catholic press of 
Weimar, he also consistently presented them only in part and as adapted to serve his own 
politically Catholic agenda.  For example, his article “Mass Democracy and the Modern State,”1214 
appearing in Die Schildgenossen in 1925, “reads like a synthesis of Schmitt’s State-theoretical body 
of thought and Guardini’s core social and ethical beliefs.”1215  Even though this essay deals with 
antiliberalism and antiparlamentarianism and promotes the authoritarian state, Becker 
demonstrates his resistance to Schmitt’s non-normative and decisionist unitary sovereign by 
demanding the State be “align[ed] with values and truth.”1216  Similarly, Becker’s article of the same 
year in Abendland, “The Politics of the Young Generation in Europe,”1217 suggested that 
contemporary youths shared Schmitt’s suspicion of parliamentarism and party’s driven by 
parochial interests and economic thought, but he “does not argue for a radical solution.”1218  Becker 
sides with the existence of Parliament, political parties, and democracy, as opposed to his mentor’s 
expectation that dictatorship was needed. 
 
A Makeshift Intellectual Exchange: Guardini-Ball-Neundörfer 
When one reads Political Form in isolation from his other works, it becomes especially 
easy to fail to notice Schmitt’s own lack of Catholicity, radical modern turn of mind, and secular 
                                                                                                                                                             
the end of the 20s and early 30s . . . looks no longer to Catholicism but the Reichs President as guarantor of political 
unity” (ibid., 149).  If Schmitt in the Weimar era truly intended to carry forward political theology in order to make the 
Center Party’s political goals and vision more fruitful—a view that would fit his postwar claim of “authentic Catholic 
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interest in the Church.  It also is written in an elliptical style conducive to providing an occasio for 
the reader to project their own views upon it.  However, after Beyerle’s positive review the second 
article published in a Catholic outlet dealing with Political Form in any capacity is one of the 
stronger pieces of counter-evidence to the standard narrative’s presentation of Schmitt, as it was 
penned by a towering figure in Weimar’s Catholic life and thought, Romano Guardini. 
In April 1924, the dogmatic theologian Guardini published an essay containing his political 
reflections in the official journal of the Catholic Youth Movement, Die Schildgenossen, of which 
he was also the editor.  The essay’s title is “Rescue of the Political,” or more figuratively, “Salvation 
of the Political.”1219  The only direct reference to Schmitt is in a footnote placed immediately after 
the title, yet the entire essay is a philosophical-theological critique of Political Form.  I believe the 
strong criticisms found within are pointers to how their paths could diverge so dramatically a 
decade later.
1220
 
Guardini’s footnote points out that reading Political Form inspired these political 
reflections.  He stresses, however, that he does not at all agree with everything in Schmitt’s book, 
for “[m]uch seems greatly exaggerated”; and furthermore: “The error is also committed of 
equating ‘Catholic’ with Romanistic.”1221  Indeed, as we already saw above, Schmitt’s use of the 
attribute “Roman” for the Catholic Church is manifest throughout Political Form.  At the outset he 
described a “temper” not of anti-Catholicism but of anti-Romanism and then continually 
emphasized what he believes is specifically “Roman” within the form and functioning of the 
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Church: its juristic, or canonical,
1222
 ecclesiastical form as well as a Roman rationality that establishes 
“personal” and “representative” authority.  Schmitt is undoubtedly aware that it was Protestants 
who began to call the Catholic Church “Roman” in order to distinguish it from national churches 
such as the English “Catholic” Church; it is a manner of speech common to Gallicanism.1223  From 
out of this one explicit criticism of Schmitt’s essay the theologian unpacks a devastating critique of 
the jurist. 
Guardini begins by admitting, nowadays, political matters are chaotic and “it is uncertain 
what to do in practice”1224 but that there are some fundamental issues worth dwelling upon 
philosophically.  First, he recognizes that to understand political action one must come to terms 
with the nature of the State.  Agreeing with Schmitt’s criticism of purely reductive economic 
thinking, Guardini believes that the State is only in part managerial as regards the “welfare of the 
individual and community”; instead, what is more truly political about the state is that it is 
“sovereign.”1225  He notes that while one can approach sovereignty by means of some limited 
jurisdiction or as based on “sociological significance . . . eventually it would have to go back to 
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God, otherwise the sovereign remains an empty dress, a fiction.”1226  The emperor has no clothes 
unless clothed in recognition of God as source of his sovereign power.
1227
 
The Catholic theologian is well aware that this claim could be understood on the grounds 
of the early modern political theory of “divine right” monarchy.  However, he is making neither a 
simple attribution of the source of State perquisite, nor the blasphemous claim that the sovereign 
(in the person of the king or the State itself) is a god on earth.  Instead, Guardini places the 
sovereign within the genus “political,” and thus subject to the natural and moral law.  For, he sees 
no alternative purely philosophical way to “justify State authority other than from ‘the grace of 
God,’ that is, so that it represents God’s earthly image of his absolute authority.”1228  This is a pre-
modern or traditional Catholic approach to politics as an expression of human nature with God as 
the author of that nature.  Also note, that Schmitt’s word is used, “represents,” the concept of 
“representation.”  Schmitt deliberately left open-ended what the State represents; he leaves it 
flexible enough to be one of many ideas or myths so long as the State succeeds in establishing 
absolute authority.  The case is different with Guardini, as, here, the sovereign represents in a 
specific earthly form the divine absolute authority. 
To take another approach, Guardini states here that “justification” of the political sovereign 
comes from God; authority is legitimated or “justified” by “the grace of God.”  An implication 
might be that the concept of justification as understood by Catholic theology is relevant to politics.  
This impression is quickly strengthened as Guardini bluntly states: “The State is not responsible in 
moral and religious things, but the Church is responsible in these.”1229  Additionally: 
                                                 
1226
 Ibid., 205n4. 
1227
 Guardini’s view here might be drawn out more by looking at what philosopher Yves Simon treats as the “paradox of 
civil obedience”; that “the multitude of the governed do obey the few that govern . . . as if persons in government had 
the power and the right to bind the conscience of the governed.  But how can a man bind the conscience of another 
man?”  Only God has that sovereign power to bind conscience.  Quoted from: Simon, “Doctrinal Issue,” 90. 
1228
 Guardini, “Rettung des Politischen,” 206n5, emphasis added. 
1229
 Ibid., 206. 
298 
 
Right [Recht][is also] a natural manifestation of divine sovereignty.  For this Right, the State sets its legitimate 
existence, the spiritual source of its sovereignty; that it is Authority.  Every law [Recht] is, in the end, made ‘in 
the name of God.’1230 
 
The legitimacy of the State, and of its authority, can therefore be recognized in part by its “works”; 
it is not sola fide, like justification in Protestant theology.  Political authority, sovereignty, is one of 
the earthly images or representations of God’s absolute authority, but it is not itself that absolute 
authority.  Guardini is adamant on this point for even: 
If politics is conceived as a separate order, so it does not yet follow that it evades the Moral Law.  . . .  Of 
course the moral order applies to the political field; just as it applies to scientific researchers, artistic creators, 
or for technical or economic workers.
1231
 
 
Just as with pre-modern Catholic thought, Guardini claims “sovereignty” is a “value,” an aspect of 
“character,”1232 because “only God has sovereignty intrinsically.”1233  The Good instantiated by both 
man and the State is a participation in the divine Good.  There is also an implicit recognition here 
of the principle of subsidiarity in his positing of multiple “orders.” 
Guardini now changes tack again on the nature of political sovereignty by asking what can 
be said about the people that make up the nation-state, about their political activity, and in what 
they are directed by the State?  His answer is that political action for a person is to “make their 
God-given nature come true.  To speak the God-given ‘Word’ in his being . . .  [A] being in liberty.  
And a being in honor.”1234  One recognizes here the Catholic social principle of the dignity of the 
human person. 
The theologian next responds to the possible objection that the way he has been speaking 
overall is in the terms of those who both divinize the state and promote a nationalist populism.
1235
  
On the contrary, Guardini asserts that these political values must not be left to the “pagan spirit” of 
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nationalists whose political attitude is “suffocatingly unintellectual, narrow, and brutal.”1236  In fact, 
he believes that Catholics only have themselves to blame for allowing a pagan nationalism to 
become a “widely grown attitude” because “we must take these values from out of the hand of 
political paganism and classify their place in the whole of life correctly from a Christian-Catholic 
outlook.”1237  It is quite possible that Guardini believed Schmitt treads close to such a politically 
pagan approach to sovereignty since reading Political Form occasioned his remarks.  If so, such a 
criticism would be amply warranted, which I hope to now demonstrate by bringing Schmitt, 
Guardini, and political Catholicism closer together. 
It is quite easy to miss the secularity of Schmitt’s line of thought in Political Form, 
especially if it is not read in conjunction with Political Theology, as he can seem to be simply 
defending the importance of “authority,” “transcendence,” and “ideas” in politics.  Therefore, it is 
crucial to notice that Schmitt never suggests any idea which he actually wants to see instantiated 
(represented) by the State; he only lists a few possibilities.  When read with the earlier text it 
becomes clear that the concept of representation in the later text coincides with “sovereignty” from 
Political Theology.  Similarly, the idea of the State in the earlier text is now captured by the 
Church’s juridical form.  To Schmitt “[w]hat matters for the reality of legal life is who decides”1238 
which dovetails nicely with his claim, in Political Form, the “will to decision as it culminates in the 
doctrine of papal infallibility”1239 is the most important aspect of the Church as paradigm for secular 
rule. 
Since Schmitt refers to Rousseau’s Legislator in Political Form as an example of the 
personal representation and unitary sovereignty that he wants to see the State reclaim for itself; 
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recalling Catholic philosopher Yves Simon’s critique of the philosophe is useful for distinguishing 
Schmitt and Guardini’s political views.  Simon tells us that Rousseau sought to protect the 
Enlightenment myth of autonomy, that one’s will can never morally be in submission to the will of 
another man, by replacing authority and obedience with “nature”: 
In politics, the way out of relationships involving authority is the theory of the general will.  Like a force of 
nature, the general will is impersonal and incorruptible; on the other hand, it is mysteriously identified with 
the will of each, so that by obeying the general will, man simply obeys himself.  The essence of obedience is 
eliminated.  Authority, as power of binding the conscience of man, has disappeared.
1240
 
 
This form of government, however, is inherently totalitarian: 
The transcendent character of the general will, its superhuman infallibility, the very peculiar way in which it 
combines privileges of natural necessity and those of human initiative arouse the suspicion that government, 
no longer protected by its traditional vindication, has been given a new and more effective guaranty of 
overwhelming power.
1241
 
 
Although it is a bit odd for Simon to quote Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-65), the socialist theorist 
did have an insight into Rousseau equally relevant to Schmitt: “Tyranny, claiming divine right, had 
become odious; [Rousseau] re-organized it and makes it respectable, by making it proceed from 
the people, so he says.”1242  The “People,” is one of those ideas Schmitt believes can be turned into 
a successful political myth to ground the absolute and unitary sovereignty of the State.
1243
  When 
Schmitt ascribes “personality” to sovereignty it is not analogous to human personhood,1244 nor is it 
analogous to the personhood of the Triune God—that most important example of a Catholic 
theological “complex of opposites” which Schmitt significantly ignores1245—rather, it is analogous to 
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the absolute and voluntarist Deity common to the thought of William of Ockham and early 
modern Protestant theologians, such as Luther and Calvin.
1246
 
In contrast, Guardini does not cross a bridge too far in his rejection of liberalism and 
anarchistic socialism.  Guardini maintains the traditional Catholic view that the political is subject 
to the social as well as the principle of human dignity.  And as one of the early popularizers of 
Newman in Germany, Guardini’s traditionalism on this latter point follows the English Cardinal’s 
well-known defense of conscience: 
The government is not the highest of values.  The noblest part of my personal arsenal is not that which is 
related to the state.  Every demand of conscience is above it; every real religious call of God in my soul.  I can 
never affirm state and political will as soon as in so doing I would transgress the just, the holy, the Kingdom of 
God.
1247
 
 
And, he adds, that of course there are additional areas that are not the concern of the State such as 
the “inner sphere of the person . . . the family . . . and the Church.”1248  If the State goes further and 
transgresses on any of these areas then it becomes “pagan” and such overextension explains “the 
deep mistrust of religious people against the State” since it: 
. . . keeps trying to intrude in those areas, because it repeatedly tries to violate the person [vergewaltigen, 
‘rape,’ a very strong word choice], to eliminate religious authority and make him subservient.  The State tries 
again and again to convert the sovereignty which is only lent to it by God into divine sovereignty itself.  The 
sovereignty of the State consists only in that it is representative of God in the natural and legal [orders].  
However, it tries to justify itself as original, sole, and absolute.  In the last analysis, the State is always seeking 
‘to be God.’  Hegel even called it ‘the present God’!  And the State succeeds in enforcing this claim to the 
extent the individual forgets God.  Since then he has nothing to oppose to the State.
1249
 
 
As the State succeeds in this project of secularization the “soul’s capacity to worship is robbed of its 
true object and focuses unnoticed on the State and justifies its claims.”1250  So there is no room for 
misconstruing his views, Guardini reiterates forcefully that what he has detailed in his essay has 
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nothing to do with nationalism, nor a “racial state.”1251  He concludes by reflecting on the traditional 
Catholic rejection of both liberalism and collectivism.  The former “renounces sovereignty” and is 
“apolitical”—much as Schmitt describes the economic-minded neutral state—but its polar opposite 
of an “authoritarian State” must also be rejected, since, for it, “the personality of the individual is 
politically insignificant.”1252  In summation, Guardini’s political reflections and the principles 
undergirding them are coherently Catholic and even politically so, while Schmitt’s are not.1253 
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A month after Guardini’s essay appeared in Die Schildgenossen, Karl Muth, the editor of 
Hochland, asked Schmitt to write an “open letter” reply to the leading (and politically conservative) 
theologian in order to clarify his views on the relationship between the Church and politics.  
Schmitt’s journal relates, on May 24, he had begun to design a reply.  In a letter written the next 
day to his friend and fellow Bonn jurist, Rudolf Smend (1882-1975), Schmitt mentions, “Guardini 
has been inspired by my Roman Catholicism to ‘rescue the political’ but he [charges me with] 
committing the ‘mistake of equat[ing] the Catholic and Roman.’”  He then admits to treating the 
Roman and Catholic as close together in the political but evades Guardini’s point by adding as 
equivocation “but I did not commit the mistake of equating the Romanesque and Roman.”1254  
However, the same day’s journal entry records Schmitt had spent the night restless and 
“depressed” over “this ridiculous letter to Guardini” and so he soon declined Muth’s invitation.1255  
With Schmitt’s approval, the editor next asked Hugo Ball to pen the response.1256  The founder of 
Dadaism had become an eccentric Catholic intellectual since returning to the faith in 1920.
1257
  
Ball’s extended review essay,1258 “Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology,” covers this theme as expressed 
in each of the jurist’s books from Political Romanticism to Political Form.  The article appeared in 
June of 1924 and quickly made a “significant contribution to the great reputation in German 
Catholicism of his revered politics teacher.”1259 
Ball begins his essay with high praise for Schmitt, claiming that once his work is really 
studied he will be elevated to the first rank, and then paraphrasing the contemporary British 
Catholic journalist Gilbert Keith Chesterton’s (1874-1936) well-known quote, “it is quite right to 
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study the theory of hydraulics while Rome is burning.”1260  Ball claims that Schmitt is doing just that 
in Weimar, as “our confused and cruel time by no means needs great practitioners for its 
reorganization, according to the demands of the world, but the great ideologue.”1261  According to 
Ball, an ideologue attempts to understand the fundamental beliefs of his era, and in so doing starts 
with politics but ends with theology before they know it, and this movement characterizes Schmitt’s 
work.
1262
  Ball Catholicizes Schmitt’s thought as he identifies its guiding impulse as a “Catholic, 
eschatological thought” that even leads the jurist to investigate and dwell first on dictatorship and 
more recently on representation.
1263
   However, this “theological form” of thought is not really 
present in Schmitt’s earliest books.  “The first writings seem to have been outside the Church, or at 
least designed to be.”1264  While his Wilhelmine books transition from law to politics it is only with 
Political Theology and Political Form that Schmitt turns to the theological. 
Ball continues by observing Schmitt’s method in his later books is sociological and 
intellectual-historical in seeking to describe leading legal and political concepts.  While Schmitt is 
fairly conservative (“the structure is an organism not a machine”), he is also a Hegelian jurist par 
excellence who believes: “The legal profession . . . is the rational present form of the Idea.”1265  It is 
at this point that Ball first introduces Schmitt’s fascination with the nineteenth–century Catholic 
counter-revolutionaries and suggests that: “The theological state is controversial, but not yet 
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destroyed; it is daily proving its still vital force.”1266  By “theological” State Ball does not mean 
theocracy, rather, he means the early modern ideal of the absolute state modelled on the divine 
right theory of justification.  This is made clear by his turn to the contemporary denial of 
transcendence by the radical metaphysics of a Proudhon and Bakunin.  “The renunciation of 
authority was the final mark of the vaunted philosophy of our time,” so the result has been that 
“the old legality is shattered” and “we have to regain it in new ways.”1267  While Ball’s depiction of 
Schmitt’s views is, so far, quite accurate he does not recognize their extremism.  Schmitt sees 
Communist Russia as just this anarchic culmination of the disaster of Enlightenment rationalism 
for they do not understand the forces of nihilism, irrationality.  Anarchists play with powers they 
cannot control, like the titular character in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s (1749-1832) poem 
“The Sorcerer’s Apprentice” (“Der Zauberlehring”).  Hence, Schmitt is a latter-day Nietzsche, 
horrified at “what we have done” with having “killed God” and seeking a means to rebuild the giant 
wicker idol, to refound the sovereign state with absolute authority over social chaos. 
Ball now begins to examine Schmitt’s works and does a fine job of drawing out their major 
themes, however, all aimed towards his conclusion that Schmitt over time became a Catholic 
political theologian.  For example, he reads On Dictatorship as an exceptional piece, which 
pushed Schmitt in dangerous directions before a return to the narrow path of Catholic political 
theology with the works after.
1268
  He also draws out the significance for the jurist of philosophical 
anthropology and recognizes his agreement that “the doctrine of the depravity of man, in the 
apodictic form as Cortés represents can hardly be surpassed.”1269  For Hochland’s readers, Ball 
emphasizes Schmitt’s critique of romanticism and defense of the Church against the self-same 
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charge; he recognizes that Catholic thought assumes the reality of a normative direction to social 
life and that the faith is not a form of irrationalism despite the prejudice of the scientific 
rationalist.
1270
  However, he very astutely recognizes, while Schmitt correctly describes the Church 
in this manner, it does not truly fit the jurist’s own beliefs for he is a “rationalist in the state and 
irrationalist in theology.”1271  In fact, the weakness in Ball’s essay is that he frequently discerns 
cleavages in Schmitt’s thought from Catholicism but, yet overall, portrays him in a light that would 
suggest the jurist’s fit within a Catholic intellectual milieu. 
For example, Ball recognizes the statism of Schmitt’s thought, that the State must needs be 
recognized as the next instance of the Idea; “No law outside the state and no state outside the 
law.”1272  Therefore, in his later writings (post 1919) Schmitt turns to the “question of the ultimate 
form of decisive authority,” and the legal interpretation of political theology.1273  According to Ball 
this yields the claim that: 
[T]he irrational can never come into direct relation to the state.  This is the meaning of the Church as an 
institution and the commissarial dictator.  The sovereign dictatorship is only justified within the Church.
1274
 
 
The problem here is in Ball’s last statement.  While he recognizes that “[t]he concept of 
personality grows more significant with each new work of Schmitt’s” he also thinks that the highest 
ideological instances of dictatorship like Cromwell are attempting to establish a sovereign 
dictatorship outside the church.
1275
  Ball’s implication is that to do so is bad, as indeed for a 
Catholic political theorist it is; however, this is not at all the case for Schmitt.  Ball completely 
misses the jurist’s consistent admiration for Cromwell in his theory of sovereignty. 
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However, the Dadaist partially makes up for this oversight by incisively noting when he 
comes to Political Form: “And so in the representative forms of Roman Catholicism is contained 
that pathos of the decision which Schmitt called ‘sovereign dictatorship’ in earlier writings.”1276  This 
is precisely right.  To Ball it does not entail extremism on Schmitt’s part, however, because he 
makes the mistake of reading Political Form as treating the Church as simply an extra-political 
guardian of all that is of value in western civilization, as a “third way.”  Schmitt’s actual point is that 
the State must adapt for itself the structure of authority (formal, decisive, representative, absolute, 
and infallible) found in the Church in order to govern contemporary unruly society.  The final 
impression Ball’s essay left its readers with was that, as Lönne suggests, “the answer to the many 
social and political problems of the Weimar Republic was then to be expected . . . by the 
leadership and creative function of Church and State, as they had been worked out by Schmitt.”1277 
Ball’s essay was quite the laudatory introduction of Schmitt to the broader Catholic 
intellectual milieu and is the original presentation of both aspects of the standard narrative; that is, 
he presents Schmitt both as a politically Catholic thinker and as primarily a political theologian.  
For his part, Schmitt loved Ball’s treatment of his thought and struck up a friendship with him as a 
result.  Schmitt told the artist that his essay helped him to clarify his own understanding of his 
political thought in directions he was surprised to find he had not been previously aware.
1278
  Years 
later he described the review as: “a great, brilliant essay, the like of which I have hardly seen a 
second of in my entire life”; in fact, he felt it read as “downright enthusiastic” from the sense that 
                                                 
1276
 Ibid., 114. 
1277
 Lönne, “Carl Schmitt und der Katholizismus,” 23. 
1278
 Unsent letter to Carl Schmitt of February 11, 1925 in: Ball, Briefe 1904-1927, volume 2, 120-1.  Ball mentions here 
that Schmitt had made such an admission to him when they first met at a conference in Lugano in August of 1924.  
See also  Schmitt’s letter to Smend of June 11, 1924 in: Schmitt, and Smend, Briefwechsel Carl Schmitt—Rudolf 
Smend 1921-1961, 28. 
308 
 
Ball “had met a kind of brother in me.”1279  In Political Theology II, he called the essay required 
reading if one wanted to understand what he had been trying to do in his early Weimar writings.
1280
  
Schmitt also praises Ball there for being “the only one who paid attention” to the necessity of 
reading Political Theology in league with his other early Weimar writings in order to really grasp 
what he was developing.   However, Ball was not the only one to read Schmitt’s books in unison as 
our next protagonist did so as well. 
Guardini’s reflections in “Rescue of the Political” do not, strictly speaking, amount to a 
review of Political Form, and so he soon published one penned by fellow priest—and close friend 
since childhood—Karl Neundörfer (1885-1926).1281  Neundörfer, like Schmitt, was a jurist.  He 
studied both theology and canon law and completed a doctorate in 1909 by means of a study on 
the separation of Church and State in France.  He was also heavily involved in Quickborn and a 
notable figure in his own right within German Catholic social thought.  Finally, he was aware of 
Ball’s Hochland piece on Schmitt when he penned his own treatment of Schmitt’s oeuvre in 
“Political Form and Religious Belief: A Book Review.” 
Neundörfer begins with a quick review of modernity’s creeping change to a dominant 
secularism where religion is privatized and law considered “purely factual and worldly.”1282  This 
development eventually led to a total separation of Church and State as well as a reaction by 
romantic thought, which argued an “interrelatedness of law and religion,” and thus pursued a 
merging of Church and State.
1283
  This leads him to dwell a moment upon Adam Müller’s state 
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theory, and he credits him for discovering again the “problem of the interrelation of law and the 
State with faith and the Church and [having] tried a solution.”1284  However, Neundörfer then 
provides precise criticisms of Müller’s theoretical failings before introducing Schmitt’s works for 
consideration; beginning with the jurist’s critique of the romantic theory of state found in Political 
Romanticism.  He says that Schmitt pens his critique “with all the force of a scientifically trained 
mind and at the same time a politically turbulent will.”1285  Schmitt’s misguided will revealed itself in 
that book “in terms of the relationship between religion and law,” where Schmitt: “remains in the 
line embarked on by the romantic” given “his own inclination to a ‘political irrationalism, which is 
in its understanding of mystical or religious origins.’”1286  It is this line of thought that Neundörfer 
wants to draw out and stress in Schmitt’s thought. 
And so Neundörfer accomplishes this goal by moving text by text; he now points out that 
the “‘political vitality’” and “will to decision” missing in romanticism is made “the subject of a 
thorough scientific investigation” in On Dictatorship.1287  He lays stress in this text on Schmitt’s 
developing understanding of the metaphysical-religious base of various political forms.  
Neundörfer finds this same idea in Parliamentarism, which he characterizes as in part a 
continuation of On Dictatorship, given comments there about anarchism being a movement 
against the “centralism” of God.1288  Next, he moves on to Political Theology, and hones in on 
Schmitt’s language about the exception, decision, and again the connection of the politics of an age 
to its metaphysical beliefs.  Neundörfer ends with Schmitt’s claim to have found “Catholic social 
philosophy” exhibiting “a solid commitment to political decision” in the thought of Maistre, 
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Bonald, and Donoso.
1289
  At this point the theologian pauses to interject critically that despite the 
presentation by Schmitt heretofore, democracy is just as viable as a political form to monarchy and 
aristocracy, and all three can either work or be abused.
1290
  This comment leads him finally to 
Political Form. 
Neundörfer begins his review of Schmitt’s most presumptively Catholic text by noting that 
the religion does not exist in any of these various political forms that may reflect origins in specific 
religious ideas and is instead a complex of opposites.  Then what follows is a lengthy and minute 
account of the content of Political Form.
1291
  Most notably, the theologian brilliantly recognizes the 
similarity in views between Schmitt and the sociologist Hellmuth Plessner (1892-1985), especially 
in the latter’s book The Limits of Community (Grenzen der Gemeinschaft).1292   Neundörfer even 
notices that both Schmitt and Plessner affirm in the Church Dostoyevsky’s myth of the Grand 
Inquisitor.
1293
 
Neundörfer is now ready to reach his conclusions.  He believes that both Schmitt and 
Plessner seem to suggest that the Church can correct the last several centuries of development in 
spiritualist churches and materialist State political thought but that in Plessner this means reducing 
the Church to a “cultural, rather than a religious value” and in Schmitt you find “a one-sided 
emphasis on the ‘Office’ against the ‘Charisma.’”1294  The theologian’s response is to point out that 
the “essence of the Catholic Church [resides] in the religious” and no one aspect can be allowed to 
overshadow all others.  He brings in Ernst Michel as well as actual references to the Code of 
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Canon Law to suggest that “earthly forms” are not simply deified by the Church.1295  Neundörfer’s 
final verdict is politically left ala Michel
1296
 as he suggests that the Church can again undergo a shift 
to an emphasis on the charismatic rather than institutional and so become even more amenable to 
the Proletariat.
1297
  The theologian also anticipates what we shall soon find is a common complaint 
against Schmitt by Weimar’s Catholic thinkers; namely, that he favors (in the later words of Lönne) 
a “one-sided juridical understanding of the Church” which succumbs to an “overly broad 
parallelization of religious and secular forms.”1298 
To conclude this section, it is worthwhile to ask ourselves why Schmitt found it impossible 
to defend his views on politics and Catholicism publicly against Guardini and instead spent a 
sleepless night wrestling with the prospect.  One possible motive was an innate fear that Schmitt 
had of treading too far into theological grounds as a layman.  In Political Theology he had already 
discussed the critique of Donoso’s views on original sin by the Abbé Gaudel.  There he 
distinguished Donoso’s exaggerated polemics on human depravity as political appropriation from 
the theologian’s interest in defense of dogma.1299  In 1929 he would expand on this clash by 
claiming that it proves “every professional theologian is his [the layman discussing doctrine and 
dogma] better and can put him in his place.”1300  He then continues: 
[Donoso], who had taken a stand against the ultimate and most extreme enemy---atheistic socialism—suddenly 
found himself in a thicket of unforeseeable controversies. . . .  The theology that he proposed as the only 
solid foundation for political theories contained more possible disputations and distinctions than he could 
admit to.  The role of a theological layman proved to be incompatible with the role of the theoretician of 
political dictatorship.
1301
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As a depiction of Donoso, Schmitt’s claims here are wholly inaccurate; however, given his 
consistent use of Donoso as a mask for his own views, this passage should be read as a veiled 
statement of Schmitt’s own intellectual situation.1302 
Additionally, when reflecting back on his life in a 1971 interview, Schmitt claimed that his 
longest running and deepest motto came from “his first philosophical impulses” as he discovered 
them expressed by the Flemish Cartesian philosopher, Arnold Geulincx (1624-69); an 
occasionalist philosopher he became familiarized with when writing Political Romanticism.  The 
motto runs, “Ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis,” and translates as: “where you are worth nothing, there 
you should want nothing.”1303  Schmitt explains that this motto particularly came to fit his life after 
he suffered a “monstrous shock” due to the criticisms of Political Form upon its publication.  It 
seems he was specifically recalling criticisms penned by Catholic priests such as Guardini and 
Neundörfer since he explains that they revealed to him: “a layman has nothing to say in this 
celibate bureaucracy.”1304  Needless to say, this is hardly the reaction one expects from an 
intellectual purported to be a Catholic conservative.  But this postwar recollection does fit with the 
evidence contemporary to these middle years of the Republic suggesting Schmitt had no intention 
of being a Catholic thinker. 
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Chapter 8. 
Schmitt in Weimar’s Catholic Press after Excommunication 
“I doubt that one can get at the problems of [Carl Schmitt] by treating him as a Nazi.  He probably 
was no more a Nazi than he ever was a Catholic or Democrat.  He rather is an agnostic and 
unprincipled existentialist like Sartre . . .”1305 
—Eric Voegelin (1953)  
    
Schmitt’s Later Weimar Publications: Hochland 
The articles and editorials Schmitt penned for Catholic publications after his 
excommunication, for the most part, fall into the categories we have already witnessed of either 
promoting his books or expressing a political radicalism likely aimed at “intensifying” Catholic or 
Center politics.  Both motives for publishing can be found in his Hochland pieces.  Indeed, 
Schmitt’s articles for Hochland leads many commentators to exaggerate his overall media presence 
in Catholic Weimar.
1306
 
If Schmitt ever had any intentions of being a Catholic public intellectual then his friendship 
with Muth certainly should have paid the most dividends.  Yet, despite developing their 
acquaintance and friendship since 1917, the first two recorded attempts by Muth to get Schmitt 
published in Germany’s leading Catholic magazine were rebuffed.  Schmitt declined to produce a 
piece on the topic of Judaism and then refused the afore-mentioned opportunity to respond to 
Guardini.  That refusal opened up the opportunity for Ball’s incredibly laudatory review of 
Schmitt’s books to be printed in 1924,1307 which in turn, may have made the jurist a bit more willing 
to branch out from academic venues.  However, Schmitt rejected two more of Muth’s topical 
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suggestions around this same time, namely, pieces on ultramontanism and Donoso Cortés.  The 
latter is noteworthy as Schmitt had become quite absorbed with the Spaniard, since at least two 
years prior, and he would later honor Muth’s request with articles in 1927 and 1929.  The first 
article Schmitt finally consented to have published in Hochland’s November 1924 issue was the 
preface he had prepared for the upcoming second edition of Political Romanticism, as discussed 
above. 
“Romanticism” was followed by two small pieces in 1925.  The first of which, “The ‘Status 
Quo’ and Peace,”1308 builds off of Rhineland.  This essay covers much of the same ground as the 
book but in an even sharper polemical and nationalist tone.  For our purposes it is only necessary 
to point out his countenance here of National Bolshevism: 
For Germany, a union of nationalism and communism seems out of the question, although it has occasionally 
been called for.  Still we must not ignore the possibility, especially since the parties that in Germany have so 
far claimed nationalism for themselves are faced with completely new problems that arise from the 
increasingly difficult economic and political situation, and have an influence under which traditional bonds 
between ideas can easily dissolve.
1309
 
 
This passage, and the essay generally, demonstrate openness to radical solutions for what Schmitt 
sees as Germany’s intolerable problem of a lack of sovereignty.  The second Hochland piece of 
the year is an only faintly political reflection and travelogue on Serbia developed from his trip there 
in the summer of 1925 with, then lover and soon to be second wife, Duska Todorović.1310 
In a similar self-serving fashion to the publication of “Romanticism,” Schmitt asked Muth 
to run his reply to the critical review of Parliamentarism written by a fellow constitutional lawyer, 
the liberal jurist Richard Thoma (1874-1957).
1311
  Muth agreed, and so “The Contrast between 
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Parliamentarism and Modern Mass Democracy,” in June 1926, became the fourth Schmitt piece 
to appear in Hochland.
1312
  Like “Romanticism” before it, “Contrast” took advantage of Hochland’s 
large circulation to promote interest in a forthcoming second edition of that year, this time for 
Parliamentarism. 
 
“Contrast” 
Thoma was a legal positivist and so he naturally hones in on Schmitt’s emphasis on 
irrationalism and political myth, and his manifest admiration for Mussolini’s fascism, as his diaries 
now make even clearer.
1313
  However, Thoma went further to: 
[H]azard to guess, but not assert, that behind these ultimately rather sinister observations there stands the 
unexpressed personal conviction of the author that an alliance between a nationalistic dictator and the 
Catholic Church could be the real solution and achieve a definitive restoration of order, discipline, and 
hierarchy.
1314
 
 
Schmitt passes “over in silence” these “utterly fantastic political aims that Thoma imputes”1315 to 
him and he does so honestly; for he was a determined and consistent opponent of the interference 
by the Church in the political order and does not treat the Center as an exception to his critique of 
parliamentarism.  Rather, Schmitt’s self-defense follows upon Parliamentarism, and even deepens 
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that book’s attack on the political foundation of the Weimar Republic in what Lönne describes as 
a “cutting history of ideas critique.”1316 
Schmitt reiterates his claim from 1923 that liberalism’s belief that political action can be 
determined in a secularized atmosphere through objective political debate yielding truth is a 
defunct ideal.  Modern parliament does not allow for such authentic discussion but is only a venue 
of competing organized interests and there is no disinterested debate to achieve the best practical 
solutions.
1317
  “Contrast” follows the theme of Schmitt attempting to intensify Catholic politics by 
not making an exception of the Center at all.  Rather, that party is just one more self-seeking and 
liberal coalition of interests. 
Lurking behind this contemporary form of parliamentarism is “modern mass democracy” 
which makes: 
Many norms of contemporary parliamentary law, above all provisions concerning the independence of 
representatives and the openness of sessions . . . [to be no more than] . . . a superfluous decoration, useless 
and even embarrassing, as though someone had painted the radiator of a modern central heating system with 
red flames in order to give the appearance of a blazing fire.
1318
 
 
Mass democracy demands action and decision by government, not debate or discussion.  In fact, 
“Democracy requires . . . first homogeneity and second—if the need arises—elimination or 
eradication of heterogeneity.”1319  Schmitt illustrates such tactics of “elimination” with Turkey’s 
“radical expulsion of the Greeks and its reckless Turkish nationalization of the country,” as well as, 
Australia’s highly restrictive immigration policies that: “only takes emigrants who conform to the 
notion of a ‘right type of settler.’”1320  These examples highlight that the political strength of a 
democracy lies in its capacity to “refuse or keep at bay something foreign and unequal that 
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threatens its homogeneity.”1321  And homogeneity since the nineteenth century is primarily a 
question of “membership in a particular nation, in national homogeneity.”1322 
Schmitt is not here thinking in terms of race
1323—as the Nazis already were—but he is 
wedding a radical nationalism with early modern State absolutism as updated by the addition of 
Rousseau’s democratic theory; for: “The general will as Rousseau constructs it is in truth 
homogeneity.  That is a really consequential democracy.”1324  It is also what Schmitt finds defensible 
within Bolshevism and Fascism: 
Bolshevism and Fascism by contrast are, like all dictatorships, certainly antiliberal but not necessarily 
antidemocratic.  In the history of democracy there have been numerous dictatorships, Caesarisms, and other 
more striking forms that have tried to create homogeneity and to shape the will of the people with methods 
uncommon in the liberal tradition of the past century.
1325
 
 
Liberal notions such as “[e]qual rights make good sense where homogeneity exists,” but they are 
idle, or even dangerous, in the context of social pluralism.
1326
 
Two of the remaining three pieces Schmitt contributed to Muth were on the traditionalist 
Spanish diplomat Donoso Cortés,
1327
 of whom Muth correctly commented, in June 1934, Schmitt 
had failed to grasp his profound essence.
1328
  The remaining article, “The League of Nations and 
Europe” was a lecture he delivered in the auditorium of the University of Bonn on October 29, 
1927; first published by the university before being reprinted in Hochland and then partially in a 
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right-wing journal.
1329
  Just as with the earlier “Status Quo and Peace” we can hear echoes of Arthur 
Möller van den Bruck’s Prussian Nationalism, particularly from his 1919 The Right of Young 
Nations (Das Recht der jungen Völker) of the mythical third way between American capitalism and 
Russian Communism.
1330
  It is in articles such as these that Schmitt is attacking the “cautious” 
policies of the Center Party and attempting “to bring the situation of Germany into radically sharp 
focus.”1331  As for Hochland, Schmitt’s last article appeared in that magazine in 1929, and he went 
right on declining chances to write for Muth; such as the editor’s request for an article on 
disarmament and security at the end of 1931.
1332
 
 
Schmitt’s Later Weimar Publications: Kölnische Volkszeitung; Staatslexikon; and Die 
Schildgenossen 
 
Schmitt had four more editorials appear in the Kölnische Volkszeitung after his second 
marriage and they all fit the mold of political intensification.  These include: “The Act 
                                                 
1329
 Carl Schmitt, “Der Völkerbund und Europa” in Zehnte Hauptversammlung der Gesellschaft von Freunden und 
Förderen der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Bonne e.V. [Tenth Annual Meeting of the Society of 
Friends and Patrons of the Rhenish Friedrich-Wilhelms University of Bonn e.V] (Bonn, 1927) 39-48.  Republished in 
Hochland, 25.4 (January 1928), 345-54.  Also reprinted in part in a right-wing magazine, Europäische Revue, 6.6 (June 
1930), 471-2. 
1330
 Möller van den Bruck also wrote The Prussian Style (Der Preußischer Stil) on the essence of Prussia being “the will 
to the state” in 1916, and was a strong influence on the “young conservatives” movement which fought against the 
Versailles Treaty.  For more on the similitude between Möller v.d. Bruck and Schmitt, see: Koenen, Der Fall Carl 
Schmitt, 173-188.  Although Schmitt’s nationalist views agreed with Möller v. d. Bruck’s on these points he did 
consistently reject organicist conservatism.  He actually also held Möller v. d. Bruck in disdain despite his having been 
a good friend of Däubler.  Schmitt met Möller v.d. Bruck through the poet in December 1914 and recorded in his 
diary that he hated the historian as “a horribly stupid and narrow-minded person.”  See the entries for Saturday 
December 19, 1914 and Tuesday December 22, 1914 in: Schmitt, Tagebücher: Oktober 1912 bis Februar 1915, 276, 
278.  Schmitt would later seek out Möller v.d. Bruck’s assistance in getting his book on Däubler published (entry of 
Saturday August 7, 1915 in: Ibid., 105) but never gives any indication that his immediate disdain for him had been 
modified.  This especially seems to be the case given his lack of regard for a similar, and latterly prominent, nationalist 
in Othmar Spann.  Schmitt proves his distatste for Spann in a letter of August 6, 1925 that he wrote to the editor of a 
book to which Schmitt had originally submitted an article.  In scathing words he protests the proposed inclusion of 
Spann in the volume and withdraws his own article because he considers him a lowbrow intellectual and claims 
differences so great that he cannot stomach being included in a publication alongside the Austrian.  Most amusingly, 
and perhaps honestly, Schmitt also lists as a criticism the fact that Spann “belongs to a circle which systematically 
ignores my work” that is, his vanity was hurt.  Quote is from Bendersky’s treatment of the letter and episode in 
Theorist for the Reich, 60. 
1331
 Lönne, “Carl Schmitt und der Katholizismus,” 21-2. 
1332
 Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt, 37n79. 
319 
 
Implementing Article 48 of the Constitution (the so-called Dictatorship Act)” on October 30, 
1926
1333
; the afore-mentioned piece on Machiavelli of June 21, 1927
1334
; “The Convening of the 
Adjourned Reichstag” on October 23, 19301335; and “Efforts for an Imperial Reform” of November 
5, 1930.
1336
  This last piece is notable for it covered the debate from the day before at the annual 
meeting of the Langnam Club (Langnamverein) organized to protect the economic interests of the 
Rhineland and Westphalia.  On November 4, 1930, Schmitt had been the keynote speaker at the 
Club’s meeting in which the members had engaged in a debate over the merits of the Brüning 
Chancellorship that displayed a deep division of opinion on the cabinet formed in March.  Schmitt 
likely took the anti-Brüning side given his later diary remark that the Chancellor was “not the last 
word of German Catholicism.”1337 
The two entries that Schmitt wrote for a 1926 political encyclopedia project, Staatslexikon, 
of the Görres-Gesellschaft, also qualify as furthering his secular-minded and radicalizing politics 
given they were on two of his favorite subjects, dictatorship and absolutism.
1338
  A similar conclusion 
applies to Schmitt’s two articles in the official journal of the Catholic Youth Movement, Die 
Schildgenossen; contrary to Lönne’s claim that Schmitt’s Catholic roots are an obvious influence as 
“his publications in Schildgenossen shows.”1339  As mentioned above, the first was simply an 
approved 1925 printing of an excerpt of the book Rhineland.
1340
  The second article was printed in 
1928 due to the efforts of Schmitt’s former student Werner Becker, who was by then a friend and 
student of Guardini’s close to the Quickborn youth movement.  Schmitt had delivered a lecture on 
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January 3, 1928 to a Catholic congress in Boppard/Mittelrhein which Becker transcribed.
1341
  He 
then presented the notes to Schmitt for review and gained his approval for publishing the lecture as 
“The Civil Constitutional State” in Die Schildgenossen.1342 
 
“The Civil Constitutional State” 
Schmitt begins “The Civil Constitutional State” by noting the continuity between the old 
Reich and the new Republic given both existed under a constitution; a constitutional monarchy 
became a constitutional republic.  Yet, the Republic has a serious problem, namely, that the 
constitution is barely alive in the consciousness of the German people.  The reasons for this are 
several, and Schmitt lists them: first, the continuing lack of true sovereignty for Germany under the 
Versailles and Dawes Plans; second, the fact that the bourgeois liberal constitution took the day not 
by its own merits (as would have been the case if it had been victorious in 1848) but rather by the 
monarchy simply removing itself after military defeat; and lastly, that after the war Germany had a 
stark and simple choice to make either for the West (of democratic republics) or the East (Soviet 
Russia).
1343
 
Schmitt continues by spelling out the liberal nature of the constitution, that it is meant to 
strictly curtail and define the scope of the State while leaving the freedom of individuals as 
expansive as possible.  He then moves into his standard critique of liberalism since he penned 
Parliamentarism, consisting in pointing out that the liberal approach to divided government and 
balanced powers is ultimately “non-political,” as it fails to achieve a “form” of government; terms 
which in Schmitt’s parlance mean that liberalism undermines the sovereign and unified power of 
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the modern State.
1344
  At this point, Schmitt moves in a much more radical direction, for what he 
treats as “bourgeois law,” or political liberalism, attempts to deny the people’s natural capacity for 
coming into a “political existence,” of achieving form or sovereignty.1345  He adds another wrinkle, 
however, for in order to achieve a political existence the people must enjoy: “a certain sameness, 
homogeneity is required”; and how is such homogeneity to be achieved?  “The institutions of a 
state have the function to make this similarity [of the people] possible and restore it afresh every 
day.”1346  In other words, as Hobbes taught him, the State is ontologically prior to the society, the 
people are such due to the unifying action of the State and its institutions; Leviathan determines 
who is a citizen. 
Next, Schmitt bemoans as strange that given Weimar’s democratic constitution “the 
assembled people . . . appear nowhere” due to the liberal safeguards of secret voting and lack of a 
means for public acclamation.
1347
  His solution to a lack of a unified people necessary for a strong 
state starts from a realist (and traditional) perspective that “only one part [of the people] may be the 
political leaders.”1348  That is, factions will vie for political rule and only one ruling class/group can 
be triumphant at any given time.  But from this basis he takes a radical path, for Schmitt believes 
given the heterogeneity of the German people—“culturally, socially, by class, racially, and 
religiously”—that, “[a] solution must be sought outside the democratic political methods” by which 
means the needful integration of “the German people to political unity” can be achieved.1349  
Schmitt leaves as an open question here how this political integration of the German people can or 
will be achieved.  The proto-fascist direction of his views is seen in other contemporary and earlier 
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evidences, as detailed above as regards his attachment to Mussolini and Maurras, as well as his 
anticipation of nationalism as the key component.  Additionally, at this time, he had also begun to 
promote the integrative effect of the political use of plebiscites and referenda.
1350
 
While it was only due to Becker’s efforts that this lecture of Schmitt’s was even typed up 
and became an article in Die Schildgenossen, the jurist now took the opportunity to spread its 
message.  “The Civil Constitutional State” was therefore reprinted twice more in quick succession 
in the Catholic press.  It first appeared with minor changes in Abendland
1351
 and then in part in the 
leading Center Party daily of Berlin, Germania; both being venues at which he had students on the 
editorial staff.
1352
  These two journals were the last Catholic venues to publish any articles by 
Schmitt after his excommunication. 
 
Schmitt’s Later Weimar Publications: Abendland and Germania 
In his postwar diary after naming a project of authentic Catholic intensification as a key 
motivation of his life’s work, Schmitt added: “Here in this way of Catholic intensification all stayed 
away from me, even Hugo Ball.  Only Konrad Weiß and Paul Adams remained with me as true 
friends.”1353  His discounting of Ball was due to the short life of their friendship.1354  On Weiß, we 
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must take Schmitt’s word, as there is not much independent evidence available.  However, the very 
phrase Schmitt makes a catchword of his work, “Catholic intensification,” was adapted from a work 
of the mystical poet’s on Theodor Hacker.1355  As for Adams, he did indeed remain a fellow-
traveler of Schmitt’s.  Having started out as a student of the jurist’s in Bonn, Adams went on to 
become the editor of Germania’s cultural supplement.  Both before Schmitt moved to Berlin in 
1928, but increasingly after, the protégé often joined his charismatic professor in roaming the red 
light district’s seedy bohemian bars.1356  And, to further clarify what Schmitt may have had in mind 
as proper intensification for Catholic politics, Adams became an enthusiastic member of the Nazi 
Party and heavily critiqued the Catholic episcopacy for its lack of support of the Nazi regime.
1357
 
Adams was likely instrumental in several pieces by his mentor being published in 
Germania.  These included “The State and the Right to War,” in 1928 which would become part 
five of the 1932 edition of The Concept of the Political.
1358
  In this piece, Schmitt is entirely 
dismissive of the entire Catholic tradition of just war theory, and attacks the Church as an entity 
                                                                                                                                                             
him he thought the review was a “bad joke.”  The artist wrote a letter to Schmitt for an explanation of the review and of 
his own views on his book, but then decided not to send it.  In this unsent missive he is particularly concerned that 
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Catholic thinker, one must keep in mind that he was himself an eclectic, and frankly heterodox, thinker in his own 
right.  Ball’s resistance to institutional religion and desire to treat Catholicism as a private affair with no corporate 
aspect had already received pointed criticism by Romano Guardini in his review of Ball’s Byzantinisches Christentum: 
Drei Heiligenleben (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1923), the year before Gurian’s review so upset the artist.  
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1924 issue of Die Schildgenossen.  In the bound collection of Die Schildgenossen, it is found at volume 4 (1923-4), 
256-268.  I have only had access to the extended quotes from the review given in Gerhart Edward Steinke, The Life 
and Work of Hugo Ball, Founder of Dadaism (Paris: Mouton, 1967), 236-37. 
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which, by means of such indirect power and theorizing, attempts to impede the State’s complete 
control of the determination of the jus belli.  For “[b]y virtue of this power over the physical life of 
men, the political community transcends all other associations or societies.”1359  Only the State, the 
sovereign, can declare who its enemies are and an attempt to postulate justice as belonging to “the 
concept of war” will “usually serve a political purpose”; it indicates “a hidden political aspiration of 
some other party to wrest from the state its jus belli and to find norms of justice whose content and 
application in the concrete case is not decided upon by the state but by another party.”1360  The 
other two Schmitt articles in Germania—1929’s “Culture as a Social Problem,”1361 and “Neutrality 
towards the Economy?”1362—were far less militant than “The State and the Right to War.”  
However, both remain examples of Schmitt’s increasing radicalism as they informed his belief that 
the social was invading and “secularizing” the political realm (totalizing and dissipating the state) in 
contemporary European politics.
1363
 
Although Schmitt was in contact with Hermann Platz, the founder of Abendland, while 
they were both in Bonn, he displayed a general unwillingness to write for or be associated too 
closely with that journal.  In January of 1928, Platz asked Schmitt for his help in contributing to 
and jointly publishing a collection of recent French work in intellectual history as a volume in a 
series titled “Studies on the History of the Western Spirit.”  Despite Schmitt’s own Francophilia he 
declined to assist Platz.
1364
  Two Schmitt articles did, however, find their way into Abendland’s 
pages, possibly because two of his students, Becker and Adams, were associated with the journal 
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(the former as one of its editors).  The first article has already been mentioned; it was simply the 
reprint of “The Civil Constitutional State.”  But, as if to reinforce his distance from the journal, 
after it ran Schmitt insisted the editors run a notice in the next issue making it quite clear that the 
piece which bore his name in April had simply been taken from a transcript made by Becker of a 
lecture he gave to a small group.  He also mentioned the article’s presence in the journal in the 
same dismissive manner in a letter to fellow constitutional lawyer Rudolf Smend.
1365
  The second 
article is an original piece that, much like the first, demonstrates Schmitt’s adversarial stance to 
political Catholicism. 
 
“The Political Situation of the Demilitarized Rhineland” 
The second piece that Schmitt published in Abendland follows the polemical pattern of 
the first.  In “The Political Situation of the Demilitarized Rhineland,”1366 Schmitt continues his 
attempts to radicalize Catholics by stressing the abnormality and unworkability of the political life 
of Germany under the Versailles Treaty.  He focuses here on the problems of rule in the forcibly 
demilitarized regions of the country.  That Schmitt’s polemics are directed at Catholics is 
immediately suggested by his reference to the Center Party leader, Father Ludwig Kaas, who he 
selectively quotes from throughout the essay.
1367
  Schmitt insists that the primary question that must 
be addressed to the “political terms of the Versailles Treaty and the agreements following it” is the 
classical question of “quis judicabit?” “who judges or decides?”  It is the basis of sovereignty for 
Schmitt that: “a normal, politically independent state decides about the existential questions of 
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concern to its political life, especially whether it is attacked and of its right to self-defense.”1368  
Clearly, the demilitarized and subject state of the Rhineland specifically denies German sovereignty 
and undermines the nation-state in an abnormal and untenable manner.  To Schmitt, the terrible 
and natural conclusion of such a course will be the turning, to Geneva or Paris, of the Germans of 
the Rhineland for protection of themselves and territory from “gunmen” that could prey on a 
demilitarized zone, given the people will naturally seek out the sovereign power which can offer it 
protection.
1369
  Schmitt applies here the Hobbesian principle that with protection comes obedience 
(protego ergo obligo), the basis of reciprocity between the people and the Sovereign State.
1370
 
Schmitt points out basic contradictions, or at least unresolved conflicts, between the 
Republic’s Constitutional democracy and the articles of the treaty which claim the power to keep 
the Rhineland demilitarized.  Since the German President is granted the authority to intervene—
even by means of the army if necessary—to maintain or restore order and public safety in German 
territory (Article 48, paragraphs I and II), a deep conflict exists with the articles 42 and 43 of the 
Versailles Treaty governing the demilitarized Rhineland.
1371
  Schmitt illustrates this conflict by 
reminding his readers of the occupation of Frankfurt by the French, in the spring of 1920, in 
response to attempts by the German Army to suppress Communist riots; an occupation he recalls 
as a “monstrous sanction.”1372  Schmitt ends by noting that since a large portion of the demilitarized 
zone is in Prussia, which—thankfully—has a well-developed police apparatus, means exist to some 
extent to maintain public order without use of the army.  However, the same cannot be said for all 
regions of the Rhineland, much of which he fears lack the capacity of defending itself in times of 
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civil unrest.
1373
  Just as with the publication history of “The Civil Constitutional State” Schmitt 
sought multiple venues for “The Political Situation of the Demilitarized Rhineland” and so in 
addition to its appearance in Abendland, it was also distributed as a four-page pamphlet by the 
Cologne Publishing Guild and then appeared in the politically nationalist newspaper Der Ring.
1374
  
In his polemical works Schmitt sought a broad audience and influence. 
All things considered, it is logical to assume that Schmitt’s primary interests in being 
published in the Weimar Catholic press were either prosaic (seeking to promote one of his 
forthcoming books) or polemical (to promote his practical political views).  The latter motive 
supports the “authentic Catholic intensification” hypothesis.  The content of these articles and 
editorials, however, make it clear that Schmitt was not at all trying to promote a specifically, or even 
generically, “Catholic” understanding of German politics.  He was a consistent opponent of the 
Center Party and any recognizable form of Catholic political thought.  His status as an outsider to 
German Catholic intellectual life and thought was widely, and increasingly, recognized in the 
reviews and articles on his work which appeared in the Catholic press. 
 
Schmitt’s Later Weimar Treatment in the Catholic Press:  Book Reviews 
In the later years of Weimar very few noteworthy articles or pieces in the Catholic press 
looked favorably upon Schmitt.  The bulk of the complimentary press he received was in book 
reviews rather than substantial articles.  Positive, albeit primarily straightforward, reviews of 
Schmitt’s 1926 book The Core Question of the League of Nations were published in 
Abendland
1375
and twice in the Kölnische Volkszeitung
1376
; with the latter perhaps due to his student, 
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Gurian’s, influence.  In 1929, Gurian himself wrote an anonymous and positive review of Schmitt’s 
Constitutional Theory
1377
 for Germania.  His juridical magnum opus also received a straightforward 
but positive treatment in Die Schildgenossen.
1378
 
The review essay of Constitutional Theory published in Hochland deserves lengthier 
treatment as it was more detailed, insightful, and pro-Schmitt than the others.
1379
  The author was 
Serbian philosopher, and student of Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), Mila Radaković (1861-1956).  
She begins with a straightforward point-by-point review of the text by a “highly respected professor 
of public law in Berlin.”1380  She recognizes that Schmitt’s view of bourgeois constitutionalism as 
liberalism means that he complains it is intended to reduce the State to nonexistence, to just a 
series of contracts between individuals which Radaković describes as “the victory of society over 
the state.”1381  This is a critical insight as it reflects the reversal in modern political thought of the 
Catholic and pre-modern view that society is superior to the state and signals her agreement with 
Schmitt. 
Radaković continues by agreeing with Schmitt that in contemporary times the only realistic 
option for forging the unity of a people is the force of nationalism which has come to be the basis 
of even the right of a particular state to exist.
1382
  As Schmitt argues, the only true representation of 
the people’s will is in the acclamation, not normal polling or secret ballots.1383  Along with Schmitt, 
she thinks “we vaguely guessed that something new and great today wrings itself into existence”; a 
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new synthesis of conflicting forces, the form of which is not yet clear.
1384
  The failure of parliament 
is it now exists just to balance the competing parties but such a “civil war with the ballot” makes 
“the state at best only a neutral third party” and the state of affairs leaves open who is actually 
sovereign, who “represents the unity of the people in political life.”1385  Like Schmitt, she concludes 
that in interwar Europe only two states have “broke new ground,” the Soviet Republics and Italy, 
which has “returned to the original democratic form,” meaning acclamation.1386  But “whether this 
attempt of Italy brings the final decision is irrelevant to the fact that it lies in the line of logical 
development.”1387 
Germania ran a review of Schmitt’s The Guardian of the Constitution in 1931.  This 
second review in the leading Berlin Center paper was penned by Johannes Popitz, a lawyer and 
close friend of Schmitt, who held high ranking office in the Prussian, and then, German finance 
ministry during the Republic as well as under Nazi rule.
1388
  Popitz clearly agrees with Schmitt that 
the settled pluralist party structure of the Republic was leading towards a “total state,” in which 
society and state become helplessly intertwined leading to the dissipation and eventual collapse of 
the independent sovereign State and national unity.
1389
  He follows Schmitt in first suggesting and 
rejecting both the Parliament and Judiciary as potential guardians of the Constitution against 
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“neutralization or depoliticization”1390 in favor of the Reich President, a result “fully consistent with 
the democratic principle on which the Weimar Constitution is based.”1391  Popitz’s review, coming 
as it did from a high ranking ministerial official as well as being placed in the most significant 
Center paper in Berlin, has been credited with laying out and promoting for a much wider 
audience Schmitt’s late Weimar political views.1392  The last positive book reviews on Schmitt we 
need to examine were penned by the historian and Latinist Hermann Hefele. 
The last published review of Political Form in the Catholic media, written by Hefele, 
appeared in Abendland over a year after Schmitt’s excommunication, in April 1927.1393  Although 
Political Form was first issued in 1923 only one of its six reviews are of this edition.  The other 
reviews correspond to the book’s reissue in 1925, by the publishing arm of the German 
episcopacy, Theatiner-Verlag München, as the thirteenth title in a series on Catholic Thought (Der 
Katholische Gedanke).  Incidentally, only ten of the fifty-five Weimar-era pieces on Schmitt in 
Catholic venues date to before 1925.  Thus, it is reasonable to suspect that receiving the bishops’ 
imprimatur had an undue impact on the interest Schmitt received from Catholic intellectuals as 
well as being a primary cause of his positive reputation amongst German Catholics in the Weimar 
era, to the extent that he had such. 
Hefele had been deeply involved in working out what German political Catholicism should 
entail from at least 1919 when he first wrote an article on the topic.
1394
  He proved to be one of the 
few Weimar Catholic thinkers who believed that Schmitt was making valuable contributions to 
                                                 
1390
 Popitz, “Wer ist Hüter der Verfassung,” 103. 
1391
 Ibid., 104. 
1392
 Bentin, Johannes Popitz und Carl Schmitt, 126.  Bentin focuses on the manner in which he believes Popitz’s 
approach to state economic policy would be unthinkable without his personal interaction with Schmitt (they became 
acquainted once Schmitt took a position at the Berlin Handelshochschule in 1929).  In fact, he persuasively argues that 
Popitz was intentionally trying to carry out Schmitt’s political philosophy in his financial and state administrative policy 
in the 1930’s. 
1393
 Hermann Hefele, “Zum Problem einer Politik aus dem katholischen Glauben,” Abendland, 2.7 (April 1927), 195-
7. 
1394
 See: Hermann Hefele, “Der politische Katholizismus,” in Der Leuchter: Weltanschauung und Lebensgestaltung.  
Jahrbuch der Schule der Weisheit, ed. Graf Hermann Keyserling (Darmstadt: Darmstadt Reichl, 1919), 127-60. 
331 
 
determining what approach the Center, and Catholics generally, should take in response to the 
political and social problems the Republic faced.
1395
  For example, he shared Schmitt’s animus 
towards Romanticism, and in a 1924 article for Hochland, “Democracy and Liberalism,”1396 he 
utilized the distinction that Schmitt had made in Parliamentarism between those two concepts.
1397
  
However, in his enthusiastic review of Political Form it is still important to note—like those by 
Beyerle and Port discussed above—Hefele utilizes Schmitt’s thought as an occasio for developing 
his own views on political Catholicism. 
Hefele begins by calling Political Form “extremely clever and brilliant” and “unfortunately 
far too little noticed.”1398  He then promptly diverges completely from Schmitt’s text and views by 
describing the relationship of Church and State in the traditional language of Pius XI as one in 
which the Church is representative of the “mystical Body of Christ”; which combined with its legal 
character in canon law give it the grounds to “judge the political.”1399  He then returns momentarily 
closer to Schmitt by expressing their shared horror of political anarchy based on the materialism 
and apoliticism of capitalist and Marxist thought which could leave the Church alone to defend 
“the existence of a political order of things at all.”1400  But Hefele again immediately goes his own 
way by stating, “the debate on the political task of Catholicism” would do well “to adhere to 
Schmitt’s ideas” as found in Political Form, and so he wants to develop his own views upon that 
basis.
1401
 
Hefele differentiates the Church as an institution and its religious mission from individual 
Catholics as members of both the universal Church and a specific political community.  This 
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arrangement leaves the determination of the specific policies of the political community a task for 
the individual Catholics with the Church as conscience and guide; thus, “strictly speaking, it is 
incorrect to speak of a Church politics.”1402  Again he refers to a traditional concept, that of the “two 
swords” of Church and State but that within this dynamic the State is itself under the educative 
purview of the Church just as is the individual conscience.  Therefore, the conflict between Church 
and States is really between the Church and absolute states, which claim “absolute validity” and 
dominion.
1403
  As we have repeatedly seen, this is the polar opposite of Schmitt’s view of the matter, 
even if they are in agreement that the most extreme political ideology is anarchy, which denies any 
political form of authority at all. 
Hefele’s divergence from Schmitt’s views is made even starker as he continues to describe 
the ontological priority of the Church to the State.  One reason for its superiority is the Church has 
within itself a deeper form of “political community” than is generated in the State since it “rests on 
the sanctity of marriage, the religious character of the profession and the communion of love of the 
faithful.”1404  In fact, the Catholic recognizes “as a matter of course” the “freedom of the Church” 
and, therefore, “the State as such can never be final and absolute.”1405  The Catholic is more vividly 
aware of the “inadequacy and . . . relative value” of the State than those of other religions.  Why?  
Because, the Church had created an: “order and political form before the awakening of national 
consciousness.”1406  This claim sounds like the traditional civilizational concept of Christendom, 
that the early and medieval Church shaped a unified Europe long before the individual modern 
nation-States were formed from out of the remnants of the Roman Empire. 
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The Latinist and Romanist Hefele is, however, no reactionary romantic yearning for a 
return to the Middle Ages.  He wisely points out that the belief that the Church is meant to ally 
itself with monarchy is an old prejudice based primarily on the simple fact that the Middle Ages 
saw very few democracies anywhere.  It is a prejudice many German Catholics still find difficult to 
rid themselves of in the aftermath of the fall of the Wittelsbach dynasty.  For his part, Hefele favors 
democracy as best befitting the Catholic view because—once again in total contrast to Schmitt—the 
Church recognizes the value of the individual person as opposed to the subject being made a: “. . . 
mindless tool and object of the State.”1407 
Immediately after Schmitt’s “The Civil Constitutional State” in the April 1928 issue of 
Abendland, a glowing review of the first essay form of The Concept of the Political was placed, 
again penned by Hefele.  Like Schmitt, the conservative historian was a deep admirer of 
Machiavelli, and so he appreciated, along with Schmitt, the modern “realist” view that “politics is 
power.”1408  He found Schmitt’s concept of “friend and foe” to be felicitous and to perfectly 
encapsulate the context in which the “striving for individual values” takes place within a “viable 
community.”1409  Hefele even agrees with the more radical aspects of Schmitt’s political thought in 
this review as he readily accepts that political will is fundamentally arbitrary and not a matter of 
ethics but, instead, requires “the full commitment of all human existence.  Unless politics is 
associated with danger to life . . . it is business, at best bureaucracy.”1410  Hefele here embraces 
political existentialism.
1411
  Yet, as Dahlheimer tells us, even when at his most rhetorically radical, 
                                                 
1407
 Ibid. 
1408
 As quoted in: Dahlheimer, Schmitt und der deutsche Katholizismus, 303. 
1409
 As quoted in: Ibid., 304. 
1410
 As quoted in: Ibid. 
1411
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Hefele: “names the concept of order, in the sense intended by Catholic social teaching, as the aim 
of the political.  One searches for such a statement in vain in Schmitt’s ‘Concept of the 
Political.’”1412  Hefele routinely goes beyond Schmitt towards a presentation of his own authentically 
Catholic social and political views; thus treating Schmitt as a participant in a dialogue he had no 
interest in joining.
1413
  The political radicalism that Schmitt exhibited more directly in his later 
Weimar works did not net very many clear allies within the Catholic press.  Hefele was likely the 
most prominent intellectual who was routinely published in the confessional milieu’s media outlets 
and shared common ground with the jurist; yet, even he was a more independent thinker than 
echo of Schmitt.  The above examination exhausts the positive treatments of Schmitt’s books in 
the later Weimar Catholic press.  For the most part, his works were ignored, except for a scathing 
review of Political Romanticism, an additional review of The Core Question of the League of 
Nations, and a number of uniformly negative reviews of The Concept of the Political. 
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Dawson (1899-1970), had Political Form published by England’s leading imprint for Catholic apologetics, Sheed and 
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providing a fascinating account of a common Catholic interpretation of modernity as temporal site of the progressive 
secularization of Europe and the concomitant rise of irrationalism; as well as of growing forces of moral, social, and 
political decay.  Dawson’s introduction pays little to no attention, however, to Schmitt’s essay and the actual arguments 
contained therein.  If one is interested in seeing a truer representation of where mainstream political Catholicism stood 
in the 1920’s and Thirties, particularly as regards political modernity, one should read Dawson’s introduction rather 
than Schmitt’s essay.  Thus, Gary Ulmen writes of Dawson: “his introduction does not evidence a very clear 
understanding of Schmitt’s thesis” (Ulmen, “Introduction” to Schmitt, Political Form, xil).  In a similar fashion Frank 
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Originally the diocesan paper for Limburg, the Rhein-Mainische-Volkszeitung became a 
widely circulated and politically left Catholic paper in the Weimar years.  In 1926, the prominent 
poet, author, and priest Johannes Kirschweng (1900-51) reviewed the second edition of Political 
Romanticism for the paper.
1414
  Kirschweng remarks that Schmitt’s reduction of romantics to “being 
without substance” is “too easy.”1415  He then notices that, in fact, Schmitt reveals himself to fit the 
very definition of a romantic that he is critiquing given his own use of “criticism [as] an instrument 
on which he himself plays.”1416  Kirschweng even refers to how Schmitt fits into Franz Blei’s literary-
critical Bestiary of German Literature, which the jurist happened to assist in writing.
1417
  Kirschweng 
then offers an alternate description of what makes one a romantic; namely, being a person filled 
with “longing” and “inherently in movement and not at peaceful rest” so that they are driven by 
“aspirations and not possession.”1418  The priest believes that Schmitt fits this description of a 
romantic as a “man of intoxication and of the anguish of ecstasy and despair” given his polemical 
“tone of grimmest indignation” and unscientific personal manner of writing.1419  Perhaps 
Kirschweng only had Schmitt’s vitriolic attacks on Müller in mind; but in any event, his insight into 
the man from reading Political Romanticism is impressive given what we now know about 
Schmitt’s personal life and character.1420 
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Next is a Bavarian Baron, Carl-Oskar Freiherr von Soden (1898-1943), who wrote a highly 
critical review of Core Question in 1926 for the Allgemeine Rundschau, a Catholic weekly out of 
Munich covering German politics, culture, and religion since 1904.
1421
  Soden writes: 
We know Carl Schmitt as one of our most brilliant contemporary jurists.  But the special luster of his thought 
is its one-sidedness.  And besides that, Carl Schmitt's jurisprudence, no, his thought is extremely romanized.  
The clarity and the relentless rigor of Roman law have shaped the character of this philosopher and jurist and 
her voice speaks from [his writings].
1422
 
 
Soden here penetrates to one of the central, and consistent, aspects of Schmitt’s thought; namely, 
its Romanism rather than Catholicity.  Since Schmitt’s “too loud commitment to Romanism and 
his doctrine of state sovereignty” are so omnipresent in his writings Soden has no need to waste 
words.  
Instead, he focuses on the deep infertility of the jurist’s critique of the League of Nations, 
which he believes comes from Schmitt’s commitment to state sovereignty.  Poignantly, Soden 
refers to the constant complaint from Mussolini that it will be the pretension to itself being a 
universal State that will make the League “intolerable for the member states.”1423  Soden was 
committed to federalism and defended the individual against the State; he had even recently 
become a priest.  So he shared the Catholic suspicion of the modern unitary and absolute 
nationalist states.  However, he also recognized in the League an attempt to overcome state 
sovereignty and national history to usher in for Europe “a new era of the heroic struggle of 
humanity to progress, peace and freedom” counter to the “fascist madness” now developing.1424  
Soden would soon pay for his prescience, as he was an outspoken critic of the Nazis, and when 
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Germany came under that regime he first fled to Switzerland, then Austria to assist the opposition 
to the Anschluß, before finally making it to the United States. 
That the political existentialism and authoritarian decisionism present in Schmitt’s The 
Concept of the Political has nothing to do with Catholic social and political thought was a fact not 
lost on the reviewers of that work in Weimar’s Catholic press.  The Catholic pacifist journal Der 
Friedenskämpfer was home to a debate on The Concept of the Political over the course of several 
issues in 1928-29.
1425
  The exchange was begun by the complaint lodged by Dominican priest 
Franziskus Stratmann
1426
 (1883-1971) that Schmitt neutralized or simply dismissed the Church as 
moral influence and power, as well as exhibited a complete disregard for charity.  Stratmann 
strongly objects to the clear insistence, by Schmitt, that the command to “love one’s enemy” is 
merely a private affair with no consequence for the political actions of the State tasked with 
defining and responding to internal and external enemies.
1427
  Schmitt’s student, Werner Becker, 
sent in a reply to Stratmann’s attack, which was published in a subsequent issue along with a 
response by the priest, and a final commentary by Catholic philosopher, Dietrich von Hildebrand 
(1889-1977).
1428
  Even Becker’s defense of Schmitt, however, was not wholesale as he did admit to 
wanting “the political criterion aligned to the ‘ordering concepts’ of war and peace.”1429 
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When The Concept of the Political was finally published in book format in 1932, a cluster 
of three negative reviews (and no others) appeared in Catholic outlets that summer.  The first was 
penned by Georg Schmitt (dates unavailable), who left the Windthorst League in 1931 to work at 
the Rhein-Mainische-Volkszeitung, then politically far left.
1430
  In July of 1932, Georg’s review 
appeared in the daily,
1431
  and he “noted the broad resonance of Schmitt’s remarks” but investigates 
and rejects the jurist’s “restriction of the Christian commandment of love to the private sector.”1432  
Georg then makes a very perceptive remark when he points out that Schmitt makes a “Protestant 
mistake” by seeking to devise a new public order that will save the people from human nature in its 
“radical evil.”1433  Even worse “the new order of the people Schmitt seeks is not a civil society” 
since—instead of seeking to integrate the Proletarian masses—in “Schmitt’s Friend-Enemy 
polarization the civil state was formed against the Proletariat.”1434  Georg attacks this new order of 
Schmitt’s with reference to natural law and also indicates that the jurist is basically a utopian in his 
belief that a “consummate order” is possible “in the world.”1435  The implication of Georg’s 
criticism seems to be that Schmitt had committed what Eric Voegelin describes as a peculiarly 
modern cum Gnostic error of “immanentizing the eschaton,” or falling into a radical utopian belief 
that the “kingdom of heaven” might be brought about by human political efforts.  This belief in an 
inner-worldly end times is not the sole prerogative of radicals of the political left.  In addition to the 
vision of Marx’s classless communist society, it can also be found in radical conservatives such as 
Schmitt who believe that a strong enough state can subdue all threats of social disruption, as well as 
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radical liberals like Francis Fukuyama (1952-) and his famous claim that liberal democracy had 
succeeded in bringing “history” to an end.1436 
Hochland is home to the next appearance of a review on The Concept of the Political in a 
Catholic journal.  Erich Brock (1889-1976), “a freelance writer” on “political, philosophical, and 
literary themes” often published in Catholic venues,1437 wrote the highly critical review which 
appeared in August.
1438
  Brock begins by cutting directly to the chase and stating the specific agenda 
Schmitt has in the essay; namely, to make the political independent of any other categories and 
then define its specific characteristic.  Schmitt does this and—within these constraints—comes to the 
logical conclusion that the friend-enemy distinction is the essence of the political.  The problem, 
Brock sedately points out, is Schmitt’s political teaching is simply a contemporary instantiation of 
“the old,” in fact “already extant with the Sophists . . . doctrine of Hobbes and Spinoza” that “Law 
and Power are the same.”1439  Brock notices this doctrine has now joined with the concept of the 
existential and “is preparing, starting from the theological, to conquer all areas of the mind.”1440  But 
over the next couple of pages he shows how the friend-enemy distinction cannot sufficiently 
ground politics.  It may prepare one existentially for the “hardness” of reality but “without 
standards, without ideological imperatives” it remains a criteria “empty as Kant’s categorical 
imperative; empty as the attempt to construct simple religion from the I-Thou relationship, the 
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clash between man and God.”1441  Brock queries “without essentiality” how does one “answer the 
question” of the political or, in religion, “recognize God in this encounter”?1442 
As Brock continues to try and work out Schmitt’s argument he pointedly suggests: “We do 
not believe that the unbiased will escape the impression of being led around here in a system of 
tautologies and circular reasoning, which is obscured temporarily by a brilliant diction.”1443  More 
than that, Brock notices the logic of Schmitt’s presentation is the existential necessity of aggressive 
war.  Even though the jurist “strikingly . . . says nothing about” wars of aggression, “if the enemy in 
the autonomous political sense . . . is determined, then [one should] immediately go off on him.”1444  
He suggests instead that the concept of political “enemy” can today be understood either in the 
sense of an opposed party, as it is in parliamentary democracy, or as an enemy of the state as in 
Bolshevism and Fascism.  Brock believes that Schmitt’s understanding is much closer to the latter 
than the former but that the former option has not yet been exhausted; indeed, parliamentary 
democracy yet offers an opportunity for cooperation between different (pluralistic) political 
forces.
1445
  As Lönne informs us, Brock “rejected Schmitt’s radical conclusions” based on Christian 
impulses especially his reliance on the friend-enemy concept.
1446
 
The final critical review of The Concept of the Political from 1932 was written by the Jesuit 
professor of social ethics and moral philosophy, Johann Baptist Schuster (1883-1952), and 
appeared in the official organ of the German province of The Society of Jesus, Stimmen der Zeit 
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(Voices of the Time).
1447
  Over the course of the first two pages Schuster simply provides the reader 
with a straightforward summary of Schmitt’s argument.  In his conclusion, he then restricts himself 
to the “main idea” and asks “whether the essence of politics is really to be found in the friend-
enemy” distinction?  His response, much as would be Pieper’s during the Second World War, is 
to opine that: 
We would have desired that an ancient and well-founded tradition would have been mentioned; the State, the 
Community is based on the ‘bonum commune’ with safety and welfare its purpose, and anchored in the 
moral world order.
1448
 
 
Schuster concluded by pointing out how the actual, various, and “rich” interactions of nations 
cannot be reduced to Schmitt’s thesis, nor had he demonstrated “efforts for world peace” amount 
to a “conceptual impossibility.”1449 
 
Schmitt’s Later Weimar Treatment in the Catholic Press: The Clash with Ernst Michel 
 
Lönne characterizes the socialist journalist and lay theologian, Ernst Michel, as “within 
Catholicism the most determined critic of Schmitt’s juridical interpretation of the Church and its 
role for government and politics.”1450  Michel was the author of The Foundation of a Catholic 
Politics in 1923
1451
 and then Politics of Faith in 1926,
 1452
 as well as many articles which developed a 
Christian socialist treatment of Catholic thought during Weimar.  He was a prominent member of 
the “Frankfurter Circle” of leftist Catholic teachers and journalists associated with the Rhein-
Mainische-Volkszeitung, edited by Walter Dirks (1901-91).
1453
  When he wrote Politics of Faith, 
Michel, in part, intended it as a response and criticism of Schmitt’s Political Form: 
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If the Church is what Schmitt claims, then his conclusions are correct.  Then the Grand Inquisitor is right to 
be opposed to Christ.  But if the Church is the sacrament of agape then she would break through the cordon 
drawn [around it] by the lawyers: then she would not be the aristocratic heiress who waits for her partner, but 
she will hear the cry of distress of the unrepresented ‘society’ and practice Samaritan service to them in the 
form of her love and what ‘just here and now needs to be done.’1454 
 
Michel’s socialist mindset is expressed in the above passage and so, indeed, he was a Catholic 
thinker accused of modernism.  He amply demonstrated such an attitude in his disregard of 
Church condemnations of socialism and its ban on Catholics joining socialist parties as simply 
“outdated.”1455  However, his manner of criticizing Schmitt as well as his application of Church 
teachings to political affairs—though heterodox—does demonstrate an interest in political 
Catholicism and engaging Catholic thought lacking in the jurist.  Schmitt brackets off political 
Catholicism; he examines the Church as source of analogies to illustrate his views on the structure 
and form he desires the secular State to exhibit.
1456
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“homogenization process of the state” based on the foundational category of “the people” to Schmitt.  And he thus 
correctly notes that when Schmitt “commented enthusiastically on every step of [the Nazis] seizure of power” and 
eventually served as the regime’s “Crown Jurist,” there was “no need to break from his previous positions.”  
Unfortunately, Bröckling draws a final tendentious and erroneous conclusion which suggests that his own anti-Catholic 
sentiments are the reason he does not recognize the radical secularity of Schmitt’s thought.  He writes that Schmitt’s 
capacity to develop his understanding of the political from an “analogy to the form of the Catholic Church, perhaps 
shows the ideological kinship of Catholicism and fascism more clearly than the actual behavior of Catholics before and 
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Michel continues his attack on Schmitt’s juridical fixation as regards the Church in an 
article of November 1930 for the Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung, “On the Internal Political Crisis 
of the State: A Discussion with Carl Schmitt.”1457  Michel implies that Schmitt has a heretical 
ecclesiology—a trenchant observation—and he “went over and above all to the legal system.  In it, 
he determined the nature of the Church as well as its political mission.”1458  The lay theologian sees 
Schmitt’s position as “one last possible attempt at the self assertion of the Western metaphysical 
State that escapes into the Church and expects her to be as a Noah’s Ark after the flood and the 
restoration of the ancient world of States and western humanity.”1459  Perhaps Michel was inspired 
to make this comment by the final passage of Political Form and it sounds similar to Richard 
Thoma’s complaint.  However, Political Form in 1923 stands alone as a comment by Schmitt on 
the relationship between the Church and contemporary politics; and as we detailed above, it is not 
actually intended to suggest an involvement in national politics on the part of the Church beyond 
being a prop to secular authority by preaching obeisance to it and denying itself as even an indirect 
power.  Lönne’s conclusion is more accurate, as he notices that Schmitt develops an image of the 
Church and Christianity only in order to then “substantiate his understanding of State and politics.”  
Whereas, “Michel offered religious Catholicity as the basis; the remedy for the present social crisis 
is sought in a deep and far reaching change of heart.”1460  The “antithesis of Church of law and 
Church of love” may have “dominated the debate” over the nature of the Catholic Church “for 
                                                                                                                                                             
after 1933.  And in this sense, Schmitt remains just as ‘fascist’ as Catholic an intellectual.”  All unreferenced quotes 
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many years” but Schmitt is far more accurately described as an accidental participant in that debate 
and as an exploiter of one side of it for his own purposes.
1461
 
A number of the remaining articles dealing with Schmitt in the Catholic press are motivated 
by an interest in the thought of Michel and his critique of Schmitt.  The first such piece is a 1927 
review of Michel’s Politics of Faith by Jesuit Jakob Semmel (dates unavailable) for Stimmen der 
Zeit.
1462
  Semmel does not fully agree with Michel’s characterization of Schmitt, and so seems to 
favor the jurist’s treatment of the Church; he even places Schmitt “indirectly in the Catholic 
Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.”1463  Then, Heinrich Getzeny (1894-1970) responded to Semmel, 
on the side of Michel, in the journal of the Catholic Youth Movement, Die Schildgenossen.
1464
  
That Getzeny sides with the socialist Michel, so far as critiquing Schmitt’s ecclesiology is 
concerned, is quite suggestive, as in addition to being a student of phenomenologist philosopher 
Max Scheler,
1465
 he was best known in the Catholic community as the national secretary for 
Wurttemberg of the politically oriented conservative-nationalist People’s Association for Catholic 
Germany (the Volksverein).
1466
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Getzeny pulls no punches in “Catholicism of Being or Catholicism of Applied Will.”  He 
provocatively suggests that Theatiner-Verlag suffered from a “lack of intellectual intuition”1467 by 
having deemed Schmitt’s essay worthy of inclusion in a Bishop-approved series of books on 
Catholic thought.  He notices the jurist seems to consider Catholicism “primarily as a form of 
social and political force”;1468 a line of thinking he believes leads to the complete erosion of the 
faith.  In fact, Getzeny sees Maurras’ famous phrase “I am Catholic, but I am atheist” as apposite 
of Schmitt as well, given the jurist’s “overvaluing of the external organization of the Church” to 
inflate the importance of his concept of representation.
1469
  This is the earliest published Catholic 
piece which notes the similitude between Schmitt’s Political Form and Maurras.  His student 
Waldemar Gurian had made this connection the year before, only privately in a letter to Erik 
Peterson.
1470
  Reading Schmitt as a “State-romantic,” Getzeny maintains that such ideologues 
represent a greater danger to the Church than freethinkers because they treat it as a “highly 
organized system of power . . . and obstruct [people] from recognizing the Church as the bearer 
and bringer of salvation and grace, as a mediator of salvation.”1471  Quite presciently, Getzeny 
concludes that Schmitt’s approach leads to the total state; a criticism that we shall find becomes 
common currency at the end of Weimar.
1472
 
In 1929, an article by the Jesuit Friedrich Muckermann (1883-1946) on “Dictatorship and 
Christianity” appeared in the Berlin daily, Germania, which largely splits the difference between 
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Schmitt’s views and Michel’s.1473  And then, in 1931, the head of the social department in the 
Central Office of the Volksverein at München-Gladbach, Heinrich Rommen (1897-1967), rejected 
the entire debate as idle, for: “[t]he antithesis Legal Church-Love Church exists only in the head.  
Actually the Holy One lives just right out of the love and the power of the sacraments.”1474  
Rommen correctly applies the concept of the Church as a complex of opposites by insisting against 
both Schmitt and Michel that it is, by rights, both love and power, free spirit and rule bound.
1475
 
These last two figures from German Catholic intellectual life usefully serve as a point of 
transition to the final chapter of this study of Schmitt and Weimar political Catholicism.  For, in 
different ways, they help elucidate the contours of politically Catholic thought in Germany in the 
early Thirties and through the demise of the Weimar Republic.  Muckermann, for his part, in 
political commentaries at this time: 
[C]alled for the reestablishment of some form of the Holy Roman Empire (Reich) in which the state and the 
churches would work together.  In his judgment, this kind of polity was so much a part of Germany's history 
and culture that it was needed once again.  Muckermann struck a deep chord among Germans who longed 
for a return to the political and juridical structure that had existed in Germany until 1806, when it was 
officially dissolved by the Austrian emperor Francis I [r. 1804-35].  . . . Since the crisis of the Weimar 
Republic seemed to result from the ethnic, moral, and religious diversity of democracy, some Germans 
judged that the crisis would be remedied only by an authoritarian state in which the churches were given an 
official status.  They even promoted a Reichstheologie, a religious theory according to which German people 
were being called by God to form a polity reuniting the state and the churches and dedicated to bringing 
about a moral revival in the West.
1476
 
 
And Rommen was famously at the heart of a revival of interest in the Baroque Thomist Francisco 
Suárez and natural law theory, as well as prominent in terms of Weimar “Catholic action” in the 
Volksverein. 
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Chapter 9. 
Schmitt and Political Catholicism in the Republic’s Final Years 
“The doer is always without a conscience; no one has a conscience except him who contemplates.” 
—Goethe Maximen und Reflexionen (1820), number 125. 
 
 
Carl Schmitt’s Late Weimar Political Views 
 
The standard narrative believes that approximate to his personal alienation from the 
Church via excommunication, Schmitt’s writings are henceforward clearly secular by dropping out 
discussion of Catholic or even most metaphysical themes.  As has hopefully been shown 
throughout this study, the belief in a development, or change, in Schmitt’s views from one of 
Catholicity to secularity are exaggerated and misleading.  However, I certainly agree with the 
general scholarly treatment of Schmitt’s late Weimar texts as secular-minded.  As such, a close 
textual analysis of these writings is unnecessary to my argument. 
We have also just seen the extent to which Schmitt was criticized and rejected by Weimar’s 
Catholic intellectuals.  Although these contemporaries were responding to Schmitt’s thought on its 
merits, and judged by their various Catholic lights, it is the case that Schmitt had made his life at 
the University of Bonn uncomfortable due to the scandal of his divorce and remarriage.  So, it was 
with a sense of relief that he moved to Berlin in the spring of 1928 to fill the Hugo Preuss Chair of 
Law at the Graduate School of Business Administration. 
In April 1923, the thirty-nine year old Romano Guardini was appointed the first chair in 
“Catholic Philosophy of Religion and Belief” (Katholische Weltanschauung) at the University of 
Berlin,
1477
 where he remained until 1945.  To Schmitt biographer Andreas Koenen, the fact that the 
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jurist and theologian would again be in close proximity as colleagues from 1928 is proof of the 
former’s Catholic bona fides.  For: 
When Schmitt moved to Berlin he encountered some old friends again, among them his former colleague in 
Bonn, Romano Guardini.  Guardini . . . was one of the few from the Abendland circle who now held, with 
Schmitt, the Catholic position in the Berlin Diaspora.
1478
 
 
Koenen’s claim fits with a standard narrative interpretation of Schmitt; however, it does not accord 
with Schmitt’s Nachlass.  The evidence suggests that Schmitt and Guardini usually shared little 
more than a campus in common.   
The letter of Werner Becker, their mutual student, to Schmitt of December 13, 1928, 
indicates the jurist’s paranoia that Guardini was out of reach for him and even possibly avoiding his 
company unjustly.
1479
  Schmitt’s diaries indicate occasional interactions with Guardini.  They would 
sometimes encounter each other at the home of economist Werner Sombart (1863-1941), such as 
on January 21, 1930, where Schmitt heard Guardini “speak of the demonic animal in man” which 
he “liked well” and found “very nice”1480; assuredly as it accorded with his anthropological 
pessimism.  Schmitt left with Guardini at midnight on this occasion.  On March 9, 1930, Schmitt 
met Guardini for coffee and found him “very friendly and personable.”1481  Their conversation over 
political “neutralization”—a concept discussed at length in his lecture “Die europäische Kultur im 
Zwischenstadium der Neutralisierung,” given on October 12, 1929 at a meeting of the Association 
for Cultural Cooperation held in Barcelona—“rapidly stirred and moved” Schmitt.1482  But the next 
mention from February 19, 1931 records Schmitt finding an evening at Sombart’s boring and 
Guardini as simply “a windbag.”1483  Finally, on March 6, 1933, Schmitt records learning that 
                                                 
1478
 Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt, 100. 
1479
 See: Becker, Briefe an Carl Schmitt, 47. 
1480
 Schmitt, Tagebücher 1930-1934, 8. 
1481
 Ibid., 30. 
1482
 Ibid. 
1483
 Ibid., 90-1. 
349 
 
Guardini feared the jurist wanted to get his friend and brown priest, Karl Eschweiler, hired at the 
University.
1484
 
A more authentically close friend of Schmitt’s after his move to Berlin was economist 
Johannes Popitz, the State Secretary in the German Finance Ministry from 1925-29, then 
Reichsminister and Prussian Finance Minister in Kurt von Schleicher’s cabinet at the end of the 
Republic’s life (December 3, 1932 to January 28, 1933).  Popitz assisted Schmitt in ingratiating 
himself with the Schleicher government and then as a constitutional adviser to Brüning.  Schmitt 
did honestly lend his efforts to the regime’s attempt by authoritarian measures and presidential 
decree to avoid a Nazi takeover, as evidenced by an editorial of July 1932, written less than two 
weeks before the general parliamentary elections that saw the Nazis and Communists combine for 
an anti-Republican majority: 
Whoever provides the National Socialists with the majority on July 31—even though he is not a National 
Socialist and regards this party only as the lesser evil—acts foolishly.  He gives this movement—which is 
ideologically oriented and politically still quite immature—the possibility of changing the Constitution, setting 
up a state ecclesiastical authority, dissolving the trade unions, and so on.  He delivers Germany completely 
into the hands of this group.
1485
 
 
Despite their friendship and close political association, even under the Nazi regime, Popitz clearly 
held the jurist in some degree of reserve or distrust as he never even informed Schmitt of the 
famous Second World War conspiracy to assassinate Hitler that he was party to; that of old guard 
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aristocratic conservatives, led by Claus Shenk Graf von Stauffenberg (1907-44).
1486
  It is plausible, 
given how enthusiastically Schmitt joined the Nazi Party and worked in support of its consolidation 
of power, to suppose his radicalism was such that Popitz considered him a dangerous friend to 
confide in with his conspiratorial plans, even years after Schmitt had been kicked out of the Nazi 
Party in 1936.  Indeed, while Gopal Balakrishnan is frequently at fault for sticking closely to the 
standard narrative, he is yet quite correct to assert that by joining the Nazi Party, Schmitt, like 
Heidegger, was “going beyond the call of duty: neither Popitz nor [Ernst] Jünger, nor most of 
Schmitt’s other friends, nor even a majority of those who taught in the law faculties, ever became 
members, and he was in no danger of losing his position if he had chosen not to do so.”1487 
Schmitt’s activities in Berlin rarely lend themselves to an interpretation of the jurist as 
politically Catholic, his secularity and alienation from the Church and Center are widely 
acknowledged during these years.  There is a bit of evidence, however, of Schmitt’s continuing 
attempts at “Catholic intensification,” such as the lecture he gave, during Advent in 1930, to the 
Katholischen Deutschen Frauenbund (Catholic German Women’s Federation) on the topic “Frau 
im Staat” (“Women in the State”).  Schmitt there discussed the saints Catherine of Siena (1347-80) 
and Joan of Arc (1412-31).  He treats of St. Catherine as having stressed restoring orderly Church 
law, that the “Pope has his residence in Rome and not any other city.”1488  That Schmitt had a 
secular political purport in mind is evidenced by the fact that he repeated this lecture on “political 
saints”1489 in the Chamber of the Reich Economic Council on December 5 (the Eve of St. 
Nicholas’s Feast Day), and it was published in the young conservatives’ Deutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung, as well as reprinted in the conservative nationalist Der Ring.  As Koenen informs us, 
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Schmitt claimed “almost every sentence from the mouth of Joan” is an answer that the German 
nation can use to give to their “oppressors and exploiters.”1490 
Equally indicative of Schmitt’s lack of politically Catholic principles or instincts is his 
consistent rejection of federalism.  Robert D’Amico and Paul Piccone have suggested that perhaps: 
Schmitt’s post-1932 political decisions may have been related not only to his political opportunism and his 
automatic acceptance of the status quo (and thus of whatever power relations happened to predominate), but 
also to his failure to seriously entertain federalism as a possible reform strategy.
1491
 
 
This is a rich suggestion as Schmitt consistently opposed federalism in Germany, including in 1924 
when he rejected reforms to the Weimar Constitution, which would have given more autonomy to 
the states, and famously, in 1932, when he argued on the side of the Reich against Prussia.  In the 
section of his Constitutional Theory (1928) dealing with federalism he presents a very 
foreshortened version of it focused on what he believes are its legal and political antinomies.  Then 
he applies his understanding of sovereignty which, “resolves around the resolution of an existential 
conflict,” especially “when a decision is required,”1492 to the manner in which he believes federalism 
attempts to keep sovereignty an open issue through maintaining the integrity and relative autonomy 
of its member states.  The result he projects is that either the federation when faced with an 
“ultimate existential decision” will collapse into separate sovereign states, or “If only the federation 
is sovereign [i.e. can make the necessary decision of friend and foe], then only the totality exists 
politically.  Then there is a sovereign unitary state and the question of federalism is simply 
circumvented.”1493 
For present purposes, Schmitt’s rejection of federalism can be developed into evidence of 
his lack of Catholicity, by comparison to the views of an authentically Catholic theorist, from whom 
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he claimed so much inspiration, Donoso Cortés.  Donoso respected localism within his own 
Spanish context and believed federalism to be the best viable form of orderly and just government 
for a nation such as Germany.  He prophesied future dangers from Germany as a result of 
Protestant and nationalist Prussia.  In his many critical remarks on Germany, Donoso maintained 
that the only safe course was for it to remain a strongly federal nation with full autonomy for its 
Catholic south against the evangelical north.  He believed Germany was too dangerously divided 
between a Junker class as obstinately reactionary as the Carlists, unable to make prudent 
adjustments to changing situations, and a demagogic socialist left with far too little of a moderate 
bourgeois middle.
1494
  His writings and speeches were an influence on German political 
Catholicism, directly upon the Görres circle of German Catholic intellectuals and so indirectly on 
the growth of Ludwig Windthorst’s Center Party.1495 
It is not difficult to recognize, behind Donoso’s traditionalist views, his acceptance of 
orthodox Catholic political concepts such as the long-standing principle of subsidiarity which works 
contrary to absolutism and centralization in defense of localized autonomous corporate life; while 
such orthodox concerns and concepts are missing from Schmitt’s work.  In fact, in his 1927 essay, 
“Donoso Cortés in Berlin (1849),” Schmitt proves incapable of fathoming Donoso’s views on 
Germany.  He actually attempts to explain away Donoso’s lack of a call for rule by dictatorship 
during his time as minister plenipotentiary to the Prussian court: 
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Berlin at that time lacked any instance of atheistic socialism that would have matched Donoso’s essential 
hypothetical opponent: Proudhon.  In brief: In 1849 Berlin was neither politically nor intellectually the site 
where a dictatorship would have its great historical significance.  . . .  The political and moral forces of 
Prussianism were so robust that an anxious and principled either-or would not have been understood.
1496
 
 
Intent on presenting Donoso as the great theoretician of dictatorship, Schmitt felt the need to 
explain the presence of what is not actually a lacuna in Donoso’s thought. 
 
Mainstream Political Catholicism of the Thirties 
 
While the first decade of Pius XI’s pontificate had already stressed Catholic action in 
society and politics, the theme reached a crescendo, in May 1931, in the pages of his majestic 
encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, “On Reconstruction of the Social Order.”  Meant to 
commemorate the fortieth anniversary of Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum—hence the name1497—the 
encyclical takes a specifically ethical tone of voice as it defends the concepts of human dignity and 
freedom, and pointedly attacks the disordering of the State by either liberalism or the totalitarian 
reactions of communism and fascism.  All three ideologies distort the functioning of the state by 
displacing it from its telos in the common good and undermining the principle of subsidiarity; 
liberalism by restricting the State and favoring the rich, and the twin reactions by depriving 
corporate persons of their power and freedom. 
Pius reiterates much found in Leo’s encyclical: the traditional condemnations of 
liberalism,
1498
 individualism (and its twin error of collectivism),
1499
 and socialism;
1500
 as well as the 
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primary emphasis on the “Christian reform of morals” and institutions1501; but he also pushes 
forward the development of Catholic social thought as regards subsidiarity.  This principle rejects 
as extreme errors both individualism and collectivism in favor of a rightly ordered (parts to wholes) 
relationship of the various corporate bodies that make up society in general and the political 
community more particularly.  The emphasis on mediating societies gave rise to the term 
“corporatism” to designate the principle of subsidiarity as a program for practical action.  However, 
corporatism was never a rigid or programmatic ideology, and was subject to a variety of particular 
emphases and interpretations, ranging from politically monarchist all the way to socialist.  Martin 
Conway correctly observes: 
It was the issue of corporatism more than any other that expressed the ambivalence of Catholic political 
aspirations.  No concept was more frequently invoked by Catholic movements during the 1930s, but none 
proved more evasive of concrete definition.
1502
 
 
Corporatism provided a ground from which to judge and critique the efforts of the Center for 
German Catholic intellectuals.  But a Corporatist “might emphasize the hierarchical or state-
control aspects of that system or might expect the system to provide more truly democratic 
representation of the working classes, artisans, and farmers.”1503  Despite the wide range of 
formulations the elastic concept of corporatism allowed Catholic intellectuals to attend to, Schmitt 
never joined in such musings.  As we shall see he attended instead to the more radical concept of a 
total state. 
Pius also praised the efforts at “Catholic Action” of Catholic social scientists and 
laypersons, both of whom had been particularly active in Germany.
1504
  Such efforts were 
encouraged from Pope Leo XIII on as a natural application of the traditionally understood role of 
the Church in detailing and defending universal moral principles, which need to be prudentially 
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applied in various national and local contexts.  Pius XI best expressed the relationship of the 
Church to the social and political order in Quadragesimo Anno: 
‘[T]he Church holds that it is unlawful for her to mix without cause in these [social, economic, and political] 
temporal concerns’ [quoting his earlier encyclical, Ubi Arcano, 23 December 1922]; however, she can in no 
wise renounce the duty God entrusted to her to interpose her authority, not of course in matters of technique 
for which she is neither suitably equipped nor endowed by office, but in all things that are connected with the 
moral law. For as to these, the deposit of truth that God committed to Us and the grave duty of disseminating 
and interpreting the whole moral law, and of urging it in season and out of season, bring under and subject to 
Our supreme jurisdiction not only social order but economic activities themselves.
1505
 
 
As a result of practical intellect, political views moved in a variety of channels within German 
political Catholicism; however, the mainstream flowed close to the Tiber.  For, just as Leo XIII 
was influenced by a German Jesuit theologian, Joseph Kleutgen, to a renewal of Thomism in its 
applicability to social and political philosophy, Pius XI turned to two young German Jesuits to 
write the initial draft of Quadragesimo Anno.  These Jesuits were the aristocrat and professor of 
ethics at the University of Frankfurt, Oswald von Nell-Breuning (1890-1991), and theologian, 
Gustav Gundlach (1892-1963).  Unsurprisingly, both would be strong critics of Nazism and Nell-
Breuning was silenced by the regime from 1936.  Of the two, however, Gundlach is far more 
significant for our study, both because he is given more of the credit for developing the principle of 
subsidiarity but even more so because of his intellectual engagement in German Catholic circles; 
an engagement as public intellectual that includes authoring two articles critical of Schmitt. 
Gundlach established himself as one of the leading lights in Catholic social thought in the 
twentieth century as a close adviser to first Pius XI and then Pius XII, especially while a professor 
at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome from 1934-62.
1506
  In 1938, he would assist in 
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drafting Societatis Unio (The Unity of Society), an encyclical attacking racism meant to respond to 
the increasing anti-Semitic propaganda and violence in Germany.  The draft built upon Pius XI’s 
pastoral letter to all professors and directors at Catholic universities “Syllabus against Racism” 
(April 13, 1938) as well as his 1937 encyclical attacking Nazism, Mit brennender Sorge (With 
Deep Anxiety).  Regrettably, Societatis Unio was never completed as by the time it was submitted 
to Pius to negotiate conflicts between Gundlach’s version and that of the co-author, Fr. Gustave 
Desbuquois of France (1869-1959), the pope was in too advanced a state of ill health to complete 
the work. 
In 1932, Stimmen der Zeit published two articles by Gundlach in which he provided a 
general examination of Germany’s political parties, but also took time to specifically critique 
Schmitt’s political thought.1507  In “Principles of Party and Parties” Gundlach bases his critique of 
the jurist on a defense of the quintessential Catholic concern for natural law, always conspicuous in 
its absence from the views of the purportedly Catholic Schmitt.  The Jesuit declares Schmitt’s 
decisionist theory of state “alogical and voluntarist” and consciously opposed to “metaphysics in 
terms of scholastic natural law and the intrinsic structures of being.”1508  Rather, Schmitt has 
adopted a type of Manichaean metaphysics of “good and evil principles in the world with the result 
that politics is not a meaningful ‘order’ in the sense of Saint Thomas and the Scholastics but is just 
the power of ‘decision’ for the mastering of the ‘friend-enemy relationship.’”1509  This false 
metaphysics recognizes only the “power-state” (Machtstaat) “when in truth power and right are 
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inseparable life-functions essential to the nature of the state.”1510  Here and in “To Compulsory 
Labor,” Gundlach stresses the necessity of a Center Party, which represents Catholic thought 
against the detrimental influence of Schmitt’s social order “based solely on the authoritarian and 
dictatorial ‘authority of command’ of state power,” which leads ineluctably to the “total state.”1511 
In these final months of the republic, mainstream Catholic intellectuals and venues were 
roundly rejecting Schmitt’s political views.  At one time the Kölnische Volkszeitung had been 
receptive to Schmitt’s thought but this had long ceased to be the case by the time it reprinted 
Gundlach’s “Principles of Party and Parties” in October of 1932.1512  Likewise, the Berlin Center 
Party paper Germania, once supportive of Schmitt, now ran on January 29, 1933, the open letter 
discussed in the preface above from the canon lawyer and Center party Chairman, Monsignor 
Ludwig Kaas,
1513
 protesting Schmitt’s “relativizing tendencies” in constitutional law.1514  In this same 
issue, an article by Schmitt’s student Waldemar Gurian was also published1515 opposed to 
“emergency dictatorship” and so adds support to Kaas’s critique.1516 
Gurian’s public stance is significant as he had long been a purveyor of Schmitt’s views in 
Catholic Germany.  As late as 1930 he had, for example, echoed Schmitt’s dismissal of natural law 
by denying that it could be brought to bear on issues of positive law in modern times like it had in 
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the Middle Ages.
1517
  In private, however, Gurian had doubted Schmitt’s Catholic bona fides since 
at least as early as 1926.  Gurian was directed by Hermann Platz to write a habilitationsschrift on 
modern varieties of French political Catholicism and he credits conversations with Schmitt from 
1924-6 as greatly influencing the study.
1518
  Those conversations and his research into French 
Catholicism led Gurian to confide in a letter to Erik Peterson: 
How similar is Maurras to Schmitt; but Maurras is more honorable, he does not pretend to look like a 
Catholic!  He is a pagan and the Church a prop for Order!  Similar anxiety over theologians as external 
authority, similar mixture of precisionism, diligence, and bohemianism, similar relation to people.  
Uncanny!
1519
 
The subsequent book appeared, in 1929, as The Political and Social Ideas of French Catholicism, 
1789-1914.  It is a very detailed history of the various political movements and ideological 
groupings within French Catholicism and Gurian especially notes the manner in which the political 
extremes—represented by the leftist Sillon and the right-wing Action française—mirror each other as 
examples of what he later calls “secularized Catholicism.”1520  Both movements exemplify “social 
modernism,”1521 and while the specific error of the Sillon is immanentizing the eschaton, the 
contemporary counter-revolutionary Charles Maurras suffers from a positivism in which he does 
“not believe in [the Church’s] dogmas as truths of revelation, but he sees in them the loftiest 
expression of the social for the life indispensable principles.”1522 
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To Gurian these two extreme movements yet represent “the only politically active forces of 
French Catholicism” given that nation’s decisive secularism.1523  He followed up on The Political 
and Social Ideas of French Catholicism with a study of Maurras and his movement
1524
 which further 
develops his treatment of secularized Catholics; a concept that Gurian’s biographer believes is a 
stroke of brilliance for its application to understanding the views of nominal Catholics who would 
become Nazis.
1525
  Indeed, the phenomenon of secular Catholicism, or what might now be referred 
to as cultural Catholicism is one in which the erstwhile Catholic utilizes the Church’s transcendent 
claims only as they function in the world, fit social forms, or meet aesthetic needs.  Such as in the 
case of a Schmitt or Maurras where the external (ecclesial) form of the Church lends itself to a 
secular use as illustrating the structure they would like to see instantiated in the State.
1526
  Gurian’s 
break with Schmitt became public in 1932 when, under the pseudonym of Walter Gerhart, he 
published an attack on what he believes are exaggerations in the jurist’s thought and specifically 
takes on the work Legality and Legitimacy.
1527
 
The situation is much the same with Hochland as it is home to no less than five significant 
articles criticizing Schmitt in the last two years of the republic.  These include the review of 
Concept of the Political by Erich Brock, discussed above, as well as an article from political 
scientist and economist, Ferdinand Aloys Hermens (1906-98), in March 1932.
1528
  Hermens directs 
a complaint towards Schmitt as a member of the “free-floating intelligentsia”1529 that has no problem 
rejecting parliamentarism but fails to make clear what they are affirming.  Consistent critic of 
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Schmitt’s, Heinrich Getzeny attacked political theology1530 while, then editor of the journal, 
Friedrich Fuchs (dates unavailable) takes on, from the Catholic perspective, Schmitt’s concept of a 
total state as the jurist had discussed it in “Weiterentwicklung des totalen Staats in Deutschland.”1531  
Perhaps the most significant of Hochland’s late Weimar critiques of Schmitt to be published is that 
by the jurist’s earlier friend Theodor Haecker, who feels no compunction in describing the friend-
enemy distinction as naturalistic primitivism.
1532
 
Haecker was joined by theologian Erik Peterson, as another erstwhile friend of Schmitt’s, 
to subject his views to staunch criticism.  At a time when political theology “was all the rage,”1533 
Peterson began to formulate his critique of the entire intellectual enterprise in a Hochland article 
of 1933, “Caesar Augustus in the Judgment of Ancient Christianity.”1534 
By its nature political theology is not perhaps an element of theology per se, but rather of political thought.  
In the measure that political life is detached from the gods of the polis, the need originates to harmonize a 
theory, be it of philosophical or theological type, with the political life of the city.  Like political utopia, 
political theology is, apparently by some inherent necessity, an ever recurring phenomenon, to be sure 
regarded by the theologian with misgiving and recognized as generally having a heretical cast, but constantly 
presented by political thinkers with ever-new confidence.
1535 
 
Peterson expanded upon this article in a book of 1935, Monotheism as Political Problem.
1536
  In 
this text Peterson rejects all attempts at political theology as basically heretical, and, by this time, he 
clearly recognizes Schmitt as a secular Hobbesian theorist, especially given the jurist’s determined 
rejection of the Church’s indirect influence on the State.  Hollerich explains that “the denial of the 
indirect power meant a fatal acquiescence in secularization.  The unity of the state could not be 
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won at the expense of the [C]hurch’s public (öffentlich) character.”1537  Hence Peterson’s 
conclusion was damning of Schmitt: “The polemic against the potestas indirecta only has meaning 
if one has repudiated Christianity and has opted for paganism.”1538 
The stringent criticisms of Schmitt by such leading Catholic intellectuals of Weimar as 
Gundlach, Kaas, Getzeny, Haecker, and Peterson would deeply mark Catholic opinion of the 
jurist after the war.
1539
  But even as one moves farther afield from the mainstream of German 
political Catholicism and the Center, it becomes clear Schmitt does not belong to this milieu.
1540
  
Outside of the ultramontane Catholic political opinions most decisively shaped by corporatism and 
papal encyclicals, Germany was home to another wide-ranging trend in Catholic political thought 
more specific to itself.  Namely, a version of political theology which Schmitt himself rejected 
known as Reichstheologie (imperial theology). 
 
Reichstheologie 
 
Reichstheologie developed, in part, as an outgrowth of the post-Kulturkampf increase in 
Catholic intellectual and social organizations, particularly the Volksverein.  After the disaster of the 
First World War, which was largely seen as a defeat for Protestantism by the Catholics of 
Germany, a wide variety of Catholic intellectuals recommitted themselves to working out visions of 
society and politics which could carve a third way between liberalism and socialism.  Conditioned, 
as they were, to think of themselves as part of a wider Catholic civilization, Reichstheologie 
represented a form of German patriotism which offered an alternative to a nationalism based in 
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Protestant Prussian and kleindeutsch sentiment or the more radical racialist mythology of the 
National Socialists.  The vision of the German nation found in Reichstheologie hearkened back to 
its special pre-modern status as a central European guardian of the Church.  Proponents drew 
upon the defunct Holy Roman Empire’s combination of authoritarian political rule and defense of 
a Christian social order deferential to and protective of the Church.  They believed the “German 
people were being called by God to form a polity reuniting the state and the churches and 
dedicated to bringing about a moral revival in the West.”1541  Reichstheologie was classically 
Catholic in believing the Church and State are meant to work in tandem as forces of order, as 
social authority and political power respectively.  However, it also often promoted a romantic 
vision that tended towards “an aesthetic medieval ideal.”1542 
Reichstheologie played a part in the thinking of an otherwise ideologically diverse array of 
Weimar Catholic intellectuals, particularly in the last crisis years of the Republic.  Historian Klaus 
Breuning found renditions of this medievalist-nationalist view in the thought of: authoritarian 
monarchists like the monks and intellectuals that gathered around the historian and liturgist, Abbot 
Idlefonso Herwegen, at the Benedictine abbey of Maria Laach in the Rhineland; Weimar 
conservatives like the National Secretary of the Volksverein for Wurttemberg, Heinrich Getzeny, 
and the circle around the journal Abendland; liberal-conservatives like the publicist, Waldemar 
Gurian, and translator-philosopher, Theodor Haecker; as well as the left-socialist teachers and 
journalists of the “Frankfurter Circle,” associated with the Rhein-Mainische-Volkszeitung and its 
editor Walter Dirks, among others.
1543
  The inclusion of the Frankfurter Circle (Dirks, Michel, 
Neundörfer, Heinrich Sharp [dates unavailable], and Friedrich Dessauer [1881-1963]) in a list of 
proponents of such a backward gazing form of German patriotism surely seems surprising, 
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especially as they generally looked upon proponents of Reichstheologie as reactionary.  However, 
it was a peculiarly or distinctly Catholic political vision, especially in its strong connection to the 
traditional and cosmopolitan concept of Europe as “Christendom.”  As a result it lent itself to 
adaptation by a wide range of politically Catholic German intellectuals; and in the final crisis years 
of Weimar—when Reichstheologie was most widely debated—Dirks adjusted his earlier criticism to 
now argue for the creation of a Catholic-socialist empire.
1544
 
Far more commonly, however, Reichstheologie was an ideological current of the Catholic 
right.  A Volksverein nationalist like Getzeny, or the Jesuit editor of Der Gral, Friedrich 
Muckermann,
1545
 were moderate conservative proponents of Reichstheologie—less critical of the 
Center and Republic—as were Gurian and Haecker.  Herwegen, and the like-minded intellectuals 
around him at Maria Laach, were closely tied to the Rhineland’s conservative-monarchist Catholic 
aristocracy.
1546
  Hence, the league of aristocrats called the Kreuz und Adler (Cross and Eagle) often 
met at the monastery.
1547
  The Abbot had always held the Republic at arm’s length based on his 
suspicion that it would promote anti-Catholic and anti-monastic policies.  Rather, after the First 
World War he had hoped for an independent Rhenisch Republic or, basically, independence for 
Catholic Germany from Protestant Prussia.  More decisively, however, the Maria Laach circle were 
influenced by Austrian Catholic thought, such as the authoritarian form of corporatism found first 
in the nineteenth century aristocrat, Karl Freiherr von Vogelsang (1818-1930), and later espoused 
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by economics professor Othmar Spann (1878-1950).
1548
  This circle developed, by far, the most 
stringent and reactionary version of Reichstheologie.  Besides Herwegen’s confreres, the 
Abendland circle was the next most influential Catholic group to develop a version of 
Reichstheologie. 
As detailed above the Catholic philosopher, Alois Dempf, convinced Hermann Platz to 
found Abendland in 1925, and the journal was loosely tied to Reichstheologie.  Both Dempf and 
Platz were deeply influenced by the Christian personalist philosophy of Herman Schell (1850-
1906) who, in effect, sought to re-Christianize German idealism by bringing it into dialogue with 
Neo-Scholasticism and treating “Catholicism as the principle of progress” within world history.1549  
Dempf followed Schell in treating the catholicity of the Church as capable of bringing together all 
strands of knowledge, even from dissenters, and resolving them into solutions for modern social 
and political problems.  The Catholic synthesis could not simply be in modernism, for Dempf and 
Platz both critiqued the various ideological currents of modernity, such as: rationalism, skepticism, 
agnosticism, liberalism, and individualism.  However, a dialogue with modernity was possible and a 
higher synthesis could be reached under the auspices of Christian civilization; for example, 
Dempf’s Habilitation thesis dealt with the similarities in the treatment of the concept of the infinite 
in the metaphysics of Aquinas and Kant.  Platz had also championed these views professionally 
through the Association of Catholic Academics (Katholischen Akademikerverbandes), which he 
helped found with Fr. Franz Xaver Münch during the First World War. 
Like more monarchist proponents of Reichstheologie, Platz and Dempf did look to the 
Middle Ages for inspiration.  However, unlike the reactionaries at Maria Laach, they construed the 
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West as embodying “the universalism of the Middle Ages”; which had synthesized Hebraic, 
Greek, Roman, Christian, Germanic and Slavic currents.
1550
  Although Abendland was much more 
critical of modern nationalism than the Maria Laach thinkers, a view of Germany as occupying a 
special place in Europe was shared by all proponents of Reichstheologie.  For the Abendland 
circle, Germany’s special place derived primarily from being at Europe’s geographic center as a 
balancing force between East and West.  Platz recognized that the various nations of the continent 
each had their specific form of internal development and cohesion, but Germany could help 
remind them: “The history of Europe and Christianity unfolded [together] . . . as part of a long-
term symbiotic relationship.”1551  As such, the journal pointed more towards Christian Democracy 
as it would exist after the Second World War than it did to a monarchical Holy Roman past as 
dwelt upon at Maria Laach.
1552
  Indeed, Dempf attacked Herwegens’ Reichstheologie in a 1931 
article in Hochland.
1553
 
The nationalist views of Catholics like Getzeny associated with the Volksverein and the 
Abendland circle, like the Maria Laach thinkers, promoted a vision of the ancient Holy Roman 
Empire of which Germany had been a leading part.  Thus, it favored a Catholic Germany rather 
than Bismarck’s Protestant Prussian nationalism favored by a Moeller van den Bruck,1554 or the 
secular nationalist religion of the National Socialists.
1555
  Of these species, Schmitt clearly favored 
Germany’s secular conservative Prussian nationalism; he was closer to a Moeller van den Bruck 
than to these Catholic intellectuals.  For example: 
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In a 1925 letter to Schmitt, soliciting his involvement, [Platz] said that the name Abendland committed the 
journal to the ‘rejection of the humanitarian-liberal majority-ideology, and to the emphasis of the 
‘authoritarian theonomous sanction and norm for a league embracing the Christian peoples.’  Only Christian 
morality could prevent the threatening dissolution of the ‘ethic of the national idea’ into ‘liberal 
internationalism’ and its ‘statist’ hardening in Fascism.1556 
 
As we have seen, the last thing Schmitt was concerned about as a political threat to Germany, in 
the Twenties and Thirties. was fascist-hardened statism.  Additionally, the clear-eyed “realist” 
soundly rejected as romanticism any form of backward-yearning political thought, such as the 
Reichstheologie appeal to the Holy Roman Empire.  He even dismissed the common and 
straightforward support for monarchy shared by many German Catholics. 
Speaking generally, the proponents of Reichstheologie were among those German Catholic 
intellectuals most likely to be on the fringes of orthodoxy, especially given a widespread motivation 
to “draw German Catholics out of their longtime isolation and to lead them into a closer 
relationship with the Protestant majority and the state.”1557  Such a determination is not too far 
afield of Schmitt’s own attempts to “intensify” Weimar politics.  Getzeny, for example, found his 
name on a list of German Catholics censured for false ecumenism and modernism submitted to 
Rome, in 1926, by then Papal Nuncio to Germany, Eugenio Pacelli (1876-1958), the future Pope 
Pius XII.
1558
  Clearly the “Frankfurter Circle” was heterodox by dismissing repeated clear and 
emphatic Church condemnations of socialism and viewing the ban on Catholics from joining 
socialist parties as simply “outdated.”1559  Equally or more problematic, though, were the efforts by 
some of the Maria Laach conservatives to build bridges to the Nazi regime in 1933-4. 
In the last years of Weimar, debates over Reichstheologie, and political theology in general, 
were a common aspect of Catholic intellectual life.  The German Catholic bishops had lifted the 
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long-standing ban on joining the Nazi Party after the passage of the Enabling Act on March 23, 
1933, when Hitler delivered a carefully calculated speech mentioning most of the assurances the 
Center had asked for before it would agree to vote for the Act.  So, in the summer of 1933, when 
Maria Laach was the location for the third meeting of the Association of Catholic Academics 
(Katholischen Akademikerverbandes), the theme under discussion was “The National Problem in 
Catholicism.”  The conference was highlighted by the presence of then Vice-Chancellor Franz von 
Papen, who took the opportunity to rally fellow Catholics to the new regime by letting it be known 
that the Reichskonkordat with the Vatican had been signed.
1560
  With the conclusion of a long-
desired concordat, there were many Catholics during this early period of the Nazi regime who held 
an optimistic illusion that it would be “a transitional one” not to a “totalitarian state but for a 
contemporary reincarnation of the medieval German empire.”1561 
Included in this number were Herwegen and his monks who, despite their monarchist 
views, had spent Weimar voting for the Center “as a matter of course.”1562  At the conference 
Herwegen encouraged Catholic support of the new regime: “Let’s say an unreserved ‘yes’ to the 
new structure of the totalitarian state, which is quite analogous to the thought of the structure of the 
Church.  The church is in the world like Germany is today in politics.”1563  The Abbot’s expression 
sounds close to Schmitt’s, both from his analogous use of the structure of the Church to support 
the State as found in Political Form, as well as the jurist’s concomitant turn to the total state and 
defense of the new regime.  Indeed Schmitt—already a Nazi Party member—was in attendance at 
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this conference to hear Papen
1564
; of course, however, he did not come to his support for the Nazi 
regime from a hope in a renewed medieval Christian Reich. 
Many of the proponents of Reichstheologie increased their calls for “a contemporary 
reincarnation of the medieval German empire” as the Nazis took power.1565  Along with Herwegen 
and Muckermann this included: Maria Laach liturgical reformer and monk, Damasus Winzen, 
O.S.B. (1901-71); Church historian Joseph Lortz (1887-1975)
1566
; brilliant professor of dogmatic 
theology at the University of Tübingen, Karl Adam
1567
; pioneer of the Una Sancta ecumenical 
movement, the Jesuit Max Pribilla (1874-1954); and dogmatic theologian, Michael Schmaus (1897-
1993).  This group is generally condemned (like Papen) for political naiveté and a reactionary 
romantic belief that an aristocratic authoritarianism would quickly replace the Nazi regime.  The 
claim of naiveté is plausible given the generally swift movement away from support of the new 
regime as the scales fell from their eyes. 
Muckermann became rapidly disillusioned by the Nazis, and became such an outspoken 
critic of the new state that he likely would have been imprisoned or murdered if he had not fled 
Germany in 1934.  For his part, Adam did end up critiquing what he took to be the secular and 
neo-pagan German state religion of the Nazis in 1934, and was silenced by the regime; however, he 
reemerged to give an address in 1939 of positive support to the outbreak of the Second World 
War with the invasion of Poland.  He also shared advice on how Catholics could become more 
integrated with and better shape the German nation.
1568
  Herwegen’s initial optimism faded within 
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the first year, given the dawning recognition that the Catholic Church would not in fact be placed in 
a decisive position.  He was likely helped in being disabused of his political fancies by the presence 
at the monastery of his childhood friend, Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967), who had sought asylum 
in 1933 after being ousted from political office by the Nazis.  Adenauer stayed at the monastery for 
a year, until April of 1934, and the deeply anti-clerical and anti-Christian aspects of Nazism were 
made evident to the Abbot in the interim.  The monastery became subject to frequent searches 
and espionage leading Herwegen to send Winzen to scout locations in the United States where the 
monks could relocate if they needed to flee the country.  Herwegen even moved to Switzerland, 
from 1935 to 1937, due to his fear of arrest for treason.
1569
  Overall, he reflected a very 
Wilhelminian conservative-authoritarian view of both politics and even ecclesial matters.  The 
latter aspect got him into trouble with the Vatican’s Holy Office when it banned his book, Meaning 
and Spirit of the Benedictine Rule
1570
 due to its overemphasis of the authoritarian rule of the 
Abbot.
1571
 
In the next section we will look at proponents of Reichstheologie who in fact became 
decidedly pro-Nazi.  First, however, it is incumbent upon us to notice that most of the thinkers 
mentioned above were steadfastly opposed to the Nazis and even most of those who initially 
supported the Nazi regime soon repented.  In fact, the political-theological construct and ideal of 
“a new Holy Roman Empire” frequently “served as the basis for criticizing Hitler” and rejecting 
Nazism.
1572
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Dempf “appealed to the religious vision of a new Germany in his criticism of the 
reconcilers of Catholicism and National Socialism”1573; first in an attack on the totalitarianism of 
both left and right in his 1932 book Philosophy of Culture (Kulturphilosophie), and then in a 
specifically anti-Nazi work, Görres Speaks to Our Time (Görres spricht zu unserer Zeit).  With the 
Nazi takeover, he assisted in beginning another journal edited by Hermann Platz, titled Das Wort 
in der Zeit (The Word in Time).  The journal dedicated itself to refuting Nazism and so was 
suppressed in 1938.  In 1934 under the pseudonym Michael Schaffler, Dempf published in 
Switzerland, with Karl Barth’s help, another book attacking Nazism, The Faith Need of German 
Catholics (Die Glaubensnot der deutschen Katholiken).
1574
  The book also happens to chastise 
Abbot Herwegen and the Society of Catholic Academics for naively falling for Papen’s schemes to 
control or Christianize the Nazi regime.  Finally, Dempf wrote an appeal to the German bishops to 
protest against the clearly heretical nature of National Socialist ideology and politics the same year.  
Due to his political protestations the Nazi’s chief ideologist, Alfred Rosenberg (1893-1946), 
thwarted Dempf’s candidacy for a chair of philosophy at Bonn in 1934-5.  He ended up moving to 
Vienna but with the Anschluss was finally forced into “inner emigration.” 
Like Dempf, Hermann Platz also ran afoul of the Nazi regime, and was removed from his 
post teaching French and intellectual history at the University of Bonn, in 1935, on the grounds of 
“fanatical political Catholicism.”1575  One of his sons was forced to end his studies to become a 
medical doctor due to links to the Catholic Youth Movement, and another son spent a year and a 
half in prison by similar links to Catholic Youth activities in both Germany and France.  Reprisals 
eventually forced Platz into the inner emigration typical of so many intellectuals under the Nazi 
Reich and his home in Bonn became a gathering site for other Christian critics of Nazism, such as: 
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Dempf; Church historian (and early close friend of Schmitt’s) Fr. Wilhelm Neuß; Erik Peterson; 
and Swiss Reformed theologian Karl Barth (1886-1968).
1576
  But before his inner emigration Platz 
involved himself in one of the more notable acts of intellectual resistance to Nazism. 
On January 24, 1934, Hitler appointed Alfred Rosenberg head of the Nazi Party’s foreign 
political office.  Rosenberg was already recognized as a chief Nazi ideologist, and Catholic Church 
officials understood in the appointment that Hitler was: “officially espousing the anti-Jewish, anti-
Christian, and neopagan ideas presented in Rosenberg's Myth of the Twentieth Century (1930).”1577  
Two weeks later, on February 7, 1934, Pope Pius XI—in concert with his papal nuncio to 
Germany, Cardinal Pacelli—placed Rosenberg’s book on the Index of Forbidden Books at the 
same time as Cologne’s Cardinal, Karl Joseph Schulte (1871-1941), formally protested the 
appointment in a meeting with Hitler.  Schulte had already publicly opposed the Nazis but with 
Rosenberg’s ascension he additionally assigned “the Reverend Josef Teusch [1902-76] to direct a 
‘defense against National Socialism’s anti-Christian propaganda.’”1578  To organize a collaborative 
response to Rosenberg, Teusch turned in the spring of 1934 to Neuß, the chairman of the Catholic 
theological faculty at the University of Bonn.  Neuß had published an article on June 1, 1933, 
“Gedanken eines katholischen Theologen zur Judenfrage” (“Thoughts of a Catholic Theologian 
on the Jewish Question”), “in which he argued that anti-Semitism violated Christian belief.”1579  He 
now gathered together five of his colleagues from the University of Bonn
1580
 (including Platz) and 
one professor from the University of Cologne to produce “a short, readable refutation of the 
historical and theological errors in Rosenberg’s book,” titled Studien zum Mythus des 20. 
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Jahrhundert (Studies on the Myth of the Twentieth Century).  The essays were not attributed in 
order to avoid Nazi reprisal and diocesan printers had already been suppressed due to Schulte’s 
Nazi-critical sermons and pastoral letters.  As a result the famous Nazi resisting bishop of Münster, 
Clemens von Galen (1878-1946), allowed it to be published by his diocesan press under his name.  
The book was “released simultaneously in Cologne, Berlin, Breslau, Munich, and Würzburg in 
October 1934” and appeared in diocesan newspapers in Cologne and Münster as well.  By 1935, it 
was already in its fifth edition, and reached a total of 200,000 distributed copies.
1581
 
Although the majority of proponents of Reichstheologie may have resisted the Third Reich 
or quickly repented of an initial optimism, there were some who went so far as to become full-
fledged supporters of Nazism.  It is with these latter that Schmitt will naturally seem to be the 
closest, and several can be counted as his friends in these years.
1582
  As we shall soon see, Lönne is 
not wholly unjustified when he suggests that the jurist “reinforced subliminal tendencies in German 
Catholicism” and “helped them to break through”1583 but only in the case of a small number of 
radical thinkers with whom he came into contact. 
 
From Reichstheologie to Nazism 
 
Of the above list of initial “bridge-builders” with the Nazi regime, Joseph Lortz, stands 
apart for having actually joined the Nazi Party and remained a member of it until 1938.  However, 
he was not alone, as there were a few proponents of Reichstheologie that became even more 
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dedicated Nazis; most relevant for this study are two “brown-priests”1584: Karl Eschweiler (1886-
1936), and Robert Grosche (1888-1967), both of whom were influenced by Schmitt. 
Eschweiler had been ordained a priest for the Archdiocese of Cologne in 1910, but would 
begin doctoral studies in theology at the University of Bonn in 1921, where he was habilitated in 
1922 and began to teach from 1923.  It is here that he met and became good friends with Schmitt.  
His work in theology was modernist and progressive, as he claimed that Neo-Scholastic theology 
was in “crisis” and needed “critically to engage modern ideas.”1585  Eschweiler followed his own 
advice in 1925’s Die zwei Wege der neueren Theologie [The Two Ways of Modern Theology] 
which combined the thought of heretical theologian, Georg Hermes (1775-1831), and orthodox 
but abstruse and mystical theologian, Matthias Scheeben (1835-1888), with scholasticism to 
reconcile reason and faith in modernity along the lines of Thomas’s understanding of nature 
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perfected by grace.
1586
  In 1928, Eschweiler became the Dean, and a professor of systematic 
theology, of Braunsberg’s State Academy (Staatliche Akademie, originally known as the Lyceum 
Hosianum). 
Two years after being named Dean, Eschweiler published Johann Adam Möhlers 
Kirchenbegriff: Das Hauptstück der katholischen Auseinandersetzung mit der deutschen 
Idealismus [Johann Adam Möhlers Notion of the Church: The Cornerstone of the Catholic 
Dialogue with German Idealism].  In it he sounds quite Schmittian: 
[Eschweiler] argued that according to Möhler (d. 1838) the church is an objective reality similar to the state.  
In Eschweiler’s judgment, beginning with the Enlightenment, theologians had not upheld this notion of the 
church.  . . .  The state and the church should exercise authority in their respective arenas, and 
simultaneously they should respect and reinforce each other’s authority . . .  .  Moreover, since the authority 
appropriate to the state cannot be secured in a democracy, the nation needs to be sovereign in a highly 
structured society.  In this polity, the church should uphold the state’s authority: ‘the task of the individual as 
well as the church is to obey the legitimate (civil) authorities.’1587 
 
Eschweiler followed up with the essay “Politische Theologie,” in 1931, which drew explicitly on 
Schmitt to argue against the “vague theology of liberalism.”1588  Unlike Schmitt, however, Eschweiler 
defends the Church’s “indirect power in the temporal realm” based on Pontius Pilate’s question 
posed to Christ, “Quid est veritas?” (“What is truth?” [John 18:38]).  Eschweiler believes that 
Pilate’s epistemological agnosticism, rather than a prototypical example of legal positivism: 
. . . implicitly recognized the limit of the state in relation to true religious authority.  The state cannot answer 
the question, What is ultimate truth?  It must respect the church’s answer to this question.  ‘It is crucial that 
the state poses daily and officially [to the church] the question of Pilate.  This is the victory of the truth 
revealed in Christ for the state.  In relation to this truth, the Enlightenment and political liberalism, along with 
their dangerous errors and effects, must be regarded as rubbish.’1589 
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Eschweiler’s defense of the indirect power of the Church vis-à-vis the State contrasts him to 
Schmitt as well as his colleague at the State Academy, canon lawyer Hans Barion (1899-1973)
1590
 by 
illustrating that he held at least one politically Catholic tenet.
1591
  Likewise, Eschweiler attempted to 
reconcile natural law arguments with political theology, while Catholic theologians like Gundlach 
and Erik Peterson used the natural law as evidence against such constructs.
1592
 Yet, Eschweiler and 
Barion would soon become prominent “brown priests” once the Nazis took control of the German 
state. 
Beginning in the spring of 1933 Eschweiler: 
. . . publicly promoted cooperation between the church and Hitler’s regime.  . . .  [H]e published an article 
entitled ‘Die Kirche im neuen Reich,’ in which he argued that Catholicism and National Socialism should 
work together for the regeneration of Germany.
1593
 
 
From his position as Dean at Braunsberg’s State Academy Eschweiler was one of the more 
“outspoken proponents of the National Socialist regime” in the winter and spring of 1933.1594  
Along with Eschweiler and Barion the faculty included Joseph Lortz in Church history, and he 
joined both in vocal support for the Nazi regime.  In the run-up to the Enabling Act, Eschweiler 
publicly supported Barion’s argument that “the bishops should withdraw their support for the 
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Catholic Center party and collaborate with Hitler.”1595  After the Nazis were given control, 
Eschweiler “publicly backed Joseph Lortz, who urged in a public lecture that the church should 
cooperate with the Nazi state.”1596  The three colleagues joined the Nazi Party together with their 
friend Schmitt in May 1933.  Afterwards, Eschweiler was frequently seen attired in the Nazi Party 
uniform and in an article of June 1933, he argued that: “Catholicism and National Socialism have 
compatible worldviews.”1597  He even found “a close resemblance between Pius XI’s vision of the 
corporate state in his encyclical Quadragesima Anno (1931) and the Nazi party program.”1598 
The pro-Nazi faculty at the Braunsberg State Academy was under the ecclesiastical 
oversight of Bishop Maximillian Kaller (1880-1947) of the Diocese of Ermland.  Kaller was a 
decided and vociferous opponent of Nazism both before and after they took power.  He had for 
years been a passionate supporter of Catholic Action, those same groups which Pius XI repeatedly 
pointed to as paradigmatic of the social activity he wanted to see promoted by Catholics.  Kaller 
joined the lone strongly anti-Nazi professor at the State Academy, professor of Church history 
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Hermann Hefele, and—fascinatingly enough—the general student body of the Academy in criticism 
of Dean Eschweiler and his pro-Nazi colleagues.
1599
  The conflict quickly came to a head when the 
Nazi Reich issued a law on July 14, 1933, which “permitted the government to sterilize Germans 
whom it judged unfit to become parents.”1600  Sterilization has always been repugnant to the 
Catholic understanding of natural law, and as Krieg notes, traditional Catholic sexual ethics had 
been reiterated as recently as Pius XI’s encyclical of December 31, 1930, Casti Connubii (On 
Christian Marriage) in which he directly condemns the eugenicist movement’s desire to forcibly 
sterilize those whom “according to the norms and conjectures of their [the eugenicists] 
investigations, would, through hereditary transmission, bring forth defective offspring.”1601  Both 
Eschweiler and Barion came out publicly in favor of the sterilization law.  In fact: 
Eschweiler voiced his support in an address to the [College’s] faculty and students at the start of the autumn 
semester of 1933.  Appealing to the theological axiom that grace perfects nature, he argued that since God’s 
grace cannot make up for the natural deficiency of someone who is mentally deficient or insane, the state—
which must protect society from its unhealthy members—can decide that some people are not suited to be 
parents.  Eschweiler’s views were not well received either by the students at the Staatliche Akademie or by 
Bishop Kaller.
1602
 
 
The students and Bishop Kaller were better interpreters both of the doctrine of the perfective 
power of divine grave over human nature as well as the Pian encyclicals, given Eschweiler’s 
decidedly heterodox conclusions. 
Despite now being subject to stringent criticism from both his direct ecclesial superior as 
well as the students over whom he was Dean, Eschweiler actively promoted the new regime “by 
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requiring that the school’s athletic teams wear Nazi sport uniforms” and then proposing “to the 
government that all of Germany’s Catholic seminarians be sent for one semester to the Braunsberg 
[A]cademy in order to experience the spirit and thought of National Socialism.”1603  Within a few 
months: 
Cardinal Pacelli initiated canonical proceedings against Eschweiler and Barion because of their position on 
sterilization, and the Holy Office suspended Eschweiler’s and Barion’s permission for priestly ministry on 
August 20, 1934.  As a result, both professors also lost their ecclesiastical approval to teach seminarians.  
They retained their professorships at the Staatliche Akademie, however, because these positions were granted 
by the state.  In any case, Eschweiler now found himself in a contradiction.  Having argued since 1926 for a 
greater public recognition of ecclesiastical authority, he himself stood in 1934 at odds with the church.  
Eschweiler and Barion immediately engaged in discussions with church officials, and soon afterwards publicly 
withdrew their statements in favor of the sterilization law.  They were granted permission to engage in priestly 
ministry in September 1935 and resumed teaching seminarians in October.
1604
 
 
Eschweiler continued as a devoted Nazi until his untimely death from kidney failure in 1936.
1605
  
Barion, as well as Lortz, were seen as valuable allies by the Nazi Minister of Education, Bernhard 
Rust (1883-1945), who reassigned them to more prestigious academic professorships in hopes that 
they could help to influence or control other more recalcitrant Catholic theologians.
1606
 Lortz was 
transferred to the University of Münster, in 1935, and Barion to the University of Munich, in 1938.  
Barion’s transfer was met with a good deal of protest in Bavaria including from Munich’s 
archbishop, Cardinal Michael von Faulhaber (1869-1952).
1607
  Faulhaber appealed to the Holy See 
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with the result that the appointment became a matter of diplomatic dispute under the Concordat 
and ended with the Nazi State simply dismissing the University’s entire Catholic theological faculty, 
in February 1939.  Barion finally landed at the University of Bonn and after the war would suffer a 
fate similar to his friend, Carl Schmitt, by losing his academic post and living as a private scholar 
and priest of the Archdiocese of Cologne. 
Like Eschweiler, Robert Grosche was a progressive theologian and proponent of 
Reichstheologie.   Grosche was ordained as a diocesan priest in Cologne and served as chaplain at 
the city’s University from 1920 until 1930, where he became known for his works in art history and 
with the Una Sancta ecumenical movement.  His journalistic activity promoted the contemporary 
work of the French Catholic Renewal and his theological writings stressed the historicity of the 
Church in a manner befitting Reichstheologie.  In 1932, he became a professor of art history at the 
Düsseldorf Art Academy, and founded and edited a journal dedicated to “controversial theology” 
most specifically in ecumenical dialogue between the Christian sects.  In 1933, he was the 
Stadtdechant (official Church representative, dean, overseeing the clergy in a city) for Cologne. 
Grosche also had close ties to the Catholic Youth movement and he wrote one of three 
pieces that defended Schmitt’s political views in the pages of the movement’s official journal, Die 
Schildgenossen.  Surprisingly, this was the most receptive of any Catholic journal to works 
commenting positively on Schmitt at this late date.
1608
  In “The Foundations of a Christian Policy of 
German Catholics,” Grosche claimed that the definition of papal infallibility in 1870 placed the 
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pope as wholly superior to councils, and as such, serves as an example to follow in support of the 
authority of the Führer over Parliament.
1609
 
Grosche assisted the monks of Maria Laach in promoting cooperation with the Nazi 
regime by participating at the pivotal 1933 meeting of the Association of Catholic Academics.  
Early on Grosche had expressed sympathy for the Soviet system from an eccentric conservative 
standpoint of respecting what he viewed as a disciplined and professional ordering of the State and 
his radicalism shifted readily enough to support for the Nazi State: 
[He had] argued that since the Christian tradition generated the idea of close cooperation between church 
and state, it reinforced the idea of a ‘Third Reich.’  Catholics could ‘work toward the construction of this state 
without a false anxiety about a totalitarian state.  Indeed, this polity could be the outcropping of God’s 
kingdom if it were a state of genuine authority and genuine values.
1610
 
 
His actual activities during the Third Reich seem to have been minimal and largely nonpolitical, 
although, he did condemn anti-Semitism, in 1936, and was investigated by the regime due to his 
continued support for the Catholic Youth Movement.  Yet, he remains a “brown priest” due to the 
extent to which he encouraged a radical nationalism and support amongst Catholics for the Nazi 
State, especially during their crucial period of consolidation of power of 1932-4. 
Unlike Schmitt, even these most extreme examples of Catholic thinkers who supported the 
Nazi State fall within the general purview or confines of something identifiable as “political 
Catholicism.”  Despite their heterodoxy and militant nationalism, the likes of Eschweiler, Barion, 
and Grosche still clearly attempt to apply their peculiar renditions of Catholicism to their political 
views.  The difference may only be due to the clerical state, “brown priests” would feel far more 
                                                 
1609
 As discussed in: Lönne, “Carl Schmitt und der Katholizismus,” 35.  The original bibliographic details are: Robert 
Grosche, “Die Grundlagen einer christlichen Politik der deutschen Katholiken,” Die Schildgenossen, 13 (1933-4), 46-
52.  The other positive treatments of Schmitt in Die Schildgenossen in these last years of the Republic are: Georg 
Freudenberger, “Die Erschütterung des demokratischen Rechtstaates,” Die Schildgenossen, 12.8-9 (1933), 351-60; 
and—by a close friend of Schmitt’s—Konrad Weiß, “Die politische Spannung von Inbegriff und Geschichte,” Die 
Schildgenossen, 13.1 (1933), 38-45.  Both pieces defend Schmitt’s stance during the transition to Nazism. 
1610
 Krieg, Catholic Theologians in Nazi Germany, 42.  Incidentally, Grosche joined Getzeny and Gurian as 
contemporaries of Schmitt who correctly noted his similarity to Maurras and even made use of the Frenchman’s 
atheist quote in their treatments of Schmitt’s Political Form.  See: Dahlheimer, Schmitt und der deutsche 
Katholizismus, 156. 
381 
 
compulsion to attempt to justify their views in relation to Catholic teachings, no matter how 
heterodox the results, than the secularized and lay jurist Schmitt.  However, be that as it may, 
Schmitt never attempts to place his political views in a doctrinally Catholic context, even a 
heterodox one. 
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Conclusion. 
“[The political theorist of myth] easily glides into the role of a magician who summons forces that 
cannot be matched by his arm, his eye, or any other measure of his human ability.”1611 
—Carl Schmitt (1938).  
 
Historian Jan-Werner Müller has perceptively noted that Schmitt’s “self-interpretation 
often shaded into self-mythification.”1612  While he was always prone to identify himself with literary 
or historical figures, this tendency becomes quite pronounced after the Second World War, when 
he was exiled from German academic life as punishment for his involvement in the Nazi regime.  
From literature Schmitt likened himself to characters such as: Don Quixote, Othello, Don Juan, 
Hamlet, and Benito Cereno.
1613
  And the list of historical figures and thinkers includes: Niccolò 
Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Juan Donoso Cortés, Eusebius of Caesarea (ca. 260-ca. 340), 
Tertullian, and Saint Thomas More (1478-1535).  In the context of this study on Schmitt’s 
relationship to Catholicism several of these historical self-mythifications merit exploration. 
Exile to his hometown of Plettenberg occasioned Schmitt likening himself to one of his 
primary intellectual influences, Machiavelli.  Like the progenitor of political modernity, Schmitt 
had real economic concerns after having been ejected from his previous active life and career
1614
 
and he chose to refer to his Plettenberg “exile” as “San Casciano” after the Florentine town near 
which Machiavelli’s estate was located.  The reference is not terribly inapt unless one moves past 
Machiavelli to try and tie Schmitt’s story to that of the town’s namesake.  Saint Cassian of Imola 
(unknown-363) was a fourth century martyr killed for his refusal to worship the Roman gods and 
abandon his Catholic faith.  His assassins were former students wielding their metal writing 
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implements (styli).
1615
  Schmitt, in his vanity and bitterness, might have actually desired this deeper 
reference to the martyr given his complaint that all of his former friends had abandoned him in his 
project of “authentic Catholic intensification” except for Konrad Weiß and his “true friend” Paul 
Adams.
1616
  To equate Schmitt in his voluntary and enthusiastic subservience to the Nazi State to 
Cassian—a resister of state tyranny against conscience and the Catholic faith—would, however, be a 
quite galling comparison. 
Another saintly figure from Catholic history that Schmitt perversely likened himself to was 
the British martyr, Sir Thomas More.  He likened himself to the great lawyer and author primarily 
on the grounds of having been a “cleric” yet not a priest, that is, Schmitt differentiated the term 
from clerc in the sense of a “mere writer.”1617  Schmitt believes that More’s middle status as a 
Catholic layman who was also a “cleric” was “the secret of his inaudible, even impalpable, great 
superiority.”1618  In stark contrast to Schmitt’s evaluation of what made More a superior person, 
when Pope Pius XI canonized the Englishman and named him the patron saint of lawyers in 1935, 
he clearly intended the event to tie in with his pontificate’s interest in Catholic political and social 
thought.  Pius was a staunch opponent of the deification of the State and the reversal of priority 
between society and government typical of the totalitarianism coursing through Europe from the 
political right and left.  Schmitt’s postwar depiction of the greatness of More ignores what obviously 
made the Englishman a Catholic saint and martyr; namely, his intransigence unto death in the face 
of State tyranny against his conscience, his faith, and the social authority of the Catholic Church.  
More’s heroic sacrifice is what Pius XI expected German Catholics to take inspiration from as an 
example of resistance to the very same regime which Schmitt had chosen to aggressively support. 
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Schmitt’s attempts at analogical self-identification finally come closer to the mark with his 
treatment of Eusebius, the fourth century bishop of Caesarea.  Eusebius is known as the “Father of 
Church History” for his numerous works covering the early Christian era.  Significantly, he 
sympathized with and defended the heretical followers of Arius (ca. 250-336) who held a version of 
Gnostic belief in which the divinity of Christ was denied, similar to what would later be called 
“unitarian.”  The bishop was protected in his heretical stance by the Roman Emperor, Constantine 
the Great (r. 306-337), and both men attempted, unsuccessfully, to manipulate the Council of 
Nicaea (325) away from a condemnation of Arianism.  Constantine even exiled Eusebius’s greatest 
orthodox critic, Saint Athanasius of Alexandria (296-373). 
Eusebius’s inclination towards Gnosticism is certainly a point of connection between 
himself and Schmitt.  However, the jurist does not draw attention to this aspect of Eusebius’s life 
and thought.  Instead, Schmitt identifies himself with the bishop-historian’s role as a “court” or 
“imperial” theologian due to his close association with his patron Constantine; demonstrated by a 
panegyric biography Eusebius wrote after the emperor’s death.  In 1935, when Schmitt’s erstwhile 
friend, theologian Erik Peterson, wrote Monotheism as a Political Problem he covers Saint 
Augustine’s criticisms of Eusebius.  Augustine chastised Eusebius for having placed Christian 
theology in the service of legitimating Constantine’s rule as divinely ordained.  Schmitt finally 
responded to Peterson’s book in 1970 with Political Theology II.  Since Peterson clearly intended 
his argument against political theology “which misuses the Christian proclamation for the 
justification of a political situation”1619 as in part a critique of the Nazi State, then Schmitt’s 
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identification with and defense of Eusebius serves an apologetic purpose as regards his own 
involvement with the Nazis.
1620
 
In a similar vein to his use of Eusebius, Schmitt frequently relied on that most problematic 
of theologians, Tertullian.  Arthur Versluis, especially, makes much of Schmitt’s interest in the 
early Church Father: 
What is it about Tertullian that Schmitt found so fascinating that he returned to his work again and again?  
Divine authority as presented by Tertullian divides men: obedience to divine authority divides the orthodox 
from the heretics, the ‘friends of God’ from the ‘enemies of God,’ and the political theologian from the 
secular philosopher.  Here we are reminded of perhaps Tertullian’s most famous outcry: ‘What then does 
Athens have to do with Jerusalem?  What does the Academy have to do with the Church?  What do the 
heretics have to do with Christians?’1621 
 
Indeed, Schmitt holds up Tertullian as the prototype of “the theological possibilities of specific 
judicial thinking”1622 treating him in his role as jurist.  What Versluis fails to recognize is just how 
heterodox and secular-minded, therefore, is Schmitt’s interest in the lawyer-theologian. 
Schmitt identified himself with another lawyer as well, Thomas Hobbes.  Bendersky points 
us to the similarities Schmitt saw between himself and the theorist of Malmesbury: 
In his Leviathan, Schmitt personally identifies with Hobbes’ fate.  It is not difficult to detect Schmitt’s persona 
in his accolades for Hobbes: ‘lonely as every pioneer; misunderstood as is everyone whose political thought 
does not gain acceptance among his own people; unrewarded, as one who opened a gate through which 
others marched on . . .’ (p. 86).  He then concludes by declaring Hobbes ‘a sole retriever of an ancient 
prudence’—a phrase he had used to describe himself while defending his friend-enemy thesis against 
Hermann Heller’s critique in 1928.1623 
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The “ancient” prudence Schmitt believed himself the purveyor of as a latter-day Hobbes is not, of 
course, the ancient’s “prudence,” as discussed in a Plato or Aristotle.  At best its pedigree in the 
history of political thought would have to be traced to Thrasymachus, but more properly dates to 
Machiavelli.  Rather than classical prudence, Schmitt celebrated the modern political turn; for 
example, in his 1950 book The Nomos of the Earth he applauds the battle cry of the transition 
from medieval to modern law: “Silete theologi in munere alieno!” (theologians should remain 
silent in foreign territory).
1624
  Just as Hobbes claimed that his mother “bore twins, me and together 
with me fear”1625 when dire claims about the threat posed by the Spanish Armada induced 
premature labor; so too did Schmitt find his central, and most consistent, intellectual concern in 
the re-establishment of the socially pacifying modern nation-state—or the formulation of its effective 
replacement—in response to the revolutionary violence he witnessed in Munich at the end of the 
First World War.  Thus, as has hopefully been shown in this study, Schmitt shares with Hobbes a 
fundamental fear of social and political disorder which greatly shapes their theories of the State. 
One more of Schmitt’s postwar “rear-projections”1626 is worth examining here.  In a couple 
of places, he described himself as “a wretched, shameful and yet authentic case of a Christian 
Epimetheus.”1627  The source of this reference is Greek mythology; for, Epimetheus was the 
brother of Prometheus and married to Pandora.  Just as his name means “afterthought,” 
Epimetheus is described by Hollerich as having been: 
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. . . guilty of foolishness and fear: frightened by what Zeus had done to his brother, he ignored his brother’s 
advice to take no gifts from Zeus and accepted the woman Pandora as his wife.  She, of course, let loose the 
ills that Prometheus had confined to a jar.
1628
 
 
Hollerich points out, “the myth rather underplays Epimetheus’ personal responsibility” and so this 
reference is “closer to a confession than anything Schmitt published in his lifetime.”1629  But he also 
perceptively asks: “how did Schmitt see this as a Christian story?”1630  Indeed, Schmitt seems to 
suggest that his fear of the Nazis and lack of foresight is what drove him to accept the regime’s 
“gifts” in exchange for his support.  As far as confessions go, however, Schmitt’s portrayal of 
himself as in some obscure manner a “Christian” Epimetheus rings hollow; especially when one 
reads the reminiscences of his friend William Gueydan “de” Roussel, which reveal the jurists’ deep 
resentments and lack of remorse.  For example, Gueydan mentions that once, when the two dined 
with Bernard Faÿ (1893-1978), they discussed their “many enemies.”  And during this dinner 
conversation Schmitt also treated the idea of public remorse with contempt: “He who wants to 
confess, go and show themselves to a priest.”1631  Furthermore, in his postwar internment when 
asked by his interrogator what he thought of the fact that the Nazi regime was responsible for the 
deaths of millions of Jews and other noncombatant persons, Schmitt retorted with the quip that: 
“Christianity also resulted in the murder of millions of people.”1632  Schmitt was a “wolf in sheep’s 
clothing” when it comes to his Catholicity rather than an interested or sincere Catholic intellectual. 
Along with self-mythification by dint of spurious analogies, Schmitt also fed his 
commentators other convenient red herrings in his postwar diaries.  One such cause of 
misdirection is his mention of the theological concept of the katechon.  The term indicates one 
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who “holdeth” or “restrains,” and originates in the apocalyptic writings of Saint Paul the Apostle 
(ca. 5-ca. 67): 
And now you know what withholdeth, that he may be revealed in his time.  For the mystery of iniquity 
[ἀνομία] already worketh; only that he who now holdeth [τὸ κατέχων ], do hold, until he be taken out of the 
way.
1633
 
 
Theologian Wolfgang Palaver astutely points out the equivocalness of the term: 
Paul mentions a katechon, a ‘restrainer,’ which is a force of order preventing the outbreak of destructive 
chaos but—and that shows us the ambivalence of this concept—also delays the second coming of Christ, the 
coming of the Kingdom.  Throughout Christian history, the katechon was identified with different political 
powers that created order in the world.  The first katechon in this tradition, of course, was the Roman 
Empire.
1634
 
 
Schmitt was quite familiar with the ambivalence of the concept but rather than taking an 
apocalyptic approach—one which looks forward to the removal of the katechon so that the 
eschaton could commence—Schmitt favors the secular-minded conservative understanding of the 
term as a temporal, and political, restraint against man’s lawlessness and penchant for promoting 
chaos. 
Schmitt’s worldly intent is quite evident when the relevant passages in the Glossarium are 
read more fully.  The primary mention is as follows: “I believe in the katechon: it is for me the 
only possible way to understand Christian history and to find it meaningful.”1635  In this quote, 
Schmitt’s emphasis on their only being one way that he can find meaning in the history of 
Christianity is striking, especially as that way is in its social role of attempting to restrain or modify 
bad human behavior by justifying obedience to secular authority.  I believe that interpreters who 
read this line as expressing Christian belief on his part often do so because they have already 
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assumed it to be characteristic of him.
1636
  But the several places he writes about the katechon are 
quite consistent and clear in not being concerned with a religious belief, but rather, in the secular 
appropriation to which it can be put.   
After stating his belief in the katechon Schmitt continues by claiming that this: “Pauline 
secret doctrine is nothing more, nor less, than the secret of every Christian existence.”  This is the 
case, because only by knowing concretely about the katechon does one know their own place.
1637
  
Schmitt then dismisses all contemporary theologians because they “basically do not want to know” 
about the katechon.
1638
  He finally ponders where the katechon is today, at the close of 1947, and 
quickly dismisses as possibilities Britain’s Winston Churchill (1874-1965) or America’s John 
Foster Dulles (1888-1959).  In so doing Schmitt also dismisses either country as the present 
restraining force against chaos although he believes that there has always been such force acting 
throughout the past “1948 years,” that is, since the birth of Christ “or else we would no longer 
exist.”1639 
Schmitt’s absorption with the katechon cannot be dated with certainty to any earlier then 
1942.  According to Schmitt’s French translator, Gueydan “de” Roussel, when he met Schmitt at a 
conference in Paris that year they: “talked at length about the war, the dangerous allies of 
Germany, and especially the katechon.”1640  Schmitt had famously claimed that “All significant 
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concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts”1641 and he treats the 
katechon as working in the same manner, only in reverse.  For, after the war, Schmitt renewed his 
interest in Donoso Cortés and in each entry of the Glossarium where he brings up the katechon he 
also chastises Donoso for failing to have taken it into account in his political theory.  In the entry 
for December 19, 1947, Schmitt concludes that Donoso “failed theologically” since “this term 
[katechon] remained unknown to him.”1642  Then in the entry eight days later, for December 27, 
after plaintively quoting (in part) Ovid’s lament “Barbarus hic ego sum, quia non intelligor ulli” 
(Here I am a foreigner because no one understands me), Schmitt writes: “Poor Donoso, an 
adequate theological concept for his political theory would have been the katechon; instead, he 
finds himself in the labyrinth of the doctrine of absolute and relative Natural Law.”1643  Finally, 
Schmitt interprets the katechon as a term equivalent to “empire” in 1950’s The Nomos of the 
Earth
1644
 and believes that the concept allows for a seamless connection and transition between the 
Roman and then Germanic empires, as well as providing for a worldly “lucid Christian faith in 
potent historical power.”1645 
The secular purpose to which Schmitt places a theological concept such as the katechon 
after the Second World War reveals a consistency of approach in such matters from as far back as 
“Visibility” and Political Form.  It also reveals Schmitt to have taken the side of the Grand 
Inquisitor as described by Dostoyevsky in his famous literary condemnation of the Catholic 
Church.
1646
  Tracy Strong correctly recognizes that Schmitt: 
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. . . notes, as had Hobbes, that there is in Christianity a dangerous tendency to introduce rebellion into the 
political realm.  Hobbes and Hegel in particular try to tame this tendency and make use of it in the political 
realm, by linking religion to the State.  Schmitt’s approval is strong: they are what he calls katechontes . . . 
‘those who hold’ back the Apocalypse—thus for Schmitt those who slow down the complete neutralization of 
what is important about religion for the state.
1647
 
 
Strong’s interpretation is the correct one and directly contradicts Heinrich Meier’s esoteric 
Straussian reading; the latter being an influential updating of the standard narrative that now treats 
Schmitt as primarily a political theologian.  Meier finishes a critique of Schmitt’s interpretation of 
Hobbes
1648
 thus: 
At another point Schmitt goes so far as to declare: ‘Thomas Hobbes’s most important sentence remains: 
Jesus is the Christ.’  If a sentence, which is not Thomas Hobbes’s sentence, but rather the core statement of 
the Gospel, could be regarded as the philosopher of Malmesbury’s most important sentence, then his 
thought would indeed be wholly confined to the obedience of faith.
1649
 
 
Meier is drawing upon the following passage from the Glossarium: 
The most important sentence of Hobbes remains: Jesus is the Christ.  The power of such a sentence also 
works even if it is pushed to the margins of a conceptual system of an intellectual structure, even if it is 
apparently pushed outside the conceptual circle.  This deportation is analogous to the domestication of Christ 
undertaken by Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor.  Hobbes expresses and grounds scientifically what 
Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor does: to neutralize the effect of Christ in the social and political sphere; to de-
anarchize Christianity, while leaving it at the same time as a kind of legitimating effect and in any case not to 
do without it.  A clever tactician gives up nothing as long as it is not completely useless.  Christianity was not 
yet spent.
1650
 
 
Far from expressing a fundamental belief in revealed religion, let alone Catholicism, Schmitt is 
pointing to, and agreeing with, the modern project of settling religious (and all social) dispute by 
means of a unitary and sovereign State.  Schmitt, like Hobbes, maintains the classically modern 
principle of cuius regio, eius religio (whose rule, his religion).  A statist principle that he believes is 
                                                                                                                                                             
found in that postwar text the “political theologian” or “eschatological” thinker thesis certainly became more common.  
For example he refers to political scientist Lutz Berthold saying “ . . . that behind the brilliant and much-admired jurist 
Carl Schmitt hides  the meandering 20th century Grand inquisitor and crusader whose obsessions have their source in 
the apocryphal teachings of St. Paul” (Der Fall Carl Schmitt, 16).  Lutz continues by making it clear that he sees the 
rejection of the modern age and its individualism as key and that Schmitt seeks a “radical recourse to the sacred 
ground of European culture” (ibid.).  Berthold thus follows the updated standard narrative in Carl Schmitt und der 
Staatsnotstandsplan am Ende der Weimarer Republik (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999).  As does Motschenbacher 
in: Katechon oder Groβinquisitor?. 
1647
 As quoted in: Tracy B. Strong, “Foreword, Carl Schmitt and Thomas Hobbes: Myth and Politics,” in Carl Schmitt, 
The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol, trans. George 
Schwab et. al. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), xxxii. 
1648
 Meier, The Lesson of Carl Schmitt, 101-21. 
1649
 Ibid., 121. 
1650
 As quoted in: Strong, “Foreword, Carl Schmitt and Thomas Hobbes,” xxiv. 
392 
 
necessary to turn an intrinsically anarchistic faith, Christianity, into a civic religion which helps 
secure the State’s authority by teaching the citizen to obey.  Meier thus completely misconstrues 
Schmitt’s (and incidentally Hobbes1651) meaning, which is a utilitarian and instrumentalist 
appropriation of Christianity as a prop to the State. 
A final Glossarium passage worth examining, that is the one most frequently cited as proof 
of Schmitt’s lifelong Catholicity and fundamentally religious outlook, is the following statement he 
makes in a letter to a close acquaintance, law professor Helmut Rumpf (dates unavailable):  
For me the Catholic faith is the religion of my fathers.  I am a Catholic not only by confession but also 
historical origin, if I may say so, by race.
1652
 
 
Despite this quotation being routinely employed as proof of Schmitt’s lifelong Catholic bona 
fides
1653
 it actually is much closer to proving the exact opposite.  First, to claim one is “racially” 
Catholic is on the face of it absurd.  Even if one logically takes the claim as hyperbole meant to 
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emphasize his personal identification with Catholicism “by confession” then consideration of 
Schmitt’s lifelong racial anti-Semitism and Nazi collaboration still causes such an odd claim to drift 
towards the grotesque.  And when one reads the above quote in its complete context it becomes 
even more bizarre. 
The context of this quotation is a letter of reply of May 23, 1948, to one sent by Rumpf on 
February 23 of that year.  Schmitt begins by saying that he “will quite frankly tell [Rumpf] why” it 
has taken him three months to respond.
1654
  The problem, Schmitt begins, is “it is not acceptable to 
refrain from” acknowledging, or only “tacitly not[ing],” that Rumpf’s letter informed the jurist of 
his recent conversion to Catholicism.  Yet, “it is also not easy,” for Schmitt, “to say anything of 
merit” in response.1655  He then writes the famous lines above that “the Catholic faith is the religion 
of my fathers” which he considers a historical and racial fact of his being.1656  Next, Schmitt notes 
that he has had a number of friends and acquaintances who converted from Theodor Haecker in 
1916
1657
 to recent internment “camp-comrades” of 1946,1658 and that: “Besides, often I felt 
(especially if I had contributed through no will of my own to the practical result) like a brother who 
again loses a friend as bridegroom to his sister.”1659  As a result Schmitt finds it impossible to make 
anything other than “private remarks” on the “conversion process.”  He then asks rhetorically 
whether he should use “a conventional familiar phrase of congratulations” in Rumpf’s case.1660  
That is, Schmitt explicitly writes as a question to ponder whether he should congratulate Rumpf 
but he does not actually do so.  Instead, he shifts to comments based on their both being lawyers. 
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First, Schmitt says that it would not be appropriate for him to “try to construct the case” 
and thus “interfere in the incomprehensibility of such a mysterious and individual” process.1661  
Then he offers some unsolicited advice by prerogative of his being much older than Rumpf and in 
the same profession of “the science of public law.”  He tells the younger jurist: “You have now 
become a Catholic, but not a theologian.  As far as I can see, you are a lawyer.  . . . As lawyers we 
now stand between the grueling, and possibly even negating, alternatives of theology and 
technology.”  Schmitt next points out to Rumpf that the “key figure in the intellectual history of the 
last century” was a Protestant, “the great legal scholar Rudolf Sohm.”1662  But as he suspects Rumpf 
will not be inclined to study Sohm in order to manage the “specific task” of the lawyer 
“scientifically” and “consciously,” Schmitt suggests that Rumpf favor the work of Maurice Hauriou 
in dealing with the “question of legality and legitimacy” rather than return to “neoscholastic 
formulas of earlier centuries” or “traditional commonplaces of natural law.”1663  For a sincerely 
believing Catholic such a convoluted response to news of a friend or acquaintance’s conversion to 
the faith would be passing strange at best; coming from Schmitt it reinforces the thesis of this study 
that he in fact lacked anything more significant than a “cultural” and genealogical sense of being 
Catholic.
1664
 
Schmitt’s postwar diaries and interviews generally lack self-reflections, which correspond 
adequately with his Wilhelmine and Weimar era published and unpublished writings.  The closest 
to sincerity of such comments is likely his claim to have been engaged in a “struggle for an 
authentically Catholic intensification.”1665  As I intended to demonstrate above, Schmitt’s project 
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was not authentically Catholic, but was rather, and only in part, an effort to convince the 
authentically politically Catholic intellectuals of Weimar of the necessity to intensify, or radicalize, 
their authoritarian political inclinations.  Schmitt sought to resuscitate an understanding of the 
absolute power and sovereignty of the state of which German political Catholicism had been 
consistently and strongly critical.  Far from embodying a conservative or traditionalist stance, 
Schmitt’s brand of Hobbesianism was a radical modernist and even revolutionary form of 
authoritarian thought in Weimar Germany. 
In Political Form, Schmitt focused attention on the resolution of opposites, contradictions, 
or conflicts and suggested that myth is an essential ingredient in such a process.  He consistently 
accused contemporary liberal parliamentarism, as exemplified by the Weimar Republic, of failing 
in this fundamental task of resolving—from above of course—social heterogeneity or pluralism.  
Contemporary parliamentarism fails to provide a means for the state to be effective in its wielding 
of authority over society.  This problem of effecting social homogeneity and political unity is a 
prominent concern of Schmitt’s writings of the twenties, but especially Parliamentarism.  Since it 
was published in the same year as Political Form, it is not surprising that we would recognize the 
same themes in both works. 
The problem of heterogeneity, as discussed in Political Form, is to be resolved by the 
realization of representation in the State.  Schmitt touches upon myth as a means of achieving 
representation in this book, but expands upon it even more so in Parliamentarism in considering 
Sorel and then Italian fascism.  He had already examined Sorel in 1921’s Dictatorship,1666 but 
instead of the French Marxist’s myth of a General Strike Schmitt expected that nationalism would 
prove far better suited as foundation for a politically unifying myth in Germany, just as it was 
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proving to be such in Italy.  Fascination with Sorel is a continuous aspect of Schmitt’s Weimar 
thought and indicative of its radical bent.  In 1932, Paul Adams forwarded to Schmitt a manuscript 
penned by the political scientist, Michael Freund (1902-72), titled Georges Sorel: The 
Revolutionary Conservatism.  Later, once Schmitt received the published version in August of 
1933, he wrote Freund to express his gratitude for this introduction to Sorel and to assure him that 
he would do his “utmost to make [it] known.”1667 
Social heterogeneity, in the context of modern liberal parliamentarism and its 
neutralizations, resulted in the decay of the absolute State, because it allowed what Schmitt 
believed in earlier times had been pre-political to become a matter of political technique, or at least 
interminable debate.  The result was a “totalization” of the State, distinct from an absolutization of 
the State by dint of indicating, not the State’s power over society, but its fracturing in the face of 
multiplying responsibilities demanded by factions within society.  These factions are exactly what 
Catholic thought had always identified as corporate wholes, and what Bellarmine described (and 
Hobbes attacked) as “indirect powers”: labor and other economic groupings; churches; civil, social, 
and cultural organizations; etc.
1668
  Schmitt indubitably accepted the modern flattening of social 
parts and wholes, a characteristic difference from the pre-modern or classical and traditional 
philosophy.  Hollerich explains well Schmitt’s transition in thought from a critic of the total state to 
proponent of the totalitarian one: 
In Schmitt’s eyes such a [total] state was more likely to become too weak rather than too strong, since it risked 
overextending itself and becoming dissolved by democratic passions.  He originally opposed the National 
Socialists precisely because he feared that they would cannibalize the state, and his Nazi-era writings, such as 
Staat, Bewegung, Volk (‘State, Movement, People’) had to turn somersaults to accommodate Nazi populist 
dynamism.  Central to his compromise was the doctrine, enunciated in 1933, that a total state in this weak 
sense ought to give way to a total state of a strong type, which could exploit modern means of mass 
communication and enthusiastic mass movements to impose, top-down, the requisite order—in short, 
fascism.
1669
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Hollerich’s description of the effort needed for Schmitt to accommodate Nazi populism is 
accurate; however, it is also the case that he did truly commit himself to proposing ways in which 
the Third Reich could achieve stability and therefore longevity, perhaps better to last its anticipated 
thousand years. 
This last mentioned aspect of Schmitt’s Nazi years seems to be overlooked by political 
scientists interested in his insistence on the importance of formal or institutional controls within the 
architecture of the State.  It is a long-standing principle of conservative thought, and as David Bates 
notices, it “belies” Schmitt’s “reputation as a ‘decisionist’”1670 when it appears in the jurist’s Nazi era 
works such as 1934’s On the Three Types of Juristic Thought.1671  The conservative pedigree of 
these principals espoused by Schmitt notwithstanding, he is putting them to the purpose of 
securing and defending the Nazi State.  Bates also ties Schmitt’s Nazi period emphasis on 
institutionalism to his earlier interest in the form of the Catholic Church and in so doing constructs 
a clever version of the standard narrative.  One that exemplifies how emphasis on Schmitt’s 
supposed Catholicity of political thought can serve an apologetic purpose.  For example, while 
Bates helpfully notes “[t]hat the Nazi Führerstaat never lived up to his expectations does not mean 
that Schmitt was never really a Nazi,”1672 he then hedges by claiming “[h]owever, Schmitt’s 
longstanding institutional approach to the state, derived from a political theology inspired by the 
model of the Church, does affirm a consistent critical distance from the Third Reich.”1673  Which is 
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it?  Was Schmitt a cool and critical observer of the Nazi regime or was he really a committed 
Nazi? 
As Schmitt wrote in the introduction to the second edition of Political Theology, which 
appeared right after Hitler came to power: 
We have come to recognize that the political is the total, and as a result we know that any decision about 
whether something is un-political is always a political decision, regardless of who decides and what reasons are 
advanced.  This also holds for the question whether a particular theology is a political or an un-political 
theology.
1674
 
 
Schmitt had spent the Weimar years uncommitted to, and skeptical of, German political 
Catholicism.  He traversed these years much like a character in a Godot play, waiting for either the 
restoration of the absolute State of early political modernity or for the next effective political form 
replacing the State.  There are certainly indications throughout Schmitt’s Weimar writings that he 
thought he had found it in fascism and the power of a nationalist myth.  His efforts on behalf of the 
Nazi regime can be taken as indication that he hoped it might coalesce and settle into just such a 
State.  Therefore, I agree—for the most part—with Jan-Werner Müller’s characterization of 
Schmitt’s post-1933 efforts: 
This desire to shape a political situation by distilling it into a conceptual scheme [or, as the German idiom has 
it, auf den Begriff bringen] was most obvious in Schmitt’s fashioning of a legal vocabulary centred on 
‘concrete order thinking’ [konkretes Ordnungsdenken] for the Nazis after 1933.  In this endeavour, Schmitt 
sought to capture concepts with positive connotations such as Verfassung and Rechtsstaat for Nazi ideology, 
and draw distinctions between these concepts and others such as Verfassungsgesetz which were supposedly 
‘contaminated’ with the legacies of liberal thought.  His self-conscious construction of an ideological 
legitimation for the rulers was even more obvious in Schmitt’s elaboration of the international law doctrine of 
‘great spaces’ [Großräume] at the end of the 1930s, which was to underpin the Nazi conquest of Eastern 
Europe.  Here Schmitt openly made the quasi-Nietzschean claim that history’s victors impose their concepts, 
and that ‘is a sign of real political power, when a great people determines the way of talking and even the way 
of thinking of other peoples, the vocabulary, the terminology and the concepts.’  In short, ‘Caesar dominus et 
supra grammaticam,’ [Caesar also reigns over the grammar] as Schmitt liked to point out.1675 
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Consequently, Raphael Gross properly argues that his work “cannot be reduced to Roman 
Catholic theology given a political turn.  Rather, Schmitt should be understood as carrying an 
atheistic political-theological tradition to an extreme.”1676 
The evidence for Schmitt’s interest in and adherence to political Catholicism, or general 
intellectual Catholicity, has never really advanced past the impression made by his former protégé 
Waldemar Gurian from exile in Switzerland in 1935.  Gurian suggested that Schmitt’s Nazi 
contemporaries were forgetful, or they would recall that in 1925 Schmitt was still an invited speaker 
for meetings of the Center, and he references the jurist’s publication in a Rhenish Center Party 
brochure, namely, “Die Rheinlande als Objekt internationaler Politik.”1677  The standard narrative 
has likewise taken Schmitt as especially Catholic in the first half of Weimar.  However, the fact that 
Himmler’s paranoid SS denounced Schmitt, in 1936, as an “opportunist Catholic rooted in a 
Hegelian concept of the state”1678 and ejected him from the Party is not dispositive proof of the 
charges’ accuracy.  Indeed, Schmitt’s protests to the contrary should now seem sincere if the 
argument developed in this study is persuasive. 
Rather than an early Catholic thinker who becomes increasingly secular-minded and 
alienated from the Church over the course of Weimar, Schmitt’s diaries from the Teens reveal 
that he had already abandoned the faith of his youth for his own irenic concoction, part early 
Gnosticism and part Kierkegaardian affectation of existentially alienated spirituality mixed with 
aesthetic and sexual bohemianism.  Then his experiences of the threat of social revolution in 
Munich at the end of the First World War catalyzed his movement away from any vestige of a 
normatively Catholic turn of mind towards political existentialism in the service of State absolutism.  
Thus, I contend that an overriding concern for Germany’s national integrity and social stability 
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guaranteed by an absolute State appears much earlier in his work than the standard narrative 
would suggest, and that is the source for his later secular, non-normative decisionism. 
As has been shown, beyond the publicizing efforts of a few young friends and admirers of 
Schmitt, the jurist was more likely to be criticized by his Catholic contemporaries, that is, when 
they were not ignoring him.  What positive interest Schmitt received was primarily a reaction to 
Political Form and to a lesser extent Political Romanticism, and mostly occurred between 1923 
and 1926.  The Catholic philosopher and younger contemporary of Schmitt’s, Josef Pieper, 
provides some of the most astute remarks on Schmitt.  Pieper readily acknowledges after first 
meeting Schmitt he “immediately understood the fascination, for good and evil, that must have 
radiated from this academic teacher.”1679  However, he also pointed out that “to attack his polished 
theses one needed considerable courage in facing banality”1680 and, in part due to Schmitt’s 
cynicism, the philosopher found that their: “. . . discussions never banished the uneasy feeling that 
what was interesting was given priority over what was true.  I recalled the old dictum that the truth 
that nourishes and the brilliance of formulations seem to be incompatible.”1681 
Finally, Pieper recollects an anecdote that, while not about Schmitt, could easily be applied 
to his case.  When he was a student of law, Pieper once had a professor who began a course in 
1927 on “General Criminal Law” by providing the definition “A crime is that which is 
punished.”1682  He goes on to say that the professor was removed from his position six years later 
and the rumor was that he had bravely resisted the Nazi takeover.  Pieper thus concludes, 
“perhaps, in the end, he may have realized that this despotism was only putting into political 
practice the positivistic doctrine he himself had been proposing for decades from the professorial 
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chair.”1683  The same could readily be applied to Schmitt with his consistent emphasis on the 
unchecked absolute sovereign who is not even hemmed in from above.  And what should we make 
of this sovereign? 
Schmitt was most at home intellectually with the early formative thinkers of political 
modernity, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Bodin.  The very basic pillar of his lifelong political 
mythology was located in his forebears’ secularization of an early modern Protestant conception of 
a voluntarist deity into the absolute and unified sovereign State.  Schmitt had himself conjured up 
Goethe’s image of a “Sorcerer’s Apprentice” in criticism of Hobbes’s mythical concept of the 
Leviathan, which would eventually become a mechanical and lifeless entity.
1684
  Günter Meuter 
insists “Schmitt sees himself not as a Gentile, but as a Catholic Christian so he has written a 
political mythology, but also a political theology.”1685  Whether Schmitt had anything like a sincere 
post-war de-radicalization through a refound religiosity is an open question.  However, it is 
certainly the case that his purported Catholicity was not demonstrated in his own acceptance of the 
early modern mythical State.  Schmitt sought new ways to repackage and sell the myth of this 
temporal political deity unheeding of his own advice about the danger of such myths to those who 
think they can conjure them up. 
Schmitt was a reserved or even cagey thinker as regards exposing his lack of intellectual 
commitments to, and actual disinterest in, Catholicism.  This was in part a conservative habitus on 
his part as well as reflected his cynical attempts to not discard completely anything of use.  He 
seems to evince a residual cultural interest or even aesthetic admiration for the faith of his fathers.  
But when Schmitt developed his political ecclesiology in Political Form, the result was what 
philosopher Nikolaus Lobkowicz identifies as an “understanding of the Church literally ‘outside’: 
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an image of Catholicism which could just as well be one from those who did not share the faith and 
piety of Catholics.”1686  Such an approach coincides well with that of Charles Maurras and that is the 
closest it came to an authentic form of political Catholicism.  Thus Lobkowicz forthrightly suggests 
that: “One may wonder whether Schmitt is a Catholic thinker at all.”1687 
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